BOX BOATS

Malcom P. McLean, a trucker from North Carolina, is universally acknowledged as the individual who began the shift from break-bulk to containerized cargo transport at sea. The vessel shown here became the Sea-Land
McLean, but was originally christened, in 1972, with the name by which
McLean was known to his grandchildren.
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INTRODUCTION

The weather in New York was hardly auspicious on Thursday, April 26, 1956. A cold rain fell on and off throughout
the day, and the afternoon temperature never got beyond
the mid-forties. While a crowd of 15,866 fans ignored the
weather and attended the twenty-second day of the spring
meet at Jamaica Race Track in Queens that afternoon, a
scheduled night baseball game at the Polo Grounds in
upper Manhattan between the New York Giants and the
Brooklyn Dodgers was cancelled owing to the inclement
conditions. New Yorkers in search of entertainment that
April evening were better advised to consider something
indoors. Undoubtedly, many went to the movies. Among
the options, Invasion of the Body Snatchers was playing at
several neighborhood theaters, while in midtown Manhattan, The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit was drawing crowds
at the Roxy. Anyone in the metropolitan area who decided
to spend a quiet evening at home could have tuned in to
Channel Four and watched Groucho Marx star in You Bet
Your Life at eight o’clock, followed by an episode of Jack
Webb’s Dragnet at eight-thirty.
Two important political stories emerged from Washington that April day a half-century ago. One was an announcement that Vice President Richard Nixon, after
earlier hesitation, would remain on the Republican ticket
when President Dwight David Eisenhower sought reelection in the fall. The second story involved bipartisan agreement in the House of Representatives over a massive new
road-building program that Eisenhower had earlier proposed, an initiative that would be financed from an increase in the federal motor fuel tax and would soon lead
to the design and construction of the Interstate Highway
System.
Along the New York waterfront, the usual assortment of
passenger and cargo ships sailed in and out of port. The
French Line’s Liberté backed away from North River Pier 88

shortly before noon and departed for the channel ports of Europe, while
later in the afternoon, Moore-McCormack’s Brazil set sail from Pier 32 at
the foot of Canal Street, bound for Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. Earlier that morning, Italian Line’s Saturnia completed a fifteen-day crossing
from Trieste when it tied up at Pier 84. All three vessels were veteran
ocean liners that had been built before World War II and restored to luxury passenger service afterward.
Less glamorous but considerably more numerous in New York Harbor
that day were thirty or more cargo ships of various shapes and styles
that arrived from places as diverse as Aruba, Gibraltar, and Hamburg and
docked at piers along the East River and the Hudson River, as well as in
South Brooklyn. Longshoremen then began to unload whatever cargo the
various ships had brought to New York, a job that took days. Another two
dozen freighters (see appendix C) set sail from New York that April day
bound for ports the world over—Yokohama, Manila, Le Havre, Havana—
after an equally lengthy process of having cargo stowed and secured on
board.
Something that very few people in and around New York could possibly have known or understood on that rainy and overcast day fifty years
ago was that the seemingly routine departure of an apparently run-ofthe-mill T-2 tanker on a coastwise voyage to Houston, Texas, would prove
to be one of the most important maritime milestones in the long history
of the port of New York, fully the equal, in the opinion of many informed
observers, of a departure up the Hudson River to Albany in 1807 by a
vessel that Robert Fulton called the North River Steamboat.
The T-2 tanker in question had been built in Sausalito, California, in
1945. It measured 10,572 gross registered tons, was 524 feet long, and bore
the rather curious name Ideal X. The T-2 design was a standard wartime
tanker whose profile would predominate in world petroleum trade for the
better part of a quarter-century. It featured a stack and machinery aft, a
pilot house with distinctive porthole-like windows atop a small deck
house amidships, and open decks fore and aft where access ports to the
vessel’s carrying tanks were to be found. Ideal X was registered in the
United States and flew the blue and white house flag of the Pan-Atlantic
Steamship Company of Mobile, Alabama. When it pulled away from Berth
24 at the foot of Marsh Street in Port Newark, New Jersey, headed out to
sea, and set a course for Houston that day, though, Ideal X was not merely
another empty tanker traveling back to Texas in ballast to pick up additional petroleum product. A new and temporary spar deck, as it was
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called, had been installed several feet above the vessel’s weather deck,
and as Ideal X headed down Newark Bay and turned into the Kill Van Kull,
fifty-eight brand-new trailer trucks were securely fastened to fore-and-aft
slots in the spar deck. All were decorated with a catchy name that PanAtlantic Steamship had selected for what was, really, a new style of maritime operation: Sea-Land Service.
It was not the first time that trailer trucks had gone to sea. What was
new, though, was the fact that the trailer trucks aboard Ideal X that day
were not really trucks at all, in any ordinary sense. They were, to use a
term that would be coined presently, containers—boxes, so to speak, that
had been lifted off their detachable running gear on the pier and hoisted
aboard the vessel by dockside cranes to be re-stored atop different wheels
for delivery to their final destinations once the ship reached City Dock
Number 10 in the Port of Houston six days later.
The style of transport that the Ideal X pioneered in New York on April
26, 1956, would grow in popularity and importance over the next halfcentury and become the standard and routine way that most ordinary
cargo moves across the world’s oceans. In the early years of the twentyfirst century, commodities such as petroleum, coal, grain, and iron ore
are still transported at sea in bulk. Automobile manufacturers have found
that specialized vessels allowing new vehicles to be driven on and off ship
are perfect for their purposes, and while such car carriers are efficient and
effective, many would insist that their boxy design makes them the least
graceful-looking vessels ever to sail the seven seas. Large and high-value
cargo of various shapes and kinds typically travels aboard different kinds
of ro/ro—roll on and roll off—vessels that are functionally, although not
at all visually, similar to car carriers. But hoisting detachable containers
aboard distinctive oceangoing vessels called container ships is the way
most other cargo now travels at sea. Whereas Ideal X cleared New York
Harbor and headed for Houston in 1956 with a capacity load of fifty-eight
containers secured to its newly installed spar deck, over the next halfcentury the concept would evolve to the point where the newest and
largest container ships about to enter service today are vessels capable of
transporting in excess of nine thousand containers per trip.1 The largest
container ships in the world’s merchant fleet today are far too big to transit the Panama Canal, while even larger vessels are on the drawing boards
and will undoubtedly take to the seas in the years ahead.
In the chapters that follow, I will look into the history of the containership industry and its relationship to evolving patterns of world commerce
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and transport. It is, I think, a fascinating story that has gone largely untold
for far too long, and yet it is a critical element of a global economy that is
more dependent on overseas trade than ever before in world history. The
emergence of containerization as the dominant form of cargo transport at
sea has had a profound impact on vessel design, on the size and location
of cargo ports and terminals, and on the relationship of various modes
of freight transport one to another—motor carriers, railroads, steamship
lines.2 While the pages that follow endeavor to sketch the broad outlines
of the container-ship industry at large, my method is to focus in some
detail on the evolution of a single company and the impact of the container revolution on the development and operation of a single port city.
The company is the Pan-Atlantic Steamship Company, the one that inaugurated container transport on April 26, 1956. The Pan-Atlantic house flag
no longer flies from the mast of any ship, but the Sea-Land Service the
company inaugurated a half-century ago is today part of the largest container operation in the world, a company whose main office is located
across the North Atlantic in the city of Copenhagen, Denmark, a short
walk along the waterfront from the famous statue of Hans Christen
Andersen’s ‘‘little mermaid,’’ in fact. The company calls itself the A. P.
Moeller Group.
As for the seaport whose dynamics have been altered so totally by
something that began on a rainy and overcast April Thursday a halfcentury ago, when a T-2 tanker called Ideal X slipped away from its berth
in Port Newark, steamed out to sea, and set a course for Houston, Texas:
that harbor is the port of New York.
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1

CARGO SHIPS,
AMERICAN STYLE
A PRIMER

Oceangoing cargo ships have never rivaled passenger liners—or, for that matter, sailing ships, naval vessels, or paddlewheel steamboats—as objects of general interest and
curiosity. The famous Liberty ships of World War II may
stand as something of an exception to this generalization,
but their fame is surely more a function of the role they
played in ensuring Allied victory than of any inherent
charm or grace they may have exhibited as examples of the
shipbuilder’s art. To be sure, many enthusiasts regard cargo
ships with genuine affection. But if one looks through the
shelves of a general bookstore in the section called ‘‘transport by sea,’’ for every title one finds that concerns itself
with cargo vessels—assuming, of course, that one finds
any—there will likely be two dozen books about passenger
liners, famous and otherwise. And of the two dozen, half
or more may well be about a single ship that had the singularly bad fortune of striking an iceberg and sinking in the
middle of the North Atlantic Ocean during the dark of an
April night in the year 1912. (If our imaginary bookstore
browser does find that single title dealing with cargo ships,
well that it might be Richard Pollack’s recent work The Colombo Bay, a wonderful narrative that describes a five-week
voyage from Hong Kong to New York via the Suez Canal in
the fall of 2001 aboard a container ship working for P&O
Nedlloyd—a company we shall learn more about in subsequent chapters.1)
Clearly, this publishing imbalance reflects some basic
economic reality in the marketplace of books about ships.
But it is an imbalance that is unfortunate, and it is unfortunate for a number of reasons, not least of them that cargo

ships are just plain interesting. It is unfortunate because cargo ships have
played a singular role in the history of waterborne commerce. It is unfortunate because the evolution of cargo ship design provides a fascinating
glimpse into naval architecture and marine engineering. It is unfortunate
because while the swift passenger liners of yesteryear have disappeared,
their role assumed by jet airliners—and, perhaps, to a lesser and different
extent, by leisure-oriented cruise ships—contemporary cargo ships are
critical for the maintenance of world commerce and trade that is increasingly international and global in its scope.
Our story is about a single category of cargo ships, those specialized
vessels that are known today as container ships—less formally, ‘‘box
boats’’—and whose voyages across the waters form a critical link in a
worldwide supply chain that delivers merchandise to department stores,
parts and components to factories, and just about anything that can be
placed inside a container that is eight feet wide, eight-and-a-half feet
high, and forty feet long to just about any recipient imaginable.

The United States Shipping Board
An important advancement in cargo ship development took place as
the United States mobilized for possible participation in World War I.
Under the aegis of a federal agency called the United States Shipping
Board, established in 1916, a flotilla of merchant ships was designed and
built to support the nation’s possible entry into the Great War and address
whatever logistical challenges would be involved in sustaining American
Expeditionary Forces fighting across the North Atlantic in the fields of
France. Armistice came too quickly for this well-intentioned effort to have
any substantial impact on the outcome of the conflict. By war’s end, 470
vessels had been completed, while an additional 1,300 or so hulls were
delivered between 1918 and 1922. These vessels became the heart and
soul of the country’s postwar merchant marine. Various classes of standard wartime designs, the most notable among them being the colorfully
named Hog Islanders, worked for such U.S. steamship companies as the
Grace Line, Lykes Brothers, Moore-McCormack, and the Ward Line.2 During this era there were dozens upon dozens of steamship companies operating deepwater merchant vessels that flew the U.S. flag. By most
accountings, at the end of World War I the U.S. merchant fleet was second
only to that of Great Britain in the number of oceangoing ships it owned
and operated.3
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The Great Depression took a toll on the nation’s steamship companies.
Few were able to acquire new vessels to replace and upgrade cargo fleets
that, despite the influx of some relatively new tonnage from the Shipping
Board, were beginning to show their age. Passage of a federal statute
called the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, though, was an important turning point. This legislation combined a New Deal interest in invigorating
the nation’s dormant industrial base with a concern for future international engagements, the latter a policy that ran counter to general isolationist tendencies that had taken root in much of the country in the years
after the Armistice.4 Following the enactment of this law in 1936, the new
United States Maritime Commission, successor agency to the earlier Shipping Board, undertook responsibility for developing a new set of standard
specifications to upgrade the nation’s merchant fleet.

The Merchant Marine Act of 1936
The Commission identified nine categories of vessels, each given a letter designation: P stood for passenger ships, for instance, B identified
various designs of barges, and L was the code letter for bulk carriers designed for Great Lakes trade. Two Maritime Commission designs are of
direct bearing on container-ship history: C for oceangoing cargo ships,
and T for tankers.
Numerals were added to the letter designations to identify subclasses,
with cargo ships identified as C-1, C-2, C-3, and C-4—the higher the number, the larger the vessel. A C-1 was a modest-size cargo vessel of just over
four hundred feet in length and 7,000 deadweight tons that was suited to
offshore or interisland trade. At close to 10,000 deadweight tons and 460
feet in overall length, a C-2 was a good deal larger and became the most
popular subclass among the various Maritime Commission cargo designs.
C-3s and C-4s were even larger.
The United States Navy had input into the C-2 design, particularly its
hull form, and many such vessels would later serve as fleet auxiliaries.
Preliminary specifications for the C-2 were circulated by the Maritime
Commission in 1937, and efforts were made to solicit construction bids
from shipyards in 1938. There were some complications in the bidding
process that required adjustment, but the first C-2 vessels to be delivered
included the Donald McKay, turned out by Sun Shipbuilding in Chester,
Pennsylvania, in June 1939 for Moore-McCormack, and the Challenge,
built by the Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company in Kearney,
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New Jersey, a month later and delivered to the American-Hampton Roads
Line.5
Donald McKay was diesel-powered, a feature that was included as an
option in the overall C-2 specification but not one that would be widely
adopted, while Challenge was powered by a steam turbine engine, the
more common C-2 power plant. In all, between 1940 and 1945, 240 cargo
ships were built in the United States that can be identified as C-2 vessels.
Of this total, only twenty-two were diesel-powered. The entire class became an important national asset during World War II, some even being
converted into troopships. With passage of the Merchant Ship Sales Act
of 1946 at war’s end, large numbers of C-2s became available to begin the
systematic rebuilding of the nation’s peacetime merchant marine.6
The Maritime Commission’s C-3 was a larger version of the C-2. Its
deadweight tonnage was almost 12,000, it measured 492 feet in length,
and in its civilian configuration it could include provision for as many as
a hundred passengers in addition to cargo. Some C-2s featured passenger
accommodations, but they were far more limited, a typical C-2 carrying,
perhaps, no more than a dozen passengers. Both the C-2 and the C-3
featured a profile that can be called conventional for cargo ships of the
era. The pilothouse and funnel were located atop a deckhouse that was
positioned slightly astern of midships, and cargo hatches were found both
forward and astern of this superstructure.
At 522 feet in length, the C-4 design was not only the largest of the
Maritime Commission’s cargo ships of the late 1930s, but it also had a
profile that could be rather different from the C-2 or the C-3. Most C-4s
featured a wheelhouse and superstructure that was located well forward,
with a second deckhouse closer to the stern topped off by the vessel’s
funnel. In this basic cargo configuration, two holds were located forward
of the wheelhouse, four holds were found between the wheelhouse and
the second deckhouse, and the seventh hold was close to the stern.
So designed, the C-4 did not prove terribly popular with U.S. steamship
companies. The most interesting adaptation of the basic design, though,
was that forty-five of them were built from the keel up as troopships. In
such a configuration, a C-4 could accommodate as many as three thousand soldiers and their equipment. C-4 transports participated in landings
throughout the Pacific theater during the war’s final months, and many
continued in troop service during the Korean conflict and on into the
1960s. While there were minor variations among subclasses, a basic C-4
was 520 feet long with a deadweight tonnage of almost 15,000.7
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It can safely be said that the C-4 lent itself to more creative postwar
adaptations than did any of the other Maritime Commission cargo ships.
The Air Force, for example, outfitted two as missile-tracking ships in the
1960s, while United States Lines chartered a number of C-4 troop ships
shortly after VE Day to assist in the transport of war brides and immigrants from Europe to the United States. Other C-4s were converted into
hospital ships, tankers, even bulk carriers for the Great Lakes trade. More
to the point, C-4s would play a very important role in the early years of
the container-ship industry.
Petroleum-carrying merchant ships were also included in the Maritime
Commission’s effort to develop a set of updated designs for the nation’s
merchant fleet in the late 1930s. Tankers typically featured a small deckhouse amidships that was topped off by the vessel’s wheelhouse, with a
separate superstructure at the stern where the vessel’s funnel and ventilators were to be found, not totally unlike the profile of basic C-4 cargo
ships, although this was a design that was popular in the petroleum trade
since the nineteenth century, long before the days of the Maritime Commission. Between the dual superstructures and forward of the amidships
one, tankers featured a broad and open main deck where valves and other
gear were located that controlled the loading and unloading of product
into the vessel’s carrying tanks. Tanker designs generated by the Maritime
Commission in the late 1930s were identified, simply enough, as the T-1,
T-2, and T-3, with tankers built to T-2 specifications constituting the bulk
of the wartime fleet that transported millions of barrels of petroleum
across the Atlantic and the Pacific in support of the war effort. Following
hostilities, T-2 tankers were conveyed to private operators and formed the
backbone of the country’s fleet for many years. A typical T-2 tanker had
an overall length of 526 feet and a deadweight tonnage of 10,600.8
The U.S. Maritime Commission and its private sector partners that designed and built various classes of merchant vessels in the years after 1936
were surely—and quite deservedly—proud of their accomplishments.
Even they would surely be surprised, though, by the extraordinary longevity of much of their handiwork. A quarter-century after VJ Day, various
U.S.-flag steamship companies were expanding their fleets with new tonnage. And yet often as not, such ‘‘new’’ vessels involved the upgrading of
veteran C-2s, C-4s, and T-2s, often cutting a vessel in half and splicing a
new midbody section into its hull, a procedure often described in the
trade press as ‘‘jumboizing.’’
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World War II
Cargo ships built to Maritime Commission specifications would play a
critical role during World War II. But transoceanic logistical challenges
that were at the heart of the Allied war effort required a more dramatic
response than merely accelerating the construction pace of conventional
C-2 and C-3 cargo ships. Thus was born the famous Liberty ship, and after
it the Victory ship. Neither was a state-of-the-art cargo vessel. At 441 feet
in length, a Liberty Ship was comparable to a C-2 in size, but with a top
speed of only 10.5 knots, it was substantially slower. Liberty ships and
Victory ships were given letter designations by the Maritime Commission
so they could be categorized along with the other standardized designs
such as the C-2 and the T-2. Because they were developed as part of the
nation’s emergency mobilization for war, Liberty ships were identified as
EC-2 vessels—E for emergency, C for cargo—while vessels built to Victory
specifications were identified as VC-2s.9
The genius of the Liberty ship was that it could be produced quickly, it
could be produced in quantity, and it could be produced without undue
compromise of the nation’s ability to concentrate its heavy shipbuilding
resources on warships and other higher-value construction. The Liberty
ship, for instance, was powered by an utterly conventional, even outmoded, triple-expansion reciprocating steam engine. Basic C-2 specifications called for more efficient steam turbine power plants with diesels as
an option, but the nation’s capability to produce steam turbines was more
than fully subscribed for other tonnage—warships and T-2 tankers, for
instance. So the Liberty ship program relied on an older engine design,
one that could be produced in quantity without affecting the nation’s ability to produce sufficient numbers of turbine engines for other vessels that
needed them more.
Also central to the overall design was the matter of marine reduction
gears, critical hardware that was in especially short supply since, before
the war, United States shipyards imported substantial quantities of such
gears—and the machine tools to produce them—from Germany. Reduction gears were necessary to step down the high-revolution output of a
steam turbine engine before linking it to a propeller shaft, while reciprocating steam engines could be tied directly to the shaft without such gearing. Many war-built T-2 tankers, on the other hand, were powered by
steam turbine engines, but in a revision of the Maritime Commission’s
original specifications, their propulsion was achieved by connecting the
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turbines to electric generators and then powering the vessel’s propeller
with an electric motor, another way to avoid the need for specialized
marine gearing.
The Victory ship was yet another wartime cargo vessel that was produced in quantity. While it was superior to the Liberty in several important specifications, it, too, was not the equal of the C-2 in speed. (Some
have called the Victory a no-frills version of the C-2.) U.S. shipyards
turned out 2,751 Liberty ships starting with the Patrick Henry of 1941, making this design without any doubt the largest single class of seagoing merchant vessels of any and all time. Placed end-to-end, 2,751 Liberty ships
would form a line more than two hundred miles long, and American shipyards supplemented this production by turning out 534 Victory ships.
Following hostilities, massive fleets of government-owned Liberty and
Victory ships were available, almost immediately, to restore the American
merchant marine to prewar capability. Indeed at war’s end and for several
years afterward, the American merchant marine would enjoy a distinction
it never did before and will undoubtedly never achieve again: It was the
largest oceangoing merchant fleet on the face of the earth. In 1946 there
were some 130 U.S.-flag steamship lines, and the country’s merchant fleet
included 4,422 deepwater vessels of 1,000 gross registered tons or
greater.10
Although they would soldier on for lesser operators for many years,
Liberty and Victory ships would see relatively brief careers in postwar
merchant service for the major U.S.-flag steamship lines. The style of
cargo ship that American companies preferred was the faster and more
modern C-2. As these were mustered out of government service during
the late 1940s, they quickly replaced Liberty and Victory types and became the heart of the country’s cargo fleet for the next decade and a half.
Some new cargo ships that were built immediately after the war were
variations of the C-4 design. A whole subclass of C-4s that featured a more
conventional cargo-ship profile—deckhouse and funnel slightly astern of
midships—was built in the late 1940s and identified as Mariner-class vessels. Capable of making twenty knots, the Mariner class was really a different breed of vessel from wartime C-4s, although thanks to their length,
Mariner class vessels were categorized as C-4s in Maritime Commission
notation.
In any event, all of the original Maritime Commission designs would
not only continue in postwar cargo service, but also, because they were
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so readily available and, not incidentally, because they were well designed and soundly built, would become the raw materials, so to speak,
that naval architects would use to design and build the world’s first generation of container-carrying vessels.
Table 1.1 displays basic comparative information about various
standard cargo ships developed under the auspices of the Maritime
Commission.

Loading and Unloading Cargo
Something common to virtually all cargo ships in the first half of the
twentieth century was how they were loaded and unloaded—very, very
slowly.
Cargo was carried in below-deck holds, open spaces that were reached
through large hatches located on the surface of the main deck, sometimes
referred to as the weather deck. Cargo ships were outfitted with a forest
of masts, posts, and booms adjacent to the various hatch covers, equipment that was used to hoist cargo aboard ship from an adjacent wharf,
and then lower it into one of the ship’s holds for stowage below deck.
Wharves where cargo vessels docked often included elevated steelwork
that hoisting gear aboard ship could use as leverage to extend the ship’s
reach onto the pier. Cargo could also be hoisted aboard ship by cranes
table 1.1. Maritime Commission Cargo Ships
Type

Description

Length

Beam

Deadweight
tonnage

C-1
C-2
C-3
C-4

Small cargo
General cargo
General cargo
General cargo;
Troop ship
Emergency cargo;
Liberty ship
General cargo;
Victory ship
Tanker
Tanker

418 feet
460 feet
492 feet

60 feet
63 feet
70 feet

9,075
8,794
12,500

523 feet

72 feet

6,100

442 feet

57 feet

10,419

455 feet
524 feet
553 feet

62 feet
68 feet
75 feet

10,734
16,400
18,400

EC-2
VC-2
T-2
T-3

8 : : : box boats

and other equipment located ashore, but the more common practice was
for the ship to load itself, so to speak, with its complex assortment of
masts and booms. While the hoisting of cargo from pier to ship, or from
ship to pier, was a mechanized process, making use of such equipment as
gantries and forklift trucks, much of the overall effort involved extensive
manual labor. Cargo that had been delivered by truck or train to one end
of a pier in advance of a ship’s departure had to be moved to a point
where it could be reached by a ship’s cranes and hoists, and once lowered
into the hold, gangs of longshoremen would be required to ensure that
the cargo was stowed in such a way that it would neither be damaged nor
cause any damage during a potentially rough voyage across the sea.
Given the uncertainties of cargo ship schedules, freight was often delivered to a pier days and even weeks before it could be loaded aboard a
vessel, thus creating another series of problems and difficulties, not the
least of which were multiple opportunities for pilferage from cargo indiscriminately stored on piers for lengthy periods of time. Reflecting on these
uncertainties, a steamship executive would later claim that it typically
cost his company more to move a quantity of cargo a few hundred feet
from the street in front of a pier to the hold of a ship than it did to transport it across the sea from one port to another.11
Such a style of service has long been referred to as break-bulk cargo
operation. Break-bulk cargo is characterized by its multiplicity and diversity. In place of a single commodity that could be carried in indiscriminate
bulk—coal, say, or petroleum, or grain—in break-bulk operations, cargo
arrives in any number of different shapes, sizes, and configurations. In
break-bulk service, a cargo ship might carry barrels of cooking oil, cartons
of grocery products, office equipment in irregular shapes and sizes, bales
of textile, machinery, bags of coffee beans, automobile parts, and so on.
Given the investment of time and effort that was required to load and
unload a break-bulk cargo ship, it was not uncommon for a vessel assigned to the busy transatlantic trade route between New York and the
channel ports of Europe to spend as much time in port loading and unloading cargo, over its lifetime, as it did steaming across the ocean.12
Because loading and unloading in a port city was a lengthy task largely
performed by local stevedores, seamen who toiled aboard oceangoing
cargo ships had considerable free time to spend ashore as their vessels
were serviced for the outbound voyage. An entire subculture would develop around these sailors and the often disreputable waterfront establishments they frequented in the various ports they visited. Today, with
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container ships completing their terminal operations in hours, not days,
the very idea of a smoke-filled waterfront café whose patrons are largely
lonely merchant seamen from countries the world over is as dated a concept as the horse and buggy or high-button shoes. Commercial establishments that cater to the needs of merchant seamen in ports throughout the
world today are convenience stores that offer such services as the sale
and rental of DVDs and videotapes, plus such basic merchandise as toiletries, snack food, cigarettes, and prepaid telephone cards. They also typically include banks of pay telephones, and even online computer
terminals, for contacting family and friends back home.
It was within an older context, with the loading and unloading of cargo
ships a process that consumed inordinate amounts of time, that a trucker
out of Fayetteville, North Carolina, ventured north to the port of New
York in late November 1937. The man was not merely a hired driver; he
also owned the vehicle he had navigated north to the New Jersey waterfront opposite midtown Manhattan. His truck carried bales of export cotton from North Carolina that would be placed aboard a cargo ship of the
American Export Line for shipment to Istanbul.
The man grew irritated, though, when the loading of the ship’s cargo
proved to be such a time-consuming process. And so, as he waited impatiently on the New Jersey waterfront and watched stevedores conducting
their protracted operations, an idea began to form in his mind. ‘‘Wouldn’t
it make more sense,’’ he may well have thought to himself, ‘‘if cargo could
be hoisted aboard in larger lots and didn’t have to be handled so many
times by so many different people? Why couldn’t my whole truck be put
aboard ship, for instance, and then used to deliver its freight on the other
side?’’
Eventually the truck driver found that a five-dollar tip to a gang foreman helped get his cargo loaded with a little more dispatch, but as he
later picked up a shipment of roofing material in New Jersey and then
drove his truck south through Philadelphia and Baltimore and Washington along U.S. Highway One on his way back to North Carolina, he kept
thinking about all the time he had wasted on the Hudson River waterfront. ‘‘There has to be a better way,’’ the truck driver kept telling himself.
Twenty-three years later, in 1956, when a ship by the name of Ideal X
pulled away from a different pier in northern New Jersey, a one-time
North Carolina truck driver by the name of Malcom McLean had a chance
to demonstrate that, indeed, there was a better way.13
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Coastal Steamship Service
A characteristic of the American maritime scene that would be
changed, and changed radically, in the aftermath of World War II was
cargo service between various ports along the East Coast and Gulf Coast,
as well as cargo transport between the East Coast and the West Coast. (As
a matter of common terminology, coastwise generally refers to service
along and between the East and the Gulf coasts, or up and down the
Pacific coast, whereas intercoastal characterizes service between the East
and West coasts via the Panama Canal.)
Such steamship service had to function under the provisions of an important federal statute. To move cargo from one United States port to
another required the use of a U.S.-flagged vessel that had been built in a
United States shipyard, was owned not only by a U.S. company, but also
by a company under the direct control of U.S. citizens, and, finally, was
operated by U.S. seamen. The Jones Act—named after Wesley Livsey
Jones of Washington State, who served in the U.S. Senate from 1909 to
1932—was passed into law in 1920 as part of an effort to stabilize the
country’s postwar merchant marine.14
The Jones Act, although slightly modified, remains very much in force
in the twenty-first century and will prove to be a determining factor in
the subsequent history of the maritime industry. One legal requirement
that the Jones Act does not make, however, and that will affect the container-ship industry in an interesting way, is that to be registered in the
United States and fly the U.S. flag, a ship need not have been built in a
domestic shipyard. A foreign-built vessel may be owned by a U.S. company, fly the U.S. flag, and show a U.S. hailing port on its stern. The Jones
Act prohibits such a vessel from operating in domestic trade between U.S.
ports, although it may operate between a foreign port and a U.S. port.
Southampton to New York, yes; New York to Miami, no.
Coastwise and intercoastal steamship service, as protected by the Jones
Act, was an important element of the nation’s overall transport system in
the years and decades before World War II. In 1939, no fewer than 165
vessels were engaged in intercoastal service, with 543 working coastwise
trades. Fifteen years later, in postwar 1954, a mere 57 vessels were at work
in intercoastal services, and of 283 cargo ships sailing coastwise, 230 were
tankers moving petroleum from oil fields to refineries. In the late 1930s,
no less than a third of all oceangoing vessels that entered the port of New
York were working in wholly domestic trades.15
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The war itself caused coastwise and intercoastal service to be curtailed
severely. For one thing, oceangoing cargo ships were more needed for
transoceanic assignments. What was more important, though, was that
during the early years of America’s participation in the war, lurking Nazi
submarines began to take an awful toll on merchant ships attempting to
steam up and down the Atlantic coast.16 Coastwise and intercoastal services were resumed at war’s end, but would never achieve the importance
they enjoyed during the years before Pearl Harbor. Railroads that were
used as safer wartime substitutes for coastwise and intercoastal steamships retained substantial market share afterward, and the postwar era
also saw a new generation of over-the-road trucks—larger rigs with powerful diesel-powered tractors on the business end—competing for many
of the same markets.
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2

THE PAN-ATLANTIC
STEAMSHIP COMPANY
1933–57

A corporation founded in the Great Depression year of
1933, called the Pan-Atlantic Steamship Company, can
hardly lay claim to the kind of long and colorful maritime
heritage that one associates with the likes of, say, Cunard
or Holland America. With its operational headquarters in
the quiet Gulf Coast port city of Mobile, Alabama, the new
company’s objective was to provide scheduled steamship
service—primarily cargo, but perhaps some incidental passenger traffic as well—between ports along the Atlantic
and Gulf coasts. Such coastwise steamship service, as it was
called, represented a style of oceangoing transport that was
quite popular, and reasonably profitable, in the decades
leading up to World War II.

The Early Years of Pan-Atlantic
Pan-Atlantic, though, would never become much of a
force in coastwise trade. The more prominent coastal
steamship companies of the era—Clyde-Mallory, Merchant
and Miners Steamship Company, the Savannah Line—
could boast long histories and were especially known for
the distinctive passenger tonnage they operated. As both a
new carrier and one emphasizing cargo service, Pan-Atlantic would never rival its older and more glamorous competitors. But the company offered genuine liner service—that
is to say, steamship arrivals and departures at selected port
cities on a regular schedule. Before Pan-Atlantic was a year
old, the company’s fleet consisted of four oceangoing cargo
ships, all standard designs that were built under the auspices of the United States Shipping Board as part of the

nation’s mobilization for World War I. Pan-Atlantic was formally chartered on July 24, 1933, and began operations between New Orleans and
ports along the East Coast five weeks later on the first of September.1
Table 2.1 provides statistical information about the initial Pan-Atlantic
fleet; all four vessels were powered by three-cylinder triple-expansion reciprocating steam engines.
From the outset, Pan-Atlantic was a subsidiary of the larger Waterman
Steamship Company. New Orleans–born John Barnet Waterman (1866–
1937) founded the company that bears his name in 1919 as a venture that
would help promote maritime commerce via the port of Mobile, and Waterman Steamship would see steady growth in the era between the two
table 2.1. Pan-Atlantic Fleet: 1935
Off. No.

Name

Hull dimensions

GRT

Place built (year)

Notes

217373

Pan Royal
a) West
Carnifax
b) Exford
Pan Atlantic
a) Richmond
Borough
b) Willfaro
d) XXI Aprile
Pan American
a) Yaphank
b) Willpolo
Panama City
a) Ossa
b) Exbrook
d) Atlas

411 ⳯ 54 ⳯ 27

5,627

San Pedro, Calif.
(1918)

1, 2

387 ⳯ 52 ⳯ 27

4,810

Staten Island, N.Y.
(1919 )

3, 4

387 ⳯ 52 ⳯ 27

4,810

Staten Island, N.Y.
(1919)

4

380 ⳯ 53 ⳯ 27

4,846

Tacoma, Wash.
(1920)

2, 5

218731

218903

219683

Notes
All vessel dimensions cited here and elsewhere are displayed in rounded feet.
1. Sank in the North Atlantic following collision with another freighter, February 9, 1943.
2. Acquired from Export Steamship Company, of New York, parent company of American Export Lines.
3. Sold to Italian interests and reflagged Italian, 1937.
4. Acquired from Williams Steamship Company of New York.
5. Sold 1937 and reflagged Panamanian.
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world wars. Waterman began operations in 1919 with a cargo ship called
Eastern Sun that it had been allocated by the United States Shipping
Board. Built in Kobe, Japan, in 1918 and originally called Taifuku Maru
No. 2, Waterman’s first vessel was dispatched from Mobile on a transatlantic voyage to Liverpool and Manchester, and the company began a period
of steady growth. In 1926, for instance, Waterman organized a subsidiary,
the Mobile, Miami and Gulf Steamship Company, while the following year
saw the company establish a separate division to operate steamship service to and from Puerto Rico. The Waterman corporate family eventually
included a shipyard and a stevedoring firm in Mobile, and the company
even made a less than successful effort to establish a commercial airline
to fly between New Orleans and San Juan.2
Like its Pan-Atlantic subsidiary, Waterman Steamship was also based
in Mobile, Alabama, and from the mid-1930s onward, Waterman concentrated its efforts on international routes and service to and from Puerto
Rico, as well as intercoastal operations between the East and West coasts.
Pan-Atlantic was left to handle coastwise service—that is to say, operations covered by the provisions of the Jones Act, and more particularly,
service between ports along the East and Gulf coasts of the United States.
In addition, Pan-Atlantic vessels provided short-haul feeder service to
longer liner trades that Waterman operated.3
Waterman and Pan-Atlantic thus maintained separate identities, although vessels were often chartered from parent to subsidiary and subsidiary to parent. Furthermore, the blue-and-white house flag and stack
markings of each company during this era evidenced similarities in their
design. When they called at the port of New York, Waterman and PanAtlantic vessels both used North River Pier 45, at the foot of Christopher
Street, in Manhattan; both companies also worked out of the same sales
office in New York at 19 Rector Street, and were listed in the Manhattan
telephone directory under the same number, WHitehall 4-3111.
In 1936, when the Pan-Atlantic fleet included four vessels, parent Waterman was operating a seventeen-vessel fleet of cargo ships. By the early
1940s, Pan-Atlantic’s fleet had increased to six cargo ships, Waterman’s to
twenty-three.4 Shortly afterward, but just before America’s entry into
World War II, Pan-Atlantic’s six-vessel fleet was supplemented by two
turn-of-the-century cargo ships, the El Dia and the El Valle. Each was a
4,500-gross-ton vessel built in 1901 at Newport News, Virginia, for service
by the Morgan Line, a maritime subsidiary of the Southern Pacific Railroad.5 After joining the Pan-Atlantic fleet, the former was renamed Pan
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York and the latter Pan Crescent. (With respect to both Waterman and
Pan-Atlantic, a word of caution is in order about vessel names. There was
a practice, across the two related companies, to repeat popular vessel
names, replacement tonnage often memorializing the name of an older
vessel. Waterman’s 5,432-gross-ton Gateway City, for instance, a 1920-built
cargo ship the company operated before World War II, was recalled when
the same name was bestowed on a C-2 cargo ship after the war, one
that would figure prominently in the development of the container-ship
industry.)
Executives at Waterman realized that the war in Europe would likely
soon involve the United States. In June 1940, the company sent a telegram
to a congressman from Alabama, William B. Bankhead, a man who was
also the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. It read: ‘‘Believing
that participation by the United States in the European War is inevitable
and that speed is preferable to delay, Waterman Steamship Corporation
requests that you advise President Roosevelt that it is ready to aid in every
way it can with ships and other resources.’’6
Whether the company’s 1940 telegram had any impact is moot, but
Waterman and Pan-Atlantic suspended routine civilian operations in early
1942 shortly after the United States entered World War II, and the assets
of both companies were deployed on war-related assignments. Waterman
was called on to operate as many as 125 cargo ships during the war, only
thirty-seven of which were former Waterman or Pan-Atlantic vessels. Of
the thirty-seven, though, seventeen were sunk by enemy action, and 40
Waterman officers, as well as 147 seamen, were lost aboard them. One exWaterman freighter, the 1920-built Kofresi, was deliberately sunk on June
14, 1944, to help form a breakwater off Omaha Beach at Normandy.

The Postwar Era
Waterman and Pan-Atlantic resumed their prewar routes and services
shortly after V-J Day. At first, Pan-Atlantic operated a fleet of five Liberty
ships that it obtained under bareboat charter from the Maritime Commission. The Liberty was an emergency wartime design, produced out of
necessity and with a top speed of only 10.5 knots. While vital to the war
effort, Liberty ships were considerably less than state-of-the-art cargo vessels and could hardly provide competitive service in postwar commercial
markets. Table 2.2 identifies Pan-Atlantic’s postwar Liberty ships.
Pan-Atlantic later supplemented its five Liberty ships with two Victorystyle cargo ships, also chartered from the Maritime Commission, the Bessemer Victory and the Canton Victory.7 By 1950, though, Pan-Atlantic had
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table 2.2. Pan-Atlantic Fleet: Chartered Postwar Liberty Ships
Off. No.

Name

Hull dimensions

GRT

Place built (year)

242596

Winslow Homer

423 ⳯ 57 ⳯ 35

7,228

242158

Daniel H. Lownsdale

423 ⳯ 57 ⳯ 35

7,210

242465

John Bartram

423 ⳯ 57 ⳯ 35

7,205

246912

Albert K. Smiley

423 ⳯ 57 ⳯ 35

7,198

242257

John Laurance

423 ⳯ 57 ⳯ 35

7,176

S. Portland, Maine
(1942)
Portland, Ore.
(1942)
Richmond, Calif.
(1942)
Brunswick, Ga.
(1944)
Houston, Tex.
(1942)

Note
1. Struck by torpedo in the Pacific, but no damage inflicted, June 6, 1943.

returned its seven chartered vessels to the federal government and acquired an equal number of C-2 cargo ships to form the core of its permanent postwar fleet. With the arrival of the C-2s, Pan Atlantic even
advertised its scheduled sailings up and down the East Coast as available
for limited passenger traffic, since each C-2 had accommodations for up
to twelve passengers. Table 2.3 identifies the extent of the company fleet
in 1955.
With its seven newly acquired C-2s in service, Pan-Atlantic established
two routes, each served by multiple vessels and featuring scheduled departures every seven days. Three ships were assigned to a twenty-one-day
circuit out of New Orleans that included calls in Mobile, Pensacola,
Tampa, Georgetown, Boston, New York, and Jacksonville before returning
to New Orleans, while four ships worked a twenty-eight-day circuit that
also began in New Orleans and included stops in Mobile, Panama City,
Tampa, Jacksonville, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Jacksonville
(again), Miami, Tampa (again), and then back to New Orleans. If all
schedules were maintained as advertised, Pan-Atlantic vessels would
make 1,042 separate port calls each year.8 With respect to calls at the port
of New York, Pan Atlantic and Waterman were no longer using North
River Pier 45, but had shifted their operations to a pier at the foot of
Columbia Street along the Brooklyn waterfront.
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table 2.3. Pan-Atlantic C-2 Fleet: 1955
Off. No.

Name

Hull dimensions

GRT

Place built (year)

Notes

245979

Antinous

449 ⳯ 63 ⳯ 27

6,065

1

251507

449 ⳯ 63 ⳯ 27

6,064

449 ⳯ 63 ⳯ 27

6,064

Chickasaw, Ala.
(1943)

1

439 ⳯ 63 ⳯ 28

6,131

Kearny, N.J.
(1942)

2

245398

Arizpa
a) Jean Lafitte
b) Warren
(USN)
c) Jean Lafitte
Beauregard
a) Afoundria
b) Wayne
(USN)
c) Afoundria
Chickasaw
a) Delsantos
b) Thurston
(USN)
c) Delsantos
De Soto

Chickasaw, Ala.
(1944)
Chickasaw, Ala.
(1943)

449 ⳯ 63 ⳯ 27

6,065

1

248489

Iberville

449 ⳯ 63 ⳯ 27

6,065

243815

Warrior

449 ⳯ 63 ⳯ 27

6,065

Chickasaw, Ala.
(1944)
Chickasaw, Ala.
(1945)
Chickasaw, Ala.
(1943)

251508

241993

1

1, 3
1

Notes
1. Chickasaw-built C-2s represented a subclass designated C2-S-E1 that was designed especially for
Waterman and its subsidiaries.
2. Classified C2-F and built to specifications developed by Lykes Brothers Steamship Company; the vessel
never worked for Lykes, however.
3. First Pan-Atlantic C-2 to enter service; vessel departed Mobile for New Orleans on November 20,
1948.
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Pan-Atlantic went to some pains to secure authorization from the federal government to extend its Gulf Coast service to Houston, Texas, and
in 1951 such approval was granted.9 The company, however, did not incorporate Houston into its permanent schedules immediately, although the
fact it held such authority would later prove to be significant.
Pan-Atlantic’s parent corporation, Waterman Steamship, also acquired
a substantial fleet of cargo ships from the Maritime Commission after the
war for its various services. Indeed with twenty-three C-2s on its roster
and an overall cargo fleet that grew to fifty-five hulls by 1949, not all
C-2s, Waterman ranked third among U.S.-flag operators of oceangoing
steamships in the number of blue-water vessels in its fleet and the company operated more dry cargo ships than any other U.S.-flag steamship
line.10
Coastwise steamship service, though—the forte of Waterman’s PanAtlantic subsidiary—would never regain its prewar importance. Over-theroad trucks had become a more powerful force in long-haul cargo transport with the popularity of diesel-powered rigs in the postwar era, while
railroads that had inherited the bulk of coastwise traffic during the war
were beginning to experiment with a novel but obvious concept that could
only strengthen their market share—hauling trailer trucks between distant cities atop flat cars in a style of service that quickly came to be called
piggyback.11
Also in play was the fact that back in prewar 1940, certain aspects
of federal regulatory control over coastwise and intercoastal steamship
services had been shifted from the Maritime Commission, where they had
long resided, to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), an agency
with no previous experience or background in matters associated with
oceangoing transport, but with a decided bias toward railroads, many
have insisted, in the setting of proper rates for what had become two
highly competitive modes of transport.12 It was the ICC, for instance, that
Pan-Atlantic had to petition to secure authority to expand its service to
Houston, Texas, as previously noted.
In a contemporary context where the setting of transport rates, or even
the decision to offer a given transport service, is a largely unregulated
corporate activity, it is difficult to overstate the degree and level of control
that the ICC once exercised. Companies had to present lengthy documentation to establish a ‘‘rate base’’ for a particular commodity, and the ICC
was notorious for the degree of documentation it demanded for, and the
length of time it required to act upon, a company’s request for a rate
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change. And, of course, it was the ICC that issued requisite ‘‘certificates of
convenience and necessity’’ that were mandatory before a given company
could even provide regular service between this point and that one in the
first place. An entire subculture of professionals evolved who enjoyed the
designation ‘‘ICC practitioner,’’ and who earned lucrative fees by representing transport companies in their continuous and often protracted
dealings with the commission.13
Another factor often cited as contributory to the decline of coastwise
and intercoastal steamship service in the United States after World War II
was the steadily increasing cost of stevedoring services at domestic ports.
Unlike U.S.-flag steamship companies engaged in various international
trades, in domestic service a steamship company was forced to pay higher
U.S. wages on both ends of a voyage and all stops in between, thus increasing the impact of whatever postwar salary increases dockworkers
were able to win. In prewar 1939, stevedoring for a typical intercoastal
cargo voyage represented 32 percent of a trip’s overall cost. By 1953, this
figure had increased to 55 percent, as determined in a study conducted by
an economist from Tulane University by the name of Marvin L. Fair. ‘‘It is
obvious we are witnessing the disintegration of a major industry that has
been very vital to the commerce and industry of the nation,’’ Fair sadly
concluded.14 Another scholar expressed matters this way: ‘‘The postwar
crisis has come to coastal shipping with the speed and violence of a sea
squall.’’15
As these factors began to converge in the decade after World War II
and alter the character of coastwise and intercoastal steamship services,
the founder and chief officer of what had become one of the nation’s
larger common-carrier trucking companies felt it was time to see if an
idea he had long harbored could be turned into an operational reality.
Why not revive the moribund coastwise maritime industry by carrying
loaded trailer trucks aboard cargo ships? So wondered Malcom P.
McLean, the chief officer of North Carolina–based McLean Trucking, and
a man who was understandably frustrated, back in 1937, when longshoremen in northern New Jersey took so long to offload a cargo of cotton that
he had driven pierside to put aboard a waiting ship of the American Export Lines.

Malcom McLean
Malcom Purcell McLean was born on November 14, 1913, in Maxton
Township, a farming village ninety miles south of Raleigh, North Carolina.
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His family was of Scottish descent and had lived in rural North Carolina
for many generations. With little formal schooling beyond grammar
school, in the late 1920s Malcom McLean went to work first as a farmer,
then as the operator of a small gasoline station.
One day a road-building contractor drove into McLean’s filling station
and asked where he might obtain the services of a truck and driver.
McLean sensed an opportunity and bought a secondhand pickup truck
himself for $150 with a mere $30 down, thus inaugurating what would
eventually become McLean Trucking, one of the largest motor carriers in
the country.16
Malcom McLean’s principal gift was an uncanny ability to deal with
numbers—particularly numbers that were preceded by dollar signs. He
could perform calculations in his head that others would never attempt
without mechanical assistance. Paul Richardson, a long-time colleague of
McLean, once characterized the man this way: ‘‘Malcom did the new math
before they ever heard about the new math.’’17 Add to this quantitative
acumen an instinctive ability to find and develop resources for capital
investment, and one can begin to understand some of the dynamics that
helped turn Malcom McLean’s business ventures into impressive corporate success stories.
During the immediate postwar period, the idea of hauling loaded
trailer trucks aboard ship was being explored in a variety of ways. Like
carrying trucks on railroad flat cars, it was a rather obvious alternative to
consider, and the enormous logistical strategy that was at the heart of the
Allied victory in the recent war offered a number of interesting possibilities. Various sizes and styles of war-surplus landing ships, for instance,
offered one tantalizing set of options.
On August 15, 1947, a company called American Overseas Chartering
Corporation began offering an overnight trailer-ship service up and down
the Hudson River between New York and Albany, a 150-mile trip, using a
pair of converted U.S. Navy LST-class landing ships. (The company’s New
York terminal was actually across the river at Pier 16 in Hoboken, New
Jersey, slightly upriver from the spot where, in 1937, Malcom McLean
grew frustrated when it took longshoremen so long to unload his truck
and put its cargo aboard ship.) The ex-USN LST-970 was renamed Albany,
and LST-969 became the New York for what proved to be its brief career
on the Hudson. American Overseas Chartering, later reorganized as Trailerships Inc., soon faded from the scene, though, its prospects not at all
being helped when union teamsters in Albany initially balked at the idea
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of delivering trailers the new company had transported up the Hudson
from New York aboard ship, trailers that had previously been driven north
by fellow teamsters. For that matter, over-the-road trailer trucks could
accomplish the New York–Albany trip, even before the construction of the
New York State Thruway, in a small fraction of the time it took for the
converted LSTs to work their way up or down the Hudson. (Albany and
New York were acquired by McAllister Brothers when they were put up
for auction by U.S. marshals in September 1955, with Albany later finding
work with the Chesapeake Bay Ferry District for a number of years as the
cross-bay ferry Old Point Comfort.)18
A landing-ship conversion that received considerable attention in the
maritime trade press envisioned service across less sheltered waters than
the Hudson River. Thus was an unfinished LST-class hull sent to the
Merrill-Stevens Dry Dock and Repair Company in Jacksonville, Florida,
for an extensive rebuild. It emerged in December 1956 as the 8,000-grosston trailer ship Carib Queen, a vessel capable of transporting ninety-two
loaded trailers and ninety-seven automobiles on their own wheels in rollon and roll-off (ro/ro) fashion. Carib Queen could also accommodate
ninety-seven tons of general break-bulk cargo, and her conversion followed specifications that had been drawn up by a naval architecture firm
from New York, Designers and Planners Inc.19
In early 1957 Carib Queen made a trip from the Brooklyn Army Base in
New York to the historic French coastal port of St. Nazaire at the mouth
of the River Loire on behalf of the U.S. Navy’s Military Sea Transport
Service (MSTS), and later began a less-than-successful commercial career. Initially operated by Gulf Atlantic Transportation Company of Jacksonville, and intended for use between Key West and Havana, Carib Queen
was shifted to TMT Trailer Ferry before ever entering such service and
was operated by that company between Florida and San Juan, Puerto
Rico, for several seasons before being returned to MSTS and eventual
conversion into the missile-carrying ship Taurus.
Plans were constantly under discussion in the maritime world for new
constructions, not converted landing ships, that would emulate Carib
Queen as ro/ro trailer ships, but on a much larger scale.20 If trailers traveling aboard railroad cars were commonly referred to as piggyback service,
the advent of Carib Queen caused some in the maritime trade press to
suggest that ‘‘fishy-back’’ was a proper parallel usage for trailers aboard
ship. The emerging container-ship industry can only be grateful that the
term never achieved popular coinage.
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In Malcom McLean’s mind, though, World War II provided a more tantalizing alternative for taking trailer trucks to sea than using converted
landing craft. To maximize transatlantic capacity during the war, many
ordinary T-2 tankers that were carrying precious fuel to Europe from the
oil fields of America had been rigged to carry deck cargo, as well. A separate spar deck, so-called, was installed atop the tanker’s weather deck and
large items of cargo such as airplanes and trucks were then secured to the
spar deck, while valves and ports leading to the vessel’s petroleum-carrying tanks remained accessible beneath.
Fascinating, thought Malcom McLean.
Mindful of labor problems that Trailerships had encountered in Albany,
one of McLean’s early milestones in his effort to transport trailer trucks at
sea was securing general agreement about the idea from the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, the nation’s largest bargaining agent for overthe-road truck drivers. At a meeting of the union’s executive board in
Miami Beach on February 16, 1954, James K. McLean, Malcom McLean’s
brother and business associate, explained his company’s plans in general
terms. When he was finished, Dave Beck, the union’s president, announced that the teamsters were supportive of the idea. As reported by
the New York Times, Beck believed that ‘‘the project might result in some
temporary displacement of drivers but the long-term effect would be to
strengthen the (trucking) industry and improve employment opportunities.’’21 Had Beck and his teamsters reacted negatively to McLean’s idea
and dug in their heels in opposition, it would hardly have prevented the
eventual emergence of container-carrying ships. But it certainly would
have caused the early years of the industry to have evolved in a much
different way than they did.
McLean’s initial idea was to form a partnership with an existing maritime company, one already in possession of requisite authorizations from
the ICC to serve the markets he planned to enter. Because McLean initially
felt that the most likely trade for container-carrying ships was transporting cotton from southern ports to the textile mills of New England, the
first maritime company he considered—and would eventually acquire—
was S. C. Loveland of Philadelphia, a firm that would have given him
access to the ports of both New York and Providence, Rhode Island, as
well as several southern harbors.
Loveland was hardly a major presence in the maritime field. In 1955 its
fleet consisted of a half-dozen or so unpowered barges, plus a pair of
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absolutely delightful wooden-hull tugboats built in 1888.22 In terms of corporate assets, though, far more important than the Loveland fleet were
the ICC authorizations the company held.
At first, McLean felt that his own McLean Trucking Company would
be the appropriate corporate entity for establishing a partnership with
Loveland. For a variety of regulatory reasons, though, such a union never
materialized. Instead, in January 1955, McLean negotiated the purchase
of the Pan-Atlantic Steamship Company from Waterman, after an earlier
effort in the fall of 1954 to secure control of Pan-Atlantic by acquiring a
block of Waterman stock ended in failure.23 McLean’s acquisition of PanAtlantic was a straight-cash transaction. The purchase price was $7 million; seven C-2 cargo ships were included in the sale. To ensure observance of appropriate ICC rules and regulations, McLean removed himself
from any operating responsibilities associated with McLean Trucking—the
North Carolina company he had founded and was then serving as chief
officer—and put his interest in the firm into a blind trust. He then established a new corporation, McLean Securities, to serve as the parent firm
of Pan-Atlantic.24
Malcom McLean’s daughter, Nancy McLean Parker, tells a delightful
story about her father’s acquisition of Pan-Atlantic. After informing his
family they would soon be moving from North Carolina to Mobile, Alabama, McLean cautioned everyone to keep the news confidential, since
premature publicity could jeopardize the pending transaction. Young
Nancy presumed such secrecy did not apply to conversations with her
best friend. Problems developed, though, since her best friend’s father
happened to be the editor of the local newspaper.
Three months later, in April 1955, McLean went his acquisition of PanAtlantic one better. For an investment of $42 million—money that was
raised by using Pan-Atlantic as collateral, with financing arranged
through the National City Bank of New York and an underwriting group
headed by White, Weld—Malcom McLean became the principal owner of
Waterman Steamship itself. Although the term had yet to be coined,
McLean’s acquisition of Waterman can be regarded as a leveraged buyout.
Working through a subsidiary of McLean Securities, the C. Lee Company, an offer was mailed to Waterman stockholders to acquire their holdings at $48.00 per share.25 The transaction included thirty C-2 cargo ships,
plus such Waterman subsidiaries as the company’s shipyard in Mobile, a
downtown office building in the same city, a hotel and golf course at Point
Clear on the far side of Mobile Bay, and various properties in Puerto Rico.
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The deal was blocked when the Federal District Court in Washington,
D.C., issued a temporary restraining order in response to a suit filed by a
Waterman stockholder. The Federal Court of Appeals quickly lifted the
order, though, when former U.S. Senator Millard E. Tydings, a Democrat
from Maryland who had been retained as counsel by Waterman, introduced testimony to the effect that the stockholder was acting on behalf of
the New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Company—more popularly
known as the Ward Line—a rival U.S.-flag steamship company whose own
earlier efforts to secure control of Waterman had ended in failure. The
plaintiff was ‘‘a mere pawn of a rival company,’’ Tydings insisted, and was
approaching the whole matter with ‘‘unclean hands.’’26
With McLean and his associates now controlling in excess of 90 percent
of Waterman stock, in early May 1955 a new board of directors was
elected, with Malcom McLean serving as chairman, while his brother,
James McLean, was named president.27 Before the first meeting of the new
board was called to order, McLean’s people realized that a quorum would
not be present. One of the lawyers went out into the street, approached a
total stranger, and asked him if he wanted to earn fifty dollars. The man
said yes and was escorted inside and elected to the board—something
that apparently could happen in the absence of a quorum. The stranger’s
presence allowed the meeting to proceed.28 Later in 1955, the S. C. Loveland company became part of McLean’s growing empire when it was acquired by Pan-Atlantic, and in 1957, the ICC would agree to transfer all
operating rights held by Loveland to Pan-Atlantic.29
In later years, Malcom McLean would often discuss his acquisition of
Waterman. He was especially pleased over a relationship he developed at
the National City Bank in New York with Walter Wriston, who had earlier
sought out McLean to solicit business for the bank from McLean Trucking—and thus was an obvious person for McLean to approach when he
needed capital to acquire Waterman. McLean convinced Wriston that Waterman was a sound investment, and while Wriston, as an officer in the
bank, had authority to approve a loan for $42 million, his superiors
changed their minds and sought to reduce the amount.
McLean was incensed, paid a call on the bank’s chief executives, and
told them that Wriston believed the transaction amount was sound. The
officers downplayed Wriston, claiming he was a new hire and little more
than a clerk. McLean angrily replied, ‘‘He may be just a clerk but he’s
going to be both of your bosses soon.’’30 On the strength of such passion
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the loan was approved in the full amount, and as McLean had so confidently predicted, Walter Wriston eventually became president of the
bank. Indeed, Wriston and McLean would maintain a cordial business
relationship for the rest of their respective careers.
As word of what McLean was planning to do—namely, carry loaded
trailer trucks aboard ships in coastwise service—began to spread throughout the transportation industry, a consortium of railroad interests, led by
the Wilmington, North Carolina–based Atlantic Coast Line, banded together and petitioned the ICC to thwart McLean’s efforts. The railroads
advanced two arguments. One held that McLean had failed to divest himself fully of McLean Trucking and the ICC clearly prohibited cross ownership of rival companies providing cargo service by different modes. The
second argument was that the certificates of convenience and necessity
the ICC had earlier awarded Pan-Atlantic envisioned the carrying of ‘‘general cargo,’’ not loaded trailer trucks.
In both cases, the ICC effectively ruled in McLean’s favor. Loaded
trailer trucks were general cargo, the ICC declared, a finding that was
consistent with an earlier decision it rendered in 1954 that permitted railroads to carry trailer trucks aboard flat cars without first receiving certification as motor carriers.31 McLean was required to sever his ties with
McLean Trucking completely, though to remain in conformity with ICC
rules since placing his stock in a blind trust, as he had done when he
initially acquired Pan-Atlantic, was insufficient. As part of the realignment, McLean Industries replaced McLean Securities as the parent corporation of his new endeavor, but essentially the commission rejected the
complaints raised by the railroads. Meanwhile, plans were moving along
to convert Waterman’s Pan-Atlantic subsidiary into a trailer truck–
carrying steamship company.32
McLean acquired Pan-Atlantic in early 1955. Shortly afterward, he filed
an application with the Maritime Commission seeking ship-mortgage insurance for the construction of seven new Pan-Atlantic vessels, ships that
were estimated to cost $9 million each. They were to be entirely new
tonnage, designed from the keel up as ro/ro ships that would accommodate loaded trailers—conventional trailers, that is to say, that would roll
on and off ship on their own wheels. As part of the pending transaction,
Pan-Atlantic would trade in an equal number of wartime C-2s, vessels the
Maritime Commission would then place in a reserve fleet at various anchorages located throughout the country to await any future emergency.33
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In early November 1955, Clarence G. Morse, the administrator of the
Maritime Commission, announced that his agency and Pan-Atlantic had
reached agreement in principle on the pending transaction. The federal
government would insure as much as $55.1 million of the proposed $63
million project. The new vessels, to be built by Bethlehem Steel, would
each carry 268 trailers and have a cruising speed of 19 knots. In a separate
action, Pan-Atlantic was authorized by the U.S. Office of Defense Mobilization to write off 60 percent of the project’s total cost over an accelerated
five-year period, a tax benefit whose purpose was to help provide the
nation with up-to-date merchant vessels that could be called on by the
military during future national emergencies.34
While McLean was anxious to acquire federal mortgage insurance from
the Maritime Commission, as well as take advantage of tax benefits associated with accelerated depreciation, he was not seeking any direct subsidies from the government for his planned new operation, even though such
assistance was available. In the years after 1936, companies that constituted the U.S. merchant marine would fall into one of two camps—
steamship lines that relied on construction differential subsidies and/or
operating differential subsidies provided by the federal government, and
those that did not. Malcom McLean and his proposed container-ship operation belongs in the second category, not the first.

The First Container Ships
Even as plans to build these new ro/ro ships were moving forward,
McLean was simultaneously pursuing a project that headed in a similar
but slightly different direction. He acquired a pair of T-2 tankers that had
been built during World War II and in 1955 sent them to Bethlehem Steel’s
Sparrows Point shipyard in Baltimore, where they were refitted with new
spar decks, such as were used to haul large and bulky equipment across
the North Atlantic during the war. McLean, of course, had no intention
of carrying B-26 bombers or ‘‘deuce-and-a-half ’’ Army trucks aboard his
reconfigured T-2s. He was turning them into trailer ships—but not, in any
sense, ro/ro trailer ships. McLean had in mind a different kind of highway
trailer, one that could be detached from its running gear on the pier,
hoisted aboard ship by crane, and then attached to a different set of running gear once the ship reached its destination.
Space aboard ship—which is to say, cubic footage—has always been
both precious and limited. And while the notion of carrying loaded trailers was generally thought to be sound, why compromise a vessel’s carrying capacity, McLean reasoned, and waste so much cubic footage by
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including a vehicle’s undercarriage, when the only thing that really mattered was the trailer itself?
The first of the conversions—a T-2 that McLean renamed Ideal X—
steamed out of Baltimore Harbor in late 1955 to begin an extensive series
of sea trials that would demonstrate to officials from such regulatory and
classification agencies as the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and the
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) that the concept was sound and the
vessel’s seakeeping abilities and stability would not be compromised by a
spar deck full of loaded trailer-truck bodies.35 Why McLean selected the
name Ideal X for his first conversion is not known with certainty. The
‘‘Ideal’’ part was supposedly a description of the new intermodal service
the vessel would offer, while the ‘‘X’’ referred to the coming together of
diverse transport concepts to form a single service. McLean’s second T-2,
rechristened Almena for its new career with Pan-Atlantic, was also converted at Sparrows Point and was ready in time to help Ideal X inaugurate
the new service in the spring of 1956.36
On the question of vessel names generally, at first Malcom McLean
tried to adopt a policy he had earlier enforced at McLean Trucking: Units
were identified only by numbers, and drivers were prohibited from painting identifying names or slogans on their tractor rigs, on the theory that
uniformity helped ensure consistent maintenance policies throughout the
fleet. And so McLean wanted to identify his new ships with generic names
such as Container Ship No. 1 and Container Ship No. 2. Paul Richardson
tells how McLean eventually acceded to maritime tradition after he was
told how unlikely it was that a captain at sea would be willing to go down
with a ship that was identified only with an impersonal number.37
A modest challenge that had to be met, of course, was designing and
building a fleet of trailer trucks that were capable of being removed from
their running gear for transfer aboard ship. Prototypes were designed and
built by the Brown Trailer Company of Toledo, Ohio, in early 1955, and
the concept was not entirely unprecedented. In 1949, for example, Brown
had built a fleet of rather similar trailers for a West Coast customer who
used them to ship military cargo from Seattle to Valdez, Alaska, not
aboard ships but atop barges. Upon reaching Valdez, the trailers then
moved inland after being hoisted onto highway-style running gear. After
Brown completed work on prototypes for McLean, production model trailers, as well as sets of detachable running gear, were then turned out in
quantity by both Brown as well as by the Fruehauf Trailer Company of
Detroit. McLean was also able to orchestrate an agreement between the
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International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the International Longshoremen’s Association over their respective jurisdiction in the loading and unloading of containers. Teamsters would drive a container into position at
pier side and undo the clamps that were holding the container to the truck
chassis on which it arrived, while longshoremen would secure hooks to
the top of the container and operate the cranes that hoisted the cargo
aboard ship. McLean also coined a distinctive name for the intermodal
cargo operation he was poised to inaugurate. Proudly affixed to the exterior of the new trailers was a likeness of the Pan-Atlantic house flag and
the simple but accurate designation Sea-Land Service.
It has sometimes been suggested that McLean Trucking was the overthe-road company that operated the land portion of a Sea-Land delivery.
This is quite untrue; ICC regulations prevented McLean Trucking from
having anything to do with the new venture. Instead, McLean contracted
with existing and independent trucking companies at either end of his
New York-to-Houston route to handle pick up and delivery away from the
pier, although McLean had to acquire tractors—and hire teamsters—for
moving containers in the immediate terminal area.
From a shipper’s perspective, what was certainly the most appealing
novelty of the new Sea-Land Service was the fact that a consignment of
cargo could now move from point A to point B on the strength of a single
bill of lading. No contracting with a trucking company to move a shipment
from factory to pier, then a separate contractual arrangement with a
steamship company or a freight forwarder, and finally a third agreement
with another trucking company at the destination port. In addition, no
need to worry over whether the trucking company would get the shipment to the pier in time to be loaded aboard ship, not to mention, of
course, a major reduction in opportunities for pilferage on the pier, and a
genuine speedup in door-to-door delivery time.
Ideal X and Almena entered revenue service in the spring of 1956, with
the former’s April 26 departure from Port Newark, New Jersey, universally regarded as the very first time a bona fide container ship made a
scheduled trip on any waterway.38 Each T-2 could accommodate fiftyeight trailer bodies, and each trailer was thirty-three feet long. Trailers
were positioned eight abreast aboard ship and were secured to longitudinal slots that ran the length of the newly installed spar decks after being
hoisted aboard by dockside cranes. Unlike contemporary container ships
that sail the world’s oceans with containers stowed atop each other to
seemingly dizzying heights, all the containers that were transported
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aboard Ideal X and Almena were secured directly on the spar deck itself,
not stacked one atop another.
A second pair of converted T-2s, Maxton and Coalinga Hills, quickly
followed the two vessels. Conversion work on these two was performed
at Mobile Ship Repair, the yard that McLean had acquired when he secured control of Waterman in 1955. Maxton was named in honor of Malcom McLean’s North Carolina birthplace, while Coalinga Hills was the
only T-2 in the Pan-Atlantic fleet to retain its original wartime name. In
fact, Maxton was enrolled on the Waterman roster and chartered to PanAtlantic, while Coalinga Hills was owned by the Sword Line, of New York,
and also chartered to Pan Atlantic. Like S. C. Loveland, the Sword Line
was a company that McLean had earlier acquired primarily for the operating rights it held, although, as matters turned out, it was Coalinga Hills
that proved to be a more important Sword Line asset.
All of these facts have sometimes caused confusion about the precise
number of early T-2 conversions McLean secured and operated—which,
in fact, was four.39 It has often been asserted that Maxton was the first T2 that McLean acquired and converted into a container ship. This is incorrect. McLean took title to the ship that he renamed Maxton from the Marine Navigation Company in April 1956, mere days before Ideal X
inaugurated container-ship service. Interestingly, Ideal X, while the first
converted T-2 to enter service, was not the first McLean acquired. The
vessel that McLean called Almena was conveyed to Pan-Atlantic on April
27, 1955, while the ship that would be called Ideal X was transferred to
Pan-Atlantic on August 12, 1955.40 Table 2.4 provides additional information about the world’s very first fleet of container-carrying steamships.
It was widely reported in the maritime trade press that in addition to
carrying containers in both directions between New York and Houston,
McLean also intended to have his converted T-2s transport petroleum on
northbound runs from Houston to New York. Pan-Atlantic, though, only
held ICC certification for the transport of general cargo. During the highly
regulated 1950s, how could the company casually intrude itself into the
petroleum trade?
The answer is that were Pan-Atlantic’s T-2s to carry petroleum from
Texas to New York, they would not do so under any ICC authority held by
Pan-Atlantic but would be operating under what amounted to charter
arrangements with an oil company. Major oil companies had their own
fleets of tankers. In 1955, for instance, Esso Standard Oil owned and operated no fewer than fifty-two tankers, most of them wartime T-2s. Because
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table 2.4. Pan-Atlantic Fleet: T-2 Tankers of 1956
Off. No. Name
247155

247292
246810
248800

Hull dimensions GRT

Place built (year)

Notes

Ideal X
a) Potrero Hills
b) Capt. John D. P.
c) Potrero Hills
d) Elemir
Almena
a) Whittier Hills
Coalinga Hills

524 ⳯ 68 ⳯ 30

10,572

Sausalito, Calif.
(1945)

1

524 ⳯ 68 ⳯ 30

1

Maxton
a) Black River
b) Ponca City
c) Marine Leader
e) Potomac

504 ⳯ 68 ⳯ 30

10,544 Sausalito, Calif.
(1945)
10,573 Sausalito, Calif.
(1944)
10,516 Mobile, Ala.
(1945)

504 ⳯ 68 ⳯ 30

Notes
For additional data about container ships cited in text, see appendix A.
1. Rebuilt for container-ship service by Bethlehem Steel, Baltimore.
2. Rebuilt for container-ship service by Mobile Ship Repair, Mobile.
3. Owned by Waterman; chartered to Pan-Atlantic.
4. Owned by Sword Line; chartered to Pan-Atlantic.

they ran only in company service and did not solicit general trade, Esso
could operate its ships without any ICC authorization at all. And because
there was typically a backlog of product to be moved north out of Texas,
oil companies were more than willing to take advantage of any available
tanker capacity and make charter arrangements with the owners of such
vessels. McLean’s converted T-2s would remain under ICC jurisdiction to
the extent they solicited and carried general cargo—that is to say, loaded
trailer trucks—on a scheduled basis between New York and Houston. As
chartered petroleum carriers, however, they would assist oil companies
in services that were not subject to ICC regulation.
While such dual use was clearly McLean’s original intention, few, if
any, of Pan-Atlantic’s converted T-2s ever transported both containers and
petroleum in revenue service. Terminal operations, especially at the New
York end of the run, would have been especially complicated. An inbound
the pan-atlantic steamship company: 1933–57 : : : 31

2, 4
2, 3

T-2 would have to dock at Port Newark to unload its containers, cast off
and proceed south to one of the oil terminals along Arthur Kill to discharge its liquid cargo, return to Port Newark to take on a fresh cargo of
containers, and only then return to sea. Such maneuvering would have
had a devastating effect on Pan-Atlantic’s ability to maintain regular
schedules, and dependability would quickly emerge as an important factor in all container-ship operations.41
Ideal X and Almena, between them, were able to offer weekly service
from both Port Newark and Houston. Once Maxton and Coalinga Hills
joined the fleet, Pan-Atlantic was able to increase its service to every
fourth day. ‘‘This stepped-up schedule is the best way we know to acknowledge shippers’ support for this new type of service,’’ Malcom
McLean noted.42
Pan-Atlantic’s fleet of converted T-2 tankers received extensive treatment in the trade press of both the maritime and the trucking industries,
with most articles noting that McLean was also planning to build a fleet of
brand new ro/ro trailer ships to complement his more radical containercarrying vessels. But then something funny happened. McLean cancelled
plans to build new trailer ships, withdrew his application to the Maritime
Commission for mortgage insurance, and turned to a different kind of
rebuilding project that relied on readily available C-2 cargo ships.43

Containers and Only Containers
In lieu of a T-2 tanker that could transport as many as fifty-eight containers topside and petroleum below deck, McLean wanted a ship that
would carry containers and only containers. C-2 cargo ships already in
the Pan-Atlantic and Waterman fleets were the perfect candidates to be
so converted, and the New York naval architecture firm of George G.
Sharp was retained to develop specifications for the project.44 Once Sharp
completed design work, the actual conversions were performed at Mobile
Ship Repair. The initial program included six C-2s, converted at a cost of
$3.5 million apiece.
The first conversion to be completed, a wartime C-2 that had been
renamed Gateway City when it joined the Waterman fleet in 1950, can
rightly be called the world’s very first all-container ship. That is to say, it
could haul containers and only containers; it was rigged with vertical steel
rails in its holds so containers could be stacked one on top of another in
what would soon be called a cellular arrangement; and once newly designed hatch covers were put in place over these stacked containers, additional containers could then be placed atop the hatch covers and each
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other as deck cargo. Containers could be stacked four high in Gateway
City’s holds, two high on deck.
Compared to the fifty-eight-container capacity of Ideal X and the other
T-2s, Gateway City was able to carry 226 fully loaded containers, an almost
fourfold increase. Gateway City’s deckhouse was cut back and reduced in
size to allow maximum room for containers (all passenger accommodations were eliminated, for instance), its hatches were enlarged, and supplementary steelwork was welded in place to ensure no loss of structural
integrity. In addition, to give the vessel added stability, outboard sponsons, as they are called, were added to the hull on each side, increasing
the ship’s beam from sixty-three to seventy-two feet.45
Much of the engineering that went into Gateway City was completely
new and could look to no earlier maritime work for guidance. For instance, nobody had the slightest idea how much tolerance should be allowed between the containers and the vertical cell rails that held them in
place. There had to be some leeway if containers were to be hoisted on
and off ship, but if there was too much, containers could shift in heavy
seas and cause all manner of damage.
Eventually, Pan-Atlantic decided to use three-quarters of an inch on
each side in one direction, an inch and a quarter in the other. To test
how effective these measurements were, a Pan-Atlantic technician bought
some modeling clay in a Woolworth store in Newark. He then cut off little
cubes of clay and placed them between containers and guide rails. When
one of the converted C-2s returned to port after an early sea trial, the
little cubes of clay were virtually undamaged, and Pan-Atlantic was pretty
sure it had made the correct decision with respect to tolerances within a
vessel’s cell guides.46
Another point of difference between McLean’s earlier T-2s and the converted C-2s was that the latter were equipped with onboard gantry cranes
for loading and unloading cargo. No shoreside cranes were required, for
each C-2 itself featured two movable cranes, one forward of the deckhouse to service the forward holds, another aft to handle the holds there.
To ensure a vessel’s stability, though, Pan-Atlantic adopted a policy that
prohibited the cranes from both extending outboard of a vessel at the
same time, and a longshoreman stationed on the vessel’s navigating
bridge enforced the policy with a system of colored signal lights. The
cranes were designed by Pan-Atlantic’s own engineering staff and built by
the Skagit Steel and Iron Works of Sedro-Woolley, Washington. Each
crane was powered by its own 210-horsepower diesel engine and had a
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rated lifting capacity of 60,000 pounds. The trade journal Maritime Reporter noted that when a ship was ready for sea, the arms of the onboard
cranes were ‘‘folded like a bird’s wings.’’47
The fact that the converted C-2s carried their own cranes necessitated
the widening of their hulls by the addition of sponsons. The parallel tracks
on which the cranes moved forward and aft were secured atop the sponsons so maximum hull width could be used for the storage of containers.
Before the T-2s entered service in 1956, McLean had to make arrangements with port officials for the installation of secondhand cranes at both
Port Newark and Houston. With the C-2s, no such shoreside equipment
was necessary.
The flexibility of these onboard cranes was demonstrated dramatically
a year later, in November 1958. The Coast Guard closed the Houston ship
channel when it was discovered that high-octane aviation fuel was seeping into the waterway from the damaged tanker Amoco Virginia, and normal navigation in and out of the port was suspended. Conventional cargo
ships bound for Houston were forced to anchor offshore in the Gulf of
Mexico until the problem was corrected. Pan-Atlantic’s Bienville, one of
Gateway City’s five sister ships, with its onboard gantry cranes, was able
to lease temporary space at a bulkhead in nearby Texas City, while tractors were pressed into service to shift waiting trailers to the makeshift
facility from the Port of Houston.48
The maritime trade press was impressed with the quality of work that
had gone into Gateway City, the monthly journal Marine Engineering
going so far as to call the converted C-2 one of its ‘‘distinctive ships’’ of
1957.49 The first of McLean’s converted C-2s departed from Port Newark,
bound for Miami and Houston, on October 4, 1957.
Coincidentally, just as the transatlantic passenger liners Liberté and
Saturnia were in port in New York on the day Ideal X inaugurated container service eighteen months earlier, the same two ships set sail for
Europe from New York on the day Gateway City made its initial departure.
Gateway City arrived in Miami two days later on the rainy morning of
October 6 and tied up at Pier One in that city’s old seaport, the site of
today’s Bayside Mall. Sixty-one of the vessel’s 226 trailers were unloaded
in Miami, and three additional trailers were hoisted aboard before Gateway City departed for Houston several hours after arriving. As if to emphasize the efficiencies that the new container ships would bring to
Miami, the first trailer to be unloaded from Gateway City was attached to
its waiting chassis at 8:18 a.m. and dispatched away from the pier at 8:20,
34 : : : box boats

arriving at its consignee in downtown Miami at 8:30.50 Among the business executives and civic leaders on hand to welcome Gateway City on the
morning of October 6, 1957, were Malcom McLean and his brother James,
who hurried south from New York after Gateway City left Port Newark to
witness the vessel’s arrival in Miami.
In subsequent months, additional C-2 conversions joined the PanAtlantic fleet, and the converted T-2 tankers that inaugurated containership service in 1956 were soon declared surplus and sold. With its converted C-2s in operation, Pan-Atlantic quickly settled into a service pattern
that featured direct service between Port Newark and Houston, as well as
a four-city itinerary that left Port Newark and called at Miami, New Orleans, and Tampa before returning north.51
The most telling statistic about their new container ships that PanAtlantic frequently cited involved the time and labor savings that could
be realized during loading and unloading. A conventional break-bulk
cargo ship would typically require 150 or more longshoremen working for
at least four full days to unload and load a vessel’s cargo. With a container
ship such as Gateway City, the same task could be accomplished by a crew
of fourteen in a little over a single eight-hour shift. Expressed in dollars
and cents and using $2.80 per hour as a basic longshoreman’s wage rate
in the mid-1950s, a conventional cargo ship might incur stevedoring
charges in excess of $15,000 during a typical port call. With one of
McLean’s new container ships, this figure could be reduced to less than
$1,600.52
McLean himself never failed to talk about the cost savings that his
innovation fostered. ‘‘We sacrifice tonnage for quick turnaround in port,’’
he said some years later. ‘‘That’s the theory of the trailership. A ship earns
money only when she’s at sea. Where costs rise is in port. The quicker you
can get back to sea the more money you keep.’’53
Faster port operations were not the only opportunities for cost reduction that containerization fostered, though. Cargo traveling in sealed containers was far less susceptible to the perennial risk of pilferage on the
docks, and Pan-Atlantic even developed some statistics suggesting that
cargo transported in containers was less likely to be damaged at sea, even
during heavy weather. In early tests, Gateway City encountered gale-force
winds off Cape Hatteras and experienced a roll of 23 degrees, while her
sister ship, Azalea City, rolled 27 degrees. Either condition would likely
have caused serious shifting of cargo and consequent damage aboard a
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conventional break-bulk freighter, but the containerized cargo aboard the
two Pan-Atlantic vessels did not shift at all.54
Speaking at a pierside ceremony in Port Newark on October 4, 1957,
before Gateway City’s initial departure, Congressman Herbert C. Bonner,
a Democrat from North Carolina and longtime advocate for McLean and
his maritime endeavors, called the onset of the new service ‘‘the greatest
advance made by the United States Merchant Marine in our time.’’55
Elected officials have an understandable tendency to exaggerate matters,
especially when standing behind a microphone or in the presence of newspaper reporters. Congressman Bonner’s remarks in Port Newark in 1957,
though, were closer to an understatement than an exaggeration.
Another aspect of what Gateway City foretold that day involves a story
that Malcom McLean would often retell in later years. While dignitaries
were enjoying a luncheon on shore, McLean wandered out onto the wharf
and saw a man aboard the ship who was looking over the side and shaking
his head in disagreement. McLean boarded Gateway City and asked the
man what he thought of the new ship. The man turned out to be an official
of the International Longshoreman’s Association (ILA). In salty waterfront
language, he told McLean that from his perspective, the best outcome
would be if Gateway City were to sink ‘‘right here.’’56
Despite such misgivings about containerization, though, Malcom
McLean would deal honorably with the ILA, and in the years and decades
following 1957, New York longshoremen would become partners in realizing the benefits of containerization. Containerization would see the onset
of a guaranteed annual income for longshoremen, predictable work
hours, and a portion of the savings that containerization realized used to
ensure a comfortable retirement for workers whose jobs were no longer
required.57 (How different such a state of affairs would be from earlier
labor-management relations along the New York waterfront will be examined in chapter 3.)
October 1957 would prove to be a landmark month in both New York
City and the world at large. Yet, notwithstanding Congressman Bonner’s
enthusiastic rhetoric, few could possibly have appreciated that the maiden
voyage of Malcom McLean’s Gateway City would prove to be such an important milestone. On October 4, 1957, the very same day that the world’s
first all-container ship left New York and headed south, the Soviet Union
successfully launched the world’s first earth-orbiting satellite, a tiny
sphere that was known as Sputnik. In mid-month, the culture of New York
was torn asunder when the New York Giants and the Brooklyn Dodgers—
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two teams that had been scheduled to play each other at the Polo Grounds
on the day in 1956 when Ideal X inaugurated the container-ship era—
announced they were ending their long association with New York and
Brooklyn and moving to San Francisco and Los Angeles. In their different
ways, Sputnik, Gateway City, and the shifting of important cultural institutions from New York to the West Coast represent interesting glimpses
into an uncharted future from the perspective of October 1957.
Table 2.5 provides statistical information about Pan-Atlantic’s first fleet
of true container ships, the C-2 conversions of 1957.

The Containers
Save for their detachable capability, the trailer-truck bodies that Malcom McLean acquired for the inauguration of container-ship service in
table 2.5. Pan-Atlantic Fleet: C-2 Conversions of 1957
Off. No.

Name

Hull dimensions

GRT

Place built (year)

Notes

251506

450 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 25

9,014

Chickasaw, Ala.
(1943)

1

243436

Gateway City
a) Iberville
b) Sumter
(USN)
c) Iberville
Azalea City

450 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 24

9,014

1

243438

Bienville

450 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 24

9,014

242073

Fairland

450 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 27

9,014

242074

Raphael
Semmes
Beauregard
a) Afoundria
b) Wayne
(USN)
c) Afoundria

450 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 27

9,014

449 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 27

9,016

Chickasaw, Ala.
(1943)
Chickasaw, Ala.
(1943)
Chickasaw, Ala.
(1943)
Chickasaw, Ala.
(1943)
Chickasaw, Ala.
(1943)

251508

1
1
1
1, 2

Notes
1. Preconversion dimensions of all six vessels differed from the values shown to the extent that they
were 6,065 GRT and sixty-three feet wide.
2. Remained on the Waterman roster for several years after conversion.
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1956–57 seemed unremarkable. There was one patented feature of SeaLand containers, though, that would eventually form the basis of the standardization that remains at the heart of the container-ship industry to this
day.
Placing containers side by side on a flat surface—such as the juryrigged spar decks of McLean’s original T-2 tankers of 1956—required that
the trainer bodies merely be attached to the deck on which they were
positioned. When matters progressed to the point that trailers were
stacked one atop another, though, such as in the below-deck holds and,
as important, atop the hatch covers of the first converted C-2 cargo ships
in 1957, then the structure of the trailer body became a far more important
matter.
A critical aspect of the design McLean executed involves eight corner
castings incorporated into each trailer body, four on the top and four on
the bottom. (The term corner casting is commonly used in the industry,
even though such hardware need not be manufactured by a true casting
process.) Structurally, the trailers were designed with sufficient internal
strength so placing the bottom corner castings of one container directly
onto the top castings of one beneath it transferred the load in such a way
that a stack of containers became mechanically possible and the container
on the bottom did not collapse under the weight of the container (or
containers) above. The dynamics of the design were such that the strength
of a container was derived primarily from its frame, not its side walls,
although most contemporary containers feature side walls with vertical
corrugations that, in fact, complement the frame and impart additional
strength. The ability to stack containers atop each other, though, remains
primarily a function of their frames, and more particularly their vertical
corner posts. By contrast, the body of an ordinary highway trailer plays
some role in supporting and restraining whatever cargo it is carrying, but
it is more a weather covering than a dynamic part of the vehicle’s structure. The principal ‘‘live load’’ such a trailer body typically has to support
is whatever snow accumulates on the roof during a blizzard.58
While containers secured below deck inside vertical rails called cells
required no mechanical coupling between containers to ensure stability,
containers that were stacked atop a vessel’s hatch covers surely did, since
gravity alone would hardly be sufficient to keep containers properly
aligned in even moderate seas. Here, though, is where McLean’s patented
corner castings did double duty. A casting includes an opening on each of
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its three outward-facing surfaces. (Think of the casting as, approximately,
a six-inch cube set into each corner of a container and that is structurally
part of the frame. Three of each cube’s six surfaces face inward, three face
outward.) McLean’s engineers designed a metal device that fits into the
corner castings of the container on the bottom and the one on top. When
a twist lock is thrown, the containers are joined together and a vertical
stack of separate containers is turned into a unified structure. In most
cases, cable lashings are also used to ensure stability, but the heart of the
system was and remains twist locks that link containers together through
cleverly designed corner castings.59 (It has been said that the twist lock
for containers was designed in imitation of the bolt action of a military or
sporting rifle.)
Although the spar decks installed on McLean’s T-2 tankers did not permit containers to be stacked one atop another, the new thirty-three-foot
units were designed with sufficient strength to permit stacking. Keith
Tantlinger, who was then with the Brown Trailer Corporation, tells how
his company delivered two prototype containers to the Bethlehem Steel
shipyard outside Baltimore in the summer of 1955, where Ideal X and Almena were being adapted for container service. Tantlinger expected to
meet Malcom McLean and other Pan-Atlantic officials for breakfast in a
downtown Baltimore hotel the next morning and then drive out to the
yard to inspect the two new units.
Tantlinger reached the coffee shop in ample time, but upon learning
that the Pan-Atlantic people had already left for the yard, he caught a
taxi and followed them. When he got there, he had to forgo the detailed
presentation he planned to make about the design of the new containers,
since McLean and his people were jumping up and down on top of the
prototype units to test its strength and durablity.60
A year later, the Pan-Atlantic fleet had expanded, and McLean was able
to load containers in stacks in the holds of his converted C-2s thanks to
their unique and patented corner castings, even carry additional containers as deck cargo atop the hatch covers since the corner castings could be
linked together with twist locks. The corner castings also enabled gantry
cranes to secure a safe and reliable hold on a container and hoist it on
and off ship. The business end of the gantry crane included a rectilinear
steel frame called a spreader that was the same length and width as a
container, eight feet wide and now thirty-five feet long. Each corner of
the spreader featured a toggle-like device the crane operator engaged by
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remote control to effect a secure hold of the corner castings atop a container. By the end of 1957, the year Gateway City entered service, PanAtlantic had become, according to Marine Engineering, ‘‘the biggest trucking concern in the world in terms of equipment owned involving 7,234
pieces of highway equipment.’’61 And while Brown Trailer produced the
first experimental units for Pan-Atlantic, the Fruehauf Corporation soon
became the principal supplier of the company’s containers. For instance,
in the spring of 1956 Pan-Atlantic placed an order with Fruehauf for 280
additional units.62
The thirty-five-foot trailer length that McLean adopted in 1957 did not
reflect any prevailing national or federal standard for such rolling stock.
It was selected, rather, in recognition of the fact that the state of Pennsylvania prohibited trailers in excess of this length from traveling its highways. Given Pennsylvania’s critical location with respect to New York
Harbor, though, limits set by the Keystone State were the next best thing
to a genuine national standard.
Measured against twentieth-century innovations in fields such as electronics or nuclear medicine, a thirty-five-foot box that can be securely
stacked atop similar boxes and that can be lifted by a crane hardly seems
like cutting-edge technology. But it was, and Malcom McLean’s foresight,
in 1963, in freely forgoing the patent rights that his company held for the
corner casting was an important factor in allowing the adoption of standards that permitted the extraordinary degree of interchangeability that
remains a hallmark of the contemporary container-ship industry.
Reaching agreement on the appropriate size of containers proved to be
a somewhat more taxing enterprise, though. McLean’s company continued to use the thirty-five-foot containers it adopted in 1957 well into the
1970s, and they quickly became the largest single fleet of such equipment
in the world. The American Standards Association (ASA) impaneled a
committee in 1958 to investigate the matter of uniform container specifications, in conjunction with the International Standards Association
(ISO), and decimal-based guidelines eventually emerged. Containers
could be built to any length that was divisible by ten, with forty feet as
the maximum. A further proviso was that two twenty-foot containers
placed end-to-end would be no longer than a single forty-footer, with no
protruding hardware. Any refrigeration equipment aboard a trailer, for
example, had to be contained within the same external dimensions as
nonrefrigerated units. From these early decimal-based standards, the
practice soon evolved to regard twenty-foot containers as the norm—
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neither ten-foot nor thirty-foot containers would ever prove to be popular—
and the basic quantification system employed by the industry today
involves what is called a trailer equivalent unit (TEU), with one TEU representing one twenty-foot container.63 (Some speak in terms of FEUs
today—forty-foot trailer equivalents—and suggest that the T in TEU can
stand for ‘‘twenty’’ as easily as ‘‘trailer.’’)
Congress tried to foster greater container standardization by mandating that federal construction–differential subsidy funds could not be
awarded for building container-carrying vessels that were not in conformity with ASA standards, but these requirements were eventually relaxed.
Twenty- and forty-foot containers continue to constitute the great bulk,
but not the entirety, of the world fleet today. Some sectors within the
industry have strayed from earlier standards, and forty-eight-foot containers, as well as other nondecimal sizes, enjoy a measure of popularity.
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3

FROM THE HUDSON
RIVER TO NEWARK BAY
1915–48

When one thinks of New York Harbor, the image that often
comes to mind is that of an inbound passenger liner proceeding slowly through the Narrows, past the Statue of Liberty, and finally ending its voyage at a pier along the
Manhattan side of the Hudson River. Whether it be the superliner United States steaming into port after its recordsetting transatlantic crossing in the summer of 1952, Cunard’s
Carpathia delivering survivors from the Titanic to New York
in April 1912, a fictional Vito Corleone reaching America in
the early years of the twentieth century in the film Godfather
II, or even a contemporary cruise ship returning from a relaxing voyage to Bermuda, the Bahamas or Canada, the
image is the same: through the Narrows, past the Statue of
Liberty, to journey’s end at a Hudson River pier.1

Newark Bay
Such an image, though, fails to acknowledge the extraordinary diversity that has long been New York Harbor.
The port of New York extends over a large, two-state area
and includes a variety of nooks and crannies—that is to
say, rivers, bays and tidal straits—where oceangoing vessels have docked over the years. Depending on their size,
ships can reach New York from the sea along two routes
that bypass the Narrows completely, and there are miles of
waterfront where deepwater ships can dock without ever
catching a glimpse of the Statue of Liberty.2
Consider, for instance, a broad inland estuary called
Newark Bay, a body of water that few visitors to New York
ever get an opportunity to see or experience—other,
perhaps, than a fleeting glimpse out the window of a car

speeding along the New Jersey Turnpike.3 The headwaters of Newark Bay
can be found where the Hackensack and Passaic rivers combine to form
the bay some 4.5 miles due west of the southern tip of Manhattan Island,
while the lower reach of Newark Bay is five miles to the south where the
bay flows into waterways called the Kill van Kull and the Arthur Kill opposite the northwest corner of Staten Island. When the converted T-2 tanker
Ideal X sailed away from New York on the evening of April 26, 1956, to
begin a voyage that is generally regarded as the start of the modern
container-ship era, the berth the vessel departed from was along the western shore of Newark Bay.
Newark Bay is not easily achieved by vessels inbound from the sea. To
reach the bay’s sheltered waters, a vessel must first pass through the Narrows. Instead of continuing north past the Statue of Liberty and into the
Hudson River, though, the route to Newark Bay requires a sharp turn to
port into the twisting strait known as Kill van Kull. The Kill van Kull is
less than a half-mile wide from shore to shore and subject to swift tidal
currents. The south bank of Kill van Kull is the north shore of the New
York borough of Staten Island, while the north bank is the southern limit
of the city of Bayonne, New Jersey. Transiting Kill van Kull requires skillful pilotage. The Saint George terminal of the famous Staten Island Ferry
is located on the Staten Island shore at the mouth of the Kill opposite
Robbins Reef light, and important oil terminals, with moored tankers
often extending out into the Kill from Constable Hook on the New Jersey
shore, is another tricky aspect of traveling from the sea to Newark Bay.
After making their way through almost four twisting miles of Kill van
Kull and passing under the Bayonne Bridge, ships bound for Newark Bay
then make a turn to starboard around Bergen Point and enter the broad
expanse of the bay.4 Tugboats typically rendezvous with inbound ships in
the Kill and assist with the turn into the bay, as well as with subsequent
docking. With the arrival of the tugs, a docking pilot boards an inbound
vessel and takes over from the harbor pilot who has guided the vessel in
from the offshore pilot station adjacent to Ambrose light station. In years
past, entering Newark Bay also required navigating through a pair of twin
lift bridges of the Jersey Central Railroad that were located across the
southern end of the bay. These bridges were removed in the 1970s as
railroad commerce in New York assumed different operational patterns.5
In any event, Newark Bay is today the site of the largest, busiest, and
most important container port on the entire East Coast. Indeed, in many
important respects, in the early years of the twenty-first century, Newark
Bay is New York Harbor.
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The Early Years
Matters were not always thus. As the nineteenth century became the
twentieth, the principal docks and wharfs that oceangoing ships used
when they visited the port of New York were traditional piers in Manhattan, extensive wharfage along the Brooklyn waterfront, plus a number of
piers on the New Jersey side of the Hudson River in Jersey City and Hoboken. With such facilities, though, the overall port of New York evolved
into nothing less than the principal seaport in all of North America, arguably the most important in the world.
With respect to passenger liners, New York harbor had few shortcomings. Unlike the channel ports of Europe where transatlantic passengers
had to travel inland aboard boat trains to reach such cities as London or
Paris, when one disembarked from the Mauretania or the Leviathan in
New York, the entire city was at one’s immediate disposal. The port of
New York, though, was a considerably less hospitable harbor for seagoing
cargo vessels.
The reasons largely involve contingencies of local geography. As one
instance, the streets of Manhattan Island that led to the piers where most
passenger and many cargo vessels docked were extraordinarily congested.
And so the delivery of cargo to and from Hudson and East River piers by
draymen and teamsters was hardly the last word in speed, efficiency, or
predictability. In addition, because the waterfront surrounding Manhattan Island is finite, the preferred docking facility in New York was the
finger pier, as it was called, a structure built out into the river perpendicular to the shore. The use of finger piers allowed more vessels to dock along
a given stretch of waterfront than would be the case with bulkheads built
along and parallel to the shore. Furthermore, given the intensive land-use
patterns that prevailed along the waterfront in New York and the fact that
deepwater cargo piers were located immediately adjacent to the city’s
business and commercial districts, the piers themselves were the principal
places where cargo could be stored before or after a voyage. Some warehouses could be found inland from various piers in New York and these
played a role in sustaining the port’s maritime commerce, but the congested nature of the streets of Manhattan, and the limited space available
on the piers themselves, remained defining limitations.
Finger piers featured different styles of construction depending on the
era when they were built. By the end of World War II, for example, the
most important harbor in all the Americas was an uneven mixture of the
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old and the not so old, the hopelessly outmoded and the reasonably passable. Many functioning piers dated to the nineteenth century and were
built atop wooden pilings, while more modern structures featured concrete foundations. An analysis published in Barron’s National Business and
Financial Weekly shortly after the end of World War II put matters this
way: ‘‘New York’s pier system has been dropping into the water, piece by
piece, for many years now.’’6 A few finger piers in New York were fully
open and provided no weather protection at all, but more typically, a
finger pier included a warehouse-like structure from one end of the pier
to the other that was called a transit shed, where inbound and outbound
cargo could be stored and sorted.
In Europe, by contrast, because major seaports tended to be located
away from densely settled urban areas—Southampton, not London; Le
Havre, not Paris—finger piers were less popular (and less necessary) than
long bulkheads with extensive acreage nearby for storing and sorting inbound and outbound cargo. It was also common, in European ports, for
movable cranes to be positioned along the wharves where ships docked
to assist in the loading and unloading of cargo. Furthermore, in Europe
one would frequently find railway tracks adjacent to ship berths to facilitate the transfer of cargo from one mode of transport to another, an advantage that was a good deal less common in the United States, and
practically (but not entirely) unknown in the port of New York.
Despite the lack of direct rail-to-sea transfer facilities, though, much of
the cargo destined for ships docked in New York harbor was transported
into the metropolitan area by train. Given the fact that finger piers in
Manhattan, where so many cargo ships docked were not adjacent to rail
lines, a complicated procedure evolved to transfer cargo from inbound
freight cars to the holds of outbound merchant ships.
It was hardly the last word in efficiency or dispatch, although it certainly was colorful, and its development was surely assisted by the fact
that the railroads serving New York conducted a good deal of interchange
among themselves by shunting freight cars onto special barges called car
floats that were equipped with railroad tracks, and then moving the
barges from one railroad’s terminal to that of another. Thus, freight cars
arriving in New York from points south and west over the Pennsylvania
Railroad and bound for New England would be placed aboard car floats
at a place in New Jersey known as Greenville, just to the south of the
Statue of Liberty. Then tugboats would move the barges across New York
Bay, and the cars would be handed over to the New York, New Haven and
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Hartford Railroad in the Bay Ridge section of Brooklyn for the rest of the
trip north into New England. When such operations were at their peak in
the years just before World War II, various railroads operating in and
around New York owned 101 tugboats and 241 car floats.7 (A general term
used to describe such short-haul maritime transfer work is lighterage,
while the specialized vessels designed to perform such tasks—tugboats,
car floats, and other styles of freight boats—are known generically as
lighters.)
Onward from the late 1890s, there was continual talk in New York of
building a belt line railway, so called, to facilitate the direct interchange
of freight traffic among the several railroads, reduce the need for lighterage, and permit more efficient transfer of freight from one railroad to
another and between rail cars and cargo ships.8 Proposals were advanced
with varying levels of detail, many including the construction of freightonly rail tunnels under New York Bay and the Hudson River. Indeed when
the Port of New York Authority was established in 1921, perhaps its most
important mandate was to promote the construction of such a belt line
railway.9
Just as the idea of a belt line freight railway in New York had languished in the years before the creation of the Port Authority, though, so
was the new agency unable to turn the concept into a reality, and railroads continued to rely on fleets of tugboats, car floats, and other lighters
to transport freight from railhead to ship—and from one railroad to
another.
Keen-eyed observers of the maritime fleets maintained by the several
railroads that served New York, though, could detect two different styles
of freight car–carrying barges. For direct interchange between railroads
when the name of the game was to carry as many freight cars as possible,
car floats included three side-by-side tracks and freight cars were positioned as close to each other as possible. A second style of car float,
though, featured only two tracks, with a loading platform in between,
and these were designed to facilitate the loading and unloading of freight
cars while they were on the car float. And so with a dozen or so freight
cars aboard, a tugboat would position such a car float next to a moored
cargo ship on the side away from the finger pier where the vessel was tied
up. Longshoremen would then proceed to unload the freight cars and
hoist the break-bulk cargo they contained onto the ship, while the process
was reversed, of course, when inbound cargo was moving from ship to
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freight cars. (Such two-track car floats were also used to transfer cargo
from freight cars to shore.)
Another style of lighterage for transferring cargo from railcars to merchant ships involved the use of specialized freight boats that required two
separate handlings by longshoremen—one from freight car to freight
boat, another from freight boat to seagoing merchant ship.
Such styles of service necessarily imposed penalties with respect to
both the speed and the cost of delivery. It would typically be several days
between the time an inbound freight car arrived in a classification yard
on the New Jersey side of the Hudson River to the time its cargo was
hoisted aboard a waiting cargo ship on the Manhattan side of the Hudson,
even though the distance between classification yard and deepwater pier,
as the crow flies, may only have been a mile or two. In addition, railroads,
whose primary business involved dispatching trains along tracks, were
forced to incorporate ‘‘marine divisions’’ into their tables of organization
and hire, in addition to locomotive engineers and conductors, masters,
mates, pilots and deckhands to operate their fleets of tugboats, car floats,
and other lighters.
The emergence of containerization in the years after the early voyages
of Pan-Atlantic’s Ideal X and Gateway City would first reduce, and then
eliminate, the need to transfer break-bulk cargo from freight cars to
oceangoing vessels, and the specialized fleets of lighters that were once
so common in New York Harbor would be rendered obsolete. In addition,
changing patterns of railway freight operations brought on by mergers
and consolidations would likewise play a role in dooming the once colorful practice of interchanging freight cars between railroads in New York
by car float. In the early years of the twenty-first century, there is but one
such service still in operation, although its future is difficult to predict. A
specialized carrier called the New York Cross Harbor Railroad continues
to use car floats to move freight cars from New Jersey to its right-of-way
along the South Brooklyn waterfront.10

The Emergence of Port Newark
In the second decade of the twentieth century, before America’s entry
into World War I—and with cargo operations in and out of the port of
New York relying on extensive lighterage operations to transfer consignments from freight cars to cargo ships—public officials in Newark felt the
time was right to convert hundreds of acres of undeveloped tidal marshlands along the western shore of Newark Bay into a working deepwater
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seaport. One extraordinary advantage that such a port in Newark would
have over similar facilities in New York proper was the fact that, unlike
Manhattan and Brooklyn, Newark was located on the mainland and could
manage the transfer of goods from freight car to cargo ship without the
bother and expense of lighterage services. Furthermore, because railroad
freight rates from inland cities to the metropolitan area were the same
whether a shipment was destined for a point in New Jersey or New York,
Newark felt its new port would prove attractive to railroads since they
would be able to forgo the expense of lighterage operations with no decrease in revenue.
In 1915, James M. Reilly, the secretary of the Newark Board of Trade,
prepared a pamphlet predicting ‘‘that the Newark Bay shore front will in
the course of a few years become a great centre of manufactures and
commerce and that the Port of Newark Terminal will become one of the
great seaports on the Atlantic.’’11 Reilly was not indulging in idle speculation. Work on the project had begun several months earlier and involved
a municipal expenditure of $2.5 million to construct ‘‘a system of dockage
extending a total length of 4,500 feet, 2,500 of which extends inward from
the shore line and borders full length on a water channel 400 feet in width
at the bottom, with a depth of 20 feet at low water.’’12 Newark had acquired 930 acres of marshland along the bay and within its city limits
for what was officially called the Bay Front Development and Meadow
Reclamation Project, but would soon be universally known, more crisply,
as Port Newark.
Port Newark featured a channel that was constructed inland from the
edge of the bay roughly following the course of a waterway known as
Maple Island Creek. For most of its length, the new channel was built
perpendicular to the shoreline. Looking out to the bay from the inland
end, though, the channel could be seen to feature a noticeable dogleg to
the right before entering the bay. Originally called City Channel, and later
Inshore Channel, this waterway is today known as Newark Channel, and
the ‘‘dogleg right’’ remains an obvious characteristic. Newark officials
were also able to marshal political resources and have the Army Corps of
Engineers increase the depth of the main channel in Newark Bay from
twelve to twenty feet.13 This first phase of development at Port Newark
involved the construction of docking facilities along only the northern
side of City Channel, as well as along the shore of Newark Bay to the
north of City Channel, although some marshland to the south of City
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Channel was reclaimed for future development. In addition to Maple Island Creek, a waterway known as the Peddie Street Canal also flowed
into Newark Bay, about a half-mile north of the creek. Sometimes called
the Peddie Street Ditch, this facility was built many years earlier as part
of Newark’s sewer system and played no role in the later construction of
Port Newark.
As the project proceeded and deepwater channels were dug across sections of the bay as well as through surrounding marshlands, the dredged
material was pumped ashore through large pipes to help create solid
shorefront behind bulkhead walls that had been erected along the water’s
edge. Part and parcel of Newark’s effort was the creation of useable acreage adjacent to its new seaport where manufacturers could build factories
and warehouses, and the city never failed to boast that three major trunk
line railroads—the Pennsylvania, the Lehigh Valley, and the Jersey Central—had rights-of-way that crossed the newly developed area so freight
could be delivered to the seaport with ease and dispatch. In addition, the
Jersey Central Railroad would operate passenger service into the new
development area from Newark, Elizabeth, and Jersey City, thus providing daily access for the many workers who would be required to operate
the new seaport. The city of Newark also constructed paved roads across
other portions of undeveloped marshland to allow motor vehicles and
horse-drawn wagons to reach the new seaport, emphasizing again the
fact that unlike the docks of Manhattan and Brooklyn, Port Newark was
not located adjacent to existing industrial and commercial districts.14
The first elements of Port Newark were completed in late 1915. The
formal opening of the facility was October 20; Newark mayor Thomas L.
Raymond declared the day to be Port Newark Terminal Day, and 25,000
people visited the new facility aboard special trains, jitney buses, steamboats, and private automobiles. For this initial phase, the city had reclaimed three hundred acres of marshland and incorporated it into the
new seaport.
What would substantially affect and even define the early history of
the new waterfront facilities on Newark Bay, though, was the nation’s
mobilization for World War I; considerable equipment destined for
doughboys fighting in France was loaded aboard cargo ships at the new
municipal facility. In October 1917, the federal government purchased 133
acres at newly developed Port Newark for a supply depot for the Army’s
Quartermaster Corps, and the city of Newark used the $1.3 million the
Army paid for continued expansion of the new port.15 Port Newark also
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became the site of an important wartime shipbuilding operation. The Submarine Boat Corporation leased space at Port Newark and constructed a
number of merchant ships for the United States Shipping Board on 14
shipways that were built along the shore of Newark Bay adjacent to City
Channel.16
For one reason or another, the Army retained control of considerable
waterfront acreage at Port Newark after war’s end, and it was not until
the summer of 1936 when the Army returned its Port Newark facilities to
the city. Municipal officials then quickly signed a contract with a Philadelphia-based company, Atlantic Tidewater Terminals, to operate the facility
as a commercial seaport under the name Newark Tidewater Terminals.17
Two steamship companies that quickly leased docking facilities at Port
Newark from Newark Tidewater Terminals were the Bull Line and American-Hawaiian, but another world war would soon impact additional commercial expansion, and Port Newark would once again serve as a port for
the dispatch of military equipment bound for troops fighting overseas. In
addition, World War II saw shipbuilding resumed at Port Newark.
The Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company had long been an
important U.S. shipbuilder. The company’s principal facilities were located a short distance inland from Port Newark along the banks of the
Hackensack River in nearby Kearny, New Jersey. Federal received numerous government shipbuilding contracts during the war, and the company
took over the former Submarine Boat Company works at Port Newark for
the duration and used it as an annex of its principal yard in Kearney.18
Something that made Port Newark an even more valuable military
asset during World War II than it had been during World War I was the
fact that on October 1, 1928, the city of Newark had opened a new municipal airport adjacent to its almost-new seaport. Like Port Newark, the Newark Municipal Airport was built on marshland, although it was inland
from the seaport and its construction did not require quite as much reclamation of tidal swamps as did Port Newark.
Newark Airport would become an important pioneer in American aviation. It was the first U.S. airport to feature paved runways, for instance,
the first to have runway lights for night operations, and the first to build
an elevated control tower to direct flight operations. Not surprisingly, because it was the only commercial airport in the New York metropolitan
area for several years, Newark quickly became the busiest airfield in all of
the United States, a title it would surrender in 1939, though, when commercial air service was inaugurated at a newly expanded air field at North
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Beach on Flushing Bay that was called the New York City Municipal Airport, and later renamed LaGuardia Field.
The U.S. Army Air Corps took over Newark Airport in early 1942 and
closed the facility to commercial traffic. It became an important asset for
dispatching military aircraft to Europe. Many warplanes flew to Europe
out of Newark Airport over a variety of routings, while others, upon landing, were hauled from the airport to the nearby seaport by tractors or
trucks, given a healthy dose of weatherproofing, and then hoisted aboard
ships for shipment to Europe. Some aircraft were hoisted aboard barges
at Port Newark and then transferred to oceangoing vessels moored elsewhere in the harbor, and many of the ships that transported such aircraft
to the European theater were T-2 tankers equipped with special spar
decks, a style of accommodation that would be used to inaugurate container ship service out of Port Newark in 1956.
As was the case following World War I, the Army retained control of
elements of Port Newark after V-J Day, and with the pace of cargo operations in the harbor no longer running at the frantic levels of wartime,
Port Newark played a rather modest role in New York Harbor’s immediate
postwar commerce. There was an added measure of inbound cargo in
New York during the immediate postwar years, for much of the war materials that had earlier been sent to Europe had to be returned, and with
respect to outbound cargo, the Marshall Plan was in full swing. Such traffic, though, lacked the pace and the urgency of wartime.
An important milestone was reached in 1947. The Army had no further
use of Port Newark, and the Port of New York Authority agreed to lease
both Port Newark and Newark Airport from the city of Newark and take
over their operations. The formal handover took place on April 1, 1948,
and the Port Authority immediately earmarked $66 million for a major
upgrade of the one-time municipal facilities—$55 million for Newark Airport, $11 million for the seaport.19
Onward from 1948, Port Authority investment and expansion at Port
Newark would be virtually continuous. Between 1948 and 1954, the public
agency earmarked $23 million to upgrade and expand facilities at Port
Newark; older wharves dating back to World War I were replaced with
new construction, while channels and slips were dredged to permit deeperdraft vessels to use the facility. By 1949 there was a working depth of
thirty-five feet from the Narrows to dockside at Port Newark, and hundreds of additional acres of swampland were reclaimed and absorbed into
the port facility.20
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What Port Newark was able to offer both steamship companies, as well
as shippers, during these early years under Port Authority management,
was spaciousness and convenience. Vessels docked not at narrow finger
piers located at the foot of congested city streets, as they did in Manhattan
and Brooklyn, but along lengthy bulkheads that featured extensive inland
acreage where cargo could be conveniently sorted and stored. In addition,
the entire seaport complex was far easier to reach by train or by truck
from inland points throughout the United States. By this time, facilities at
Port Newark included berths along both sides of City Channel, as well as
along the shoreline of Newark Bay, while the rail connections that Newark
officials boasted of in 1915 were expanded and spurs were extended along
various wharves to facilitate the direct transfer of cargo between ships
and freight cars. In addition, as truck transport assumed a larger role in
freight delivery throughout the United States during the postwar era, the
fact that the state of New Jersey was completing work on an important
north-south toll road called the New Jersey Turnpike during the early
years of Port Authority management at Port Newark gave the facility yet
another advantage as a cargo port. The north-south axis selected for the
New Jersey Turnpike ran—and continues to run—in a narrow corridor
between Port Newark and Newark Airport.
By 1952, two important U.S. steamship companies, Luckenbach and
American-Hawaiian, had leased terminal facilities and were operating
cargo vessels out of Port Newark, and the Port Authority was able to boast
that tonnage moving through its Newark seaport had doubled since it
took over operation of the facility four years earlier. The third steamship
line to execute a lease with the Port Authority and transfer its New York
cargo operations to Port Newark was the Waterman Steamship Company,
and along with Waterman came the vessels of its Pan-Atlantic subsidiary.21
Before moving to berths 15 and 17 on the north side of City Channel at the
foot of Doremus Avenue in Port Newark, Waterman and Pan-Atlantic vessels docked in Brooklyn at the foot of Columbia Street.
Expansion at Port Newark would continue under Port Authority auspices, and by the time Pan-Atlantic inaugurated container-ship service
there in the years after 1956, a dozen or more steamship companies were
making regular calls at Port Newark. These included Weyerhauser Steamship, Alcoa, Calmar Steamship, Pope, and Talbot. By 1956, the volume of
cargo moving through Port Newark was a small percentage of that still
being shipped from conventional piers in Manhattan and Brooklyn, but it
was a percentage that was getting larger year by year.
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Even before the onset of containerization, the convenience and the
spaciousness of Port Newark were important factors in establishing the
facility as an attractive cargo alternative to Hudson and East River piers.
Once the container revolution began to take hold, though, it was the availability of adequate docking facilities at Port Newark—spacious wharves
that lent themselves to the new and unusual needs of container-ship operators far more efficiently than older finger piers in Brooklyn and Manhattan—
that would permit the port of New York to retain its status as a major
seaport. When Port Newark was originally planned and developed, the
very idea of containerization was in a distant future beyond anyone’s horizon. Once containerization became a reality, though, the availability of
suitable docking facilities at Port Newark allowed the overall port of New
York to retain its status as the premier seaport on the East Coast. Were it
not for the facilities available at Port Newark in the years after 1956, maritime cargo operations in New York Harbor could well have gone the way
of such other once-important New York industries as shipbuilding, food
processing, and brewing. It could have gone elsewhere, to Baltimore, Norfolk, Halifax, or Savannah. But because of the availability of spacious
docking facilities at Port Newark, the overall port of New York continues
to play an important role in cargo operations in the twenty-first century.

The Port of New York Authority
When the Constitution took effect on March 4, 1789, a section in the
first article of that document would have a direct impact on the development of New York Harbor in subsequent years. In delineating the powers
of Congress, Section Ten of Article One issues a rather explicit prohibition:
‘‘No State shall, without the consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.’’
Because the Constitution prohibited the several states from creating
formal cooperative compacts with each other without explicit congressional approval, when various states had overlapping interests, the prevailing condition often turned out to be one of competition and conflict.
Such was clearly the case in New York Harbor. At one point, the state of
New York claimed that its jurisdiction included the entirety of all waterways flowing between New York and New Jersey up to the high water
mark on the New Jersey side. This created a situation whereby a person
strolling along the edge of the Hudson on the New Jersey side of the river
at low tide was, at least in the eyes of New York officials, taking a walk
on New York territory and subject to New York jurisdiction. (This situation
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was rectified by a formal treaty in 1834—an agreement that required congressional approval, of course—and the state line between New York and
New Jersey has since been recognized as midstream.)
In the early decades of the twentieth century, officials in both New
York and New Jersey began to realize that a more permanent style of
cooperation between the two states was necessary if the country’s most
important harbor was to generate continued benefits. Long-standing conflict between the two states was one strong motivation for seeking a new
and better alternative, with Newark’s construction of a totally new seaport
on previously unused marshland to compete with piers in New York a
clear instance of such conflict. Another matter, though, was a recognition
that New York Harbor did not function as efficiently as it might have
during the World War I mobilization.
A prototype arrangement that seemed to offer considerable promise
was one that had been created in and for London in 1909. Called the
Port of London Authority, it was a special-purpose public entity whose
jurisdiction, while specialized, extended across the boundaries of multiple
local governments. (Use of the word ‘‘authority’’ as the general term for
such a specialized public entity was reportedly a function of the fact that
multiple sections of British law permitting the creation of the Port of London Authority read, ‘‘Authority is hereby given.’’)
The situation of competing jurisdictions in the port of London was not
exactly parallel to that of New York vs. New Jersey, but in 1917 the legislatures of the two states established a study commission—the New YorkNew Jersey Port and Harbor Development Commission—and after three
years of study and analysis, and with wartime inefficiencies both manifest
and immediate, the commission issued a comprehensive report in 1920
that recommended the creation of a permanent two-state agency to foster
and oversee the development of transportation facilities throughout the
port.22
There was a fair degree of give-and-take between the recommendations of the commission and what the two state legislatures later enacted.
The commission had in mind an agency with rather far-reaching and basic
governmental powers, but the two states, wishing to reserve such authority to themselves and their subdivisions, created a unique kind of public
entity that could acquire, construct, finance, and operate port-related
facilities, but always with due deference to the priority of state and municipal units of government. The new entity could raise revenue by the sale
of bonds and from fees and rentals levied on the users of its facilities, but
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it was given no direct powers of taxation, nor could it undertake any
project at all without prior approval from impacted communities.
Congressional approval of the proposed compact was forthcoming in
1921, and a new public agency was established that was called the Port of
New York Authority. A formal treaty establishing the new agency was
signed in the lower Manhattan offices of the Chamber of Commerce of
New York State on April 30, 1921.23 (As a purely technical matter, the 1921
treaty was actually an amendment to the earlier 1834 agreement between
the two states.) Conspicuously absent from the gala ceremony was Francis J.
Hylan, then the mayor of the City of New York and an implacable foe of
the very idea of such a new two-state agency, along with Governor Edward Edwards of New Jersey, over whose veto the new agency was created.24 Governor Edwards’s hostility was probably less reflective of general
opposition to the creation of the Port Authority among his constituents
than was Mayor Hylan’s. Several decades of distrust, if not actual enmity,
would prevail between the municipal government in New York and the
Port of New York Authority.
Such disagreement aside, the new agency’s formal history began on
that April day in 1921. Its jurisdiction encompassed a 1,500-square-mile
port district that was located within a thirty-five-mile radius of the Statue
of Liberty, a district that included two state governments and 165 separate
municipalities.25
A vital characteristic that was intended from the outset to be the defining feature of the new agency was professional competence coupled with
a measure of insulation from the whims and fancies of elected politicians.
As Jameson W. Doig describes it in Empire on the Hudson, the new agency
‘‘embodied the ideal of technical rationality, of relying on experts who
focused on complex technologies and on large regional and national
needs, and who gave little weight to the parochial interests of individual
towns and cities.’’26
Despite claims and assertions to the contrary, the Port Authority would
never be totally free from ‘‘the parochial interests of individual towns and
cities.’’ The Port Authority would earn high marks over ensuing decades
for the technical competence of its staff and the professionalism of its
work. But it was to be the agency’s extraordinary ability to develop a
consensus for its agenda among its various political constituencies that
would be an even more defining characteristic. To assume that the Port
Authority is an independent colossus with no regard for democratic processes and principles, as some critics have, is both unfair and incorrect.
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The Port Authority was not the first entity to be created jointly by New
York and New Jersey. In addition to the 1834 compact to regularize state
boundaries, in 1919 an agency called the Bridge and Tunnel Commission
was established to build a twin-tube vehicular tunnel under the Hudson
River linking lower Manhattan and Jersey City. Construction got under
way the following year, and the project opened to traffic on November 13,
1927. Called the Holland Tunnel in honor of the project’s chief engineer,
Clifford M. Holland, in 1931 jurisdiction over the tunnel was transferred,
by statute, to the ten-year-old Port Authority.27
Between its creation in 1921 and the onset of World War II, the Port
Authority’s principal achievements involved the design, construction and
operation of various vehicular crossings between the two states. The Port
Authority directed a good deal of its early time and attention to the matter
of building the belt line railway that had long been advocated as vital to
the future of the two-state port, and such a goal was clearly set out by the
new agency in a Comprehensive Plan that it published toward the end
of 1921, mere months after it was established.28 Little cooperation was
forthcoming from the various railroads, however, and so the new agency
focused its attention on vehicular projects. These were also seen as necessary and critical in the Port Authority’s Comprehensive Plan of 1921, but
while initially conceived as part of a larger and more comprehensive effort that would involve major realignment in regional railroad operations,
the bridges and tunnels instead emerged as independent projects.
In any event, the Port Authority took over the Holland Tunnel in 1931,
the same year that construction was completed on the massive George
Washington Bridge linking Fort Lee, New Jersey, with the upper Manhattan neighborhood of Washington Heights. The new agency also built three
bridges linking Staten Island and New Jersey, and began construction of
a twin-tube vehicular tunnel under the Hudson River between midtown
Manhattan and Weehawken, New Jersey. This crossing was called the
Lincoln Tunnel. One of its two tubes opened to traffic in 1937; completion
of the second was delayed by World War II and did not open until after
VJ Day. (In the 1950s, a third two-lane tube was added to the Lincoln
Tunnel, and a planned second or lower deck on the George Washington
Bridge, originally intended to incorporate rail rapid transit, was built as
an automotive-only addition.) Table 3.1 provides additional details about
the Port Authority’s early river crossings.
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table 3.1. Port Authority Vehicular Crossings, 1921–40
Date
opened

Name

Style of construction

Between

Across

19211

Holland
Tunnel
Outerbridge
Crossing
Goethels
Bridge
George
Washington
Bridge
Bayonne
Bridge
Lincoln
Tunnel

Twin-tube underwater
tunnel
Cantilever bridge

Lower Manhattan and
Jersey City, N.J.
Staten Island and
Perth Amboy, N.J.
Staten Island and
Carteret, N.J.
Upper Manhattan and
Fort Lee, N.J.

Hudson
River
Arthur
Kill
Arthur
Kill
Hudson
River

Staten Island and
Bayonne, N.J.
Midtown Manhattan and
Weehawken, N.J.

Kill van
Kull
Hudson
River

1928
1928
1931

1931
19372

Cantilever bridge
Suspension bridge

Steel arch bridge
Twin tube underwater
tunnel

1. The Holland Tunnel was completed and opened for traffic in 1921 but not conveyed to the Port
Authority for management and operation until 1931.
2. Only one two-lane tube was completed and opened for traffic in 1937. The second tube was not
completed until 1945.

The Port in Port Authority
The Port Authority’s first venture into the maritime field was not a
major effort. In wartime 1943, at the request of New York’s governor,
Thomas E. Dewey, the agency took over the operation of a state-owned
grain elevator that was located along the Brooklyn waterfront on the
shore of Gowanus Bay at the foot of Columbia Street, close to the place
where Waterman and Pan-Atlantic cargo ships would dock after World
War II. Under state auspices, this grain elevator had been operated as an
adjunct of the New York State Barge Canal and used primarily for the
storage of grain destined for overseas markets. By adding such a facility
to its portfolio of responsibilities, though, the Port Authority was able to
boast that it now had real-time experience in the management of a maritime asset. It would build on this experience in a few years, although the
opening of the Saint Lawrence Seaway in 1959, which facilitated the direct
shipment of export grain from ports on the Great Lakes, all but eliminated
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such traffic through the New York State Barge Canal, and the Port Authority closed its Brooklyn grain elevator shortly afterward.
As World War II was winding down, Austin Tobin, who had been appointed the Port Authority’s executive director in 1942, began to direct the
staff ’s attention to an agenda of activities for the postwar era. Suspicion
of Tobin’s agency was still a consideration in many political quarters, especially the City of New York, and it was clear that a major transportation
dynamic once the war was over would be the need for expanded facilities
to serve the commercial aviation industry. In the postwar era, the Port
Authority and the city government would square off with each other over
the matter of airfields, but out of this conflict would emerge an era of
reasonable stability and cooperation.
In 1941, under Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, New York had begun work
on a major new airfield in southern Queens County on the shore of Jamaica Bay. Once wartime construction prohibitions were lifted, work resumed and the facility was called Idlewild Airport. Idlewild opened for
business on July 1, 1948, and was formally dedicated on July 31 by President Harry S Truman and other officials.29 (This facility is known today as
John F. Kennedy International Airport. The name Idlewild derived from a
golf course that previously occupied a portion of the site.)
The municipal government in New York, though, found that capital
investment funds were severely limited in the postwar era, and in 1946,
at the city’s urging, the state legislature enacted a measure authorizing
the city to form a municipal airport authority that would take over both
the older LaGuardia Field as well as the new Idlewild. Using the structure
of a quasi-independent public authority would enable the new agency to
issue bonds for airport construction over and above the city’s own restrictive debt limit, bonds that would be serviced by user fees generated at
the facility itself—landing fees, space rental charges, concessions, and so
forth.30
In opting for such a structure, the city was, of course, following the
model pioneered by the Port Authority itself in 1921. Indeed such quasiindependent authorities had become quite popular throughout the United
States in the years after 1921, with the City of New York taking a lead role
in establishing a number of such entities to finance the construction of
various highway facilities—the Marine Parkway Bridge, the Triborough
Bridge, the Queens-Midtown Tunnel, and a number of others. Each bridge
(or tunnel) was under the management of a separate special-purpose authority, bonds issued to raise construction costs were serviced from the
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facility’s own toll revenues, and these several authorities also had this in
common: Each and every one of them was controlled by an extraordinary
New Yorker by the name of Robert Moses. (In later years, these separate
authorities would be merged into the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, which itself would eventually become part of the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority of New York State.)
Moses, a controversial figure in New York from the 1930s through the
1960s, wore many hats. He was the appointed commissioner of the city’s
Department of Parks, he managed the several single-purpose authorities
that were created to promote the construction of various bridges and tunnels, he was the chief factotum of the Long Island State Park Commission
that built and operated parkways and beaches on Long Island, and he
headed up the New York State Power Authority. At one time, Moses simultaneously held down twelve separate public offices—and neatly sidestepped a legal prohibition that prohibited simultaneous employment at
different public agencies by accepting a salary from only one of them.
One of Moses’s titles was Coordinator of Construction for the City of New
York, and it was in this post that he was able to play an important role in
all the pulling and hauling that led to the passage of legislation authorizing a city airport authority in 1946.31
Moses’s feelings about the Port of New York Authority were fully as
hostile as were those of Mayor John Hylan two decades earlier. He was
adamant in his belief that the two-state agency had to be kept in check,
never failed to use the press to deliver pointed criticisms of the Port Authority, and was especially vocal in his opposition to allowing the Port
Authority to take over the operation of the city’s airports.32 Before the
new city Airport Authority assumed control of Idlewild and LaGuardia,
though—and while, thanks to Austin Tobin’s behind-the-scene negotiations and advocacy, the idea of the Port Authority’s moving into the aviation sector was under active discussion as an alternative course of
action—Moses made a critical blunder. As Robert Caro, his biographer,
describes it, when Moses told the president of Eastern Airlines, Eddie
Rickenbacker, of the hefty new user fees that would prevail at Idlewild
Airport once it was completed, Rickenbacker calmly announced that his
airline would not use the facility at all and would concentrate its operations instead at nearby Newark Airport.33 Mayor O’Dwyer was incensed at
Moses’s action, and, believing that comparable tolls and landing fees
should prevail throughout the metropolitan area, he responded by transferring responsibility for both city airfields to the Port Authority, despite
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the fact that the mayor had earlier voiced opposition to such an idea and,
indeed, had been an important proponent of the notion of a separate
municipal airport authority.
As a procedural matter, O’Dwyer first invited the Port Authority to submit a formal proposal for the operation of the city’s airfields. In actuality,
though, Tobin and his people had made extensive direct and indirect contacts with O’Dwyer and his staff, especially through influential members
of the banking community who suggested to the mayor that the new
Airport Authority would be unable to market its bonds. And so when
O’Dwyer issued a formal invitation to the Port Authority in 1946, it was
anything but a bolt out of the blue. It was, rather, the culmination of a
carefully orchestrated overture on Tobin’s part, with many technical details worked out quietly by the Port Authority staff long before O’Dwyer
issued his formal invitation.34 When Moses’s blunder finally tipped the
scales in favor of common operation of all commercial airports within the
port district, the Port of New York Authority was ready with a detailed
and formal proposal. A lease agreement was executed between the Port
Authority and the City of New York, and the former took over the operation of La Guardia Field and the still incomplete Idlewild Airport in 1947.35
The Port Authority’s role with respect to maritime facilities did not
develop quite as sharply, or quite as totally. Despite cooperation with the
two-state agency with respect to airports, the City of New York remained
unwilling to surrender any of its traditional control over docks within its
jurisdiction, even though the Port Authority’s first maritime venture was
its 1943 assumption of responsibility for the operation of a state-owned
grain terminal on Gowanus Bay in Brooklyn. Tobin continued to work
behind the scenes to create a climate that might result in a larger Port
Authority role along the New York waterfront, since he saw such expansion as vital to his agency’s future. In mid-1948, for instance, Barron’s
National Business and Financial Weekly reported that the Port Authority
was ready to issue $114 million in bonds to fund a massive rebuilding
program at a number of city-owned piers.36 But nothing would develop
from such a proposal for a number of years.
What proved to be the next target of opportunity for Port Authority
involvement in a working seaport developed as an adjunct, really, of the
agency’s negotiations with municipal officials in Newark for its takeover
of the operation of Newark Municipal Airport in 1948. The Port Authority
executed a lease with the city of Newark in October of 1947 to assume
control of Newark Airport, an agreement that involved the same kind of
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preparatory work by Tobin and his staff as was the case with respect to
the New York airports just a few months earlier.37
The jewel in the New Jersey crown was Newark Airport. Aviation was
new and growing and glamorous, while cargo ships were none of these
things. Tobin, though, recognized the importance of cargo operations to
the continued vitality of the metropolitan area, and he also realized that
expanding cargo operations at Port Newark could help achieve many of
the long-range objectives in the way of rail-freight coordination that had
eluded his agency during its early years. So while the Port Authority
would invest considerable resources over the next decades in expanding
the three airports that were incorporated into its mandate in 1947, quietly
adding Port Newark to its portfolio at the same time gave the two-state
agency an important toehold in the important sector of maritime cargo
operations. Hardly incidental was the fact that Port Newark had few of
the inherent limitations and liabilities that had long plagued cargo operations at various finger piers in Manhattan and Brooklyn.
Interestingly, what may well have been Port Newark’s greatest asset
when the Port Authority executed a lease agreement with the city of Newark in 1947 to take over its operation was the fact that hundreds of acres
of undeveloped marshland extended south of Port Newark along the
shore of Newark Bay and were available for expansion of the cargo terminal. This acreage was beyond the limits of the city of Newark and was
within the political jurisdiction of the adjourning municipality of Elizabeth. In later chapters, we will see how the Port Authority would expand
its initial holdings at Port Newark into this undeveloped marshland, dig
another channel in from the bay along the course of Bound Creek—the
boundary between Newark and Elizabeth—and create what, by century’s
end, would become the largest and most active cargo terminal on the East
Coast.

Organized Labor on the New York Waterfront
On Wednesday, April 28, 1948, a veteran reporter who worked for the
New York Sun was assigned to cover a seemingly routine crime story. Early
that morning a thirty-year-old man by the name of Thomas Collentine
was gunned down outside his home on Post Avenue in the Inwood section
of upper Manhattan while on his way to work. Collentine died in Jewish
Memorial Hospital some hours later, but when questioned by the police
shortly after the shooting, he replied, ‘‘I don’t know who shot me, and if I
did I wouldn’t tell you.’’38
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The Sun reporter, Malcolm Johnson, approached his assignment that
day with typical professional thoroughness. Decades earlier as a young
reporter, Johnson had exposed criminal activities of the Ku Klux Klan in
his native Georgia, and after moving to New York in 1928, he covered
stories as diverse as the fire aboard the passenger liner Morro Castle, the
Lindbergh kidnapping, and, during the recent war, the invasion of both
Iwo Jima and Okinawa.
The murder of Thomas Collentine, though, would soon lead Malcolm
Johnson to the most important story of his career—one for which he
would later receive a Pulitzer Prize.39 For in exploring this single violent
crime, Johnson uncovered an extraordinary and pervasive pattern of violence, lawlessness, neglect, and criminality that prevailed in the workplace where Thomas Collentine earned his livelihood each day: the docks
along the New York waterfront.
Collentine was a hiring boss on North River Pier 92. He worked for the
John W. McGrath Stevedoring Company and was the man who ran a
thrice-daily ‘‘shape-up’’ at Pier 92, a random process whereby lucky individuals were selected and given work assignments from among a larger
crowd of longshoremen seeking employment that day. The story that
Johnson uncovered and reported was one of shakedowns, kickbacks,
thievery, loan sharking, and random murder. It was a story that involved
corrupt union officials, disinterested shippers, spineless politicians, the
overlords of organized crime—and, of course, ordinary dockworkers
whose interests and welfare were being systematically ignored within a
larger context of crime and corruption. Malcolm Johnson would soon understand perfectly well why a mortally wounded Thomas Collentine
wanted no part of talking to the police.
Johnson’s work ran as a dramatic series in the New York Sun between
November 8 and December 10, 1948. Each Monday through Friday a new
exposé was published—a total of twenty-four, every one on the front
page—and readers were able to learn how such gangland notables as
Lucky Luciano, Frank Costello, Meyer Lansky, and Joe Adonis all had a
hand in criminal activities that helped define day-to-day operations along
the New York waterfront.40 Johnson’s explosive series resulted in Governor Dewey’s establishing a New York State Crime Commission to conduct
an in-depth investigation of waterfront conditions, and from the work of
this Crime Commission, genuine reform would eventually emerge.41 The
importance of Malcolm Johnson’s investigative series in 1948, though,
cannot possibly be underestimated. Johnson’s series even formed the
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basis of Elia Kazan’s 1954 film On the Waterfront, and this Academy
Award–winning effort was also instrumental in helping create a climate
where waterfront corruption would no longer be tolerated. (Local interests in New York were at first concerned that On the Waterfront would
only serve to divert cargo traffic from New York to rival East Coast seaports.) The larger question, though, concerns how conditions on the New
York docks deteriorated into such a sorry state of affairs.
From the early decades of the nineteenth century onward, the business
of shipping had been a pivotal industry in New York. And while the loading and unloading of break-bulk cargo ships provided employment for
thousands of New Yorkers over many years and decades, into the late
1940s the work of a longshoreman was structured in a most unusual way.
The hiring of longshoremen was dominated by a process called the
‘‘shape-up’’ that was conducted several times each day on a pier-by-pier
basis. No matter how long one had previously worked as a longshoreman,
each day brought no guarantee of a day’s work. Individuals who toiled as
longshoremen worked under a system where their employment was more
casual than steady.
The need for such an irregular system of work supposedly developed
out of the schedules that steamship lines operated. While liner services
nominally followed published schedules, they were schedules that were
established to suit the needs of steamship companies, not longshoremen.
Furthermore, even slight variations in schedule performance could
quickly translate into the arrival of several vessels one day, few the next,
with random arrivals and departures of unscheduled tramp steamers
merely exacerbating the irregularity of the overall situation. Consequently, a large pool of longshoremen was necessary to meet maximum
needs, while there would be insufficient work for the full pool on slack
days. Longshoremen, of course, only earned wages on days when they
actually worked.
In New York, steamship companies leased piers from the city and then
contracted with stevedoring companies to provide the workers who would
load and unload their ships. The stevedoring companies conducted the
shape-up and hired gangs of men each day, although some of the major
steamship companies bypassed stevedoring companies and hired longshoremen directly. There was another entity in the picture, the New York
Shipping Association. It conducted negotiations with the International
Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) on behalf of its stevedore and steamship company members to establish wage rates and other conditions of
employment for the longshoremen.42
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The extraordinary traffic levels in the port of New York during World
War II tended to mask many of the inherent problems associated with
working on the docks. But with the return to more normal traffic after V-J
Day, as well as the return from military service of men who regarded
themselves as lifelong longshoremen and were anxious to reclaim their
prewar jobs, labor problems on the New York waterfront quickly became
obvious. In simple terms, too many men were seeking too few assignments. The fact that criminality had also become rampant along the waterfront only made matters worse.
Longshoremen were unionized workers, with the ILA the sole bargaining agent representing New York dockworkers. By the postwar period,
though, the ILA had strayed from the lofty and democratic ideals that
were part and parcel of the American labor movement. The ILA perpetuated a system of casual and irregular employment along the New York
waterfront while the goal of most labor unions was to secure steady and
regular employment for its membership. Add to this the fact that the end
of Prohibition in 1933 saw a ‘‘migration of mobsters from the old bootlegger gangs into the loading rackets along the waterfront,’’ and corruption
became inevitable.43
In many respects, the cost of this criminality became an ordinary part
of doing business on the New York waterfront, and it was passed along,
indirectly but ultimately, to consumers of the goods passing through the
harbor. But in another sense, honest longshoremen, dues-paying members of the ILA, were turned into victims in a far more direct way. Each
and every longshoreman was utterly dependent on being individually selected at each day’s shape-up by a hiring boss who may well have been
working in partnership with known criminals. As a result, such a longshoreman ‘‘is not willing to jeopardize the little he has . . . by any disclosure of prevalent abuses.’’44
Under the shape-up system, the only qualification for seeking work on
any given day was ILA membership. All manner of criminal types rubbed
shoulders with honest workers in seeking daily assignments as longshoremen, and preferential hiring was often ensured by bribes and other forms
of coercion. The presence of so many criminals loading and unloading
ships understandably led to pilferage from break-bulk cargo shipments.
Indeed, the reason why certain individuals appeared at a morning shapeup and went to work with a gang of longshoremen was often not to earn
an honest day’s wage, but to facilitate the theft of whatever it was they
would be unloading. Nor should it be assumed that the word ‘‘pilferage’’
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meant the removal of odd and occasional items by individual longshoreman—a coffee percolator by one man, a pair of shoes by another—the
kind of freelance criminality one associates with random shoplifting from
a department store. There was a degree of such ad hoc pilferage, to be
sure, and in many cases it reached serious and measurable proportions.
But the practice was far more extensive and included highly structured
dimensions. An often-cited example was the pilferage of twelve tons of
structural steel from in front of North River Pier 46, a facility whose lessee
was the United States Lines, in the mid-1940s, clearly not something an
individual longshoreman could take home inside his lunchpail.45
Malcolm Johnson’s 1948 series in the New York Sun even brought out
the fact that the gangsters and syndicate criminals who prevailed along
the New York waterfront were intolerant of individual longshoremen
helping themselves to ‘‘a bottle or two of liquor or maybe a sack of potatoes to take home to their families.’’46 Wishing to reserve pilferage to
themselves, dock bosses and their criminal associates would often turn in
an individual longshoremen whom they discovered doing some freelance
stealing and see to his being fired.
A quite arresting study of the social problems that the shape-up system
of employment generated among New York longshoremen was written
by a Roman Catholic priest from Brooklyn by the name of Edward E.
Swanstrom.47 Swanstrom’s study, published in 1938, reflects waterfront
conditions in the 1930s, arguably prior to the worst years of criminality
on the docks. But Swanstrom documents vividly how the absence of
steady and predictable work—and that alone—quickly leads to a variety
of social pathologies in families that are dependent on a breadwinner’s
employment as a longshoreman.48
Edward Swanstrom was not the only Roman Catholic priest who
fought against the evils under which New York longshoremen were forced
to work. Shortly after he was ordained in 1944, a Jesuit priest by the name
of John M. Corridan, S.J., was assigned to the Xavier Labor School on
West 16th Street in the Chelsea section of Manhattan, and he quickly developed a ministry among nearby dockworkers.49
Criminality on the waterfront was more rampant when Corridan arrived on the scene in the 1940s than it had been when Swanstrom conducted his studies in the 1930s. And while mindful of the influence
exercised by organized crime on the docks, Corridan focused particular
ire on the role of the Shipping Association in preventing needed reform
and tolerating crime and corruption. He was also vocal in decrying the
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way the ILA had abdicated its role as an advocate for its own membership.
‘‘The ILA in this harbor is a racket union,’’ he said. ‘‘We have slave labor
today because the men have no voice in their union.’’50 Corridan—the
model for Father Barry in On the Waterfront—undoubtedly felt that supposedly legitimate organizations—the Shipping Association and the ILA—
were more susceptible to argument and persuasion than were lawless
chieftains who presided over the criminal underworld.
Not, perhaps, the worst of its ills, but the shape-up system also made
honest longshoremen especially vulnerable to loan-shark operations,
since a family needed groceries whether its breadwinner brought home a
pay envelope or not. Indeed, some longshoremen told reporter Malcolm
Johnson that dock bosses preferred to have their men indebted to the loan
sharks, since that made them more tractable. ‘‘At the pier where I work
you’ve got to stay in debt to the loan sharks to keep working. As long as
you owe them money you find that you keep working. If you are ever
lucky enough to pay them off, you suddenly find that you can’t work until
you borrow from them again,’’ one man said.51
Based on successful programs that had earlier been implemented in a
number of European ports, as well as in cities along the West Coast of the
United States, Edward Swanstrom had long advocated a ‘‘decasualization’’ of the work assignments of longshoremen—that is to say, the adoption of a system that would permit a greater degree of regularity in dayto-day work assignments and, above all, the elimination of the daily
shape-up.52 But it would not be until after World War II and the de facto
meltdown of labor-management relations on the New York docks in the
wake of Malcolm Johnson’s investigations, and the revelations that
emerged during the hearings of the Crime Commission, that such decasualization would be achieved. It would be achieved, in large measure, by
replacing the thrice-daily shape-up at individual piers with work assignments distributed in publicly operated hiring halls, by eliminating known
criminals from the pool of individuals seeking work as longshoremen, and
by linking established programs of unemployment insurance with a more
regularized work force to provide longshoremen with predictable levels
of take-home pay.
Clearly, such massive and fundamental reform could not—and did
not—happen all at once, and questions would continue to be raised as to
the thoroughness of labor reform on the New York waterfront. At first, the
ILA vigorously opposed efforts that stemmed from the findings of the
Crime Commission and refused to cooperate with the agency that was
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established in 1953 to oversee waterfront hiring, the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor. But in 1953 the ILA was expelled from the American Federation of Labor (AFL), and as a result of the revelations of the
Crime Commission, the ILA’s longtime president, Joseph P. Ryan, was
forced to step down from his leadership position in the union, a post that
he previously intended to retain for the rest of his life.53
Exactly how the trauma and reform that labor relations experienced
along the New York waterfront in the late 1940s and early 1950s affected
the subsequent shift of cargo operations in the port from largely breakbulk to primarily containerized is difficult to assess. Thanks to more progressive labor-management policies in subsequent decades and enlightened leadership at a reformed ILA, longshoremen became willing
partners in the shift to containerization and enhanced their own job security as they did so. They would sit down to negotiate with ship owners like
Malcom McLean and bring about a new era along the waterfront, one that
would see overhead gantry cranes hoisting containerized cargo aboard
ship in a fraction of the time it took during the days of break-bulk cargo.
Absent the reforms instigated by Malcolm Johnson’s articles, though, the
corruption that was so rampant along the New York waterfront could well
have had an extraordinarily negative effect on the onset of containerization, and substantially affected the subsequent success it would achieve
in New York Harbor.
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4

SEA-LAND
THE FIRST DECADE
1956–66

If Malcom McLean’s Pan-Atlantic Steamship Company pioneered container-ship operations with the April 26, 1956,
voyage of Ideal X from Port Newark to Houston, the idea
of carrying detachable highway trailers aboard oceangoing
ships would quickly gain popularity throughout the maritime world. Interestingly, though, while the overwhelming
majority of the world’s contemporary container ships do
not sail under the U.S. flag, virtually all the industry’s early
developments were achievements of American steamship
companies and the U.S. merchant marine.

Others Imitate McLean
The second major deepwater operator to experiment
with the concept of transporting seaborne cargo in intermodal containers was a truly old-line U.S. steamship company, the Matson Line.1 Matson vessels have long provided
an important link between California and Hawaii, as well
as points further west in the South Pacific. When Matson’s
Hawaiian Merchant, a C-3 cargo ship that had been built in
1945, quietly slipped under the Golden Gate Bridge and set
a course for Honolulu on August 31, 1958, it marked the
inauguration of container service on the Pacific. Hawaiian
Merchant had been rigged to carry a modest number of containers as deck cargo—a mere twenty or so—while her
below-deck holds remained configured for conventional
break-bulk cargo. The vessel reached Honolulu on September 6, 1958, and its containers were offloaded onto narrowgauge flatcars of the Oahu Railway and hauled away from
the pier by a diminutive diesel locomotive. (By 1958, the
Oahu Railway operated trackage only in the immediate

terminal area, and the containers that arrived aboard Hawaiian Merchant
had to be transferred to trailer trucks in a nearby freight yard for final
delivery.)
Five other Matson C-3s were also outfitted to transport containers atop
their hatch covers at roughly the same time, and Wayne Horvitz, an executive with Matson at the time, later downplayed the novelty of transporting containers as deck cargo. He likened such transport to hoisting any
kind of large and unwieldy cargo aboard ship. ‘‘It’s like you’re loading
an elephant for the Ringling Brothers Circus,’’ Horvitz later remarked of
Matson’s initial efforts at containerization.2 When Matson later added ro/
ro (roll-on, roll-off) vessels to its fleet, circus elephants were able to perambulate aboard ship—on their own hoofs—and forgo the indignity of
the cargo hoist.
Two years later, in the spring of 1960, Matson introduced its first allcontainer cargo ship on the San Francisco–Honolulu run, the Hawaiian
Citizen. She, too, began life as a wartime C-3, and after being rebuilt
into a fully cellular container ship at Willamette Iron and Steel’s yard in
Portland, Oregon, she was able to handle 356 containers.3 Design work
for the conversion was handled by Gibbs and Cox, and Hawaiian Citizen
set sail for Honolulu from the Encinal Terminals in Alameda, California,
on May 19, 1960, with a less-than-capacity load of 237 containers aboard.
Twenty-six were refrigerated units that required electrical connections
with an auxiliary power system aboard the ship to ensure that proper
temperatures were maintained inside these containers during the voyage.
Unlike Malcom McLean’s Gateway City and her five sister ships, Hawaiian
Citizen included no onboard gantry cranes for loading and unloading containers and relied, instead, on shoreside facilities for such tasks. Robert
Pfeiffer, the long-time chairman of Matson, recently reflected on this difference between himself and Malcom McLean. ‘‘And we’d have friendly
arguments. He believed in cranes being on the ship, we believed in cranes
[that] are on the dock,’’ Pfeiffer said.4
In addition, unlike the thirty-five-foot trailers that Pan-Atlantic specified for its rapidly growing fleet of container ships, Matson, following an
extensive engineering analysis, concluded that a twenty-four-foot trailer
body was perfect for the unique conditions that prevailed in its Hawaiian
trade. (At the time, California permitted two twenty-four-foot trailers to
be hauled by a single tractor on most state highways, while twenty-fourfooters were also more appropriate for narrow Hawaiian roadways.)
Oddly enough, while Pan-Atlantic and Matson can rightly be regarded
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as the two most important pioneers of seagoing container service in the
maritime industry, each company adopted a trailer body whose length
would prove to be at variance with industry-wide standards that would
soon emerge. Matson converted a number of additional C-2 and C-3 cargo
vessels into fully cellular container ships, as well as five larger C-4s. (See
chapter 8 for additional treatment of Matson’s container services.)
In 1960, a storied U.S. steamship company whose specialty had long
been cargo and passenger service to Central and South America, the
Grace Line, wrote another chapter in the growing field of containerized
transport when it dispatched the first such vessel to sail from the United
States to a foreign port. Grace Line’s Santa Eliana was converted into an
all-container ship from a wartime C-2 in Baltimore in late 1959 at the yard
of the Maryland Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company. Design work was
under the direction of the George G. Sharp firm, which had handled the
conversion of Pan-Atlantic’s Gateway City and her five sister ships two
years earlier. The effort for Grace Line reflected many of the same general
concepts: outboard sponsons added to the hull, onboard gantry cranes,
cellular container storage below deck with additional units secured on the
weather deck atop the hatch covers.5 Santa Eliana’s conversion differed
slightly from Gateway City’s in that her length was increased by having a
new forty-five-foot section spliced into the middle of her hull, and it may
well be that this modest increase in hull length gave the Grace Line conversion a more pleasant appearance than the earlier Sea-Land effort. The
magazine Via the Port of New York characterized Santa Eliana as looking
‘‘graceful’’—no pun intended, presumably—and while maritime commentators had lots of good things to say about Gateway City when she entered
service in 1957, all spoke to the vessel’s new forms of efficiency, while
none felt compelled to offer any compliments about that vessel’s
aesthetics.6
The overall cost of the Grace Line conversion was $6.9 million, and
because Grace was a longtime participant in various subsidy programs
run by the U.S. Maritime Administration, the federal government assisted
the steamship company in paying for the conversion. Malcom McLean, on
the other hand, long believed that federal subsidies were part of what
was wrong with the U.S. merchant marine and never sought financial
assistance from Washington for his container-ship operations.7
Grace Line adopted seventeen-foot trailers to initiate its new international service to Latin America, containers that were decorated with the
legend the company adopted for its new venture: ‘‘Grace Line Seatainer
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Service.’’ To underscore the importance it was placing on its new container operations, Grace Line painted the hulls of its converted container
ships in the same shade of gray it was then applying to the company’s
luxury passenger liners, not the black more commonly used for run-ofthe-mill cargo vessels. Santa Eliana included a traditional Grace Line funnel, dark green topped off with a white and black band. Grace Line’s first
container ship could accommodate 476 containers—382 in cells below
deck, the rest topside on the weather deck.
Santa Eliana departed from Berth 16 at Port Newark, where Grace had
leased space for its new international container service, on Friday, January 30, 1960. Captain Ronald Mackenzie was on the bridge, and Santa
Eliana was carrying a less-than-capacity load of 176 containers filled with
such U.S. export products as radios, machinery, chemicals, beer, aspirin,
and bubblegum. The schedule called for stops at three separate cities in
Venezuela, the first of which was to be La Guayra, a small port in the
eastern part of the country just across the Gulf of Paria from Port-ofSpain, Trinidad. Following La Guayra, calls were scheduled at Puerto Cabello and Maracaibo, and on the return trip to Port Newark, Santa Eliana
would carry but a single containerized commodity—coffee. Along with a
sister ship whose conversion Maryland Shipbuilding was in the final
stages of completing, another C-2 called the Santa Leonor, Grace Line
was poised to offer weekly container service between Port Newark and
Venezuela.
Except things did not exactly go as planned. When Captain Mackenzie
reached La Guayra, the Venezuelan Federation of Port Workers refused to
let its members unload the containers that Santa Eliana was carrying, and
a protracted standoff ensued. The union was concerned over the laborsaving implications of containerization and was attempting to ensure that
its members would not lose work—and, more important, wages—with
the onset of the new and more productive form of transport. Santa Eliana
remained anchored outside the harbor at La Guayra for over two weeks
while representatives of the stevedores, Grace Line, and the Venezuelan
government tried to find common ground for a settlement.8
A settlement was eventually reached, but it was more temporary truce
than permanent solution. Santa Eliana could proceed into port and unload its containers, but Grace Line agreed that it would not dispatch any
more container ships to Venezuela until a permanent arrangement was
negotiated with the federation.
sea-land: the first decade, 1956 –66 : : : 71

It took two years before Grace and the Venezuelan longshoremen
reached such an accommodation, and Santa Eliana and Santa Leonor
remained tied up during the negotiations, with Grace Line supposedly
incurring $2,000 in per-day and per-ship costs. Grace Line officials contacted United States Lines and inquired as to that company’s interest in
establishing a jointly operated transatlantic container service—ships, containers and terminal facilities at Port Newark supplied by Grace, the transatlantic route, service marketing and docking rights in Tilbury, England,
the contribution of U.S. Lines. U.S. Lines, however, had no interest in
such an arrangement, believing, at the time, that containerization was a
short-term fad that was unworthy of its attention. Meanwhile, discussions
and negotiations in Venezuela quickly spread to matters quite beyond the
original issue and involved questions associated with how Grace Line’s
new container ships would impact the operations of break-bulk cargo
ships sailing for the Venezuelan Line—and the jobs of workers who toiled
aboard such vessels.
In October 1962, Grace announced that the two vessels would soon
resume—or, more properly, inaugurate—the service for which they were
intended. Another labor issue erupted at the last minute to complicate
matters further, though, this one involving a Manhattan local of the International Longshoreman’s Association (ILA) that objected to the transfer
of work from the Hudson River piers that Grace Line traditionally used to
Port Newark, a dispute in which the ILA found an unexpected international ally in the same Venezuelan longshoremen’s union that scotched
Grace Line’s original plans back in 1960. Once this dispute was resolved,
Santa Eliana and Santa Leonor went to work on the world’s first international container-ship service in late 1962. But the labor agreements on
which the service was based proved to be illusory and the two vessels
were quickly withdrawn, never to operate in Grace Line service again.
Interestingly, Malcom McLean had faced a similar standoff by Caribbean labor interests when he attempted to inaugurate container service
to Puerto Rico in 1958. McLean, of course, was anxious to expand his
operations, and after successfully establishing service between Atlantic
and Gulf Coast ports in 1956 and 1957, the next sector he felt was an
appropriate market for container-carrying vessels was service to and from
the island commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a jurisdiction heavily dependent
on a steady flow of imports from the mainland. Rather than operate his
intended new service under the Pan-Atlantic house flag, McLean utilized
a separate operating company that was called the Waterman Steamship
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Corporation of Puerto Rico, and on February 27, 1958, Bienville—one of
Gateway City’s five sister ships—set sail from Port Newark with 266 containers aboard, many of them refrigerated units filled with meats, fruits,
and vegetables.
It proved to be a singularly unsuccessful inaugural. Because when Bienville reached San Juan several days later, longshoremen there who were
members of the United Dock Workers refused to unload the vessel, since
they had grave reservations about job security. The standoff continued
for the better part of a month, with the governor of Puerto Rico, Luis
Muñoz Marı́n, playing a personal role in efforts to find common ground.
Finally, on March 27, four weeks after she had set sail from Port Newark,
Bienville left San Juan, all cargo still aboard, and set a course for New
Orleans while matters were allowed to sort themselves out.9
Over the next several months, McLean negotiated a long-term agreement not with the United Dock Workers but with the ILA, a much larger
labor union that he had successfully dealt with in New York and other
mainland ports. In late July 1958 container-ship service between Port
Newark and Puerto Rico finally got under way, with Azalea City and Fairland now assigned to the service.10
Oddly enough, a steamship operator called Seatrain Lines also faced
the problem of uncooperative Latin American longshoremen back in 1928
when that company attempted to inaugurate a style of cargo service that
anticipated McLean-style container operations in several important
respects.
Seatrain—more formally the Over-Seas Steamship Company—
specialized in transporting cargo in sealed containers that could travel
from shipper to consignee without any en-route handling by the likes of
stevedores. Except the ‘‘containers’’ that traveled aboard Seatrain vessels
were not highway trailers detached from their running gear by gantry
cranes; they were full-size railroad boxcars that were hoisted aboard ship
at the company’s various terminals. Boxcars—ninety or so of them—
traveled as cargo on a Seatrain vessel running gear and all, and the several decks of the company’s highly specialized vessels were equipped with
railroad tracks so cars could be shunted forward and aft by mechanical
devices aboard ship.11
In any event, Seatrain’s initial market was service between U.S. ports
and Cuba. Except when the first Seatrain vessel—a British-built ship that
was registered in Canada and called, appropriately enough, Seatrain—
steamed into Havana Harbor in December 1928, Cuban longshoremen
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told the vessel’s captain that it was their intention not only to hoist the
box cars ashore as Seatrain intended, but to remove cargo from the freight
cars on the pier, manually, once they were brought ashore, then restore
it all back aboard the cars before turning them over to Cuban railways
for eventual delivery to their destinations. Seatrain soon worked out an
agreement with the longshoremen in Havana, but it was a foreshadowing,
certainly, of difficulties Malcom McLean would later face in Puerto Rico,
and Grace Line would experience in Venezuela.
Seatrain, a company with corporate links to the Ward Line, was both a
commercial and an operational success, and turned a nice profit hauling
loaded freight cars between ports along the East Coast, and across the
Straits of Florida to Cuba, onward from the late 1920s. The original Seatrain was later renamed Seatrain New Orleans, re-flagged in the United
States, and became part of a fleet that grew to five vessels by 1940. Seatrain Lines made an aggressive effort to adapt its operations to the realities of containerization in the post-Gateway City era, and not without
some success. Although Seatrain was liquidated in 1982, for several seasons the company could well be regarded as providing Malcom McLean
with some of his most vigorous competition.12
Another company that attempted to enter the new ‘‘trucks-at-sea’’ market in the late 1950s was called the Erie and Saint Lawrence Corporation.
After lengthy studies and evaluations, the firm retained the George G.
Sharp firm to design a pair of yachtlike, diesel-powered vessels that, depending on one’s definitions, could merit the distinction of being the first
container ships to be built from the keel up in the United States.
The vessels were small—362 feet from stem to stern—and while they
could transport containers, they were primarily ro/ro vessels and accommodated a maximum of 190 loaded containers, either as deck cargo or in
a garage-like lower deck that was reached through a stern gate. Neither
ship was equipped with vertical cells for carrying containers in their
holds, a feature that would soon come to be regarded as mandatory for
calling a vessel a bona fide container ship. Built at Maryland Shipbuilding
and Dry Dock, the twin motor vessels were called New Yorker and Floridian, and they inaugurated a New York–Jacksonville route in the summer
of 1960.13
The wonderfully named Erie and Saint Lawrence Corporation would
not prove durable, however, and the company hauled down its flag in
April 1961, less than a year after service was inaugurated. The Bull Line
then charted New Yorker and Floridian for service between Florida and
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Puerto Rico, but Bull Line, as will be seen shortly, was also on its last legs.
New Yorker and Floridian were later acquired by Malcom McLean and
used in service to Puerto Rico, primarily for their ro/ro capabilities. Floridian would enjoy a relatively brief tenure with McLean, but New Yorker,
later renamed Aleutian Developer, was deployed for many years as a
feeder vessel on the northern end of a route the company would soon
inaugurate between Seattle and Alaska.

No More Pan-Atlantic
With the onset of a new decade, McLean decided it was time to retire
the Pan-Atlantic name and logo. From early 1960 onward, his entire intermodal venture—trucks, trailers, and ships—would be known as Sea-Land
Service, formally as well as informally. The company was operating container ships between East and Gulf coast ports, also from the mainland to
Puerto Rico, and the concept McLean had introduced was not only proving to be a practical and attractive alternative for shippers, after suffering
losses during its startup years, in 1960 the company began to post annual
profits. (Sea-Land veterans of the early years tell of payless paydays from
time to time when the new company’s cash flow was less than robust.)
Sea-Land Service was also unusual to the extent that it was a U.S.-flag
deepwater steamship company that was operating with no subsidies from
the federal government. Onward from the passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the United States Government made funds available for
oceangoing steamship companies under two general programs. One was
a construction-differential subsidy that provided ship owners with money
to help offset the higher labor costs associated with ship construction in
domestic ship yards, while the other was an operating-differential subsidy
that helped steamship lines offset the higher wages American crews typically earned. Since the Jones Act prohibited foreign-flag steamship companies from offering any wholly domestic services, operating-differential
subsidies were not available for such trades, although constructiondifferential subsidies certainly were. The dual subsidies, justified as public
policy to ensure a vigorous and active merchant marine in the event of
future war, had become a virtual article of faith for many elements of the
U.S. maritime industry. It was a faith, however, toward which Malcom
McLean and Sea-Land maintained a posture of total apostasy.
While McLean was steadfast in keeping Sea-Land free of any encumbrances associated with various government subsidies, a different approach prevailed at Waterman Steamship, also a subsidiary of McLean
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Industries. Initially, Pan-Atlantic and Waterman were jointly managed out
of the older company’s headquarters in Mobile. By 1958, though, McLean
decided that a few degrees of separation would be a better idea. Waterman was about to go a different way and was seeking federal subsidies
for its international services, while it was also becoming clear that the
epicenter of Pan-Atlantic’s new container operations was New York Harbor. So James McLean was left to manage the Waterman side of the house
in Mobile, and McLean Industries also remained in Mobile. But Malcom
McLean moved north and established a new headquarters for Pan-Atlantic
in an old pineapple warehouse at the foot of Doremus Avenue in Port
Newark.14
The next area that McLean felt was an appropriate market for container-ship operation was service between the East Coast and the West
Coast via the Panama Canal, a lucrative trade for break-bulk cargo ships
before World War II but virtually abandoned by steamship companies in
the face of railroad competition in the postwar era.
On March 22, 1961, the 110-year-old Luckenbach Steamship Company
dispatched its C-4 cargo ship Marine Snapper from San Francisco. It was
bound for the East Coast, and coupled with an earlier departure from
Brooklyn for San Francisco of the same company’s Lena Luckenbach, it
was widely thought that intercoastal cargo service had come to a sad,
inevitable, and probably permanent end, since Luckenbach, the only company then offering such service, had announced it would do so no longer.
‘‘We were truly driven out of this trade by actions of the Interstate Commerce Commission favoring the railroads,’’ the company’s president,
Edgar F. Luckenbach, said.15 Mere weeks later, though, Malcom McLean
announced that Sea-Land would soon restore intercoastal steamship
service.16
Pan-Atlantic had petitioned the ICC for authority to operate intercoastal service in 1956. The commission granted McLean’s company permanent authority in November of 1957, and it was on the strength of this
ICC action that Sea-Land revived intercoastal service in 1961 using a pair
of conventional C-2 break-bulk cargo ships from the Waterman fleet. Although it had not been converted into a genuine cellular container ship,
Fairport began loading containers and general cargo in Portland, Oregon,
on April 14, 1961, and transported this cargo from the West Coast to San
Juan, Puerto Rico, where containers were transferred to one of McLean’s
specialized vessels for the final leg of the voyage to Port Newark. True
container-ship service to and from the West Coast would have to wait on
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the availability of a new generation of Sea-Land container-carrying vessels that were then under development.

Elizabethport and Her Sister Ships
The vessels McLean acquired for his new intercoastal service involved
more than the mere conversion of older tonnage for container-carrying
service, although they did not quite constitute anything that could be
regarded as vessels that were purpose-built from the keel up. The project
would also involve shipyard work performed on two different continents.
The starting point of the new class of container ships was a quartet of
veteran T-3 tankers that McLean acquired from Esso Standard Oil. Once
dry-docked, shipyard workers proceeded to cut off both the bow and the
stern of each old tanker, the latter being that portion of the ship where the
vessel’s propulsion machinery was located. Liberated midsections were
discarded, while boilers and engines were overhauled and returned to
like-new condition. Unlike many wartime T-2s that were built with turboelectric propulsion because marine reduction gears were difficult to acquire, the ex-Esso T-3s featured steam turbine engines geared to the propeller shaft. Meanwhile, an entirely new 417-foot midbody section that
had been constructed across the Atlantic at a shipyard in Hamburg, West
Germany, was towed to North America to mate up with the bow and stern
of the old T-3.17
One minor problem was that the midbodies had been designed on the
assumption they would be spliced into T-2 tankers, not the slightly different T-3s McLean eventually acquired. Some last-minute design revisions
were required to match the new midbodies to the dimensions of the T-3,
but once joined, and with a new bridge and deckhouse built atop the
stern section, McLean’s design foreshadowed the general profile of most
contemporary container ships—pilothouse and deckhouse aft, with cargo
holds located between the deckhouse and the bow. Sea-Land itself, as
well as other companies, would deviate from this profile from time to
time in subsequent years, but the general appearance the new class of
vessels exhibited in the early 1960s would effectively foreshadow common features of many container ships in the following decades.
To handle design work for these latest additions to his fleet, McLean
retained the services of the J. J. Henry Company, an eminent New York
naval architecture firm that would go on to enjoy a long and productive
relationship with Sea-Land. The design Henry executed produced ‘‘new’’
vessels that were 628 feet long—as against the 501 feet of the T-3 tankers
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out of which they were partially built. The conventions of vessel documentation are such, however, that each reconfigured ship retained the
same government-issued official number as the tanker whose bow, stern,
and propulsion machinery it utilized, and could thus be considered the
same vessel as the older T-3. This was a far from trivial matter, because
thanks to a legal interpretation issued by the United States Customs Service, McLean was able to have new midbodies constructed in less costly
European shipyards while still preserving the right to operate his ships
in coastwise and intercoastal trades where strict Jones Act requirements
prevailed—that is to say, trades requiring vessels that were built in U.S.
shipyards. Congress would quickly close this loophole—and Sea-Land’s
competitors filed suit, unsuccessfully, to have McLean’s rebuilt vessels excluded from Jones Act trade.18 But for a short period of time in the early
1960s, steamship owners were able to regard the overseas construction of
an entirely new vessel midbody that was four hundred or more feet long
as a mere ‘‘repair’’—not unlike fixing a broken mast light or putting a new
hinge on a pilothouse door—something that did not have to be performed
in a U.S. shipyard to retain a vessel’s right to operate in Jones Act service.
The first of the new class was completed at Todd’s Hoboken yard across
the Hudson River from midtown Manhattan in the fall of 1962 and was
christened Elizabethport, to honor a new 92-acre, $150 million Sea-Land
terminal and office complex on the shore of Newark Bay, but to the south
of the Port Newark terminal at the foot of Doremus Avenue that McLean’s
ships had previously used. Built by the Port of New York Authority and
leased to Sea-Land, the new facility included five steamship berths, as
well as an open area where two thousand containers could be stored. (By
this time, Sea-Land owned more than eight thousand containers, plus five
thousand chassis to move containers over streets and highways to and
from their landside origins and destinations.) Sea-Land executives and
staff were also able to move out of the former pineapple warehouse
they used as a headquarters building at Port Newark and manage the
company’s expanding business, instead, from a new and modern 200,000square-foot office building at the new site.19 Among the benefits incorporated into the new complex was an up-to-date computer system for
monitoring the location of ships and containers throughout the company’s
rapidly expanding service area.
When Sea-Land was working out of the Doremus Avenue facility, the
only technique for keeping track of where various containers were located
around the Port Newark property was a big magnetic board inside one of
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the offices that featured an outline map of the facility, and a quantity of
colored and numbered magnets that were positioned on the board to indicate where individual containers had been parked. One weekend—or at
least so the story goes—a Sea-Land executive brought his young son to
the office and told the boy to amuse himself for a hour or so while he took
care of some paperwork. The youngster did, except when the operations
staff reported for work early Monday morning, they found all the numbered magnets stacked neatly on the floor, and nobody had the slightest
clue where any of over 2,500 containers were to be found around the
yard.20
With a 417-foot midbody section that had been built at the Schlieker
Werft yard in Hamburg, West Germany, and towed across the North Atlantic by the Dutch tug Thames, and with a bow, stern and machinery that
had previously been the heart of the T-3 tanker Esso New Orleans, SeaLand’s newest container ship, Elizabethport, set sail from her namesake
city on September 8, 1962, bound for Los Angeles and San Francisco.
Several days after heading out the Kill van Kull and clearing New York
Harbor, Elizabethport earned the honor of being the first all-container ship
to transit the Panama Canal, and on September 26, the eighteenth day of
the voyage, Elizabethport sailed under the Golden Gate Bridge and into
San Francisco Bay.
(Speaking of lengthy voyages, the tug Thames required fifty-one days
to tow Elizabethport’s new midbody from Hamburg to Hoboken. By contrast, a fifteenth-century Italian navigator by the name of Columbus was
able to sail from Palos, Spain, to the New World in seventy days—and
that included a four-week stopover for repairs in the Canary Islands.)
In the same month that Elizabethport inaugurated container-ship service between New York and the West Coast, the newly created New York
Mets, the National League successor of the since-departed Dodgers and
Giants, who had been scheduled to play each other on the day Ideal-X
inaugurated the container-ship era, completed the team’s first season in
the big leagues, and managed to lose a grand total of 120 games, a dubious achievement that no major league team has yet been able to exceed
or equal.
During the weeks and months after Elizabethport inaugurated container service between New York and the West Coast, three sister ships
were delivered to Sea-Land that incorporated the same design concept—
bow, stern, and machinery from a T-3 tanker, with a new midbody built
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in West Germany and towed across the North Atlantic. Like McLean’s earlier C-2 conversions, the new vessels featured onboard gantry cranes for
hoisting containers on and off ship. By way of capacity, the reconfigured
vessels were able to handle 476 of the thirty-five-foot containers Sea-Land
still preferred to use, better than double the capacity of Gateway City and
her sister ships. With the advent of the four new vessels, Sea-Land’s roster
of container ships grew to ten hulls, Ideal X and the other T-2 tankers
of 1956 having been quietly withdrawn from service and sold. Table 4.1
identifies the four vessels that McLean added to his fleet in 1962 to inaugurate intercoastal container service.
table 4.1. Sea-Land Fleet: T-3 Tankers of 1962
Off. No.

Name

Hull dimensions

GRT

Place built (year)

Notes

242557

Elizabethport
a) Esso New
Orleans
b) New Orleans
Los Angeles
a) Esso Albany
b) USS
Housatonic
c) Esso Albany
d) Esso
Bethlehem
San Francisco
a) Esso Trenton
b) USS
Chicopee
c) Esso Trenton
d) Esso
Chattanooga
San Juan
a) Esso Raleigh

627 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 27

16,395

Chester, Pa.
(1942)

1

620 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 30

16,395

Chester, Pa.
(1941)

2

630 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 27

16,401

Chester, Pa.
(1941)

3

630 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 27

16,395

Chester, Pa.
(1942)

2

241153

241220

242653

Notes
1. Rebuilt for container service by Todd Shipyards, Hoboken, N.J.
2. Rebuilt for container service by Bethlehem Steel, Hoboken, N.J.
3. Rebuilt for container service by Bethlehem Steel, Baltimore, Md.
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A brief reflection is in order, though, about the novelty—and the
value—of placing a vessel’s pilothouse and its deckhouse close to the
stern. A few years earlier, Henry J. Karsch, of the same J. J. Henry Company that did the design work for the Sea-Land conversions, had been
project manager for an effort that resulted in the lengthening of several
T-2 tankers for Hess Petroleum, and Karach was instrumental in having
these conversions include the concept of an aft deckhouse. Some years
later, a conventional tanker of another company with its bridge and deckhouse amidships suffered an unfortunate explosion, a blast that took a
heavy toll on the ship’s crew who were working in the amidships superstructure—directly over the vessel’s petroleum-carrying tanks.
After this tragedy, aft superstructures became the rule on tankers, and
it was Karach who advocated placing Elizabethport’s pilothouse atop an
aft deckhouse. This, too, would soon become standard container-ship
practice, although not for the same safety-related reasons as prevailed
aboard tankers. With container ships, placing a vessel’s container-carrying
holds in an open area not bisected by an amidships deckhouse greatly
facilities the work of gantry cranes in loading and unloading a vessel,
although in subsequent years, many container ships whose deckhouse
was located well aft would also carry a small number of containers behind
the deckhouse. From a navigational perspective, an aft pilothouse places
the ship’s officers further away from the bow, but it provides a better
perspective on how the ship is performing, especially while maneuvering
in close quarters. With a pilothouse located forward, it is sometimes difficult to detect when the stern of the ship has begun to swing in one direction or another.
In 1963, the year after Sea-Land began running Elizabethport and her
three sister ships between the East and West coasts, the company acquired
an unusual piece of marine equipment so container service could be extended north beyond San Francisco Bay to Portland, Oregon. The new
addition was a 313-foot unpowered barge that was certified for openocean use, could accommodate sixty-seven thirty-five-foot containers on
two separate decks, and was named Columbia. Unlike Sea-Land’s ordinary
container ships, though, Columbia was a ro/ro vessel, and most of the
trailers it transported rode on their own undercarriage. Columbia, of
course, could only travel between San Francisco and Portland in the company of a powerful seagoing tug, and Sea-Land contracted with the Foss
Launch and Tug Company of Seattle to provide such propulsion.21 Two
years after entering service, Columbia would become one of Sea-Land’s
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few deep-sea casualties. On February 27, 1965, while en route north out
of Oakland, tug and barge found themselves racked by a severe Pacific
storm. The tug’s crew was forced to cut the barge loose, and Columbia
promptly sank—along with sixteen containers and ten chassis.22
Also roughly coincident with Sea-Land’s extension of container service
to the West Coast was another new option for the company’s customers:
the opening of a terminal in New York in mid-1961 that catered to what,
in railroad parlance, would be called ‘‘less than carload lots’’ (LCL) of
freight. With Sea-Land, the term might be revised to ‘‘less than container
lots,’’ but the fact remains that a new Sea-Land terminal at 501 West 19th
Street, in Manhattan, was a place where shippers could send smaller consignments that Sea-Land would then consolidate, place aboard containers, and forward to their destinations.23
A final matter that relates to Sea-Land’s inauguration of intercoastal
service in the early 1960s is the fact that a one-time operator of such
service, the American-Hawaiian Steamship Company, was actively considering a reentry into the market. In 1955, American-Hawaiian had come
under the control of an American shipping executive of extraordinary talent, Daniel K. Ludwig. American-Hawaiian had withdrawn from intercoastal service two years earlier in 1953, but after Ludwig took charge, all
manner of proposals began to surface to the effect that the company
would acquire ten new container ships and resume service between the
East Coast and the West Coast.
In point of fact, American-Hawaiian would acquire no new vessels, and
since Ludwig disposed of all the company’s other tonnage in 1956, the
American-Hawaiian house flag would never again fly from the mast of
any vessel. But Ludwig’s maneuverings were taken quite seriously, and
the upshot of it all was an agreement between Ludwig and McLean that
saw Ludwig purchase 800,000 shares of Sea-Land stock and become a
major investor in McLean’s company. Daniel Ludwig did not remain a
force at Sea-Land for very long, and he soon redirected his talents and
capital to the sector with which he will always remain most identified: the
construction and operation of tankers and other kinds of bulk carriers.24

Management Style
As Sea-Land grew from a small company promoting a new and untested transport technology into a major force in the U.S. merchant marine, the way the company conducted its business also evolved. Initially,
Sea-Land was a freewheeling operation that had little regard for the kind
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of constraints—that is to say, established business procedures—that were
common at older companies, particularly older steamship companies.
Malcom McLean’s own managerial style went hand in glove with the character of the company’s early years, and some trace his tolerance for such
an approach to his own roots in the over-the-road trucking industry, a
sector that was hardly known for its button-down behavior.
McLean’s own penchant for numbers and his ability to absorb, analyze,
and recall instantly enormous volumes of quantitative data set the tone.
Sea-Land veterans remember how during the early years at Port Newark,
he would constantly scribble odd notes to himself on small scraps of paper
and toss them indiscriminately into one of his desk drawers. Weeks and
even months later, when a related matter was under discussion, McLean
had the uncanny ability to open the drawer and fish out whatever it was
he had earlier reminded himself, and bring it to bear on the topic at hand.
One Sea-Land veteran from the early days likened working for Malcom
McLean to trying to get a drink of water from a firehose.25
While many people characterize Sea-Land’s early days as freewheeling
and unstructured, there were a number of sound business principles the
company religiously observed. One of these was the importance of paying
proper attention to the recruitment and training of new personnel. SeaLand quickly gained a reputation for the quality of its recruitment and
training programs, and the company was in a class by itself in the importance it placed on instilling a management way of thinking in its trainees.
Paul Richardson, a man who went to work for McLean Trucking directly
out of college in 1952 and subsequently accompanied Malcom McLean to
Sea-Land, where he would eventually serve as the company’s president,
felt that a major difference between Malcom McLean’s enterprise and rival
elements of the U.S. merchant marine is that while other executives primarily saw themselves as steamship operators, the people at Sea-Land
saw themselves as managers.26
Sea-Land was equally conscientious in the recruitment of its maritime
personnel. One important indicator of the satisfactory working environment aboard Sea-Land vessels was an extraordinarily low turnover rate
among licensed people. When an officer was appointed master of a given
vessel, for example, he would remain with that vessel for an extended
tenure, until a promotion might develop to a newer or larger vessel, perhaps. In addition, when a vessel’s master was enjoying shore leave, it was
routine Sea-Land practice to have the ship’s first officer assume his duties
rather than place a different officer aboard, a practice that contributed
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positively to shipboard morale. Sea-Land very much regarded the officers
aboard its ships as part of the company’s management team, and not as a
separate class of ‘‘mere employees.’’27
Charles Cushing, a Sea-Land veteran and confidant of Malcom McLean,
recently reflected on the various cultures that were brought together to
create Sea-Land. There were people from the maritime industry who ran
the company’s ships, longshoremen who worked in the various ports, lots
of people with a background in the trucking industry, new hires fresh
from some of the best universities in the country, and overlaying it all, a
large delegation of southerners. Out of this unusual mix, though, would
emerge a sharply focused and smooth-running organization.28

North to Alaska
The next new market for Sea-Land was container service along the
Pacific Coast between Alaska and the lower forty-eight. Two former C-4
troopships were in the process of being converted into container ships at
Todd’s Seattle yard by the A. H. Bull Steamship Company, a venerable
operator whose specialty was service to and from Puerto Rico. Bull recognized early on the benefits that containerization might entail; it had already chartered New Yorker and Floridian, the two small ro/ro vessels
built by the ill-fated Erie and Saint Lawrence Corporation, and deployed
the pair in service to Puerto Rico.29
Although it had recently come under the ownership of Manuel E. Kulukundis and was on the verge of making radical changes in the way it did
business, Bull Line was in the throes of serious financial difficulties; the
company lost $3.9 million in 1961, for example.30 McLean had earlier attempted to acquire Bull Line outright and merge it with Sea-Land, and
while this proved unsuccessful, in 1962, after Bull Line declared bankruptcy, he was able to purchase the partially converted C-4s and turn
them into ships that eventually bore the names Seattle and Anchorage, the
terminals of Sea-Land’s new Alaskan service.31
On March 27, 1964, southwest Alaska had been struck by an extraordinarily severe earthquake—the ‘‘Good Friday earthquake,’’ as it has been
called—and when Sea-Land’s recently converted container ships made
their way around the Kenai Peninsula and up Cook Inlet shortly afterward
for the very first time, the cargo they were carrying was largely material
to assist in the rebuilding of the earthquake-stricken area. It was the start
of a permanent service, though, not a one-time relief effort, thus providing the port of Anchorage with its very first year-round steamship service.
84 : : : box boats

Before Sea-Land’s entry into the Alaskan trade, cargo service between
Anchorage and Seattle used Seward as a winter port, since ice-clogged
Cook Inlet was thought to be impassible. Despite later enthusiasm for
intermodal service involving steamships and railroads, McLean wanted
no part of hoisting containers from ships to flat cars at Seward and using
train service northward from there to Anchorage during wintertime. So
after being assured by his maritime people that the key to navigating Cook
Inlet during wintertime was to make sure the propeller rode low in the
water, Sea-Land decided that year-round service directly into Anchorage
was perfectly feasible. (Damage to the thin leading edge of a vessel’s propeller blades, not the heavier steel of its hull, was thought to be the more
serious threat that the kind of ice found in Cook Inlet represented.32)
In terms of carrying capacity, when Seattle and Anchorage were acquired in 1962 and their initial conversion completed, they could each
accommodate 166 containers, plus 435,000 cubic feet of break-bulk cargo,
the design Bull Line had specified for its service to Puerto Rico. Before
deploying the vessels on its new Alaska service two years later in 1964,
Sea-Land converted the pair into fully cellular ships that could each handle 360 containers. Initially called Mobile and New Orleans, they retained
their 166-container configuration. Sea-Land used them to inaugurate a
new service linking Elizabethport, Baltimore, and San Juan, Puerto
Rico—with a stop, southbound, in Jacksonville, Florida. Since Baltimore
initially lacked any shoreside facilities for loading containers and the two
ex-Bull Line vessels had no onboard gantry cranes, on their early trips,
Mobile and New Orleans carried containers out of Elizabethport, but only
break-bulk cargo to and from Baltimore. By April 1963, proper loading
facilities had been provided adjacent to a pier owned by the Canton Rail
Road, and Baltimore joined the growing list of American ports that were
equipped to hoist containers on and off ships.33
An older steamship line also inaugurated container service to Alaska
at roughly the same time as Sea-Land. The Alaska Steamship Company
converted a pair of war-surplus Liberty ships into cellular container
ships—rechristened Tonsina and Nadina for the new operation—and put
them in service between Seattle and Seward, but not beyond to Anchorage, like Sea-Land. Tonsina and Nadina could also accommodate a small
quantity of conventional cargo, but they were primarily container ships.
Alaska Steamship also converted a third Liberty, the Oduna, into a partial
container ship and used it to serve Kodiak Island in Alaska’s Aleutian
chain. Tonsina and Nadina were unusual container ships in that they were
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rigged to carry containers—176 of them each—in cells that faced athwartships, not fore and aft as had become standard practice in the still-new
industry.34 It is difficult to verify general statements about Liberty ships,
since so many of them wound up operating for so many different companies in so many different parts of the world during the postwar era. But
it is thought that the two (or three) Alaska Steamship vessels represent
the only instance of Liberty ships being converted into cellular container
ships. (They may also be the world’s only deepwater container ships that
were powered by reciprocating steam engines.) Alas, competition from
Sea-Land proved to be the undoing of Alaska Steamship, and the company
quietly went out of business in the mid-1960s.35
Alaska Steamship, incidentally, should not be confused with Alaska
Freight Lines, another waterborne carrier specializing in cargo transport
to the land of the midnight sun. Alaska Freight Lines, based in Seattle,
was primarily a tug-and-barge operation, and Malcom McLean acquired
this company in 1964 to help establish a toehold in the Alaskan market.

Across the North Atlantic
The next important milestone for container-carrying cargo ships would
be their deployment on the premier steamship route of all time, service
across the North Atlantic from New York to the channel ports of Europe.
Despite thoughtful assessments in the mid-1950s that container ships were
inappropriate for transatlantic service and would likely remain a wholly
domestic innovation, on Friday evening, March 18, 1966, the 13,264-grosston, C-4 cargo ship American Racer, two years old and flying the house
flag of the United States Lines, eased away from North River Pier 62 at
the foot of West 22 Street—one of New York’s famed ‘‘Chelsea piers’’ that
had been built in 1904—and headed out to sea.36 Secured below deck in
her holds, along with other more conventional cargo, were fifty twentyfoot containers. American Racer, one of four C-4s United States Lines had
outfitted to handle its initial venture into containerized service, belonged
to a class of cargo ships that United States Lines called its Challenger
Class, but which were also identified as C-4s under Maritime Commission
notation.
Viewed from the Bay Ridge shore in Brooklyn as she headed through
the Narrows and out to sea that evening, American Racer would have
looked, for all the world, like any other break-bulk cargo ship, since the
containers she was carrying were stowed out of sight and below deck,
and she was equipped with all the kingposts and booms of a typical cargo
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ship. Yet, although she carried other break-bulk cargo that day, she was
rigged with genuine cells for holding containers and can rightly be called
the first true container ship to cross the North Atlantic. (For more on
United States Lines container-ship operations, see chapter 6.) MooreMcCormick also inaugurated transatlantic container service at roughly the
same time with a fleet of six C-4s the company had converted into partial
container ships.37
Sea-Land, though, would not be far behind the competition. McLean’s
people had been traveling throughout Western Europe putting together a
network of local and regional agents to generate business for a proposed
transatlantic service and handle various ‘‘land’’ aspects of Sea-Land Service. On the evening of Saturday, April 23, 1966—three days shy of a
decade after the departure of Ideal X and a mere thirty-six days after
American Racer’s inauguration of transatlantic container service—
Sea-Land’s Fairland slipped her mornings at Elizabethport and headed
out to sea, bound for Rotterdam. (If Southampton and Le Havre were the
major channel ports in the days of the great transatlantic passenger liners,
Rotterdam long enjoyed—and continues to enjoy—the same distinction
with respect to cargo traffic.) Securely stacked above and below Fairland’s
deck were 226 containers, containing everything from cameras to safety
razors to components for prefabricated houses. While American Racer will
forever hold the distinction of being the first container-carrying merchant
ship to cross the North Atlantic, Fairland, which reached Rotterdam on
May 4, 1966, will likewise be identified as the first all-container cargo ship
to link North America and Europe. Fairland also called at Bremen, West
Germany, and steamed up the Firth of Forth to the Scottish port of
Grangemouth before returning to Elizabethport. At Grangemouth, several
containers were hoisted aboard that were being sent to bottlers and distributors in the United States and whose contents were wholesale lots of
Scotch whiskey.38
Before Fairland’s initial transatlantic voyage could be called a success,
some rather long odds had to be overcome. While the vessel was at sea
on its way to Europe, the port agent Sea-Land had retained in Bremen
suddenly resigned, and a replacement had to be found on extremely short
notice.39 In the way of bad omens, a crane operator in Bremen was unfamiliar with the controls that held a container on its spreader and he released a container prematurely with fatal results.40 In addition, at a
reception in Rotterdam prior to Fairland’s arrival, an executive with Holland America Line, livid over the idea of this American newcomer intruding itself into the venerable transatlantic cargo trade but confident the
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new service would not succeed, approached Sea-Land’s vice president for
marketing, Scott Morrison, and all but shouted in his face, ‘‘Your containers come here on one trip, and you come back with the next ship and take
all the containers home.’’41
Looking back at the first fifty years of container-ship service, the 1956
voyage of Ideal X and the 1957 departure of Gateway City are important
historical benchmarks. But if any one voyage can be said to have grabbed
the traditional world steamship establishment by the lapels, given it a
good shake, and underscored the point that containerization was here to
stay, it was Fairland’s 1966 arrival in Rotterdam. Prior to 1966, major
steamship companies on both sides of the Atlantic were content to regard
Malcom McLean’s innovative container ships as a novel idea whose use
would be restricted to relatively incidental coastwise and intercoastal domestic services in the United States, with perhaps some deployment in
the Caribbean, as well. When Fairland steamed into Rotterdam Harbor on
May 4, 1966, though, steamship executives would retain such points of
view only at their peril. Nor could Fairland’s transatlantic voyage be dismissed as any kind of one-time stunt or demonstration. It was the start of
a steady weekly service; seven days after Fairland set sail from Elizabethport, another Sea-Land container ship followed her across the North Atlantic to the channel ports of Europe.
Some commentators believe that Fairland’s call at Grangemouth was
a revelation for many European steamship operators; while containers
themselves could be ignored as a technical development whose novelty
would likely wear off, Sea-Land’s ability to lure some of the lucrative
Scotch whiskey trade to its new style of service was not something to be
treated casually. Malcom McLean himself said that once Sea-Land began
to transport whiskey across the North Atlantic, traditional steamship operators ‘‘knew the monkey was dead.’’42
To provide a little maritime context for Sea-Land’s inaugural transatlantic departure, harbor activity in New York on the day Fairland departed
for Europe included Furness, Withy’s Queen of Bermuda and Ocean Monarch departing in tandem for Hamilton, Bermuda, as well as Home Line’s
Oceanic leaving port in a style of passenger service that would soon eclipse
transatlantic travel in both importance and popularity, a leisure-oriented
cruise to Nassau, in the Bahamas. Earlier in the day, the Greek Line’s
Queen Frederica arrived in port from Piraeus, the seaport of Athens, and
North German Lloyd’s Bremen completed a crossing from Bremerhaven
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and Southampton. The night before Fairland set sail for Rotterdam, SeaLand’s Gateway City, the company’s very first cellular container ship, left
Elizabeth on a routine sailing for Jacksonville, Florida. The transatlantic
service that Fairland inaugurated on April 23, 1966, would become a more
dominant market for Sea-Land in future years, while coastwise container
service to places like Jacksonville that Gateway City was still operating in
1966 would soon fade from the scene—as, indeed, would intercoastal service as well.43

The First Decade
Despite the fact that many of its domestic services would soon be deemphasized, the expansion of international routes would ensure that SeaLand’s business continued to grow and the company would find itself in
need of additional tonnage on an almost continual basis. In addition, it
would be the growth of international markets that would shape the future
of the entire container-ship industry and reflect profound forces that were
at work in the world’s economy.
Sea-Land was always ready to recognize a bargain as the fortunes of
other steamship companies waxed and waned and serviceable tonnage
came on the market. In 1964, for instance, McLean was quick to react
when Grace Line grew exasperated with its inability to sustain its New
York-Venezuela container service and declared its converted C-2s, Santa
Eliana and Santa Leona, surplus. Because the conversion of the two cargo
vessels into container ships for Grace had been supervised by G. H. Sharp
and included many of the same features the firm had earlier incorporated
into Gateway City and her sister ships in 1957, they were appropriate additions to the Sea-Land fleet. With their cells reconfigured at the Ingalls
Shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi, to accommodate Sea-Land’s thirtyfive-foot containers rather than the smaller seventeen-footers that Grace
Line preferred to use, the two ships were deployed, initially, in Sea-Land
service to and from Puerto Rico.44
Because Grace Line had used Construction Differential Subsidies from
the federal government to acquire and convert the two vessels, McLean
had to pay back a prorated portion of these funds, since he had no intention of using the pair—or any other Sea-Land vessels, for that matter—in
any kind of subsidized service. There was also an interesting development
in the initial names the two vessels bore once they joined the Sea-Land
fleet. McLean planned to inaugurate a new service to Puerto Rico that
would bypass San Juan and call, instead, at the island ports of Mayaguez
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and Ponce, the eventual Sea-Land names of the newly acquired vessels.
He was anxious to keep the new service an in-house secret as long as
possible and not tip off the competition about his plans. So until they
were ready for service, the two ships bore the place-holder names Sea and
Land—and did not become Mayaguez and Ponce until they were ready to
enter service.
Despite its bad luck with Santa Eliana and Santa Leonor, Grace Line
still believed there was a future in carrying containers to and from South
America. In 1963 and 1964 it took delivery of four ships that could each
accommodate 175 twenty-foot containers—along with 117 passengers—
and deployed the quartet in passenger-cargo service between New York
and South America. Because the vessels had to load their containers at
Port Newark, Grace Line established a small passenger terminal there that
the Port Authority built for the line at a cost of $180,000, and while many
container ships featured accommodations for a dozen or so passengers,
Grace Line’s Santa Magdalena and her three sister ships are among the
very few that were designed and built, from the outset, as combination
passenger and cargo/container vessels.45
On April 26, 1966, Sea-Land marked the tenth anniversary of the departure of Ideal X from Port Newark with a quiet in-house celebration. On
the day of the event, Fairland was east of Cape Race, Newfoundland,
steaming across the North Atlantic toward Rotterdam for the very first
time. Table 4.2 presents a snapshot view of the nineteen-vessel Sea-Land
fleet as the company completed its first decade of service—nineteen container ships out of a total of fifty-seven such vessels then operating under
the U.S. flag for a variety of steamship companies.46
The single T-2 conversion of 1963, Summit, was to have been a threeship project; McLean acquired a trio of veteran T-2s for the effort, Gulflight—which actually became Summit—as well a sister ship, Gulfmoon,
plus another T-2 called Baltimore Trader. The latter two vessels were
never converted, though, since Sea-Land was quite favorably impressed
with the performance of the converted C-4s it had acquired from Bull
Line and would soon acquire additional C-4s for future conversions. The
unconverted T-2s were made available for charter work as petroleum carriers for several seasons under the names Ridgewood and Westfield,
though.
The four C-2 conversions of 1965 and 1966 represented additions to the
company’s original class of true container ships, Gateway City and her five
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table 4.2. Sea-Land Fleet: 1966
Off. No.

Name(s)

C-2 conversions of 1957
251506
Gateway City
a) Iberville
243436
Azalea City
243438
Bienville
242073
Fairland
242074
Raphael Semmes
251508
Beauregard
a) Afoundria
T-3 conversions of 1962
242557
Elizabethport
a) Esso New Orleans
b) New Orleans
241153
Los Angeles
a) Esso Albany
b) Esso Bethlehem
241220
San Francisco
a) USS Chicopee
b) Esso Trenton
c) Esso Chattanooga
242653
San Juan
a) Esso Raleigh
ex-Bull Line C-4 conversions of 1963
247275
Seattle
a) Marine Fox
b) Dorothy
c) Mobile
246736
Anchorage
a) Marine Panther
b) Alicia
c) New Orleans

Capacity
(in 35-foot containers)

226
226
226
226
226
226

476

476

476

476

360

360
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table 4.2. (Continued)
Off. No.

Name(s)

T-2 conversion of 1963
243658
Summit
a) Jalapa
b) Gulflight
ex-Grace Line C-2 conversions of 1965
245546
Mayaguez
a) White Falcon
b) Santa Eliana
c) Sea
245544
Ponce
a) Santa Leonor
b) Sea
C-2 conversions of 1965–66
251507
Arizpa
a) Jean Lafitte
b) Warren (USN)
245189
Wacosta
243815
Warrior
244018
Afoundria

Capacity
(in 35-foot containers)

226

274

274

225

225
225
225
Total 5,654

sister ships of a decade or so earlier. While converted from the same subclass of Waterman C-2s as the earlier vessels, this quartet lacked onboard
gantry cranes—Sea-Land was beginning to rely more on shoreside
cranes—and so they did not require hull sponsons and could be regarded
as a simplified version of the earlier conversions. The four vessels did not
give Sea-Land any technical improvement in container-ship design, much
less performance, and must be seen as an almost desperate effort to expand overall carrying capacity whatever the cost.
As the company began its second decade of service, the Sea-Land fleet
would grow beyond these nineteen hulls. In fact on the very day of the
anniversary celebration in 1956, shipyards in both Baltimore, Maryland,
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and Pascagoula, Mississippi, were putting the finishing touches on still
more conversion projects that would soon expand the Sea-Land fleet to
twenty-five hulls, a substantial increase of 31 percent. And because the
majority of the new vessels would feature greater carrying capacity than
any of the older ones, this 31-percent increase in the number of vessels
would increase Sea-Land’s overall container-carrying capacity by a robust
55 percent.

From Troopships to Container Ships
In early 1964, the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD)—the successor agency of the Maritime Commission established in 1936—allocated
eighteen surplus C-4 troopships to seven different U.S.-flag steamship
companies for conversion into various kinds of cargo vessels. One stipulation of the MARAD offer was that the companies had to use the vessels in
services that were not receiving operating-differential subsidies from the
government. Such a requirement was made to order for Sea-Land and the
company received six of the vessels, more than any other operator, returning an equal number of former Waterman cargo ships to MARAD in exchange.47 All six of the C-4s had been built in Vancouver, Washington, in
1945 at the Kaiser yard there. Conversion of the troopships into modern
container-carrying vessels was a project that cost Sea-Land in excess of
$34 million. While two of the six newcomers would be converted with no
changes to the basic geometry of their hulls, the four others would follow
the general plan Sea-Land had earlier developed for Elizabethport and her
sister ships. A newly built 443-foot midbody section was spliced between
the original bow and stern producing a vessel capable of transporting
more than six hundred containers, while the two C-4s that retained their
as-built hulls were each able to transport more than three hundred containers. Because Congress had ‘‘closed the loophole’’ that allowed McLean
to have the midbodies of Elizabethport and her sister ships built in less
expensive overseas shipyards, the C-4 conversion involved new midbody
sections that were made in the U.S.A.
A further statutory requirement of the MARAD program was that an
applicant had to ‘‘trade in’’ another hull before taking title to a vessel from
the reserve fleet. There was no stipulation as to the ultimate usefulness
of the vessel being traded in, so steamship companies would often take
title to old ferryboats or excursion steamers and transfer them to MARAD
in exchange for more useful T-2 tankers or C-4 troop ships. Traded-in
vessels were often referred to as ‘‘box tops’’ in maritime circles, and the
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fleet roster in Appendix A identifies various hulls that Sea-Land conveyed
to MARAD in exchange for ships that became the heart and soul of its
container-carrying fleet in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In any event,
table 4.3 provides additional details about Sea-Land’s C-4 conversions of
1966.
The advent of the converted C-4s saw McLean orchestrate a financial
arrangement that, while common in other U.S. industrial sectors, was
regarded as downright radical by a steamship industry that many observers characterized as excessively bound to traditional ways of doing business. The conversion work on four of the C-4s was performed at the
Ingalls Shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi. And because Ingalls had by
then become a subsidiary of Litton Industries, a diversified electronics
firm with headquarters in Beverly Hills, California, McLean was able to
have Litton establish a new subsidiary, Litton Industries Leasing Corporation, and Sea-Land would acquire the converted vessels through a charter
arrangement with Litton. MARAD agreement was required before the arrangement could be executed, and Sea-Land was able to expand its fleet
for the proverbial ‘‘no money down.’’ It acquired the C-4s from MARAD
on the basis of a no-cash exchange for an equal number of ex-Waterman
cargo ships, Litton did the conversion at Ingalls and took technical title to
the containerships through Litton Leasing, and no money changed hands
until Sea-Land’s first lease payment came due.48
Malcom McLean would later expand the use of Litton for financing his
fleet, and additional vessels were conveyed to Litton and then leased back
to Sea-Land for operation. Such vessels, while technically owned by Litton
Leasing, continued to be decorated in Sea-Land’s livery and could only
be distinguished from company-owned tonnage by examining enrollment
certificates and other legal documents. Sea-Land’s livery, incidentally,
called for a black (or gray) hull, white superstructure, and a white funnel
with a black band at the top, a red band at the bottom, and a stylized ‘‘SL’’
logo in black, white, and red.

Other Matters
Something else that Sea-Land did at the time of its tenth anniversary
was largely abandon the idea of hoisting containers on and off ship with
onboard cranes. Containerization was here to stay and there was no doubt
that shoreside equipment could do a better job—which is to say, a faster
job. Furthermore, movable cranes aboard ship limit a vessel’s carrying
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table 4.3. Sea-Land Fleet: C-4 Conversions of 1966
Name of
original C-4
troopship

Sea-Land
name(s)

Off. No. Nature of conversion

Marine Cardinal Baltimore
248238
b) San Pedro

Marine Shark

Charleston

248095

Marine Falcon

Trenton

248239

Marine Jumper

Panama

248241

Marine Tiger

Oakland

248076

Marine Flasher

Long Beach

248240

No lengthening in
1964; vessel would
be lengthened in
later years
No lengthening in
1964—or ever
New 443-foot
midbody spliced
between original
bow and stern;
original propulsion
machinery retained
New 443-foot
midbody spliced
between original
bow and stern;
original propulsion
machinery retained
New 443-foot
midbody spliced
between original
bow and stern;
original propulsion
machinery retained
New 443-foot
midbody spliced
between original
bow and stern;
original propulsion
machinery retained

Where
performed

Maryland S/B;
Baltimore, Md.

Maryland S/B;
Baltimore, Md.
Ingalls S/B;
Pascagoula,
Miss.

Ingalls S/B;
Pascagoula,
Miss.

Ingalls S/B;
Pascagoula,
Miss.

Ingalls S/B;
Pascagoula,
Miss.
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capacity. Sea-Land thus began what would prove to be a continually escalating effort of designing bigger, faster and more far-reaching shoreside
gantry cranes to load and unload containers.
In 1966, Sea-Land acquired its first 415-ton gantry crane, a $750,000
product whose operating machinery was built by Pacific Coast Engineering of Alameda, California, and whose steel structure was fabricated on
the opposite side of the continent by the Newport News Shipbuilding and
Dry Dock Company. When the first of the new cranes was installed at
Elizabethport, it was able to load or unload a single container in sixty
seconds—as against two or three times longer with the older onboard
cranes. In subsequent months, Sea-Land installed twenty-two similar gantry cranes in twelve other important port cities that the company’s vessels
served.49
Expansion and improvement of the Elizabethport facility, of course,
would be virtually continuous over the years, to accommodate both SeaLand and other Port Authority tenants. When Hapag-Lloyd’s Hamburg Express came on the scene in the late 1970s, for example, and established
new standards in container-ship carrying capacity, it required a clearance
of 76.5 feet between the vessel’s waterline and the underside of the
spreader on shoreside cranes to service containers that were stacked four
high atop the vessel’s hatch covers. And because the Port Authority recognized that even larger vessels would soon follow Hamburg Express, C. R.
Cushing and Company was retained to help upgrade the port’s cranes.
Instead of recommending the acquisition of totally new cranes, the
Cushing firm was able to design a set of upgrades for the existing equipment. Some cranes were improved by using hydraulic jacks and splicing
new steelwork into their base. For others, though, a massive floating
crane, owned by Sun Shipbuilding, was brought to Elizabethport to lift
the topmost part off a crane and set it aside gently, while new steelwork
added footage to the lower portion of the crane. Because the Port Authority was increasing the height of steel structures that were adjacent to
Newark International Airport, the project had to be approved by the Federal Aviation Administration before it could proceed to ensure the added
height represented no hazard to arriving and departing aircraft.50
Another service enhancement that Sea-Land arranged roughly coincident with the company’s tenth anniversary was connecting service, by
contract carriers, to and from smaller ports that conventional container
ships could not visit. In Puerto Rico, for instance, a company called Slater
Boat Service took delivery of a 166-foot motor vessel whose design was
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based on boats that had been developed to service offshore oil rigs in the
Gulf of Mexico—head boats, as they are sometimes called. Rio Haina was
built at Moss Point, Mississippi, by Halter Marine and could accommodate
two dozen thirty-five-foot containers on her open rear deck. While not
owned by Sea-Land, because she hauled containers decorated with the
distinctive Sea-Land logo and featured the same decoration on her own
stacks, Rio Haina appeared, for all the world, as if it were the smallest
container ship in the growing Sea-Land fleet as the vessel moved containers on short voyages between Sea-Land’s terminal in San Juan and smaller
ports around the island commonwealth, as well as in nearby Caribbean
countries. The namesake of Rio Haina, for instance, is a small seaport in
the Dominican Republic.51
Sea-Land’s Scott Morrison has suggested that Malcom McLean’s background in the trucking industry was a factor in adopting such a system of
line-haul service between major ports, and feeder operations onward to
smaller ports, something that will continue to characterize Sea-Land for
many years.52 Morrison also suggests that it was a casual conversation
about Sea-Land’s feeder system with a Maplewood, New Jersey, neighbor
while sitting around a swimming pool one day. Morrison’s neighbor was
Bob Crandall, who would later become the president of American Airlines, which was instrumental in the airline industry’s developing a similar
service pattern, one that it would call a ‘‘hub and spoke’’ operation.53
Another factor that affected Sea-Land’s growth in the late 1960s—and
consequently translated into a need for even more tonnage—was the fact
that the United States found itself fighting a land war in Southeast Asia.
The enormous logistical effort that was needed to support troops in the
field provided yet another opportunity to demonstrate the speed and efficiency of shipping seaborne cargo in containers. A final matter associated
with the company’s first decade, though, was McLean’s decision to divest
himself of Waterman Steamship, the onetime parent company of PanAtlantic.

The Sale of Waterman Steamship
McLean negotiated the sale of the Waterman Steamship Company to
independent interests in the spring of 1965. Waterman Steamship of
Puerto Rico, however, the formal name under which Sea-Land operated
its service to and from the island commonwealth, remained a subsidiary
of McLean Industries. The devolution of Waterman Steamship was a $15
million transaction, with McLean selling 1.9 million shares of stock in the
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company to two brothers, Cornelius S. and Edward P. Walsh, individuals
who had earlier held executive positions with States Marine Line, an important U.S.-flag steamship company.54 The transaction included fifteen
cargo ships, most of which were then operating in various tramp
services.55
After its separation from McLean’s control, Waterman Steamship
would manage to survive, and even thrive, although the company did
have to endure a short period under the protection of Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings before achieving stability. Despite travails, though, in
the early years of the twenty-first century, the Waterman house flag still
flies from the masts of a small fleet of oceangoing cargo vessels, vessels
that maintain liner service under the U.S. flag between ports along the
East and Gulf coasts and the Middle East. Today’s Waterman offers container service, but neither exclusively nor primarily. Its vessels also accommodate ro/ro traffic, but its principal operations are LASH service, as
it is called. LASH is an acronym that stands for lighters aboard ship, and
the distinctive service such vessels offer calls for loaded barges to be
floated through a stern gate in the ship, then lifted aboard ship by an
onboard crane for overseas transport, and finally refloated for delivery
once the vessel reaches its destination.
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5

SEA-LAND
APPROACHES MATURITY
1966–85

Sea-Land continued to be the pacesetter in the growing
container-ship industry for the rest of the 1960s, throughout the 1970s, and on into the 1980s. Malcom McLean’s
company thus found itself continually in need of additional
tonnage to serve new markets, while other steamship operators soon realized that transporting cargo in sealed intermodal containers was just about the smartest thing that
ever happened to overseas shipping since the development
of the steel hull.

More Conversions
There was continual talk at Sea-Land of designing and
building totally new container ships. In 1965, for instance,
Malcom McLean announced that Litton Industries would
soon build six new container ships for his company’s
about-to-begin transatlantic service.1 But despite such
talk—and the 1965 announcement turned out to be just
that, talk—the conversion of older tonnage remained the
company’s preferred option for many years. The U.S. Maritime Administration had steady supplies of World War II–
era vessels available for such conversion projects, and while
it was certainly less expensive to add a new container ship
to the fleet by converting, say, a C-4 cargo or troopship or
a T-2 tanker, an equally important advantage was that such
conversion work could yield a finished product in less than
half the time it would require to build an equivalent new
vessel from the keel up. Other steamship companies, in
both the United States and Europe, were taking delivery of
new container-carrying hulls from various shipyards. SeaLand, the industry’s pioneer and unquestioned leader,

remained an advocate of converting older tonnage through most of the
1960s.
Between 1967 and 1969, Sea-Land added three converted T-2 tankers
to its container fleet, vessels that could each accommodate 332 thirty-fivefoot containers, bore the names Houston, Jacksonville, and Tampa, and
were converted at the Todd shipyard in Galveston, Texas. Even before the
last of these three vessels had entered service, the first of ten converted
C-4 troop ships joined the Sea-Land fleet. Nine of the ten were originally
built by Kaiser in Richmond, California, the tenth vessel was built at Kaiser’s Vancouver, Washington, facility, and two of these conversions—
vessels that sailed for Sea-Land as Chicago and Saint Louis—involved
adding a new bow and midbody to the stern and machinery of the C-4 at
Todd’s yard in San Pedro, California.2 So converted, the vessels featured
a carrying capacity of 622 thirty-five-foot containers, making them the
largest Sea-Land container ships up until that time. The eight other converted C-4s involved no alterations to the geometry of their hulls, each
had a carrying capacity of 360 containers, and the work was performed
at a variety of shipyards—from Hoboken, New Jersey, to Portland, Oregon. Once completed, all of these conversions exhibited what had become
a standard Sea-Land profile: deckhouse and machinery aft, with containers carried in below-deck cells and atop the hatch covers between the
deckhouse and the bow. (A few odd containers could often be carried as
deck cargo, and sometimes in below-deck cells, aft of the deckhouse.)
The larger Chicago and Saint Louis each featured eleven rows of containers, while the C-4 conversions that retained their original hull configuration carried seven rows of containers. Table 5.1 identifies the ten C-4
conversions that joined the Sea-Land fleet between 1968 and 1970.

Europeans Join the Game
Although European steamship companies began to orient their cargo
operations around container services in the years after Fairland’s inauguration of transatlantic service in 1966, one looks in vain for the names of
such traditional transatlantic companies as the French Line or HollandAmerica among container-carrying lines. Instead, European operators
preferred to join forces and form new cooperative ventures as their means
of entering container-carrying trades. Thus was the Atlantic Container
Line Ltd. (ACL) established, a consortium that eventually included La
Compagnie Générale Transatlantique (French Line), Cunard, HollandAmerica, the Swedish American Line, Rederi A/B Transatlantic, and the
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table 5.1. Sea-Land Fleet: C-4 Conversions of 1968–70
Off. No.

Name

Hull dimensions

GRT

Place built (year)

Notes

516542

Chicago
a) Gen. C. H.
Muir
c) San Juan
Saint Louis
a) Gen. M. L.
Hersey
b) Pittsburgh
Galveston
a) Marine
Serpent
Boston
a) Gen. M. M.
Patrick
Brooklyn
a) Gen. C. C.
Ballou
c) Humacao
d) Eastern Light
Philadelphia
a) Gen. A. W.
Brewster
USMC
Portland
a) Gen. D. E.
Aultman
Newark
a) Gen. H. B.
Freeman
New Orleans
a) Gen. E. T.
Collins
c) Guayama
d) Eastern Kin

695 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 30

18,455

Richmond, Calif.
(1945)

1

695 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 30

18,455

Richmond, Calif.
(1943)

1

523 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 30

11,389

Vancouver, Wash.
(1945)

2

523 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 31

11,522

Richmond, Calif.
(1944)

2

523 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 31

10,958

Richmond, Calif.
(1945)

3

523 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 31

10,979

Richmond, Calif.
(1945)

4

523 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 31

12,521

Richmond, Calif.
(1945)

5

523 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 31

11,522

Richmond, Calif.
(1945)

2

523 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 31

11,400

Richmond, Calif.
(1944)

5

515620

248242

511485

513557

516541

511487

511486

516540
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table 5.1. (Continued)
Off. No.

Name

Hull dimensions

GRT

Place built (year)

Notes

513556

Mobile
a) Gen. Stuart
Heintzelman

523 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 31

11,307

Richmond, Calif.
(1944)

6

Notes
1. Converted to container ship at Todd Shipyards, San Pedro, Calif.
2. Converted to container ship at Todd Shipyards, Galveston, Tex.
3. Converted to container ship at Todd Shipyards, Hoboken, N.J.
4. Converted to container ship at Bethlehem Steel, Baltimore, Md.
5. Converted to container ship at Wilmette Iron & Steel, Portland, Ore.
6. Converted to container ship at Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding, Mobile, Ala.

Wallenius Lines. In the fall of 1967, the new venture’s initial vessel, the
diesel-powered Atlantic Span, tied up at Elizabethport after completing
its first transatlantic voyage.3 It would then continue a twenty-eight-day
circuit that included calls at Baltimore and Portsmouth, Virginia, in the
United States, and Antwerp, Rotterdam, Gothenburg, and Bremerhaven
in Europe. (Lest too much emphasis be placed on Fairland’s transatlantic
voyage in 1966 as the motivation for Europeans to enter container-carrying trades, the cooperative venture that would become ACL had its origins
in 1965, the year before Fairland made her symbolic crossing.)
Atlantic Span was not exclusively a cellular container ship, though. The
vessel could accommodate 859 trailer equivalent units (TEUs) both above
and below deck, but it was also equipped with stern and side gates to
allow roll-on, roll-off (ro/ro) cargo to be carried as well. Ro/ro capacity
was one thousand automobiles, or some equivalent combination of larger
vehicles and fewer cars. In addition, carrying maximum ro/ro cargo reduced the vessel’s TEU capacity. Atlantic Span was outfitted with an internal system of traffic lights and closed circuit television to permit the safe
and swift loading and unloading of ro/ro ‘‘traffic’’ between the stern gate
and internal ramps leading to six different car-carrying decks.
Atlantic Span was owned by Rederi A/B Transatlantic—individual vessels were owned by various consortium members, although all sailed
under the blue and white colors of ACL—and it was one of four virtually
identical ships that constituted the new venture’s first generation of container-carrying vessels, the G-1 class, as it was called. The diesel-powered
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G-1s were equipped with bow thrusters, would later be lengthened to
increase carrying capacity, and were quickly joined by six faster and
larger G-2-class vessels. When Atlantic Span entered service in 1967, the
trade journal Maritime Reporter called it ‘‘the first ship built from the keel
up for transatlantic container service.’’4
ACL remains a contemporary presence in the container-ship industry,
and its current vessels continue the tradition of carrying ro/ro cargo in
addition to containers. ACL is not the same broad-based consortium it
originally was, however, and is now more of a stand-alone corporation
that enjoys a working relationship with the Grimaldi Group, an important
operator of European ferry services.
In any event, the consortium approach would prove popular with European steamship operators. An all-British venture called Overseas Containers, Ltd. (OCL) was composed of a number of traditional UK-based
steamship companies: British and Commonwealth Shipping Company,
Ltd.; Furness, Withy; Ocean Transport and Trading Group; and the legendary Peninsula and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, more popularly known as the P&O Line.
The first OCL-designed vessel, Encounter Bay of 1969, is frequently referred to as the world’s first cellular container ship with a capacity in
excess of one thousand TEUs. Such a characterization, however, overlooks a small class of vessels that was built for American Export Lines two
years earlier in 1967—C.V. Lightning and three sister ships that could each
accommodate 1,070 TEUs. For whatever reason, though, Encounter Bay
earned more headlines in the maritime press than C.V. Lightning, and the
British vessel’s status as the first container ship to break the thousandTEU mark has rarely been challenged.5
The initial trade where OCL sought to operate the new vessel was a
very traditional British route, service from home waters to points ‘‘east of
Suez’’ as far as Australia. When OCL attempted to inaugurate container
service between England and Australia, though, it faced much of the same
kind of labor opposition that Grace Line experienced in Venezuela, and
Malcom McLean encountered in Puerto Rico. A new British container port
at Tilbury in the Thames estuary sat unused for several seasons while
Encounter Bay and her three sister ships—Botany Bay, Flinders Bay, and
Jervis Bay—were forced to load and unload containers to and from Great
Britain across the channel in Rotterdam, with short sea ferries then used
to reach the homeland.
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As designers and naval architects from the participating steamship
companies begin the effort that would lead to the construction of Encounter Bay, one of them articulated an important characteristic of container
ships with rare precision, noting that ‘‘for the first time in dry-cargo ship
design the nature of the cargo was precisely known.’’6 This was, perhaps,
a truth that was self-evident to naval architects since the days of Gateway
City, but it does emphasize something fundamental about the new style
of oceangoing transport. From a design perspective, a container ship does
not carry furniture, or automobile parts, or burlap bags filled with raw
coffee beans, or barrels of heavy-duty motor oil—and it certainly does not
have to be designed to accommodate one style of cargo more than another. It carries containers and only containers, look-alike boxes that are
eight feet wide, eight-and-a-half feet high, and with two or three different
options with respect to length—twenty feet, thirty-five feet, forty feet.
True enough, some containers require electrical connections to keep refrigeration units in operation while at sea, but as OCL designers noted,
from a ship owner’s perspective, what was inside a container was largely
irrelevant, and vessels did not have to be designed with flexible storage
space to accommodate freight of different shapes and sizes because ‘‘the
nature of the cargo was precisely known.’’
OCL generated some statistics after Encounter Bay had been in service
for a full year that once again demonstrated the increased productivity
container ships are able to realize. While Encounter Bay spent three hundred days of its first year at sea and only sixty-five days in port, over the
same interval the most modern break-bulk cargo ship operated by any of
the OCL partners was in port for 149 days and at sea for merely 216.7
Like ACL, OCL remains an active force in the container-ship industry
in the twenty-first century, although the membership of the consortium
has seen a bit of alteration over the years. In 1980 Furness, Withy was
acquired by Hong Kong interests associated with C. Y. Tung, and it has
been reported that Tung saw this acquisition of Furness, Withy as a way
to gain a foothold in OCL. The other members of the consortium viewed
any cooperation with the shipping tycoon as unwise, however, and so
Furness, Withy left the OCL fold. P&O later withdrew when it decided to
operate container tonnage under its own flag. And as for OCL’s first container ship, Encounter Bay, after three decades of dependable service, the
vessel was withdrawn from service and sent to the breakers in 1999.
The notion of separate and independent steamship companies operating container-carrying vessels under the aegis of a joint venture was a
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rather limited phenomenon when the first such entities materialized in
Europe in the late 1960s. As we will see in the next chapter, however, the
concept would achieve far more widespread popularity in the mid-1980s.
Another distinctive characteristic of early European container-ship ventures was a willingness to use diesel engines for the propulsion of their
container-carrying vessels, certainly to a far greater extent than their
American counterparts. One factor that militated against the use of diesel
propulsion by U.S. companies was a stipulation associated with the U.S.
construction-differential subsidy program. Vessels constructed with such
financial assistance from the federal government had to be equipped with
U.S.-built engines and, simply enough, no U.S. firms were then offering
diesel engines that were appropriate for heavy duty, container-ship application. Granted, this represented no problem at all for Sea-Land, since
McLean’s company would never seek any such federal subsidies. But it
does help explain why other U.S. steamship companies were behind their
European equivalents when it came to the adoption of diesel engines for
seagoing tonnage.
In addition to new container-carrying services inaugurated by ACL and
OCL in the years after Fairland’s inaugural transatlantic voyage in 1966,
two traditional European steamship companies began operating container
ships between Europe and North America. Hapag-Lloyd—itself an earlier
merger of North German Lloyd and the Hamburg American Line—entered
the trade in 1968. Hapag-Lloyd would grow into one of the world’s major
container-ship operators in subsequent years, and at various times would
be able to boast that its fleet included the world’s largest container-carrying vessel. A second European steamship company to have an early presence in the North Atlantic container trade was Manchester Liners, Ltd.
Established in 1898, Manchester Liners would never rival the likes of Cunard or White Star as a premier British steamship company, but the company was an important cargo carrier and its specialty was service between
the United Kingdom and Canada. In November of 1968, the company’s
452-TEU Manchester Challenger became Great Britain’s first fully cellular
container ship designed for deepwater trade. Britain’s very first cellular
container ships were likely vessels built to operate short-sea ferry
routes—Harwich to Zeebrugge and Tilbury to Rotterdam, for example—
and that worked for British Rail and a ferry subsidiary of the famous
P&O Lines.8
Another dimension of the new enthusiasm that container ships were
then beginning to enjoy in countries beyond the United States during SeaLand’s second decade of service can be found in the fact that in April
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1969—thirteen years after Ideal X left Port Newark for Houston and only
three years after Fairland first crossed the North Atlantic—shipyards
throughout the world were at work building 199 container ships of a thousand gross registered tons or more. To be sure, many of these were smaller
vessels designed for various feeder trades, but forty-seven could accommodate more than a thousand TEUs. Encounter Bay was one of them.
Of the 199 vessels under construction, only thirty-two were being built
in the United States, while the rest were under construction in forty-eight
different European yards. And in a statistic that more foreshadowed the
future than described the present, six shipyards in the Far East were at
work on eleven new container ships.9
Interestingly, though, among the 199 new vessels under construction in
April 1969, not a single hull had been ordered by Sea-Land, the industry’s
pioneer and operator of by far the world’s largest fleet of container ships.
As matters would turn out, though, four of the 199 would wind up on the
Sea-Land roster before being delivered to the company that ordered them.

Vietnam
The logistical effort that the United States mounted to keep its troops
in Vietnam supplied with the equipment needed for war provided yet
another opportunity for Malcom McLean and Sea-Land to demonstrate
the efficiency of containerized transport. It took a bit of convincing,
though, before the U.S. military was ready to acknowledge the improvements that Sea-Land could bring to its transpacific supply lines.
Ronald Katmis, a longtime Sea-Land executive, tells of a business trip
to Germany in January 1966 in conjunction with the company’s soon-tobegin transatlantic container service. What should have been an overnight
flight from the United States to Europe was delayed and failed to reach
Germany until late in the day. Then after a business dinner with German
associates, Katmis was understandably exhausted and ready for a good
night’s sleep. Suddenly the telephone in his hotel room rang and Malcom
McLean was on the other end of the line. ‘‘Ronnie,’’ McLean thundered,
‘‘meet me in Beirut tomorrow morning at ten o’clock.’’10
The exhausted Katmis was able to plead for mercy and McLean agreed
to meet him a day later—and in Paris, not Beirut. The two then boarded
a plane, though, headed east, and seven stops and thirty-three hours later,
arrived in Saigon. Katmis, who left home thinking his January travels
would be restricted to northern Europe, was wearing a winter suit and
topcoat, while the Saigon temperature was 104 in the shade when they
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stepped off the plane. Over the next week, though, the Sea-Land party
toured various U.S. installations in Vietnam as guests of the Department
of Defense to assess how containerization might improve the overall logistical effort. Katmis, it can fortunately be reported, was able to supplement
his heavyweight winter wardrobe with tropical clothing acquired in
Saigon.11
While the vast majority of Vietnam-bound supplies were then being
transported as break-bulk cargo, the concept of using some kind of a container for transoceanic shipping was not foreign to the U.S. military. A
smaller steel container—six-feet square, eight-feet high, and known as a
Conex box—had long been popular. One problem, though, was that an
empty Conex box could be lifted by a small squad of soldiers and was
readily adaptable to all sorts of ad hoc uses by in-country personnel. And
so after Conex boxes were unloaded, they would often be commandeered
and converted into storage sheds, command posts, offices, and any number of other uses instead of being returned for fresh consignments. Larger,
Sea-Land-style containers would not be so adaptable.
Given the realities of government procurement policies, McLean had
to sell his idea aggressively before any transport contracts were advertised
for bid that specified containerization as an option. One argument that
Sea-Land effectively advanced to flag officers in all branches of the military is the degree to which break-bulk cargo operations into places like
Cam Ranh Bay were so susceptible to pilferage that it was entirely possible that half or more of the cargo aboard any incoming ship was winding
up in the hands of the Viet Cong. Paul Richardson put it this way: ‘‘We
had a supply line in Vietnam that was supplying both sides—the Viet Cong
and ourselves.’’12 In addition, the slow pace of unloading break-bulk cargo
inevitably resulted in incoming vessels’ having to ride at anchor for days
and weeks while waiting for berths to clear. McLean and his people made
their case on two fronts—they tried to convince officers in Vietnam to
demand a more secure supply chain, and they advanced a case in Washington that Sea-Land provided a service that could get supplies to the
front faster and more securely than break-bulk operations.
McLean’s arguments carried the day. Onward from 1966 and for the
rest of the years that U.S. forces were engaged in South East Asia, SeaLand won multiple contracts from the Military Sea Transport Service
(MSTS) of the U.S. Navy and the Army’s First Logistical Command to
ship containers to Vietnam. Thought to be the first military contracts to
transport containers to the Far East was a $12.8 million, two-year contract
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between Sea-Land and MSTS for service between Oakland and Okinawa,
and a $10.9 million agreement with Seatrain for similar services, that
were executed in May 1966.13
Sea-Land stationed as many as 450 company personnel in Vietnam to
handle the land side of the operation, including the staffing of a complete
trucking company. Initially, Sea-Land vessels docked in Da Nang, and
since there were no shoreside cranes there, this represented an ideal assignment for converted C-2s and T-3s that featured onboard loading
equipment. Eventually, a major container terminal was established at
Cam Ranh Bay, and it was here that Sea-Land erected shoreside cranes to
load and unload its ships. The cranes at Cam Ranh Bay terminal were
located on a large floating pier that had been assembled in Japan by the
DeLong Corporation and towed across the South China Sea to Vietnam.
The first Sea-Land vessel to off-load containers at the new Cam Ranh
Bay facility was the converted C-4 Oakland, which steamed into port in
December of 1967. Vessels equipped with onboard gantry cranes were still
required to serve the other ports in Vietnam, though.14
Sea-Land dedicated seven vessels to Vietnam service, and a statistic
often cited is that these seven were able to handle ten percent of all inbound Vietnam cargo, while it took a fleet of 250 cargo vessels to handle
the remaining ninety percent. As stated, this claim may seem rather underwhelming, but perhaps a more forceful way of expressing matters is
that Sea-Land was able to transport ten percent of Vietnam-bound cargo
aboard two percent of the hulls used in such service. As traffic increased,
Sea-Land supplemented its container fleet with chartered tonnage, including vessels from rival Seatrain.
While the Vietnam experience itself is clearly not a happy chapter in
American history, it remains the case that the logistical supply chain that
supplied U.S. troops in the field was yet another dramatic demonstration
of the efficiency and the effectiveness of containerized transport.15 In addition, though, an important benefit that Sea-Land was able to gain from
its contract services to Vietnam was an opportunity to test various markets on the far side of the Pacific as further opportunities for containerized
operations, especially eastbound traffic out of Asia bound for North
America. Sea-Land was obligated to expedite containers bound for Cam
Ranh Bay, of course, but on return trips there was flexibility, and after a
year of returning empty to the west coast, vessels were able to call at
various Asian ports and provide real-time demonstrations of the benefits
that containerization offered. Sea-Land inaugurated formal liner service
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out of Yokohama in 1968 after developing a working agreement with the
Mitsui Corporation to handle terminal operations and landside deliveries,
and feeder service was soon established between Japan and South Korea.
On December 21, 1968, Sea-Land’s container ship San Juan arrived in the
port of Seattle, thus completing the company’s very first West Coast–Cam
Ranh Bay–Yokohama–West Coast circuit. Hong Kong and Taiwan were
added to the network the following year, 1969, and the service pattern
that quickly evolved called for loaded containers to be shipped from the
West Coast to Vietnam, empties to be moved from Cam Ranh Bay to Yokohama, Hong Kong, and/or Taiwan, and, finally, containers filled with
products manufactured in the Far East to be carried across the Pacific to
consumers in North America.
Malcom McLean tells an interesting story about starting up Sea-Land
service to Japan. With no idea whatsoever about the shape and style of
that country’s economy, he acquired a batch of annual reports from major
Japanese corporations, flew to Japan, and, believing that Mitsui was the
company he was looking for after reviewing the annual reports, stopped
by the office of that company’s president early one morning with no appointment or advance warning, a technique that McLean had perfected
into a virtual art form over the years. When the president arrived at work,
he agreed to give his unexpected visitor a few minutes—a few minutes
that turned into four hours and resulted in a working agreement between
Mitsui and Sea-Land.16

The Mayaguez Incident
It was while Sea-Land was providing logistical support to U.S. troops
in Vietnam that one of the company’s vessels became involved in an unfortunate and tragic international incident. Sea-Land’s Mayaguez—built in
1944 as the C-2 cargo vessel White Falcon and later converted into the
container ship Santa Eliana by Grace Line for that company’s ill-fated
Venezuelan service—was one of the vessels Malcom McLean’s company
had deployed in South East Asia.
Sea-Land did not merely haul containers across the Pacific from the
United States to Vietnam. There was considerable traffic to be moved
between Asian ports, and so on May 7, 1975—a week after the fall of
Saigon—the Mayaguez departed Hong Kong bound for Sattahip, Thailand, and Singapore with a full load of containers, a voyage of almost
three thousand miles that the vessel had made many times before. After
proceeding down the South China Sea and around Pointe de Camau at
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the southern tip of Vietnam, May 12 found the Mayaguez steaming north
by northwest in the Gulf of Siam, sixty miles off the coast of Cambodia—
but a mere eight miles from a small island called Poulo Wai that Cambodia
claimed as its territory. The master of the Mayaguez, Capt. Charles T.
Miller, later said; ‘‘We were taking a route considered a normal traffic
route for all commercial ships. We were 61 miles off the coast of Cambodia, and I didn’t feel we were cruising in dangerous waters.’’17
Except matters quickly turned very dangerous indeed. In mid-afternoon, several armed Cambodian gunboats under the control of the Khmer
Rouge, some of them American-made PCF class Swift boats, surrounded
the Mayaguez and put a 76-mm shot across her bow. Miller stalled as
long as he could and sent out urgent SOS radio messages, but eventually
surrendered his vessel to the rebels. The Mayaguez then either steamed
itself or was towed to an anchorage off an island closer to the Cambodian
coast, and the crew was taken ashore. President Gerald Ford denounced
the seizure of an unarmed merchant ship as ‘‘an act of piracy,’’ and when
negotiations appeared unlikely to resolve the situation, a military response was ordered.
This is when matters turned terribly, terribly tragic. An assault force,
as well as a fresh civilian crew, arrived aboard the Knox-class frigate USS
Harold E. Holt (DE-1074). They successfully took back the Mayaguez,
raised the American flag on the vessel’s main mast, and the Holt towed
the vessel back to international waters. Meanwhile, the Cambodians had
released the thirty-nine-man Sea-Land crew—all were unharmed—but a
Marine helicopter assault that was deployed to rescue the crew suffered
fifteen U.S. combat deaths. In addition, three men who were unfortunately left behind later became fatal casualties, and twenty-three U.S.
airmen died in a helicopter crash in Thailand that was part of the overall
operation.18
As for the Mayaguez, the vessel was undamaged and returned to SeaLand. Along with all of Sea-Land’s older converted C-2s, though, its days
were numbered, and it would never again return to U.S. waters. In May
1979, Sea-Land’s Mayaguez arrived at Kaohsiung, Taiwan, where it was
later dismantled and reduced to scrap.
While the incident involving the Mayaguez was the more newsworthy,
another of Sea-Land’s converted C-2s saw hostile action during the Vietnam War. In May 1969, the converted C-2 Fairland—the container ship
that had inaugurated Sea-Land’s transatlantic service three years earlier
in 1966—came under rocket attack from Viet Cong forces. The ship’s hull
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was penetrated, but it was above the waterline and caused little damage
and no casualties.19

Some Unique Conversions
Before it began designing and building new container ships from the
keel up, Sea-Land undertook an extraordinarily complicated—or at least
unusual—conversion project. The ‘‘raw materials’’ for this extraordinary
effort were three of the company’s earlier container ships, a trio of recently acquired T-2 tankers, and three newly constructed bow and midbody sections. Out of this assortment of something old and something
new, six container ships were pieced together.
In the first phase, sterns and machinery were cut away from the container ships Anchorage, Seattle, and Baltimore—all three having earlier
been converted from C-4 cargo and troopships—and joined to newly built
bow and midbody sections, thus creating the container ships Rose City,
San Pedro, and Pittsburgh. The finished ships were 695 feet long, and each
could accommodate 602 of Sea-Land’s thirty-five-foot containers, thus
placing them, in terms of carrying capacity, among the company’s largest
tonnage. Indeed after conversion, this trio was identified by Sea-Land as
belonging to the same general class of vessels as the converted C-4s Chicago and Saint Louis, now a group of five similar vessels that could each
accommodate slightly in excess of six hundred containers and were typically assigned to Sea-Land’s most important international trades. (Chicago
and Rose City were identified as the C4-J1 class, while Pittsburgh, Saint
Louis, and San Pedro constituted the C4-JC class.) As was the case with
earlier conversions, the ‘‘identity’’ of a given vessel—that is to say its official number—remained with the stern and machinery. And so Rose City
can be regarded as the ‘‘same vessel’’ as the container ship Anchorage that
Sea-Land acquired from Bull Line in 1965, since it included the same stern
and machinery and was identified by the same official number.
In the second phase, each container-carrying midbody that was liberated during the first phase of the project was then joined to the stern and
machinery from a recently acquired T-2 tanker to create another new—or
at least different—container ship. But because they incorporated the stern
and machinery of a trio of T-2 tankers, these three newly created container ships carried the official numbers of the tankers. Sea-Land elected
to christen this trio Seattle, Anchorage, and Baltimore, the names previously carried by container ships whose stern and machinery—and official identity—had earlier become Rose City, San Pedro, and Pittsburgh. To
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complicate matters further, these various efforts were carried out in a
number of different shipyards, and partial hull sections were welded
closed and towed through open water to distant cities to complete the
program.
Such a complicated effort could be expected to run into a few glitches
along the way. Sea-Land’s John Boylston recalls heading home one evening after spending the day poring over technical details of a conversion
effort that was moving forward at a Todd shipyard. Suddenly, while driving along the New Jersey Turnpike, he realized that a particular midbody
and bow utilized direct current to run its anchor windlass and other auxiliary equipment, while the T-2 stern and machinery to which it was in the
process of being welded produced only alternating current to power such
auxiliary equipment. It took a little rewiring, and a rectifier or two had to
be incorporated into the vessel’s electrical system, but everything worked
out in the end.20 Despite occasional errant steps, the conversion projects
moved along just fine.21
Table 5.2 lays out this multi-phase effort. The rationale behind the project was to correct an earlier propulsion imbalance, with San Pedro, Rose
City, and Pittsburgh—and their C-4 engine rooms—capable of powering a
rather larger vessel than the original Seattle, Anchorage and Baltimore,
while T-2 machinery was a much better match for a smaller hull.
Sea-Land’s original plan called for the bow and midbody section of the
three T-2 tankers, Bull Run, Petrolite, and Esso Roanoke, to be scrapped.
table 5.2. Sea-Land Fleet: Multiple Conversions of 1969–70
Stern and
machinery of the
container ship . . .

joined with a newly
built bow and
midbody to create
the container ship . . .

with the original
bow and midbody
joined to the stern
and machinery of
the T-2 tanker . . .

to create the
container
ship

Anchorage
(246736)
Seattle
(247275)
Baltimore
(248238)

Rose City
(246736)
Pittsburgh
(247275)
San Pedro
(248238)

Bull Run
(243850)
Petrolite
(245025)
Esso Roanoke
(246103)

Anchorage
(243850)
Seattle
(245025)
Baltimore
(246103)
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As the Petrolite-into-Seattle project was moving forward, though, a T-2
tanker called the Oregon Standard was involved in a serious accident near
the Golden Gate Bridge. Low and behold the no-longer-needed sections
from Petrolite were just what the proverbial doctor ordered, and when
Oregon Standard was repaired and returned to sea, major elements from
Petrolite had been incorporated into its hull.22
Table 5.3 presents a snap-shot view of the trades each of Sea-Land’s 41
container ships were working on September 8, 1972, mere weeks before
the first of the company’s newbuildings entered service.
The final two vessels noted in the preceding table were each distinctive. Whole bona fide members of the Sea-Land fleet, neither was a genuine cellular container ship. New Yorker was a diminutive craft that was
originally built for service between New York and Florida under the shortlived house flag of the Erie and Saint Lawrence Corporation, as discussed
in chapter 2. While the vessel carried some containers as deck cargo, it
was primarily a ro/ro vessel. More interestingly, New Yorker—together
with a sister ship, Floridian, which enjoyed a much shorter tenure with
Sea-Land—were the first diesel-powered members in the company’s fleet.
Detroit, on the other hand, not only began life as a C-3 cargo ship, but
when acquired by Sea-Land in 1962 and placed in the company’s Puerto
Rico service, it also retained its traditional cargo-hoisting masts and
booms and remained a conventional break-bulk cargo ship. Detroit could
accommodate a small number of containers as deck cargo, but the vessel’s
forte was transporting automobiles below decks, primarily secondhand
cars from the mainland to the island commonwealth where such vehicles
were in heavy demand. Detroit was also deployed in Vietnam service by
Sea-Land, but this was not the first time the vessel steamed in harm’s way.
On December 7, 1941, the C-3 that later became Sea-Land’s Detroit was
serving in the United States Navy as the seaplane-tender USS Tangier
(AV-8). Tangier was moored directly astern of the battleship USS Utah on
the northeast side of Ford Island at Pearl Harbor on that quiet Hawaiian
morning. (USS Utah was built in 1931 as a true battleship and identified
as BB-31. Earlier in 1941 it had been converted into a mobile target platform and was redesignated AG-16.) When Japanese planes began their
sneak attack on the fleet that morning, gunners aboard Tangier were
among the first to return fire, and the crew of the Tangier claimed three
downed aircraft that morning.
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table 5.3. Sea-Land Fleet on September 8, 1972
Vessel

Service or location

C-2 conversions
Gateway City
Azalea City
Bienville
Beauregard
Fairland
Raphael Semmes

New York–Jacksonville–San Juan
Baltimore–San Juan
Mobile–San Juan
At Cam Ranh Bay
Hampton Roads–New York–Boston
At Saigon

T-3 conversions
Elizabethport
Los Angeles
San Francisco
San Juan

Tacoma–Yokohama–Hong Kong
Busan–Yokohama–San Francisco
Tacoma–San Francisco–Yokohama
Los Angeles–Yokohama–Busan

T-2 conversion
Summit

Tacoma–Anchorage

C-2 conversions
Afoundria
Arizpa
Wacosta
Warrior

Jacksonville–San Juan
Jacksonville–San Juan
Baltimore–San Juan
New York–San Juan

Ex-Grace Line C-2 conversions
Mayaguez
New Orleans–San Juan
Ponce
Charleston–New York–Jacksonville
C-4 conversions
Long Beach
Trenton
Panama
Oakland

T-2 conversions
Jacksonville
Houston
Tampa
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Los Angeles–San Francisco–Yokohama
Cam Ranh Bay–Hong Kong–San Francisco
Hong Kong–Yokohama–San Francisco
Los Angeles–San Francisco–Yokohama
CharlestonNew York–Houston

New York–San Juan
Los Angeles–San Francisco–San Juan
New York–Los Angeles

table 5.3. (Continued)
Vessel

Service or location

C-4 conversions
Chicago
Saint Louis
Galveston
Boston
Brooklyn
Philadelphia
Portland
Newark
New Orleans
Mobile

San Francisco–Kobe
Busan–Tacoma–San Francisco
Anchorage–Tacoma
New York–San Juan
Tacoma–Anchorage
New York–Los Angeles
New York–Houston
New York–Rotterdam
New York–Houston
Tacoma–Anchorage

C-4 conversions
Rose City
San Pedro
Pittsburgh

Los Angeles–Kobe–Yokohama
Vancouver–Hong Kong–Singapore
Tacoma–San Francisco–Yokohama

C-4 ⴐ T-2 reconversions
Anchorage
Seattle
Baltimore

New York–Los Angeles
San Francisco–New York
New York–Bremerhaven

SL-18 class
SL 180
SL 181

New York–Rotterdam–Bremerhaven
Rotterdam–New York

MV Class
New Yorker

New Orleans–Puerto Rico

C-3 car carrier
Detroit

Miami–San Juan

Note
Vessels identified as SL 180 and SL 181 were designed and built by the Matson Navigation
Company but acquired by Sea-Land before entering service. SL 180 and SL 181 were
temporary names; the vessels would later be identified Sea-Land Venture and Sea-Land
Economy.
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Some years later, Sea-Land was ready to retire Detroit, and the company offered the vessel to Hawaiian interests for incorporation into a permanent memorial. No interest in such a donation was forthcoming,
though, and the former USS Tangier was scrapped.

The Magnificent SL-7
When Sea-Land eventually did acquire its first fleet of newbuildings,
they turned out to be vessels of rare distinction. When ship fanciers gather
to talk about the very finest deepwater vessels ever to fly the U.S. flag,
Sea-Land’s SL-7 class container ships belong on any short list of finalists,
right up there with Iowa class battleships, Mariner class cargo ships, even
the Leviathan and the United States.
First of all, they were fast. Malcom McLean wanted a vessel that could
cross the world’s most hostile oceans, fully laden, at speeds in excess of
thirty knots. They were also big. With a length of 946 feet and a carrying
capacity of 896 thirty-five-foot containers, plus four hundred TEUs, they
were, for their day, the largest container-carrying hulls ever built. The
SL-7 would surrender its title of world’s largest container ship in a few
years, though, as ever larger tonnage was built by any number of
companies.
When the Sea-Land staff began to draw up preliminary plans for the
new ships, a top speed of thirty knots was specified. McLean, though, was
nervous, and to ensure that his new vessels would indeed achieve that
speed, he insisted that a ten-percent margin be added to the specification,
and so the top speed of the new vessels has always been said to be thirtythree knots. Other preliminary requirements of the project included a fleet
of eight new vessels, the ability to transit the Panama Canal, and full port
turnaround in twenty-four hours.
Internal procedures at Sea-Land had become a good deal more formal
from the freewheeling style of earlier years, and so after the staff had
completed preliminary specifications for the new ships, approval of the
project by the company’s board of directors was required. (In the early
days, Malcom McLean was the final word on just about everything and
anything.) So the Sea-Land staff made a presentation to the board, and
the board voted fourteen to one against going forward with the project.
The staff was crestfallen, but McLean himself, who had cast the sole
affirmative vote, was anything but. A consultant was retained whose forte
was not naval architecture or capital financing, but the delivery of effective oral presentations. At a subsequent board meeting the consultant presented the staff ’s recommendation a second time—same data, same
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information, but with lots of fancy charts and colorful graphics—and the
board voted fifteen to nothing to move the project forward.23
The next step was to retain a naval architect to turn the staff ’s preliminary specifications into more formal designs. As McLean and his people
visited one naval architect after another, though, all were quite unwilling
to take on the extraordinary, and perhaps risky, assignment. One firm felt
it was the maritime equivalent of the supersonic transport plane, an aviation proposal that the United States had recently determined to be too
costly for further consideration. Another prominent firm politely suggested that what Sea-Land really wanted was a perfectly ordinary twentytwo-knot container ship similar to one the firm had recently designed for
another of its clients.
One day, McLean and his staff made a presentation to James Henry,
the founding principal of the J. J. Henry Company that had worked with
Sea-Land in the early 1960s when Elizabethport and her three sister ships
were converted from T-3 tankers. When the staff presentation was over,
Henry calmly turned to McLean and said, ‘‘Well, what color would you
like the ship, Mr. McLean?’’24 The J. J. Henry Company was retained to
design the new vessels.
McLean himself maintained an intense interest in the SL-7 project,
from the earliest design stages through to inaugural voyages. William du
Barry Thomas, who spent his professional career working for J. J. Henry
and is a noted maritime historian in his own right, recalls the only time
he ever met Malcom McLean. It was at the Netherlands Ship Model Basin
in Wageningen, where engineers were running evaluations on various potential hull forms for the SL-7. When McLean visited the facility, Thomas
recalls that he put but a single question to the engineers: ‘‘Will it be fast?’’
Assured that it would be, McLean departed, leaving the engineers to complete their work.25
Malcom McLean had no maritime background, and he was in no sense
an enthusiast about ships and the sea. He would often refer to his container ships as ‘‘nothing but wheelbarrows,’’ and it may well have been
his lack of any appreciation of the heritage of steam and sail that allowed
him to decide calmly that he wanted a fleet of container ships that could
travel the seven seas at thirty-three knots.
As the J. J. Henry Company pressed forward with design work, locating
a shipyard that was able and willing to construct the new vessels proved
to be every bit as challenging as retaining a naval architect. In August
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1969, though, contracts were signed with three different northern European yards: A. G. Weser would build three vessels at its yard in Bremen;
another West German company, Rheinstahl Nordseewerke, would construct two ships in Emden; and the remaining three hulls in the eightvessel fleet would be turned out in the Netherlands at Rotterdam Dockyard. The cost of the eight ships would be $53.4 million each—or $427
million for the fleet.26
Splitting an order for nominally similar vessels among different yards
was not unusual, but it rarely produced ships that were carbon copies of
each other. Shipyards typically perform a good portion of a ship’s final
engineering work, and they also have flexibility in acquiring components
from various vendors—navigational gear, propulsion machinery, and so
forth.
Sea-Land, though, wanted vessels that were as identical one to another
as humanly possible, and so a cooperative effort called the Containership
Construction Center (CCC) was established. Representatives of all three
shipyards, plus, of course, Sea-Land and J. J. Henry, staffed it. A resident
coordinator for the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) also worked at
the CCC, and since the ships would be registered in the United States and
employ U.S. crews, retired officers from the United States Coast Guard
were retained to facilitate later inspections by that all-important agency.
Another aspect of the procurement that helped ensure uniformity was
the avoidance of any contractual terminology that gave a shipyard the
discretion to provide equivalent equipment to that indicated in the specifications. (Construction contracts often specify a particular component in
detail, sometimes even by brand name, but then give the shipyard broad
flexibility by adding the phrase ‘‘or its equivalent.’’ The SL-7 contracts
contained no such open-ended language.)
As for the design that J. J. Henry developed, it was a radical departure
from what had become conventional container-ship configuration. Typical
container ships feature a sharp flare of the hull immediate behind the bow
so the vessel achieves maximum beam for as much of its hull length as
possible, a design that also helps prevent ‘‘green water’’ from crashing up
onto the weather deck in rough seas and possibly damaging containers
stowed there. As important, by achieving maximum width as close to the
bow as possible, a greater number of containers can be carried in a ship’s
forward holds.
Such a hull form might have been fine for vessels designed to operate
in the twenty-knot range, but it would hardly do when speeds in excess
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of thirty knots were desired. Consequently, the SL-7 featured a very sharp
and graceful hull that was more akin to something one might expect to
find on a light cruiser or a fast passenger liner than a routine container
ship. The hull lines also narrowed gracefully toward the stern, and while
the SL-7 did feature a squared-off transom stern, this transom was less
than half the width of the vessel’s full beam. Containers were carried ten
across amidships, but only six across close to the stern.
J. J. Henry paid considerable attention to a deckhouse for the SL-7; in
fact, the final design included dual deckhouses. One was located close to
the bow and incorporated the pilothouse and cabin accommodations for
a vessel’s officers. A forward deckhouse would help protect containers on
the weather deck from ‘‘green water’’ coming over the bow, but another
factor influencing the design was the height of lift-bridges of the Jersey
Central Railroad at the entrance to Newark Bay that the SL-7 would have
to navigate en route to and from Elizabethport. The bridges imposed ‘‘air
draft’’ limits that a single deckhouse, wherever it was located, would have
had problems observing.
The second deckhouse, where the remainder of the crew had their
accommodations, was slightly aft of amidships and was topped off by a
pair of side-by-side funnels. The boilers were located directly beneath the
funnels, of course, and deep down in the vessel, the engines were immediately aft of the boilers.
An interesting design feature that the J. J. Henry people were asked to
incorporate at Sea-Land’s request called for a slight rise in the main deck
aft of this second deckhouse. The reason was to allow additional containers to be carried below deck, but it did create a somewhat unusual ‘‘bump’’
in the otherwise graceful hull lines of the SL-7. Unusual configurations
such as this were rather more common in some of Sea-Land’s earlier conversion projects, but it caused one observer to remark to a Sea-Land colleague, ‘‘You can’t even build a new ship without it looking like a
conversion.’’27
Another curious feature of the SL-7 was a function of its hull form.
Because there was insufficient beam forward of the pilot house to incorporate any container cells there, a conventional break-bulk cargo hatch was
included in the weather deck close to the bow, and the vessels were able
to accommodate whatever odd-size cargo could be hoisted into this hold.
Plans are one thing, though, facts are another, and despite the capability
that was incorporated into the SL-7 design, Sea-Land never used these
holds to carry break-bulk cargo.
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When it came to developing a propulsion plant for the SL-7, engineers
had calculated that to sustain a speed of thirty-three knots, 120,000 horsepower would be required. The only style of engine that could generate
such power was a pair of compound steam turbines, each geared to a
separate shaft and propeller. A compound steam turbine is, in effect, two
engines linked together. High-pressure steam directly from the boiler is
fed into the first and smaller turbine, but because this steam is still capable of generating additional force, it is then fed into a second, but much
larger, turbine to tap this additional energy. With an SL-7 operating at
full power, the high-pressure turbine rotates at 5,038 rpm, the low pressure turbine at 3,574, and double reduction gears step this down to a more
workable 135 rpm on the propeller shafts.28 (Compound steam engines
often cause confusion in vessel documentation registers, since some authorities identify a single compound engine as two engines, others as
one.)
Diesel engines were evaluated for the SL-7 but quickly ruled out, and
while there was some talk during the design phase of using nuclear reactors to generate steam for the turbines, the eventual choice was a pair of
more conventional Foster-Wheeler D-type two-drum boilers, each feeding
steam to one of the sets of turbines. As for the turbine engines themselves,
each was a General Electric (GE) model MST-19 unit that was rated at
60,000 horsepower. The complete engines for the first SL-7 were built
entirely at GE’s Lynn, Massachusetts, facility, while the other seven SL-7s
featured internal engine elements built in Lynn, while external castings
were produced in Europe.
In terms of auxiliary machinery, electricity for various onboard purposes was generated by two GE turbo-alternators that were fed steam at
full boiler pressure, and there was also a large twelve-cylinder General
Motors model 12-645E7 diesel engine, plus a smaller Caterpillar diesel,
that could also be used to generate current; two Aqua-Chem distilling
plants were able to convert 33,300 gallons of seawater into freshwater
each day.
One maritime trade journal suggested that the compact and efficient
design of the SL-7 engine room was based on that of Essex class aircraft
carriers of the United States Navy.29 In any event, J. J. Henry put considerable effort into laying out the engine room, since an important operational specification of the SL-7 was an ability to load and unload all
containers inside twenty-four hours, and various scheduled maintenance
activities had to be completed, in port, within this narrow window.
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Table 5.4 displays basic statistical information about Sea-Land’s new
SL-7 vessels.
The first two SL-7s—one called Sea-Land McLean, the other Sea-Land
Galloway—headed out for sea trials on the very same day. The McLean
had been built in Rotterdam and the Galloway in Bremen, but the man
who was heading up the SL-7 project for Sea-Land, Warren Leback, had a
very stern injunction to issue about the pending trials. ‘‘I’m absolutely
dictating,’’ Leback insisted, ‘‘that one of these ships is to sea trial in the
North Sea between Sweden and Finland and the other ship is to go off
the coast of Norway and sea trial there, and you’re not to get within 100
miles of each other because I don’t want any races.’’30
Leback’s caution generated something rather unexpected. The tests
were going routinely enough, and commercial fishermen working at sea
were understandably taken by the high-speed runs they were witnessing
and hastened to tell their friends about the goings-on by radio. One of the
fishermen off the Norwegian coast was telling someone about this big and
fast new vessel he had seen an hour or so earlier, when another fisherman
many miles away suddenly came on the air and said the same ship was
steaming past his location at that very moment. And so stories quickly
circulated that there was a new ship at sea—and it could travel at a hundred knots. Malcom McLean was delighted with such rumors and felt they
would throw his competition completely off stride.
Another interesting story from the initial sea trials involves a U.S. Navy
observer who was aboard to evaluate the performance of the GE turbines
for possible future use aboard aircraft carriers. The Navy observer asked
table 5.4. Sea-Land’s SL-7: Statistical Information
Data element

Value

Length (overall)
Length (waterline)
Length (between perpendiculars)
Beam (molded)
Draft
Gross registered tons
Deadweight tons
Classification Society

946⬘ 1.5⬙
900⬘ 0⬙
880⬘ 6⬙
105⬘ 6⬙
30⬘ 0⬙
41,127
27,358
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)
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if the vessel could be run at full speed astern, and such a trial was arranged. The SL-7—even with its flat transom stern—was able to sustain
twenty-three knots at full power while running astern. At one point during the run, the SL-7 overtook a bulk carrier that was moving along at a
perfectly respectable fourteen knots. The master of the bulk carrier was
quickly on his radio telling anyone in listening range that he had just been
passed, at speed, by a ship that was steaming backward.31
The SL-7 proved to be exceptionally vibration-free. It has been said, for
instance, that when off-duty crew members awoke at sea on early voyages, they often felt the ship must have lost power and was adrift, so firm
was the deck beneath their feet. There was really only one design problem
that surfaced during the early days of the SL-7. Devices known as shafting
fairwaters—streamlined fiberglass shrouds that allow sea water to pass
smoothly around awkwardly-shaped struts that hold the propeller shafts
in place—developed a tendency to fall off, as did a similar hub at the end
of the propeller shaft. Their absence took a toll on a vessel’s top speed,
and also created issues associated with cavitation. The problem was identified before the fourth vessel had been delivered, and a new all-steel
design was quickly engineered to solve the problem. To ensure that everything was working smoothly, though, Sea-Land arranged to have underwater movies taken of an SL-7 running at speed. And so when Sea-Land
Trade was proceeding from Europe to the Panama Canal to inaugurate
the SL-7 era on the Pacific, camera crews were stationed at a place called
Brown’s Deep in the Caribbean, where the sea is known to be exceptionally clear.
Routine fare available on many cable television channels includes underwater movies of dolphins and whales swimming around in the presence of camera crews. Imagine how different an experience it must surely
have been, though, when instead of a gentle Blue Whale slowly swimming
past, or even a more threatening species like a hammerhead shark circling
slowly around a camera operator, three teams of scuba divers stationed
themselves on either side, and underneath, a 44,000-gross-ton containership that was steaming past a marker buoy at thirty-three knots.32
Before the SL-7 entered service, an extensive training regimen was developed to help deck officers, as well as harbor pilots and docking pilots,
familiarize themselves with the operating characteristics of the new vessels, especially in close quarters. Engineers were concerned that because
of various trade-offs that were made during the design process to ensure
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high-speed performance, the new ships would not have good maneuvering characteristics at slow speed. (The SL-7 also lacked a bow thruster
because the streamlined hull was too narrow to permit its installation in
the area where such an accessory would be most effective.) At a facility
operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Vicksburg, Mississippi, a
large hydrostatic likeness of the approach to Newark Bay was constructed—including the twin bridges of the Jersey Central Railroad that
inbound and outbound ships had to pass under at a slight angle—and
with a nine-foot model of an SL-7 that had been built at Stevens Institute
in Hoboken, officers were able to try their hand navigating the radiocontrolled model, while a similar likeness of Rotterdam harbor was built
at the same model basin in the Netherlands where SL-7 hull forms
were earlier tested. As a practical matter, though, the SL-7 proved to be a
good deal more maneuverable at low speed than many designers felt it
would be.
On October 6, 1972, Sea-Land Galloway steamed under the Verrazano
Narrows Bridge and became the first SL-7 to visit the Port of New York.
When the vessel was later assisted into its berth at Port Elizabeth by a
flotilla of McAllister tugs—Sea-Land traditionally contracted with McAllister for docking assistance—a distinctive white band that encircled the top
of its hull was especially dramatic. (For some reason, this white band was
later painted over.) Far more significant, though, was the fact the new
vessel had completed a westbound crossing from Bishop’s Rock off the
southern coast of Cornwall, England, to Ambrose Light adjacent to the
pilot station outside New York Harbor, the traditional North Atlantic
course, in four days, seventeen hours, and seventeen minutes and at an
average speed of 31.07 knots. It was the fastest transatlantic crossing ever
made by any cargo ship, and among passenger liners, only Normandie,
Queen Mary, and United States had ever recorded swifter crossings.
The following spring—and with the shafting fairwater problem resolved—Sea-Land McLean bested the time her sister ship had posted by a
substantial measure, shaved in excess of twenty hours off Galloway’s earlier mark, and reached Ambrose Light three days, twenty-one hours, and
five minutes after clearing Bishop’s Rock at an average speed of 32.71
knots. But even this would not be the end of it; in August of that same
year, Sea-Land Exchange bested Sea-Land McLean’s performance by arriving at Ambrose in three days, eleven hours, and twenty-four minutes—an
average speed of 34.92 knots. Both of these performances were faster than
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the best crossings ever recorded by either Normandie or Queen Mary, leaving Malcom McLean’s new superships second only to the United States as
all-time speed champions of the North Atlantic, with Sea-Land Exchange’s
time a mere 0.97 knots behind what was then the fastest transatlantic
crossing of all time. Sea-Land McLean later posted 33.005 knots on an
eastbound crossing, while in August of 1973, Sea-Land Trade departed
Kobe, Japan, and reached Race Rocks at the entrance to the Straits of San
Juan de Fuca north of Seattle five days and six hours later, having crossed
the Pacific at 32.75 knots. Sea-Land Commerce later steamed from Yokohama to Long Beach, California, at 33.216 knots, a record that represents
the fastest transpacific crossing ever made by any merchant ship, passenger or cargo.33
Not nearly as fast as these noteworthy crossings but interesting nonetheless is the fact the SL-7 could maintain twenty-four knots when running on one boiler and two turbines, and an eminently respectable
twenty-one knots with but a single boiler and a single turbine on line.
Table 5.5 identifies the eight SL-7 vessels.
The onset of SL-7 service in the fall of 1972 was delayed a week or so
because of a labor dispute. While the United States Coast Guard had approved operation of the new vessels with only five deck officers aboard,
Sea-Land was proposing to assign six. The International Association of
Masters, Mates and Pilots, however, was holding out for eight, and as a
result a work stoppage managed to bring the entire Sea-Land fleet to a
halt. The issue may well have been less about SL-7 staffing levels as much
as it was over the fact that the ordinary working agreement between SeaLand and the bargaining unit had expired in June and little progress was
being made toward a new contract. Eventually a compromise was reached
that called for the SL-7 to operate with a master and six other officers, the
impasse was over, and the new ships could enter service.34

Feeder Service
While Sea-Land Galloway arrived at Elizabethport from Europe on October 6, 1972, the SL-7 era is better said to have begun the next day,
when Galloway left New York for Rotterdam and Sea-Land McLain began
a westbound voyage for New York from Europe. Sea-Land had developed
a new and different transatlantic service pattern for its new ships. They
would call at only three ports: Elizabethport in the United States and
Rotterdam and Bremerhaven in Europe. Container service to and from
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table 5.5. Sea-Land Fleet: SL-7 Class of 1972
Off. No.

Name

Place Built (Year)

542200

Sea-Land Galloway

540413

Sea-Land McLean

545200

Sea-Land Commerce

546383

Sea-Land Exchange

550723

Sea-Land Resource

550721

Sea-Land Market

545201

Sea-Land Trade

550722

Sea-Land Finance

Bremen, West Germany
(1972)
Rotterdam, Netherlands
(1972)
Bremen, West Germany
(1973)
Rotterdam, Netherlands
(1973)
Rotterdam, Netherlands
(1973)
Bremen, West Germany
(1973)
Emden, West Germany
(1973)
Emden, West Germany
(1973)

other ports—Baltimore, Norfolk, or Boston in the United States, Antwerp,
Le Havre, or any of the British ports in Europe—would be handled by
other vessels deployed in feeder service out of the major ports. In the
United States, such feeder service was operated by Sea-Land itself with
its older vessels, while in Europe, contract arrangements of various sorts
were made with other companies to connect with the SL-7s in Bremerhaven and Rotterdam and deliver containers to other ports. Some of these
feeder vessels were time-chartered by Sea-Land and decorated in SeaLand livery, while others operated under less formal arrangements. Table
5.6 identifies a sampling of vessels that were providing feeder service to
and from Sea-Land’s own international liner routes at the time the SL-7
fleet entered service.
Although a good many of the feeder vessels that transported containers
in and out of major transfer ports such as Rotterdam were owned and
operated by independent steamship companies, Sea-Land eventually saw
potential for profit in such service, and in the late 1970s the company
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table 5.6. Adjuncts to Sea-Land Fleet: Various Feeder Vessels
Flag

Name(s)

Dimensions
(GRT)

Place Built (Year)

Liberia

Grand Navigator

Japan

Otowasan Maru

Italy

Osaka, Japan
(1970)
Tamano, Japan
(1952)
Deest, West Germany
(1970)

West Germany

Relay
b) Guido Baldo
c) Atlantic Ferry
d) Sea Star X
Mar Tierra

484 ⳯ 67 ⳯ 30
(10,095)
564 ⳯ 70 ⳯ 34
(14,469)
242 ⳯ 43 ⳯ 12
(1,184)

312 ⳯ 46 ⳯ 23
(1,422)

West Germany

Black Swan

West Germany

Albert Friesecke

Austria

Stadt Ascheddorf
b) Kydor Pioneer
c) Senta
d) Virginia Express
e) Seadoll III
f) Miramar
g) Patritsia V
h) Mona
Ragna

319 ⳯ 57 ⳯ 18
(994)
243⳯ 36 ⳯ 13
(499)
246 ⳯ 43 ⳯ 12
(500)

Bremerhaven,
West Germany
(1970)
Deest, West Germany
(1969)
Hamburg, West Germany
(1968)
Deest, West Germany
(1969)

244⳯ 42 ⳯ 12
(499)
376 ⳯ 68 ⳯ 14
(1,599)

Hamburg, West Germany
(1968)
Deest, West Germany
(1970)

314 ⳯ 53 ⳯ 15
(2,998)

Alblasserdan, Netherlands
(1970)

West Germany
Singapore

Italy

Flying Scot
a) Greyhound
c) Cast Salmon
d) Cast Raccoon
e) Pablo Metz
f) Mersin
g) Pablo Metz
Tiber
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established a small offshore subsidiary to share in this trade. Sea-Land
organized a Bermuda-based company called InterSea Operations, and InterSea then established branch offices in places as diverse as Singapore,
Hong Kong, Rotterdam, and Flexistowe. Table 5.7 identifies three classes
of smaller container-carrying vessels—all built in Japan between 1978 and
1984 and registered under various flags of convenience—that constituted
table 5.7. Sea-Land Fleet: InterSea Operations Feeder Vessels
Flag

Name

Hull dimensions GRT

Place built
(year)

TEU
Capacity

Bay Class
Panama

Shelly Bay

450 ⳯ 69 ⳯ 26

8,635

540

Seaward Bay
450 ⳯ 69 ⳯ 26
b) Santa Paula
c) Sea Florida
Somers Bay
450 ⳯ 69 ⳯ 26
b) Sea Link
Sandys Bay
450 ⳯ 69 ⳯ 26
b) Sea Lark

8,428

Imabari, Japan
(1983)
Imabari, Japan
(1983)
Hakata, Japan
(1984)
Hakata, Japan
(1984)

540

Panama

Liberia
Liberia

World Class
Singapore World Tiger
b) Sea Lotus
Singapore World Lion
b) Sea Legend
Liberia
World Lynx

Panarea Class
Panama
Panarea
b) Panarea I
c) Amersham
Panama
Oahu
b) Chesham
Panama
Pagai
b) La Trinity
c) Denham

502 ⳯ 76 ⳯ 28
502 ⳯ 76 ⳯ 28
502 ⳯ 76 ⳯ 28

8,654
8,654

540

540

10,381 Yokkaichi, Japan 754
(1978)
11,314 Yokkaichi, Japan 754
(1978)
11,312 Yokkaichi, Japan 754
(1979)

396 ⳯ 68 ⳯ 26

6,764

Yokkaichi, Japan 528
(1980)

396 ⳯ 68 ⳯ 26

6,807

396 ⳯ 68 ⳯ 26

6,807

Yokkaichi, Japan 528
(1980)
Yokkaichi, Japan 576
(1980)
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the InterSea operation and provided feeder service to Sea-Land’s international liner routes.
Returning to the advent of the SL-7 class in the fall of 1972, on the same
day that Sea-Land Galloway set sail from Port Elizabeth for Rotterdam for
the very first time, Cunard’s Queen Elizabeth 2 departed New York for
Southampton. It is interesting to speculate if the two vessels were ever in
sight of each other during their transatlantic crossing. The SL-7 was a
considerably faster vessel than QE2, but Sea-Land Galloway made this
crossing at reduced speed and reached Europe a day behind the latterday Cunarder.

Once a Week with Two Ships
In the long and storied history of steamship service between the United
States and Europe, a cherished goal was to provide weekly service from
each continent and to protect such a schedule with but two vessels. Cunard was unable to achieve such a goal until its Queen Mary of 1936 and
Queen Elizabeth of 1940 were able to operate in tandem after World War
II. A plausible case can be advanced that North German Lloyd’s prewar
sister ships, Europa and Bremen, had engine rooms that were capable of
turning in such performance, but available records indicate that this pair
never managed weekly departures. Every eight days, perhaps, but not
every seven days.
It was only when Malcom McLean’s magnificent SL-7 came on the
scene that a second steamship company was able to provide weekly departures from both sides of the North Atlantic—and do so with but two
vessels. Steamship enthusiasts will likely never confuse Sea-Land Galloway and Sea-Land McLean with Queen Mary or Queen Elizabeth, and for
obvious reasons. But if the name of the game is to steam across the world’s
most hostile ocean at sufficient speed to maintain weekly departures from
Europe and North America, then Sea-Land Service stands as fully the
equal of the fabled Cunard Line.
While it is interesting to discuss the new vessels in terms of steamship
traditions associated with the North Atlantic, in point of fact, six of the
eight vessels were initially deployed in transpacific service, and not across
the North Atlantic at all. McLean’s original plan was to operate his new
fleet in around-the-world service, but he backed off such a concept. Instead, six vessels were assigned to conventional east-west trade between
the West Coast of the United States and the Far East.
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Fundamental shifts were underway in world commerce, and one result
of these shifts is that the manufacture of all sorts of products was shifting
away from the areas where they had traditionally been produced. More
and more of everything—from baseball gloves and model railroad trains
to men’s socks and television sets—was being manufactured in Asia. Malcom McLean was more than willing and ready to recognize such trends.
And so six of his new SL-7s were deployed in transpacific service, where
their thirty-three-knot speed was faster than any previous steamship service ever operated across that ocean. Table 5.8 displays where all eight
units in the new fleet could be found on a particular day, selected quite
arbitrarily, a year and some months after the new era had been inaugurated. (The final SL-7, Sea-Land Finance, had been delivered to the company mere weeks earlier on December 4, 1973.)
The full and complete capital investment that the SL-7 represented involved $427 million for the eight vessels. But an almost equal amount of
new investment was earmarked for a series of non-vessel improvements
that were necessary to ensure that the new ships would operate at maximum efficiency. New shoreside cranes were installed at all three terminals
the SL-7s would serve, improved berthing facilities were constructed, and
at the southeast corner of the Elizabethport facility, a unique turntable
was built so gantry cranes could be rotated 90 degrees to work vessels
docked at berths along either of the perpendicular bulkheads in the SeaLand terminal.35
Sea-Land’s fleet of trailers also had to be expanded substantially
in advance of the arrival of the new vessels, and an up-to-the-minute
table 5.8. Sea-Land’s SL-7 Fleet on January 31, 1974
Vessel

Service

Sea-Land Commerce
Sea-Land Exchange
Sea-Land Finance
Sea-Land Galloway
Sea-Land Market
Sea-land McLean
Sea-Land Resource
Sea-Land Trade

Kobe–San Francisco
Hong Kong–San Francisco
Hong Kong–San Francisco
At Kobe
Rotterdam–Port Elizabeth
Port Elizabeth–Bremerhaven
Los Angeles–Yokohama
Los Angeles–Yokohama
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computer system was designed and installed to develop loading and unloading plans for each departure, keep track of which trailers were being
kept where, and create up-to-date manifests and forward them to other
ports in the Sea-Land system by bouncing electronic signals off orbiting
satellites that land stations across the North Atlantic could receive. The
Port of New York Authority also got into the act and expanded approach
channels and enlarged a turning basin in Newark Bay to accommodate
the big new vessels.
And so the SL-7 era at Sea-Land began in October 1972. A year later,
on October 6, 1973, though—with the eighth and final SL-7 still two
months away from being delivered to Sea-Land—Egypt and Syria invaded
Israel in a conflict that has since been known as the Yom Kippur War
and were thoroughly defeated by Israeli forces. One wholly unforeseeable
consequence of this conflict was that the promise the SL-7 program represented for Sea-Land barely a year earlier was undone.

The R. J. Reynolds Era
On August 29, 1972, a Sea-Land delegation was in Rotterdam, the
Netherlands, and at the shipyard of Rotterdam Dockyards that afternoon,
Margaret Sykes McLean, the spouse of Sea-Land founder Malcom
McLean, christened the first of the company’s new SL-7 container ships
Sea-Land McLean.
By 1972, Malcom McLean’s children were raising families of their own,
youngsters who called their grandfather ‘‘Pop-Pop.’’ At the family’s request, officials of Rotterdam Dockyard made a temporary change in the
way the name of their newest vessel was rendered across its stern. The
ship’s home port remained Wilmington, Delaware, but when Malcom
McLean got a look at the big new SL-7 that was to bear his name, what
he was pleasantly surprised to see was not Sea-Land McLean, but rather
Sea-Land Pop-Pop.
Three days later, the Sea-Land party had traveled 250 or so miles to
Bremen, in West Germany, and at the A. G. Weser shipyard there, Mrs.
Alex H. Galloway christened the second SL-7 Sea-Land Galloway in honor
of her husband. Alex H. Galloway was the about-to-retire chairman and
chief officer of the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company.
R. J. Reynolds had been anxious to diversify its holdings in the face of
increasing social and political pressure that was steadily building against
its principal product line, namely cigarettes. And so while it would eventually add such products as Oreo Cookies to its basket of wares, in January
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1969 a thoroughly friendly $400 million takeover was negotiated whereby
R. J. Reynolds became the principal owner of Sea-Land Service. McLean
sold his shares in the company he had founded, but continued to serve as
president of Sea-Land after the transaction, in addition to holding a seat
on the R. J. Reynolds board of directors—and acquiring a substantial portfolio of R. J. Reynolds stock. R. J. Reynolds and Malcom McLean were
both from North Carolina, of course, and long before anybody ever heard
of a T-2 tanker called Ideal X, Reynolds was a major customer of McLean
Trucking and relied on the company for shipping quantities of its products
to market.
Most observers feel that the takeover was advantageous to both companies. For its part, before acquiring Sea-Land, R.J. Reynolds’s nontobacco revenues represented merely twelve percent of the corporation’s
total revenues, while once Sea-Land was part of the picture, nontobacco
revenue had increased to twenty-six percent.36 Reynolds even changed its
formal corporate name to acknowledge the new order. Before the merger,
the company was the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company; after the merger,
it became R. J. Reynolds Industries. The formal date of Sea-Land’s acquisition by Reynolds was May 13, 1969.
For Sea-Land, the merger provided a badly needed source of investment capital, and while the SL-7 program had begun to move through
various design phases prior to the merger, it is doubtful in the extreme if
Sea-Land had the financial resources to execute construction contracts
without additional support. McLean even arranged to establish a new
company, Reynolds Leasing, to assume title to the new SL-7s and charter
them to Sea-Land Service for operation.
During the Reynolds era, McLean gradually scaled back his involvement with Sea-Land, although he certainly kept his hand in the SL-7 project from beginning to end. While many Sea-Land veterans felt a bit
uncomfortable with the added layers of procedure and oversight that the
merger brought with it, most would agree that under R. J. Reynolds, SeaLand remained Sea-Land and maritime people did not find themselves
continually second-guessed by people whose principal business experience involved, essentially, manufacturing and selling cigarettes. There
was some additional business formality, to be sure, but Sea-Land itself
had begun to move away from its freewheeling style of earlier years even
before the R. J. Reynolds takeover.
One change that John Boylston, a long-time Sea-Land hand, noted with
a degree of humor is that after the merger, business meetings that were
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held at Reynolds’s facilities always included bowls of tobacco products on
the conference tables, and people were free to help themselves and indulge. Boylston was a pipe-smoker, though, and the only brand Reynolds
then provided was called Carter Hall—which, to Boylston’s tastes, was
simply awful. The diplomatic solution was for him to take a package of
Carter Hall tobacco home, throw away the contents, and refill the empty
box with his preferred brand.37

More Sea-Land Newbuildings
Early in the R. J. Reynolds era—indeed, while the SL-7s were still
under construction—Sea-Land was able to follow up its contracting for
the new eight-vessel class with four additional newbuildings. These were
not, though, vessels that were designed and built by Sea-Land itself, nor
were they even remotely in the same league as the SL-7 with respect to
carrying capacity, much less speed. Acquiring the steam-powered quartet
was more a case of taking advantage of a target of opportunity—actually
two separate targets of opportunity—than the careful carrying out of any
long-range corporate strategy. The four vessels were under construction
for two other U.S. steamship companies, but they became Sea-Land’s
SL-18 class before earning a single dollar for their original owners.
Two vessels, designed by the Matson Navigation Company for that
company’s Far East trade, were under construction at Bremer-Vulkan in
Bremen, West Germany. S. T. Alexander, the first of the pair, was launched
on June 2, 1970, and was able to accommodate 1,175 of Matson’s distinctive twenty-four-foot containers, plus an additional 148 forty-footers.
(This is about 1,500 TEUs.) But before either the Alexander or its sister
ship, the H. P. Baldwin, was completed, Matson had withdrawn from its
international transpacific service, and because the two foreign-built hulls
could not be used in Matson’s basic Hawaii service since they were not
Jones Act–compliant, Sea-Land was able to acquire the pair and add them
to its fleet as, eventually, Sea-Land Economy and Sea-Land Venture. (The
two vessels actually worked for several months as SL 180 and SL 181, were
in service before the first SL-7s were delivered, and in that sense could be
called Sea-Land’s very first newbuildings.)
Sea-Land’s Scott Morrison believes that the acquisition of these two
vessels provides an interesting glimpse into how internal procedures at
the company had become more formal in the days after R. J. Reynolds
assumed control. Morrison and Warren Leback, the executive who headed
up the SL-7 project for Sea-Land, had learned through various industry
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contacts that Matson might be willing to negotiate the sale of its two yetto-be-delivered vessels, and the two quickly developed a plan for acquiring the pair and deploying them in a new Gulf Coast–Europe trade. One
day Morrison and Leback ran into a Reynolds executive waiting for an
elevator and quickly outlined their idea to him. The Reynolds man was
aghast and insisted that paperwork had to be completed, and a formal
proposal put forward, before such a course of action could even be
considered.38
The other two SL-18 class vessels were quite similar to the Matson pair
and were built at Bethlehem Steel’s Sparrows Point yard in Baltimore for
Pacific Far East Lines (PFEL). Each accommodated 1,664 TEUs; thanks to
their domestic construction, both were able to operate in Jones Act trades.
PFEL, which had come under the control of the Alioto family of San Francisco in its final years, filed for bankruptcy before the vessels were delivered, though, and Sea-Land was handed yet another opportunity to
supplement its rapidly expanding fleet with two additional hulls, vessels
that were christened Sea-Land Producer and Sea-Land Consumer.
Interestingly, while Sea-Land acquired these two container ships from
PFEL, they were designed and ordered from Bethlehem Steel by Matson,
and conveyed to PFEL during construction. All four of these SL-18 class
vessels had thus been developed under Matson supervision, were similar
in general appearance and specification, and featured a profile that did
not follow conventional container ship design of the era. They included a
deckhouse and navigation bridge close to the bow, funnel and machinery
aft, and containers in between, a design that bore some similarity to SeaLand’s SL-7.39 The two Bremer-Vulkan vessels, Sea-Land Economy and SeaLand Venture, could also carry a small number of containers below deck
and atop their hatch covers forward of the deckhouse, and these two ships
were also delivered with their hulls rendered in Matson’s distinctive gray
livery, rather than typical Sea-Land black. Table 5.9 provides additional
information about the four SL-18 class vessels.
When Sea-Land acquired the SL-18s, it was in the process of converting
its operation from the use of the thirty-five-foot containers it had relied
on since 1957 to the more common twenty- and forty-footers that had
become standard in the industry. Matson also inaugurated container service with an unusual twenty-four-foot unit, and it, too, was beginning a
similar shift to more standard containers. Consequently, the vertical cells
in the two Bremer-Vulkan ships were designed to be flexible; they could
be converted from handling twenty-four-foot containers to forty-footers
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table 5.9. Sea Land Fleet: SL-18 Class
Off. No. Name
531478

532410

552819

552818

Sea-Land Venture
a) S.T.
Alexander
b) SL 180
Sea-Land
Economy
a) H.P. Baldwin
b) SL 181
Sea-Land
Producer
a) New Zealand
Bear
c) CSX
Producer
d) Horizon
Producer
Sea-Land
Consumer
a) Australia
Bear
c) CSX
Consumer
d) Horizon
Consumer

Hull dimensions GRT

Place built (year)

Notes

720 ⳯ 95 ⳯ 34

24,774

Bremen,
West Germany
(1970)

1

720 ⳯ 95 ⳯ 34

24,774

Bremen-Vegesack,
West Germany
(1971)

1

720 ⳯ 95 ⳯ 34

23,510

Sparrows Point, Md.
(1974)

2

721 ⳯ 95 ⳯ 32

23,763

Sparrows Point, Md.
(1973)

2

Notes
1. Designed and built by Matson Navigation Company and identified by Sea-Land as Class 18M.
2. Designed by Matson, conveyed to Pacific Far East Line during construction, and identified by SeaLand as Class 18P.

voyage by voyage, and this feature greatly facilitated their conversion to
Sea-Land specifications.40 When Sea-Land put the pair in service, they
were rigged to carry 552 thirty-five-foot containers and 181 forty-footers.
On the other hand, the two SL-18s that Sea-Land acquired from PFEL had
been converted to carry standard-size containers only, and when they
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joined the Sea-Land fleet they were rigged to carry 120 twenty-foot containers and 613 forty-footers, with an additional 159 spaces atop the hatch
covers that could accommodate either forty-foot or even forty-five-foot
containers.
Sea-Land’s shift from thirty-five-foot to forty-foot containers was necessarily a gradual one that took several years to effect. In 1975, for instance, Sea-Land owned 52,000 thirty-five-foot containers and 10,000
forty-footers. By 1984, the company’s inventory of forty-foot containers
had increased threefold to 32,000 units, although its fleet of thirty-fivefoot containers had also grown from 52,000 to 56,000. Were Sea-Land to
have parked one of its containers in New York’s Times Square in 1984 and
placed all the others in a row behind it, the resulting line of containers
would extend north on Broadway to the city limits, on up the Hudson to
Albany, west through the Mohawk Valley to Buffalo, along the southern
rim of Lake Erie into Ohio, and end in the western suburbs of Cleveland,
Ohio.
A service expansion that took place shortly after the SL-18 class joined
the fleet gave Sea-Land additional flexibility for serving Mediterranean
and Middle Eastern trades. In 1975 a new terminal was opened in Algeciras, Spain, a port located immediately inside the Straits of Gibraltar and
across the Bay of Gibraltar from the most famous rock in the world. SeaLand’s facility at Algeciras was not intended as a place to off-load containers bound for inland points in Spain, though. Rather, it was primarily a
transfer facility where container ships working transatlantic trades could
exchange containers bound for, or originating in, ports such as Barcelona,
Marseilles, Genoa, and Naples, as well as smaller points, and Sea-Land
would develop a variety of cooperative arrangements with smaller container-ship companies based in Europe to handle such feeder operations.
Both the SL-7s and the SL-18s became frequent visitors to Algeciras in the
years after 1975.

From Steam to Diesel
Following the construction and delivery of the steam-powered SL-7s in
1972 and 1973 and the parallel acquisition of the SL-18s, all subsequent
Sea-Land newbuildings would feature diesel propulsion. The company
would add additional steam tonnage to its fleet in subsequent years, but
these were ‘‘previously owned’’ vessels obtained in conjunction with corporate realignments of one sort or another.
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One factor that prompted Sea-Land to adopt diesel propulsion in a big
way was its experience with the SL-7. As noted earlier, the big new speedsters were only in service a single year when war erupted in the Middle
East, a war that soon led to a global phenomenon called the Arab Oil
Embargo.
A vital operational assumption behind Sea-Land’s strategy in acquiring
a fleet of steam-powered container ships that could operate at thirtythree-knot speed was that both the price and the availability of the Bunker
C fuel such performance required was steady and constant. As a result of
the Arab Oil Embargo that was imposed in the wake of the Yom Kipper
War, though, neither the price nor the availability of the enormous quantities of fuel that an SL-7 required was either steady or constant. Bunker C
fuel oil that cost $22 a ton in 1973 rose to $70 a ton in little over a year’s
time.
Speed at sea is expensive. It is expensive in the finely designed hull
form that is necessary to achieve high-speed performance; it is expensive
in the quantity of fuel that must be consumed to achieve the desired
speed; it is expensive in the capacity trade-offs that are required to incorporate an engine of adequate size, plus sufficient fuel-carrying capability,
into the overall design.
Perhaps the most classic example one can cite goes back to the early
years of the twentieth century when the Cunard Line built its famous twin
transatlantic liners Mauretania and Lusitania, vessels that were designed
to sustain twenty-four-knot speed. The fuel needed to push the big vessels
from a relatively fast twenty-two knots to an even faster twenty-four knots
was twice that needed to sustain twenty-two knots.41 Stated in different
terms, a nine-percent increase in speed was only achieved after a 100percent increase in fuel consumption.
Sea-Land’s statistics for its SL-7 offer even more dramatic contrasts. If
an SL-7 were to throttle back and cruise at a modest twenty-five knots,
the vessel would consume 240 tons of Bunker C in a day’s time. Push the
vessel to its designed maximum speed of thirty-three knots, though, and
the daily fuel consumption jumps to an extraordinary 614 tons a day.
(Fully bunkered, an SL-7 carried 5,488 tons of fuel.)42
The Arab Oil Embargo of 1973 produced unprecedented increases in
world petroleum prices that were at least fourfold. When oil prices doubled again in 1979 in reaction to continued unrest in the Middle East,
Sea-Land found itself in an untenable position. With the cost of fuel escalating at rates even the most cautious company planners would have had
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difficulty imagining, much less including in any kind of formal calculations while the SL-7 was under design, continued operation of the big
vessels at thirty-three knots became impossible. The only short-term
course of action was to slow the big vessels down.
Sea-Land still wanted to maintain weekly transatlantic departures with
its SL-7s, though. But to do so at a reduced speed of twenty-three knots,
one of the six transpacific vessels had to be shifted to the Atlantic, and
while customers could count on the same departure frequencies, transatlantic delivery times had increased by at least two full days, and from
the perspective of Sea-Land’s accountants, it now required three vessels—
and three crews—to sustain such weekly departures. Meanwhile, on the
Pacific, five vessels, not six, were making round-trip circuits in thirty-five
days at twenty-three knots, rather than twenty-one days at thirty-three
knots, although the longer circuit did include an additional port call.43
In any kind of long-term perspective, though, the situation was untenable, both operationally and financially. Sea-Land had paid a premium
price for a high-performance vessel, and yet the eight ships had to be
throttled down and operated well below their design limits. And so, after
the much-heralded vessels had been in service for little more than a decade, Sea-Land was able to negotiate their sale to the U.S. Navy, where
they were converted into fast supply ships to support U.S. forces operating
in foreign lands. Six SL-7s were conveyed to the Navy in 1981 for $203.4
million, while the final two changed hands the following year for $65
million.44
The steam turbine engine remains a marvelous technical achievement,
especially in a marine environment, and its deployment in vessels from
the Normandie and the United States to the SL-7 and the latest fleet carriers of the United States Navy forcefully documents its performance capabilities. But one of the prices that must be paid to achieve the kind of
high-speed performance that the steam turbine is uniquely able to provide
is that it has an almost insatiable appetite for fuel. And so as the price of
fuel continued to rise after the 1973 war, Sea-Land was more than willing
to explore the fuel economies that diesel power might generate.

The D-6 Class
Given Sea-Land’s earlier propensity for splicing and upgrading older
tonnage, it is perhaps appropriate that the company’s first venture in
diesel-powered container ships involved the rehabilitation of a quartet of
veteran hulls.45
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As described in chapter 4, in 1962, Sea-Land had added Elizabethport
and three sister ships to its fleet, vessels that combined the bow, stern and
machinery from wartime T-3 tankers with newly built midbodies. By the
1970s, this quartet was showing its years, even while the container-carrying middle portions of their hulls were relatively new.
What Sea-Land did, in 1977, was dispatch all four vessels to the Mitsubishi yard in Kobe, Japan, and there each vessel’s bow and stern was cut
away and discarded. The midbodies were retained, newly built bows and
sterns were spliced onto them, and new six-cylinder Sulzer 6RND90 diesel
engines were installed as well. So rebuilt, Sea-Land’s first diesel-powered
container ships joined the roster and were designated the D-6 class. They
were a bit longer and had a larger carrying capacity than the converted
T-3s they replaced: 662 feet versus 627 feet in length, and 673 forty-foot
containers versus 476 thirty-five-footers. Overall cost of the project was
$52.5 million—four almost-new container ships for less than the price of
a single SL-7.
Because the project involved new machinery and a new stern, the resulting hulls were regarded as entirely new vessels and so were issued
new official numbers by the Coast Guard when they were formally enrolled as U.S. merchant vessels. Though technically new, thanks to their
older midbodies, D-6 class vessels enjoy a unique historical lineage. And
this note: when the four new midbody sections were built in Germany in
the early 1960s, they featured a riveted topside strake, since all-welded
hull construction had yet to achieve the universality it would later enjoy.
The D-6 class was still in service in the early years of the twenty-first
century and more than likely embraces the only active container ships in
the world to exhibit riveted construction along the midbody section of
their hulls.46 Table 5.10 identifies the four vessels and provides relevant
statistical information about them.

From D-6 to D-9
In the late 1970s, there was some talk that R. J. Reynolds was so
pleased with both the results—and the cost—of the D-6 conversion project that Sea-Land would soon develop a similar upgrade program for
some of its converted C-4s. Nothing materialized from such reports,
though, and what in fact happened next was that the company designed
and built a new class of diesel-powered container ships from the keel up,
an effort that would be called the D-9 class. Some of the criteria that were
established for the new vessels as design got underway were a service
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table 5.10. Sea-Land Fleet: D-6 Class of 1977
Off. No.

Name

Hull dimensions

GRT

Place built
(year)

Notes

594374

Sea-Land
Leader
Sea-Land
Pioneer
Sea-Land Pacer

662 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 39

17,618

1

662 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 39

17,618

662 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 39

17,618

Sea-Land
Adventurer
b) Sea
Adventure
c) Maersk
Constantza
d) Sea
Adventure
e) Maersk
Koper

662 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 39

17,618

Kobe, Japan
(1977)
Kobe, Japan
(1978)
Kobe, Japan
(1978)
Kobe, Japan
(1978)

594375
593980
594073

Notes
1. Midbody formerly part of Sea-Land’s Elizabethport.
2. Midbody formerly part of Sea-Land’s Los Angeles.
3. Midbody formerly part of Sea-Land’s San Juan.
4. Midbody formerly part of Sea-Land’s San Francisco.

speed of twenty-one to twenty-two knots, the ability to transit both the
Panama Canal and the Suez Canal, and diesel propulsion with engines
controlled directly from the pilothouse.
The D-9 project was unusual in that Sea-Land did not retain a conventional naval architect to develop plans and specifications. Rather, because
Sea-Land was then involved with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries on the D-6
effort, it had sufficient confidence to retain that company to prepare such
documents for its newest class of vessels, and a contract to this effect was
executed in the spring of 1978.
This did not mean that Mitsubishi would automatically be awarded
construction contracts to build the D-9 class; subsequent competitive bidding would be required, and in August 1978 Sea-Land sent invitations to
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bid to shipyards in twelve different countries. Mitsubishi was able to win
construction contracts, though, although not for the entire twelve-vessel
fleet. Indeed, because of an important contractual requirement that SeaLand insisted upon, it is unlikely that any single yard could have won a
contract for the entire D-9 effort. Sea-Land expected all twelve ships to
be delivered within a twelve-month period and so, like the SL-7 effort,
D-9 construction was shared by three different builders—three builders
and four yards, in fact.
Mitsubishi would build seven of the new vessels, three at its yard in
Kobe, four in Nagasaki; another Japanese shipbuilder, Mitsui Engine and
Shipbuilding, would turn out three vessels from its yard in Tomano; and
Hyundai Heavy Industries, of Ulsan, South Korea, would build the final
two. All construction contracts were executed on October 13, 1978, and
the per-vessel cost was $44.12 million—or $396 million for the full dozen.
Stated differently, Sea-Land would acquire twelve D-9 vessels for $29 million less than it paid for eight SL-7s almost a decade earlier.47
As the case with the SL-7, Sea-Land wished to achieve maximum similarity despite construction by multiple shipyards, and so Mitsubishi’s Kobe
yard was assigned the task of coordinating the overall project. Hull forms
were tested under the supervision of people from Mitsubishi’s Kobi facility, in cooperation with the Nagasaki Technical Institute, and it was the
Kobi yard that played a lead role in ensuring that, to the maximum extent
possible, all yards used the same vendors to supply equipment—
everything from navigational gear and lifeboats to coffee makers and
lighting fixtures.
Sea-Land’s requirement of delivery within a single calendar year was
met with ample time to spare. The first vessel, Sea-Land Patriot, was
handed over to Sea-Land by Mitsubishi on January 30, 1980, while the
final vessel, Sea-Land Mariner, was delivered by Mitsui on November 15,
1980. All twelve flew the U.S. flag and were registered in the United
States, although their offshore construction meant they were not eligible
to work any Jones Act trades.
With respect to technical specifications, with a service speed of twentytwo knots, the D-9 class was not at all as fast as the earlier SL-7—nor is it
likely that any deepwater container ship ever will be. The new vessels
were even a bit smaller than the SL-7 in carrying capacity. Expressed in
TEUs, the SL-7 was rated at 1,974, while the comparable number for the
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newer D-9 was 1,678, although this figure was later recalculated and set
at 1,780. (Because Sea-Land was still in the process of converting from the
exclusive use of thirty-five-foot containers to more industry-compatible
twenty- and forty-footers, the D-9 was designed with a number of container-carrying cells that could be adjusted in size as the transition
progressed.)
D-9 class vessels were each equipped with a nine-cylinder Sulzer model
9RND90M diesel, engines that were built, in Japan, by Mitsubishi, but
under license to Sulzer, and are commonly referred to as ‘‘slow-speed’’
diesels. The engine is directly linked to a five-bladed propeller that rotates
at 122 rpm at cruising speed, and the only significant design adjustment
that had to be made after the vessels entered service and accumulated
some hours of operation was an ever-so-slight alteration in the pitch of
the propeller. With respect to general external appearance, the D-9—like
the D-6 before it—eschewed the SL-7 (and SL-18) concept of a forward
deckhouse and returned to the more conventional container ship profile
of an after deckhouse, but with some containers accommodated between
deckhouse and stern.
Table 5.11 displays technical information about the D-9 class, while
table 5.12 identifies each of the twelve vessels and indicates the shipyard
where it was constructed.
For a season or two after its new D-9 class vessels entered service, SeaLand had both its SL-7s and its D-9s working simultaneously. Business
was running at record levels and the company needed all this tonnage to
table 5.11. Sea-Land’s D-9 Class: Statistical Information
Data element

Value

Length (overall)
Length (waterline)
Length (between perpendiculars)
Beam (molded)
Draft
Gross registered tons
Deadweight tons
Classification Society

744⬘ 7 5/8⬙
698⬘ 97/8⬙
100⬘ 4.75⬙
31⬘ 2⬙
24,867.09
23,308
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)
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table 5.12. Sea-Land Fleet: D-9 Class of 1980
Off. No.

Name

Place Built (Year)

604246

Sea-Land Defender

604247

Sea-Land Developer

606062

Sea-Land Endurance

604248

Sea-Land Explorer

604249

Sea-Land Express

606065

Sea-Land Freedom

606061

Sea-Land Independence

606064

Sea-Land Innovator

604245

Sea-Land Liberator

606066

Sea-Land Mariner

604244

Sea-Land Patriot

606063

Sea-Land Voyager

Tomano, Japan
(1980)
Kobe, Japan
(1980)
Ulsan, South Korea
(1980)
Nagasaki, Japan
(1980)
Tomano, Japan
(1980)
Nagasaki, Japan
(1980)
Nagasaki, Japan
(1980)
Ulsan, South Korea
(1980)
Nagasaki, Japan
(1980)
Tomano, Japan
(1980)
Kobe, Japan
(1980)
Kobe, Japan
(1980)

serve its customers in an efficient and dependable manner. When the
SL-7s were sold to the U.S. Navy in 1981 and 1982, though, the company
found itself short of tonnage and five modern diesel-powered container
ships were chartered in from three separate overseas companies to pick
up the slack and ensure that the company would not lose market share.
Two 1,340-TEU vessels were obtained from Cia Transatlantica Espanola
SA (CTE) and two 1,444-TEU ships from Orient Overseas Container Line
(OOCL) of Hong Kong, while the fifth came from Singapore-based Neptune Orient Line (NOL) and was rated at 1,569 TEUs. All five vessels were
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diesel-powered, thus creating the remarkable phenomenon of a Sea-Land
deepwater fleet that was entirely steam as late as 1979 operating twentyone modern diesel-powered container ships less than five years later.48
Sea-Land would charter many vessels over the years. The chartering of
these five is especially noteworthy, though. Table 5.13 identifies the vessels that Sea-Land obtained, through charter, to run alongside its new
D-9s and compensate for the departed SL-7s.

table 5.13. Sea-Land Fleet: Chartered In Tonnage of 1982
Flag

Name

Owner

Built
(Year)

Dimensions

Propulsion

Malta

Pilar
b) CGM Champagne
c) Pilaro
d) Al Khakji
e) Sea Dragon
f) Maersk Kyoto
g) Irenes Synthesis
h) ACX Clover
i) Global Synthesis
j) MSC Spain
k) Irenes Synthesis
Almuden
b) Prosper
c) TSK Chorus
d) Al Khaumah
e) Sea Fortune I
f) Irenes Horizon
g) Global Horizon
h) MSC Australia
i) Irenes Horizon

CTE

Real,
Spain
(1982)

604 ⳯ 89 ⳯ 36

7-cyl. B&W
diesel

CTE

Real,
Spain
(1982)

604 ⳯ 89 ⳯ 36

7-cyl. B&W
diesel

Malta
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table 5.13. (Continued)
Flag

Name

Liberia

Oriental Commander
a) Pacific Phoenix
c) Ocean
Commander
d) Ocean
Commander 1
e) ScanDutch
Hispanio
d) San Francisco
Bay
e) Pacific Song
f) Eagle Trust
Liberia
Oriental Leader
b) Ocean Legend
c) Dart America
d) OOCL America
e) OOCL Blessing
f) Ocean Blessing
Singapore Neptune Coral
b) NOL Coral
c) Dragon Komodo
d) MSC Laurencea

144 : : : box boats

Owner

Built
(Year)

Dimensions

OOCL

La
769 ⳯ 85 ⳯ 32
Seyne,
France
(1972)

10-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

OOCL

La
769 ⳯ 85 ⳯ 32
Seyne,
France
(1971)

10-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

NOL

Kure,
Japan
(1977)

729 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 38

Propulsion

12-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

Pan Royal was a First World War-era cargo ship that helped inaugurate
Pan-Atlantic Steamship service in the early 1930s. Shown here in wartime
livery, she was lost during a trans-Atlantic convoy in 1943. Steamship
Historical Society of America)

Above: Although its containers were secured to a specially installed spar deck
and not in below-deck cells, the April 26, 1956, voyage of the T-2 tanker
Ideal X from Port Newark to Houston is commonly regarded as the inauguration
of the container-ship era. Below: With company executives watching intently
from above the pilot house, longshoremen and teamsters work cooperatively to
hoist containers aboard Pan-Atlantic’s Gateway City in 1957.

The converted C-2 cargo ship Gateway City carried containers both on deck
and in below-deck cells.

Illustration of Pan-Atlantic’s conversion of ordinary C-2 cargo ships into the
world’s first cellular container ships.

Sea-Land’s Elizabethport incorporates the bow, stern, and machinery of a T-3
tanker, plus a newly constructed mid-body section.

Elizabethport steams through the Golden Gate into San Francisco Harbor.
(Paul Tully)

Sea-Land’s St. Louis was converted into a cellular container ship from the C-4
troop transport General M. L. Hersey.

Sea-Land’s Chicago was converted into a cellular container ship from the
C-4 troop transport General C. H. Muir. (Steamship Historical Society of
America)

A thin, knife-like bow was a critical design feature to ensure that Sea-Land’s
SL-7 would achieve high-speed performance. (McLean Foundation)

Sea-Land Galloway (left) and Sea-Land Commerce (right) under construction
at the A.G. Weser shipyard in Bremen, West Germany. (McLean Foundation)

While final fitting out continues on Sea-Land Galloway, work goes forward on
Sea-Land Market (on the same ways where Sea-Land Galloway had been
constructed) and Sea-Land Commerce. (McLean Foundation)

Sea-Land Galloway
slides down the ways.
(McLean Foundation)

Sea-Land Galloway shortly after entering service in 1972. (Steamship
Historical Society of America)

Above: In January 1979, Sea-Land Finance maneuvers through the Golden
Gate into San Francisco Harbor after crossing the Pacific. By this time,
unanticipated increases in the cost of fuel oil had forced Sea-Land to throttle
down its SL-7 fleet to less impressive speeds. (Paul Tully). Below: Although the
USNS Regulus now serves as a ro-ro cargo ship for the military, the handsome
lines of her origin as the SL-7 container ship Sea-Land Commerce are evident.
(U.S. Navy)

On the fiftieth anniversary of Malcom McLean’s bold initiative of 1956, few
active containers still feature the once-distinctive Sea-Land logo and decoration.

Above: Sea-Land Pacific was designed and built by Farrell Lines, later worked
for the United States Lines, and was acquired by Sea-Land c. 1978. (Paul Tully).
Below: A Maersk-Sealand container ship being unloaded at the Port Elizabeth
facility on Newark Bay.

Sea-Land Explorer, a D-9 class container ship built in 1980, heads into San
Francisco Bay. Most of her above-deck containers bear the Maersk name and
logo, indicative of cooperative ventures between Sea-Land and the Danish
company preceding their 1999 merger. (Paul Tully)

Above: Sea-Land Voyager, seen here passing through the Kill van Kull on its
way to Port Elizabeth on Newark Bay, is a D-9 class container ship that was
designed and built by Sea-Land in 1980 but conveyed to Maersk-Sealand in
1999. Below: Horizon Pacific, formerly Sea-Land Pacific, steams under the
Golden Gate Bridge. Horizon Line vessels feature a version of the original
Sea-Land logo on their stacks. (Paul Tully)

The Maersk Sealand designation on the hull of the 2004-built Maersk Denver
identifies this photo as from the 1999–2005 era. With its acquisition of P&O
Nedlloyd in 2005, the Danish company now calls itself, simply, Maersk Line.

Above: With containers stacked seventeen across on her stern, a Maersk-Sealand
container ship heads north in Puget Sound. Below: A 1998 air view of what was
then the Sea-Land container terminal at Port Elizabeth, New Jersey.
Contemporary container ports require vast acreage inland from the berths to
sort and store inbound and outbound containers. (Duffy/Granard Associates)
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After the new SL-7s entered Sea-Land service in late 1972,
Malcom McLean scaled back his involvement in the day-today operations of the company. McLean continued to retain
substantial portions of the R. J. Reynolds stock he had acquired at the time of the 1969 merger, and he remained a
member of the Reynolds board of directors through 1977.
He severed his ties with the tobacco conglomerate completely in April 1980, though, when he liquidated 1.3 million shares of stock for $44.5 million.1
The man who created Sea-Land in 1956 and turned it
into the premier player in the new container-ship industry
over the subsequent decade and a half had other challenges
to address. He dabbled a bit in real estate in the mid-1970s
and devoted some time to farming interests in his home
state of North Carolina. The venture that bears more significantly on the subsequent history of transporting containers at sea, though, is the fact that in April 1978—two
years before selling off the last of his R. J. Reynolds stock—
Malcom McLean became the principal owner of no less a
steamship company than the United States Lines.

United States Lines
For many Americans, the very name United States Lines
once represented the very epitome of transport stability, on
a par with the Pennsylvania Railroad and Pan American
World Airways. And while United States Lines declared
bankruptcy and went out of business in late 1986, ten years
after McLean acquired the company, that final decade not
only represents an interesting chapter in the evolution of
the container-ship industry, but it also provided yet another

opportunity for Malcom McLean to challenge conventional steamship wisdom and accomplish a few dramatic things that few others would have
dared think about, much less try.
While it is possible to trace the history of the United States Lines back
to the America Line of the nineteenth century, the modern company had
its origins in 1921 when the United States Shipping Board created United
States Lines as a government-owned corporation. In 1929, the government sold the company to the P. W. Chapman Company, but Chapman
soon defaulted and the government was forced to foreclose. It was not
until mid-Depression 1931 that United States Lines reentered the private
sector, this time to stay, when International Mercantile Marine (IMM), a
consortium headed by P. A. S. Franklin and long associated with the turnof-the-century financial empire of J. P. Morgan, acquired it. IMM and
United States Lines merged into a single corporate entity under the latter
name in 1943.2
After World War II, United States Lines is perhaps best known for the
record-breaking transatlantic performance turned in by its magnificent
new passenger liner, the United States, in July of 1952.3 But the company
also acquired a substantial fleet of C-2, C-3 and C-4 cargo ships during
this same era and operated them on a variety of world routes. As these
vessels started to become long in years—and recognizing the limitation
of tonnage that reflected designs from the 1930s—United States Lines
acquired ten new cargo ships in 1962–63 that it designated the Challenger
class, 11,300-gross-ton vessels that could maintain twenty-one-knot speed
and that were built in a number of different U.S. yards. Traditionally,
United States Lines cargo ships bore names that began with the word
‘‘American’’—American Scout, American Ranger, American Merchant—
although vessels assigned to transpacific service were identified with the
name ‘‘Pioneer’’—Pioneer Glen, Pioneer Mist, Pioneer Star—and were operated under the aegis of a United States Lines subsidiary, the American
Pioneer Line. All vessels were decorated in the same livery, however:
black hull, white superstructure, and a red funnel with white and blue
bands at the top.
The first United States Lines vessels to be rigged for carrying containers
were a fleet of five ships that were built in 1964–65 at the Chester, Pennsylvania, yard of the Sun Shipbuilding Company and were a minor variation, really, on the earlier Challenger class of break-bulk cargo ships. The
first transatlantic voyage by any container-carrying vessel—described in
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chapter 5—was an eastbound crossing in 1966 by American Racer, a member of this five-vessel class of ships, which were equipped with genuine
container-carrying cells but were not exclusively container ships. In 1968–
71, United States Lines took delivery of the company’s first all-container
newbuildings, the eight-vessel Lancer class. Designed by J. J. Henry and
also turned out by Sun Shipbuilding, they were fast, could sustain twentyfive-knot speed, and were each able to accommodate 1,240 trailer equivalent units (TEUs). When the first Lancer keel was laid at Sun Shipbuilding,
plans called for break-bulk cargo vessels. It was while the first of these
ships were under construction, though, that the company did some fast
redesign work and had the hulls lengthened, widened, and converted into
fully cellular container ships.4
United States Lines would expand its container fleet with a number of
acquisitions from other steamship lines throughout the 1970s as the nature of the company’s cargo operations shifted from predominately breakbulk to predominately container.
In December 1968, United States Lines was acquired in a hostile takeover by the Belleville, New Jersey, investment syndicate of Walter Kiddie
and Company, and it was under Kiddie management that the line began
to reorient itself to the realities of the container era with an added degree
of urgency.5 (It was also early in the Kiddie era, in November 1969, that
the United States was removed from passenger service and placed in layup
status.) Kiddie never achieved any degree of comfort or stability as the
owner of United States Lines, though; virtually from the outset, reports
circulated throughout the maritime and investment communities that the
company’s assets were available—for sale, for lease, but above all for the
right price.
The steamship line most often mentioned as a candidate for establishing some kind of cooperative arrangement with United States Lines was,
interestingly enough, Sea-Land Service. Malcom McLean had often said
that he thought Sea-Land and United States Lines would make a good
match, and in October 1969—mere months after Sea-Land had become a
subsidiary of R. J. Reynolds and while McLean’s influence was running
strong—it was announced that Sea-Land would enter a twenty-year timecharter agreement and acquire sixteen United States Lines vessels for approximately $61 million a year—or $1.2 billion over the twenty-year term
of the charter, a commitment of serious proportion. Were these sixteen
container ships to come under Sea-Land control, parent R. J. Reynolds
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would find itself managing three-quarters or more of the containercarrying tonnage then under the U.S. flag.6
Because United States Lines vessels had largely been built with
construction-differential subsidies from Washington, the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) had to approve the charter plan; vigorous protests were lodged with the FMC by other U.S.-flag steamship companies,
which feared the power that Reynolds and Sea-Land would wield if the
deal were to go forward. In July 1970 an FMC examiner recommended
that the full commission approve the transaction, but no final action was
forthcoming. With matters in a state of uncertainty and the charter proposal languishing, in November 1970 R. J. Reynolds and Kiddie announced they were terminating the pending arrangement.7
This was hardly the end of matters, though. Months later Kiddie and
Reynolds announced agreement on a plan whereby the latter would acquire United States Lines in toto, although it would continue to be operated as a stand-alone entity, not merged into Sea-Land in any operational
sense. In early 1973, the FMC approved this transaction by a three-to-two
vote, with the commission chair, Helen Bentley, calling the agreement ‘‘at
best exceedingly impractical, and at worst totally unworkable.’’8
Then matters grew even more complicated. A federal court declared
that the FMC had no authority to rule on mergers of steamship companies,
FMC promptly appealed, and in March 1973 the United States Supreme
Court refused to hear the case, essentially validating both the commission’s action and the proposed merger. While this seemed to clear the way
for the acquisition, lawyers in the Justice Department’s antitrust division
took a dim view of the pending transaction, and the takeover proposal
was thwarted from that quarter.9
Matters continued to drag on and the future of United States Lines was
anything but clear. In the wake of all this uncertainty, in April 1978,
McLean Securities acquired United States Lines from Walter Kiddie and
Company in a $160 million transaction.10 Malcom McLean still owned a
substantial block of R. J. Reynolds stock, but his acquisition of United
States Lines was a venture in which there was no Reynolds involvement.
This all happened in April 1978. Before the year was out, Malcom
McLean announced that United States Lines had signed a contract with
Daewoo Heavy Industries, of South Korea, for the largest order of merchant vessels ever placed at one time by any private corporation.
The agreement called for Daewoo to construct twelve new dieselpowered container ships that would each accommodate in excess of 4,258
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TEUs. Construction would take place at the brand-new $500 million Okpo
shipyard that Daewoo was building on Koje Island, thirty-five miles southwest of Busan. By way of contrast, on the day that United States Lines
signed its contract with Daewoo, the largest container ship then in service
was Hapag-Lloyd’s Frankfurt Express, a mammoth vessel that could handle 3,045 TEUs. Each of McLean’s new vessels would be forty percent
larger than what was then the largest container ship in the world, while
taken collectively, the ‘‘Daewoo dozen,’’ as they were quickly dubbed,
would have a capacity in excess of any other world container-ship fleet.
So they were big. And each driven by a powerful Sulzer-designed
model 7RLB90 diesel engine, they were the first-ever United States Lines
ships that were not steam-powered.11 In addition, the contract with Daewoo marked the first time United States Lines ever ordered vessels from
an overseas shipyard. Expectedly, the new vessels did not come cheaply;
the price tag worked out to $47.5 million per hull, and according to William Kelly, the president of the National Maritime Council, a trade association, McLean’s purchase represented ‘‘the boldest American stroke in
shipping in twenty years,’’ while Forbes magazine reported that lenders
‘‘fought to finance McLean’s vision.’’12
An important aspect of the Daewoo dozen was their design speed.
While the newcomers were record-setters in many quantitative categories,
McLean was ever mindful of the problems he faced some years earlier
with Sea-Land’s SL-7s when their high-speed capability quickly turned
into a fatal liability. In assessing the markets the new ships would enter,
he specified relatively slow-speed performance for his new vessels—a top
speed slightly in excess of eighteen knots, and a service speed of sixteen
knots. This was perfectly average for break-bulk cargo ships of the 1950s,
but it was decidedly below standard when contrasted with the performance other container-ship operators assumed to be necessary in the mid1980s.
McLean, though, was never one to run with the crowd, a characteristic
that would prove to be an extraordinary business strength most of the
time, but a tragic flaw on rare occasions—and this would prove to be one
of them.
McLean was convinced that cost control had become the new name of
the container-ship game. The new vessels included extensive automation
in their design and operation—push-button control of hatch covers, for
instance—features that McLean believed would allow the vessels to operate competitively with foreign-flag ships, because while U.S. seamen
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earned higher wages than their overseas equivalents, the Daewoo dozen
would require fewer of them per vessel. Couple such labor productivity
with the new fleet’s record container-carrying capacity and the economy
of scale it promised, and McLean was convinced that his new ships would
quickly propel United States Lines into first place among the world’s growing fraternity of container-ship operators.
The new ships were designed by C. R. Cushing and Company, a noted
New York naval architectural firm; Charles Cushing and Malcom McLean
had enjoyed a long and productive business and personal relationship,
and Cushing had earlier worked for McLean at Sea-Land. The ships featured diesel engines that could be directly controlled from the pilothouse,
while the engine room was able to run for hours on end with no crew in
attendance at all. By way of contrast, when Gateway City steamed out of
Port Newark in 1957, the vessel required an onboard crew of forty-seven
people to sustain normal operations. Each of the Daewoo dozen—whose
carrying capacity exceeded Gateway City’s by a factor of ten—could be
safely operated by a crew of 21, less than half the number needed to
operate the converted C-2. Stated differently, Gateway City was able to
carry 4.8 thirty-five-foot containers per crewmember, while each of the
Daewoo dozen was able to transport 202.8 forty-foot containers per
crewmember.
For all their innovations, though, just as the tragic flaw of Sea-Land’s
SL-7 was the unexpected cost required to sustain high-speed performance,
so, too, would the Daewoo newbuildings have to be called commercial
failures for reasons associated with speed. Namely, they were far too slow
and proved unable to operate at sufficient speed to be competitive in a
rapidly changing container-ship marketplace. In addition, because they
were underpowered, they were unable to maintain even their own less
demanding schedules in the face of any kind of adverse weather, the Wall
Street Journal reporting that strong crosswinds would often cause the new
vessels to fall behind on their itineraries.13 Table 6.1 displays information
about the Daewoo dozen, a fleet that United States Lines preferred to call
the Econships.
McLean retained the traditional United States Lines practice of prefacing the names of the new ships with the word ‘‘American,’’ while the vessels were distinguished one from another by honoring various states. On
May 31, 1984, American New York was the first of the class to be so christened. Malcom McLean’s spouse, Margaret McLean, was the vessel’s sponsor, the same role she had played for Sea-Land McLean over a decade
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table 6.1. United States Lines: The Econships
Hull dimensions
Gross registered tons
Deadweight tons
Container capacity
Crew
Main engine
Propeller
Cruising range
Classification
Initial voyage of initial ship

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 30 feet
57,075
57,000
2,464 TEU in hold; 1,794 TEU on deck;
4,258 TEU total
21 persons
Hemco-Sulzer 7RLB90x1 diesel
Five blades, fixed pitch; 24.9 feet
in diameter
30,000 nautical miles @ 18 knots
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)
American New York; Busan, South Korea,
Hong Kong, Kobe & Yokohama, Japan,
to Savannah, GA & New York. Arrived
Savannah, July 22, 1984; arrived
New York, July 27, 1984.

earlier, and three additional Econships, American New Jersey, American
Alabama, and American Maine, were christened at Daewoo’s Okpo yard
on the same day.
With the construction of the twelve Econships for United States Lines,
all named after states, C. G. Yoo, the general director of the Daewoo shipyard, was looking ahead to future business with McLean when he observed that his company was ready and willing to build the thirty-eight
additional vessels it would take to have one named after each of the fifty
states.14 McLean also thought he sensed a new market for noncontainerized traffic that his new Econships might tap. U.S. mass transit agencies
were then starting to acquire new rolling stock more from overseas suppliers than from domestic car builders, so the new U.S. Lines vessels were
outfitted with a spacious open area on the main deck beneath the superstructure where things like subway cars might be transported.
American New York left Busan, South Korea, for the United States in
the early summer of 1984 and following a transit of the Panama Canal
made its initial U.S. landfall in the port of Savannah, Georgia, on July 22.
Then it was north to New York, the new vessel’s once and future home
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port, and arrival there on the rainy morning of July 27. American New
York slipped under the Verrazano Narrows Bridge and headed up the Hudson, where it was accorded the harbor’s traditional fireboat welcome by
marine units of the New York Fire Department. Instead of docking at a
Hudson River pier, though, American New York reversed course in the
Hudson at a point near the World Trade Center with assistance from a
flotilla of Moran tugboats. (Frank Duffy, the longtime editor of the Moran
house organ, Tow Line, commented that when American New York was in
the midst of being turned in the Hudson, it almost seemed like a new
bridge had been built across the river from lower Manhattan to Jersey
City.15) The big container ship then headed south past the Statue of Liberty and west through the narrow confines of the Kill Van Kull. Unlike
Sea-Land vessels, American New York did not later swing north into
Newark Bay and dock at the huge Port Authority container-ship facilities
at Elizabethport. United States Lines leased space at a different Port
Authority–operated container facility, one that was located on the Staten
Island shore of the Arthur Kill at a place called Howland Hook, just beyond Shooters Island and the entrance to Newark Bay, and that is where
Moran tugs assisted the new container ship into its berth.16 Because Arthur Kill is too narrow a waterway to turn a large vessel like an Econship,
docking pilots first direct an inbound vessel into the lower reaches of
Newark Bay, turn it there, and then carefully move the ship astern into
Arthur Kill for docking at Howland Hook. Indeed with the advent of the
Econships, the Port Authority agreed to expand the Howland Hook facility
to the tune of $85.7 million by building new cranes and expanding storage
space so the big new ships could be loaded and unloaded efficiently.
Something that was largely ignored at the time American New York
inaugurated the Econship era, though, was the fact it was the largest vessel ever to fly the famous house flag of the United States Lines, besting
the company’s previous record holder, the since-retired superliner United
States by 3,746 gross registered tons. The United States was 990 feet long,
while each of the Daewoo dozen was slightly shorter at 950 feet. The
overall size of a merchant vessel, though, is best reflected by its gross
registered tonnage and using this measure, American New York established a new company standard.
When American New York left the Daewoo shipyard in South Korea and
began to steam eastward across the Pacific, it was less than a finished
product. United States Lines newbuilding team had a ‘‘punch list’’ with no
fewer than 480 unfinished items that Daewoo had yet to complete to the
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owner’s satisfaction and that would only be completed while the ship was
at sea. McLean had pressured the shipyard to get the big new vessel in
operation as quickly as possible so he could capture a share of the lucrative transpacific summer trade that moved Christmas merchandise from
Asia to North America.17 Santa Claus was coming to town, but he was not
riding a miniature sleigh pulled by eight tiny reindeer. This time Santa’s
toys and goodies were all neatly stowed inside forty-foot containers and
carried aboard a 57,075-gross-ton container ship.
The service pattern that McLean established for his big new ships was a
continuous series of eighty-four-day eastbound voyages around the world,
something that was fully as radical in 1984 as building a container ship
that could accommodate in excess of 4,000 TEUs. This would enable the
new ships to serve the rapidly growing Asia-to-North America market,
as well as the always important North America-to-Europe trade, without
having to worry about competing for traffic in much smaller westbound
markets on both routes. With twelve of the new ships maintaining an
eighty-four-day ’round-the-world circuit, each vessel was, effectively,
seven days behind the one ahead of it, thus providing weekly service over
all the important trade routes McLean hoped to serve—and dominate.
At first, things went well. McLean was even able to expand the scope of
United States Lines operations by acquiring the remnants of both MooreMcCormack in 1983 and Delta Line in 1984, thus providing United States
Lines with access to South American markets, although both acquisitions
were largely intended to generate feeder service for the new global itineraries of the Econships. McLean even followed up his acquisition of the
Daewoo dozen with five somewhat smaller newbuildings, two from South
Korea’s Samsung Shipbuilding—American Ohio and American Georgia—
and three vessels that had been under construction at the Odense Steel
Shipyard in Denmark for Delta, but were eventually delivered to United
States Lines as American Hawaii, American Michigan, and American North
Carolina.18 The three Danish-built vessels were 1,936-TEU container ships
that featured onboard cranes for loading and unloading, as well as a stern
ramp that allowed a modest amount of roll-on, roll-off (ro/ro) cargo to
be carried under the deckhouse.
Interestingly, Malcom McLean had christened one of his converted T-2
tankers of 1956 Maxton to honor the town where he was born. Now, almost three decades later, he was able to honor his home state, as well,
with a vessel that would become one of the last deepwater container ships
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he ever acquired. Like the Econships, the five new vessels were dieselpowered.
Under McLean, United States Lines did not merely add tonnage to its
fleet. The company also upgraded the management of its container operations by the installation of a high-speed facsimile system to transit a vessel’s ‘‘stowage plan’’ to its next port of call, thus facilitating timely
planning for the unloading and dispatching of a vessel’s containers. Before
the deployment of this automated system, United States Lines would
often dispatch a courier—by airplane—from one port to the next to deliver such important documents.19
It would be the huge Econships, though, whose advent would have the
greatest impact on the operations and fortunes of United States Lines.
Major competitors were able to greet the arrival of McLean’s new vessels
with a withering series of rate reductions, and one newcomer to the
container-ship industry even put a series of its own newbuildings into the
same around-the-world service that McLean once thought he might have
all to himself. Given the debt load that acquisition of the twelve new
vessels represented—McLean actually acquired seventeen new ships if the
five later fleet additions are included, and there was also debt associated
with his earlier purchase of the company from Kiddie—United States
Lines had little ability to match the discounted rates that other companies
were offering. Nor was the competition particularly kind in their comments when it became clear that the Econships were not living up to
expectations. Kerry St. Johnson, the chairman of London-based Overseas
Containers, Ltd., offered this comment: ‘‘I suspect Mr. McLean felt the
seas would part for him the way the Red Sea parted for Moses.’’20
Despite valiant efforts to reduce costs—United States Lines captains
supposedly cut back on the cartons of American cigarettes they traditionally gave to pilots working vessels through the Suez Canal—the end of
the road came quickly for United States Lines shortly after all twelve
Econships had entered service. Their slow speed made them unable to
compete—compete with Sea-Land, compete with other large-volume
container-ship operators, and most telling of all, compete with a new Far
Eastern company that had recently emerged on the scene and called itself
Evergreen Marine—or, in the words of container-ship authority R. F. Gibney, the ‘‘Taiwanese entrepreneurial enigma that is Evergreen.’’21 (It was
Evergreen that challenged McLean by offering a competitive around-theworld service—in both directions—at cheaper rates and with faster
ships!) We will learn more about the ‘‘enigma that is Evergreen’’ in chapter
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8. More immediate is the fact that late in the afternoon on Monday, November 24, 1986—after a frantic weekend of trying to restructure the
company’s massive debt and a mere two years after American New York
inaugurated the Econship era with a maiden voyage from Busan, South
Korea, to Savannah and New York—McLean Industries and United States
Lines filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the federal bankruptcy
code.22 Once United States Lines vessels that were then at sea completed
their voyages and returned to port, they were tied up and secured because
the company had suspended all transatlantic and around-the-world service. Asked what would happen after that, a company spokesman said
that ‘‘the banks will come after them, and they’ll do what they want with
them.’’23
Earlier in 1986, another U.S. transport firm terminated its operations
through bankruptcy. McLean Trucking, founded by Malcom McLean in
1934 and sold by him in 1955 when he acquired the Pan-Atlantic Steamship Company, was one of several over-the-road common carriers that
were unable to adapt to the new realities of a substantially deregulated
trucking environment. McLean Trucking, which had merged with Delta
Trucking some years earlier and celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in 1984,
terminated all operations and filed for Chapter 11 protection in midJanuary of 1986. While the company continued to call itself McLean
Trucking until the very end, no members of the McLean family held any
substantial interest in the company in the years after 1955.24
Returning to United States Lines, the company was not alone in specifying slower and more economical diesel power plants for new container
tonnage that was designed in the early 1980s in reaction to earlier instability in world petroleum markets. What put McLean more at risk than
any of the others, though, was the sheer size of his acquisition—not only
the largest container ship of all time, but eleven carbon copies built to
the same extraordinary specifications. A rival company that might have
expanded its fleet in more modest and measured fashion in the 1980s was
also at risk to the extent that it acquired slow-speed vessels, but not at all
to the same extent as United States Lines, a company that clearly ‘‘bet the
store’’ on its new Econships and their performance specifications. (Not
surprisingly, in the early years of the twenty-first century it would appear
that many of these slower vessels from the 1980s are becoming candidates
for the breakers before older, but faster, container-carrying tonnage that
was built in the 1970s.)
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The out-of-service Econships—towering vessels that were far more
imposing when seen in port than even the likes of Cunard’s Queen Elizabeth 2—were tied up in various harbors throughout the world, the brilliant red, white and blue of their funnels standing in mute tribute to a
once-proud steamship company that was no more.

Sea-Land’s Post–R. J. Reynolds Era
In 1983—five years after Malcom McLean had taken over United States
Lines—R. J. Reynolds announced that in reviewing its ongoing diversification strategies, it did not see a relationship with Sea-Land as worthy of
continuation. As early as 1978, a decade after acquiring Sea-Land, Reynolds was saying that it had reservations about the future earning capabilities of its container-ship subsidiary. This was before the SL-7s were sold
to the U.S. Navy, and Sea-Land did manage to improve its performance
in the profit-and-loss department in the early 1980s. In 1983, though, SeaLand’s profits dropped by 52 percent over the previous year, and in midsummer of 1984, executives at Reynolds announced that Sea-Land would
be spun off and turned into a stand-alone corporation, independently
listed on the New York Stock Exchange and with no relationship to R. J.
Reynolds, thus marking the end of an important era in Sea-Land history—
and, of course, the beginning of a new one.25
The new era would turn out to be rather short-lived. Curiously, though,
in the year after it was devolved from R. J. Reynolds’s control, Sea-Land
managed to post the highest earnings in the company’s twenty-eight-year
history.
One interesting vessel betterment effort from Sea-Land’s immediate
post–R. J. Reynolds era recalls the company’s seemingly incurable tendency to upgrade and improve existing tonnage. In 1985, each of the
twelve D-9 class vessels—none over five years old—was dispatched across
the Pacific to one or another yard of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Japan,
and there new hundred-foot midbody sections were spliced into the vessels, increasing their length from 745 to 845 feet, with gross registered
tonnage rising from 25,224 to 32,629. As a result of this surgery, carrying
capacity increased by 44 percent, from 1,718 TEUs to 2,472, and the rebuilt
vessels were redesignated as the D-9J class.26
Sea-Land also sensed a bargain of serious proportions in the aftermath
of the United States Lines bankruptcy. McLean had financed the Daewoo
dozen largely through Korean investment banks, but with the vessels sitting idle in places like the Brooklyn waterfront opposite lower Manhattan,
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the investment was generating absolutely no return.27 As a result, in 1988
Sea-Land was able to acquire the twelve hard-luck Econships at substantially below going market prices. McLean had paid $47.5 million per vessel
in 1984, while Sea-Land acquired all twelve for little more than $13 million
per hull in a transaction with Econ Associates, a New York–based limited
partnership that was representing various creditors of United States Lines.
Once redecorated in Sea-Land livery, the ships were known as the company’s Atlantic class. Table 6.2 identifies each of the twelve vessels.28
When Sea-Land acquired the twelve ex-United States Lines ships in
1988—and deployed them on schedules that supplemented faster services
provided by faster vessels—Sea-Land was no longer the stand-alone corporation it had been after emerging from R. J. Reynolds’s control in 1984.
Yet another new era began for Sea-Land in April 1986, two years after the
company had been spun off by R. J. Reynolds and almost thirty years to
the day after Ideal X left Port Newark for Houston.

Enter CSX
In early 1986, less than two years after Sea-Land left the R. J. Reynolds
family, an investment syndicate attempted a hostile takeover of the company. The bid was spearheaded by an investor from Dallas, Texas, by the
name of Harold Simmons, a man who already held a sizable block of SeaLand stock. Had his bid been successful, Simmons intended to secure a
position on the Sea-Land board of directors for himself as well as for a
colleague, retired admiral Elmo Zumwalt.29
Simmons’s announced goals for the company, once he secured control,
included reducing overhead expenses, retiring older and less efficient vessels, and applying for a federal operating subsidy from the U.S. Maritime
Administration (MARAD), a course of action that Sea-Land had never previously pursued. Simmons, who already held 34.8 percent of Sea-Land,
was seeking to double his stake in the company to secure effective control
and was offering to buy outstanding shares for $25 a share. Reaching his
goal would require an investment of $445 million.
Sea-Land was able to thwart Simmons’s hostile bid during the early
months of 1986, despite the fact that he raised his offer to $26 a share.
Finally, though, after the New York Stock Exchange ended trading on the
afternoon of April 21, 1986, an announcement was issued in Richmond,
Virginia. CSX Corporation, one of the nation’s more stable and prosperous
railroads, was proposing a friendly takeover of Sea-Land that had previously and quietly been negotiated between the two corporations and
from rjr to csx: 1985 –99 : : : 157

table 6.2. Sea-Land Fleet: Atlantic Class of 1988
Off. No.

Name

Hull dimensions

GRT

Place built
(year)

665786

Sea-Land Atlantic
a) American
Oklahoma
b) Karen H.
Sea-Land Integrity
a) American
Virginia
b) Jacqueline J.
c) Virginia
Sea-Land Motivator
a) American
New Jersey
b) Elizabeth L.
c) Raleigh Bay
Sea-Land Performance
a) American
Washington
b) Ruth W.
Sea-Land Pride
a) American
Kentucky
b) Mary Ann
c) Galveston Bay
Sea-Land Quality
a) American
Illinois
b) Patricia M.
Sea-Land Achiever
a) American
Alabama
b) Leyla A.
d) Galveston Bay
e) Sea-Land
Achiever

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 42

57,075

Okpo,
South Korea
(1985)

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 42

57,075

Okpo,
South Korea
(1985)

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 42

57,075

Okpo,
South Korea
(1984)

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 42

57,075

Okpo,
South Korea
(1985)

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 42

57,075

Okpo,
South Korea
(1985)

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 42

57,075

Okpo,
South Korea
(1985)

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 42

57,075

Okpo,
South Korea
(1984)

665783

665223

665790

665784

665787

665782
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table 6.2. (Continued)
Off. No.

Name

Hull dimensions

GRT

Place built
(year)

665788

Sea-Land Commitment
a) American
California
b) Marguerete
d) CGM Ile
de France
e) OOCL
Inspiration
f) Sea-Land
Commitment
Newark Bay
a) American
Utah
b) Irene D.
c) Utah
e) LTC John
U.D. Page
Sea-Land Value
a) American
Maine
b) Kim D.
Nedlloyd Holland
a) American
New York
b) Catherine K.
d) Sea-Land
Florida
Nedlloyd Hudson
a) American
Nebraska
b) Susan C.
c) Nebraska
e) OOCL
Inspiration

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 42

57,075

Okpo,
South Korea
(1985)

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 42

57,075

Okpo,
South Korea
(1985)

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 42

57,075

Okpo,
South Korea
(1984)

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 42

57,075

Okpo,
South Korea
(1984)

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 42

57,075

Okpo,
South Korea
(1984)

665789

665781

665222

665785
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table 6.2. (Continued)
Off. No.

Name

Hull dimensions

GRT

Place built
(year)

f) Sea-Land
Oregon
g) SSG Edward A.
Carter, Jr.

that bettered Simmons’s offer by $2 a share. Joseph F. Abbey, then the
chairman and chief executive officer of Sea-Land, recommended that his
board accept the CSX offer, and in the face of the CSX proposal, Simmons
refused to make a counteroffer and withdrew his bid. A new and different
phase was about to begin for an entity that once called itself the PanAtlantic Steamship Company.30

Railroads
When it orchestrated its friendly takeover of Sea-Land Services in 1986,
the name CSX was relatively new in the evolving world of North American
railroading. CSX was, essentially, the amalgamation of a number of previously independent rail companies and the name itself had only begun
to appear on freight cars and diesel locomotives a year earlier in 1985.
As recently as 1957—the year Gateway City inaugurated cellular container service—there were 116 Class One railroads, as they are called, in
the United States, major carriers with annual revenues above a certain
threshold that is adjusted from time to time to ensure that the designation
only applies to the nation’s major carriers. With only a handful of exceptions here and there, by the turn of the twenty-first century, these 116
Class One companies had merged themselves into four major carriers.31
(In 1957, the definition of a Class One railroad was one with annual operating revenue in excess of $3 million. By 2004, the threshold had risen to
$277 million.)
In the west there is Union Pacific, the sole corporate name from the
World War Two era that has survived all the mergers and acquisitions,
even though the Union Pacific of today is many times larger than it was
even a quarter-century ago and incorporates such once-independent railroads as Southern Pacific, Western Pacific, Missouri Pacific, and the Denver and Rio Grande Western. Also in the west will be found the Burlington
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Northern-Santa Fe (BNSF), the sole U.S. railroad whose right-of-way and
rails span almost the whole continent. With railheads in all major ports
along the Pacific coast, the company’s eastern limit is in Florida, certainly
an authentic enough Atlantic seaboard state. But BNSF tracks end in the
Gulf of Mexico port of Pensacola, not in, say, Jacksonville or Miami. Burlington Northern–Santa Fe is a merged railroad that incorporates such
once-independent companies as the Santa Fe, the Chicago, Burlington
and Quincy, the Great Northern, and the Northern Pacific.
East of the Mississippi one finds the country’s other two major railroads. Norfolk-based Norfolk Southern is an amalgamation of such carriers as the Southern, the Nickel Plate, the Wabash, and the Norfolk and
Western, while the nation’s fourth major railroad is CSX.
If one seeks to identify the nucleus of today’s CSX, a good case could
be made that it is a modest-sized railroad once known as the Chesapeake
and Ohio (C&O). The C&O ran between Newport News in the tidewater
area of Virginia and Chicago, with lots of branch lines to tap the many
coalfields in between. To this day, the CSX main line east from Richmond
is a major corridor for export coal bound for overseas through Newport
News. In 1963, the C&O merged with its long-time rival the Baltimore and
Ohio and the combined railroad soon absorbed the Western Maryland to
form what was called the Chessie System. In 1980, the CSX Corporation
was established to serve as a holding company for both the Chessie System and another evolving railroad network that called itself the Family
Lines, an amalgamation of the Atlantic Coast Line—the principal railroad
that sought to thwart Malcom McLean’s plan to transport loaded trailer
trucks aboard ships in 1956—the Seaboard Air Line, the Louisville and
Nashville, and a number of others. In 1986, Chessie System and Family
Lines were operationally merged, and the resultant railroad identified itself as CSX.32
Until 1998 in the east, there was also Conrail—the amalgamation of a
number of once-bankrupt railroads such as the Reading, the Lehigh Valley, and the infamous Penn Central—itself the product of an earlier
merger of the Pennsylvania and the New York Central. Conrail was created in 1977 under federal supervision, but the company rationalized its
routes and services in subsequent years, achieved profitability, and was
eventually divided, half acquired by Norfolk Southern, half by CSX.
When CSX became the parent corporation of Sea-Land Service in 1986,
its own acquisition of Conrail, and with it direct rail access to such Northeast port cities as New York and Boston, was still in the future. Indeed,
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CSX’s later sell-off of Sea-Land in 1999 was said to have been part of the
railroad’s strategy to secure capital for the Conrail takeover, a transaction
that carried a price tag of $10.2 billion.33 Even without Conrail, though,
the CSX of 1986 was a formidable railroad; its lines extended from south
Florida to Ontario, from Pennsylvania to Missouri, and it was then—and
remains today—the only railroad with a main line that parallels the busy
I-95 corridor along the East Coast from Miami to the Northeast.

Intermodal
Four years before CSX assumed control of Sea-Land in 1988, the railroad—then still called the Chessie System—received authorization from
the Interstate Commerce Commission to acquire controlling interest in a
corporation called American Commercial Lines, a barge company whose
home base was in Lafayette, Indiana, and whose specialty was traffic
along America’s inland rivers.34 So when Sea-Land later became part of
the CSX equation, and with a new corporate emphasis that CSX planned
to place on ‘‘seamless’’ intermodal transport, it would be possible—at least
in theory—for a container of export merchandise that originated, say, in
an industrial park outside Toledo, Ohio, to travel from there to a local
railyard on a highway chassis, west to Saint Louis aboard a CSX freight
train, down the Mississippi River from Saint Louis to the port of New
Orleans under the care of an American Commercial barge, and at New
Orleans be hoisted aboard a Sea-Land container ship bound for Rotterdam. Ohio to Holland—aboard four different modes of transport—and all
of them part of the CSX family.
CSX invested considerable energy in various intermodal initiatives
throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, but such a full international paradigm proved more illusory and theoretical than practical and profitable.
Indeed as CSX numbers crunchers began to examine the details of SeaLand finances as the twentieth century entered its final years, they were
more motivated by a desire to reduce day-to-day expenses than to create
that seamless intermodal system. In addition, there was also the matter of
devoting sufficient corporate attention to, and finding sufficient corporate
resources for, the enormous challenges associated with the takeover of
almost half of the rail lines formerly operated by Conrail. (Some earlier
‘‘mega-mergers’’ by U.S. railroads had resulted in monumental traffic delays as operations from rival companies failed to integrate smoothly. CSX
was determined to avoid such problems with its acquisition of Conrail—
although many feel its success in doing so was less than perfect.35)
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But if U.S. railroads, CSX among them, were somewhat less than aggressive in developing intermodal services to their fullest potential, one
could advance a rather plausible argument that it was container-ship operators—acting on their own and irrespective of corporate links with overland railroad companies—that did more to foster true intermodal
opportunities than any other transport sector. The concept was known as
a land bridge, an awkward term that refers to a container’s traveling
aboard a ship and a railroad train as part of a single shipment.36
Both Sea-Land and American President Lines (APL) were pioneers in
dispatching containers that originated in the Far East from West Coast
ports to East Coast cities aboard railroad trains. Sea-Land and the Southern Pacific Railroad, for instance, inaugurated such a service out of the
port of Los Angeles in 1977 that is universally regarded as the first of its
kind, but APL and the Burlington Northern Railroad followed closely
behind with a service from the port of Seattle, and APL would quickly
become more aggressive than any other container-ship company in developing overland railroad extensions of its oceangoing steamship services.
At first, railroad companies were reluctant to regard container-ship operators as anything other than conventional customers of their freight
services. Railroads would supply flat cars and locomotives, routine ratemaking protocols would necessarily apply, and the freight trains that
hauled container-carrying cars would observe traditional railroad operating
practices with respect to schedules and interchange with other railroads.
The needs of container-ship operators, though, would soon force American railroads to adopt unconventional policies and techniques. One of
these was the development and use of a double-stack railcar, as it has
been called. As this technology eventually developed, a double-stack car
turned out to be five separate cars linked together into a permanent unit
to reduce car-to-car vibrations along the way.37 The most important feature of the double-stack car is that its basic floor—the ‘‘flat’’ portion of a
flat car—is slung low between the running gear so two containers could
be stacked atop each other, while still respecting clearances along the
right-of-way. It should hardly come as a surprise to learn that a man who
played an important role in the development of the double-stack container car was Malcom P. McLean.
Sea-Land people had been meeting with executives from the Southern
Pacific, but the railroaders kept insisting that the floor level of a conventional flat car precluded transporting containers one atop another, as
McLean wanted to do.
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One day McLean and his wife and children were invited to a reception
at the White House, and they traveled to the capital from northern New
Jersey aboard a Pennsylvania Railroad train. As they were walking along
the platform at Washington Union Station, McLean noticed that a considerable amount of permanent equipment hung below the floor level of the
cars, especially steam pipes and brake hoses that were connected to each
other below the couplers of the cars.
Getting down on his hands and knees, McLean crawled beneath the
cars to estimate how high above the rails this equipment rode, and he
determined that it cleared by a mere three inches. Armed with this information, Sea-Land people renewed their efforts with the Southern Pacific,
and the world’s first double-stack container car, Southern Pacific No.
513300, was turned out by the American Car and Foundry Company, a
joint effort of Sea-Land and Southern Pacific.
Not so lucky, though, was the man who was en route to a White House
reception. His little inspection tour in Washington Union Station put a big
hole in Malcom McLean’s trousers—he called them his ‘‘britches’’—and
when he arrived at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue shortly afterward, the man
was anything but the last word in sartorial splendor.38
The use of double-stack cars on various eastern lines was initially
rather restricted due to more limited clearances on railroads serving such
cities as New York and Baltimore. High-voltage overhead catenary wires
that provide current for electric-powered trains along the Northeast Corridor, for example, were a limitation; so were various nineteenth-century
tunnels built long before anyone ever thought about stacking containers
one atop another. Many of these clearance limitations have since been
addressed, and double-stack trains now serve most eastern cities.
Different and important as it may have been, the double-stack car was
merely a piece of rolling stock. Far more radical was a policy that soon
took hold whereby container-ship companies themselves would acquire
their own fleets of double-stack cars, and the railroads would merely supply motive power and operating personnel for moving such a train over
their tracks—‘‘hook and haul’’ service, as it is sometimes called, the same
style of operation railroads provide to energy companies that own fleets
of hopper cars for transporting coal from mine to power plant.
Given such arrangements, container-ship companies were no longer
held hostage to traditional railroad operating practices and were able to
exercise far greater control over the land portion of their shipments. APL,
for example, established what amounted to a ‘‘railroad division’’ within
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its table of organization to oversee the operation of its land-bridge services. While precise numbers differ from company to company, a rule of
thumb maintains that if an all-water service from the Far East to the East
Coast via the Panama Canal requires thirty days to complete, use of a
land-bridge connection at a West Coast port can reduce transit time to
twenty days.39
In a highly readable book that traces the adoption of both piggyback
and containerized technology by U.S. railroads, David J. DeBoer explains
how the instinctive reaction of most railroad executives to just about any
intermodal innovation, technical or operational, was no. DeBoer delights
in telling how such totally unrelated developments as the passage of the
Staggers Rail Act of 1980—a piece of federal legislation that substantially
deregulated U.S. railroads—as well as a massive snowstorm between Chicago and Buffalo during the winter of 1978–79 helped create conditions
that led to more widespread use of railroads to move transpacific containers eastward, and the shift from railroad-owned rolling stock to cars that
were owned by container-ship companies.40
What may well have been the most radical dimension of these new
rail-bridge services, though, was the rapidity with which they were
adopted and became commonplace. Within a few short years, most major
container-ship companies owned large fleets of railcars and were contracting with various railroads to move these dedicated trains eastward
from West Coast ports. When Denmark’s Maersk Line took the plunge and
acquired a fleet of double-stack cars in 1990, publicity people from both
Maersk and the Santa Fe Railway got together, painted Santa Fe locomotive No. 146 as if it, too, were part of the Maersk empire—it was not, of
course—and posed a special train at various desert locations along the
famous Santa Fe Trail, all rendered in traditional Maersk blue, and not
Santa Fe red and silver.41 By mid-1989 there were in excess of one hundred
double-stack trains, each a mile or so long, operating across the country
every week, trains whose rolling stock was composed of cars owned by
various container-ship companies and decorated with logos that were previously seen only on the funnels of ships in the harbor, not freight cars
speeding past country grade crossings. And the hundred double-stack
trains of 1989 would continue to grow. By 1993 the weekly count had
reached 241—156 out of the dual ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, 34
out of Oakland, and 51 from the three ports in the Pacific Northwest,
Seattle, Tacoma, and Portland—while by 1996, APL alone was dispatching
250 rail-bridge trains of various sorts each week.
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Once container-ship companies established this new working relationship with operating railroads and became the owners of the trains that
carried containers inland from various seaports, they were able to incorporate flexibilities into train operations. Where railroads were previously
reluctant to interchange container-carrying freight cars with other roads
except in conventional fashion and at conventional junctions—a process
that could often be inordinately time-consuming—container-ship operators were able to specify when and where cars were to be removed from
a double-stack train and dispatched along a different line. A train that
originated in Tacoma, Washington, for instance, might split into two sections in the Twin Cities, with one heading south to New Orleans and the
other heading east to Norfolk or Savannah.
Dispatching double-stack rail-bridge trains into the New York metropolitan area was not possible from the outset. Clearances along eastern
railroads tended to be more restricted than on lines in the west, and because Conrail enjoyed a monopoly on rail freight traffic into a number of
eastern cities, it faced no competitive pressure to upgrade its rights-ofway to permit the operation of double-stacks. Enter the New York, Susquehanna and Western Railroad.42
In the era of railroad deregulation that the Staggers Act brought on,
this small regional carrier was able to secure westward access out of its
previously limited Northern New Jersey territory, and by linking into an
east-west mainline that was once part of the Erie Railroad—and that had
been built with generous overhead clearances—the Susquehanna, once
on the verge of abandonment, secured its own future by becoming the
easternmost link that permitted coast-to-coast double-stack trains to
reach New York.
Sea-Land first joined forces with the Susquehanna to move rail-bridge
trains in and out of New York. Such trains began or ended their transcontinental ‘‘voyages’’ at an intermodal railyard Sea-Land built in Little Ferry,
New Jersey, along the Hackensack River and adjacent to the northern end
of the New Jersey Turnpike. The first bright red Sea-Land double-stack
cars to reach metropolitan New York drifted into Little Ferry behind six
Susquehanna diesel locomotives shortly before noon on August 5, 1985.
The train had begun its transcontinental journey several days earlier on
the shore of Puget Sound in the Pacific Northwest and headed up into
the Cascade Mountains over the Burlington Northern, the railroad that
handled the train all the way to Chicago. Then it was a route over the
Norfolk Southern through Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania to Buffalo,
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where the Delaware and Hudson took over and forwarded the train to
Binghamton, New York. This is where the Susquehanna entered the picture, coupled its black and yellow diesel locomotives onto the head end,
identified the departure as train SLN-4, and began the final leg of the
transcontinental journey through such Delaware Valley communities as
Hancock and Port Jervis.
Upon reaching the Sea-Land facility in Little Ferry—in 1985 as well as
in later years—containers are removed from land-bridge trains and continue onward from there by highway—to the big Port Authority container
facility at Elizabethport, or to whatever might be their final destination.43
With the sale of Conrail to CSX and Norfolk Southern in 1998, additional
east-west routings for double-stack cars were established and the Susquehanna no longer serves as the eastern leg for such traffic. In the early
1990s, the Port Authority—by then formally renamed the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey—built a new rail facility at Elizabethport
called ExpressRail that facilitates the exchange of containers between
double-stack railcars and oceangoing container ships.44
However important double-stack land-bridge services have become as
a way of forwarding containers inland from ports in the United States,
the most unusual example of such an intermodal operation is surely one
that operates over the famous trans-Siberian Railroad. Begun in the early
1970s, the service quickly became an important link for cargo that originated on the Pacific coast of Latin America and was bound for such cities
as Moscow and Leningrad—even Helsinki, Oslo, and Copenhagen—even
though the volume of such traffic is a small fraction of that in North
America. By the end of 1974, more than 4,000 TEUs a month were moving
westward over the system; Sea-Land became a participant in the transSiberian land bridge in 1990.45

From Conferences to Alliances
A business practice that was central to the operation of ocean-liner
services since the final quarter of the nineteenth century—long before the
first containers went to sea aboard Malcom McLean’s Ideal X, certainly—
was the establishment of conferences, as they have been called, among
otherwise competing companies. Conferences were cooperative arrangements that steamship companies established and joined—if they chose
to—and whose central requirement was that, by virtue of their joining,
members must agree to charge a comparable price for the same service
as other conference members.46 Conferences among steamship companies
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proved to be one of the few institutions that national governments, including the United States, tended to tolerate, despite general opposition
to price-fixing and other cooperative practices that could be characterized
as monopolistic. As Mary Brooks explains in Sea Change in Liner Shipping,
‘‘traditional competition policy guidelines applicable to most land-based
industries have not been applied to liner shipping.’’47
The Calcutta Conference of 1875 is generally regarded as the first true
conference to be established by steamship companies, closely followed in
1879 by the awkwardly named Agreement for the Working of the China
Trade, Outbound and Homebound. (Conferences rarely distinguish themselves by the adoption of catchy names for their cooperative ventures.) In
the United States, the Shipping Act of 1916 sanctioned conferences ‘‘as a
means of stabilizing steamship activities and rates,’’ and most U.S.-flag
companies joined conferences in the various trades they worked.48 The
1916 legislation required U.S.-flag steamship companies to secure government approval for any conference membership, but such authorizations
were, in most cases, granted rather routinely, although an undercurrent
of ‘‘anti-conference’’ sentiment would always be present in Washington,
with organizations representing shippers routinely in the forefront of
keeping such views alive.
Over the years many conferences have been established—well over a
hundred by most reckoning—with individual conferences established for
specific international corridors, even for specific directions within corridors; typically there were separate conferences for cargo and passenger
services. Sea-Land had a penchant both for joining conferences and for
canceling its membership in the face of pending market developments but
then rejoining when business conditions so warranted. Canceling membership in a given conference gave a steamship company freedom to quote
rates below those charged by other members of the conference, while
joining a conference meant that price was eliminated as a competitive
factor with other conference members. Typically, given sea routes were
served by both conference members and non-conference members, although nonmembers tended to be in the minority with conference members supplying the bulk of the tonnage, and the bulk of the departures, in
a given trade. When Malcom McLean put his new Econships in service
for United States Lines in 1984, major competitor Evergreen was able to
undercut McLean’s prices because it was not a conference member in the
critical trades where McLean’s new ships had to do well. In 1969, eight
steamship companies, including Sea-Land, proposed the establishment of
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the first exclusive conference for container-ship operations, and such an
entity was eventually established.49
In more recent years, the importance of conferences has diminished to
a measurable degree, while new forms of cooperation have arisen. They
are known as alliances—or, sometimes, strategic alliances. (In the United
Kingdom, a strategic alliance is often called a consortium.) Under a conference agreement, steamship companies are free to compete with each
other in a variety of ways—dependability, speed of delivery, reliability—
and each conference member remains in sole control of its own fleet.
Steamship companies, however, may not quote prices that are different
from other conference members. Conferences often establish other operational constraints that its members are obliged to observe—frequency of
service, for example, or ports served—but eliminating price as a competitive factor is the principal hallmark of a steamship conference. Like so
many endeavors, the actual operation of a given conference involves a
good deal of bureaucratic give and take, negotiations among and between
members, and meetings.
Alliances, on the other hand, typically involve fewer participants in a
given cooperative entity, but they not only preclude competitive action in
a variety of price and non-price areas, they practically constitute a de
facto merger among and between alliance participants. Individual companies are still responsible to their shareholders and earning profits remains
each company’s corporate objective; but in a variety of areas, from joint
marketing, to equipment-sharing arrangements, to schedule coordination, two or more companies operate in virtual partnership.
An important factor behind the formation of alliances was the fact that
as container ships got larger, and operations became more productive,
steamship companies could easily accommodate more business aboard
fewer container-ship departures. By the turn of the twenty-first century,
major operators were placing orders for newbuildings with capacities approaching 9,000 TEUs, with even larger vessels likely in future years.50
Mindful of the fact that excess capacity can represent as fatal a flaw to a
shipping business as insufficient customers, many lines began to think
about increasing overall capacity along a given trade route, but doing so
with fewer sailings.
But if container-ship operators were motivated by an understandable
desire to introduce more efficiencies, the requirements of their customers
were often at odds with such initiatives. Many shippers are more sensitive
to the frequency of departure than any other variable—including speed
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and cost. And so conflict arose when container-ship operators attempted
to balance supply and demand by shifting, perhaps, from weekly to biweekly departures along a given route. The container-ship operator might
feel that providing a 6,000-TEU vessel over a given trade twice a month
offers more capacity, while being substantially less expensive to operate,
than weekly departures with 2,500-TEU vessels. For a shipper, though,
whose reliance on a ‘‘just-in-time’’ supply chain from, say, a factory in the
Far East to a chain of discount department stores in Georgia and Alabama,
the proposed schedule that is more productive and efficient from the perspective of the container-ship operator would be nothing short of a
disaster.
The concept of just-in-time delivery involves, to use an admittedly
oversimplified example, ten inbound containers each filled with a single
commodity that recently arrived in port from an overseas manufacturer
backing up to one side of a distribution center. (The operative terminology is important here, too; it is a distribution center, not a warehouse.)
Then, in a swift but carefully orchestrated process, the merchandise is
removed from the ten inbound containers and sorted, and ten percent of
the product from each container is placed aboard each of ten trailer trucks
backed into the other side of the distribution center for subsequent delivery to retail outlets. There is no warehousing, and no labor costs associated with shifting merchandise from inbound containers to storage areas,
and then onto trucks for later delivery. Merchandise arrives from overseas
factories ‘‘just in time,’’ and is dispatched immediately to stores and other
points of sale.
The solution to this dilemma was the creation of an alliance, whereby
an individual steamship company could offer its customers the same
weekly departures they had come to rely on, although the actual vessel
that cast off on any given departure might fly the house flag of any alliance member. Hypothetically, a vessel of the ABC Line might handle departures on the first Tuesday of each month, the DEF Line on the second
Tuesday, and so forth.
Alliances often lead to the chartering of vessels from one member company to another, and still another form of cooperation that has developed
during the alliance era—but often separate from the formation of formal
alliances—is the practice of one company’s chartering capacity aboard
another carrier’s vessels, ‘‘slot chartering’’ as it is often called. Given the
enormous size of contemporary container-carrying vessels, a steamship
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company can realize substantial savings in response to market fluctuations by offering service between two ports not with its own vessels, but
by virtue of its chartering so many TEUs aboard the sailings of another
company. Again using our two hypothetical container-ship companies, a
shipper may contract with the ABC Line to have a container full of goods
delivered to an overseas destination, and the shipper conducts all its business with the ABC Line. ABC Line handles the international shipment of
its customer’s container by placing it aboard a container ship of the DEF
Line, with whom it has contracted to reserve 1,000 TEUs per week, perhaps, over a given trade route.
One visual impact of the onset of alliances and other space-sharing
arrangements has been the gradual disappearance of vessels whose containers are all decorated in the same corporate color scheme. Part of the
multicolor diversity one sees aboard contemporary container ships is the
result of large numbers of containers that are now owned by containerleasing firms, not container-ship operators. Thanks also to the formation
of alliances, the days when a Sea-Land vessel would sail under the Verrazano Narrows Bridge into New York Harbor with nothing but Sea-Land
containers visible on its weather deck are long gone.
A case could be made—and Lane Kendall and James Buckley do so in
their landmark study, The Business of Shipping—that the 1967 creation of
Atlantic Container Line (ACL) by a number of different European steamship companies, fifteen years before the onset of the alliance era, represented an early effort at creating a strategic alliance.51 ACL, discussed in
chapter 3, whether it can correctly be called a true alliance or not, certainly gave up a large measure of any continuing claim to such a status
when ACL became more of a stand-alone company in later years.
In some respects, contemporary alliances among container-ship operators are not unlike the ‘‘code sharing’’ arrangements that major airlines
have adopted in recent years. A daily flight from Washington, D.C., to
Frankfurt, Germany, for instance, might be listed separately among the
services offered by both United Airlines and by Lufthansa. On any given
day, only one aircraft would operate the flight, but passengers would appear at the gate with tickers and confirmed reservations issued by both
United and by Lufthansa.
In the United States, passage of the Shipping Act of 1984 paved the
way for companies like Sea-Land to explore new kinds of cooperative
ventures with other operators. In October 1984, for instance, Sea-Land
and the German container-ship operator Hapag-Lloyd filed an application
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with the Federal Maritime Commission under the terms of the new legislation to establish a space-sharing arrangement on a transpacific trade.52 It
was granted and became Sea-Land’s first such cooperative venture. Oddly
enough, the Shipping Act of 1984 was nominally an effort to curb the
power of the older steamship conferences and allow more liberal policies
to prevail. Europeans, on the other hand, welcomed the emergence of
alliances as a way to counter the rapid growth and potential market dominance of a few large companies, with Sea-Land and Evergreen typically
identified as the lines in question.53
European nations were also going through fundamental realignment
in areas associated with competition and cooperation as part of the establishment of the European Common Market and the European Union, and
such matters affected developing relationships—conferences as well as
alliances—among container-ship operators.54 In September 1998, for instance, an EU commission levied a substantial fine of $318 million against
all sixteen members of the Transatlantic Conference Agreement (TACA),
arguably the largest and most important of all the steamship conferences,
after finding that TACA was in violation of a number of highly technical
antimonopoly provisions. Sea-Land’s share of the fine was $27.5 million,
second in dollar value only to P&O Nedlloyd’s $41.26 million.55
The general point remains, though, that both conferences and alliances
represent degrees of cooperative activity that, while alien to many aspects
of public policy associated with corporate practices, have largely been
tolerated by national governments and transnational institutions because
of a perceived need to ensure a measure of stability in international
steamship services.
Among container-ship operators, alliances have evolved, and individual companies typically do not devote the entirety of their fleets to the
alliance. As is the case with a route-specific conference, a company might
elect to join, or form, an alliance for its transatlantic services from the
channel ports of Europe to the East Coast of the United States, but remain
independent for its transpacific services—with or without joining any of
the many transpacific conferences.
Ignoring, for the moment, such earlier ventures as ACL, the contemporary alliance era is usually said to have begun in the mid-1980s, and by
1995 four major strategic alliances were in operation. With respect to SeaLand, it, too, decided that developing trends in the industry warranted
giving alliances some serious attention—and its decisions in this regard
would substantially affect its future. By 1988 Sea-Land had negotiated
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vessel-sharing arrangements with both P&O Containers, of Great Britain,
and Nedlloyd, a Dutch firm. (P&O Containers and Nedlloyd would later
merge and form P&O Nedlloyd.) Sea-Land chartered three of its recently
acquired Atlantic class vessels to P&O, two to Nedlloyd, and entered an
agreement that called for Sea-Land to control 58 percent of shared capacity, P&O 25 percent, and Nedlloyd 17 percent on several trades between
Gulf and East coast ports in the United States and Europe.56 In addition,
Sea-Land leased two Atlantic class vessels—former Econships from United
States Lines—to Hong Kong-based Orient Overseas Container Line
(OOCL) and named them OOCL Inspiration and OOCL Innovation for the
duration of the arrangement. This created, of course, the anomaly of vessels appearing in formal vessel registers with Sea-Land showing as their
owners, but decorated in the livery of OOCL, and bearing names that
were part of that company’s vocabulary.
Sea-Land also established working agreements with a number of
smaller European container-ship operators in an effort to secure entry
into specialized markets, essentially using its new partners as feeders for
its own international routes. In 1985, for instance, cooperative relationships with French and Italian container-ship companies provided SeaLand with entry to Kuwait and Bahrain, countries Sea-Land had never
been able to serve on its own. As a result of these relationships, as many
as two dozen vessels that were owned by such companies were given SeaLand names and decorated in Sea-Land livery.
Eventually, these early forays in cooperative endeavors were followed
by Sea-Land’s establishing a formal two-company alliance with a containership company that could easily be called the most independent-minded in
the entire industry, the Maersk Line. Sea-Land’s alliance with MoellerMaersk was established in 1995, following a space-sharing arrangement
between the two companies that began in 1991.57
Further aspects of Sea-Land’s relationship with Moeller-Maersk will be
explored in the next chapter, but with respect to immediate and shortterm impacts, following the formation of this alliance, Maersk’s profits
increased by 23 percent in 1996, and its slot utilization—a key measure of
productivity in the industry—rose to a little below 90 percent, versus an
industry average of 62 percent. For its part, Sea-Land was able to save
$100 million a year in costs it was able to share with Maersk, and its
income rose despite an overall decline in the industry. Table 6.3 identifies
the four major alliances as of 1995.
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table 6.3. Container-ship Alliances: 1995
Alliance

Participating container-ship
companies

Vessels participating
in the alliance

Global Alliance

American President Lines (APL);
Mitsui-OSK; Nedlloyd; Orient
Overseas Container Line (OOCL)
Hapag-Lloyd; Neptune Orient
Line (NOL); Nippon Yusen
Kaisha Line (NYK); P&O
Container Lines
Cho Yang; DSR-Senator;
Hanjin Shipping Co.
Maersk (A.P. Moeller);
Sea-Land Services

77 out of 187

Grand Alliance

Tricon/Hanjin
Maersk/Sea-Land

60 out of 182

60 out of 95
175 out of 206

The fourteen container-ship companies that were alliance participants
in 1995 owned and operated a grand total of 670 vessels. Of this total,
372, or 55 percent, were dedicated to alliance services, the rest operating
in nonalliance trades. In the years after 1995, alliance affiliation would
see considerable shifting and change; NOL acquired APL and the merged
company joined the Global Alliance, while Nedlloyd and P&O also merged
into a single company and cast its lot with the Grand Alliance. (We shall
explore further details about the NOL’s acquisition of APL in chapter 8.)
In addition, a new although much less formal alliance was established by
Cosco, K-Line and Yangming, three Far Eastern container-ship companies.
In any event, in a world where supposedly unfettered global competition is regarded as an unquestioned dogma of contemporary business and
public policy, a critical link in the global supply chain has long managed
to operate under the umbrella of various formal relationships that insulate
their members from some of the less predictable side effects of competition, such as price-cutting and the need to sustain sufficient capacity to
accommodate the needs of customers.

More Vessels
A steady theme throughout the Sea-Land story has been the continual
attention the company has paid to ensuring that its fleet is both productive and competitive. As described earlier, in 1988 Sea-Land acquired all
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twelve Econships that Malcom McLean had built for United States Lines
and that had been idle since that line filed for bankruptcy and suspended
operations in 1986. Sea-Land’s penchant for refining and upgrading its
fleet saw rather interesting expression after the company acquired the
former Daewoo dozen. Because the weakness of these vessels was their
slow speed, Sea-Land developed a program to reduce their size and give
them a little extra power boost so they might run a little faster.
The Econships were the world’s largest container ships when they were
built—although they had surrendered this crown by the time Sea-Land
acquired them in 1988. Sea-Land engineers felt that taking a hundredfoot section out of their hulls, reducing capacity from 4,258 TEUs to 3,918,
and supplementing the original seven-cylinder Sulzer diesels with a new
twelve-cylinder booster diesel that generated electricity and added ‘‘muscle’’ to the propeller shaft through an electric motor, would leave SeaLand with a generous enough vessel for most major trade routes, but one
whose increased speed would make it more competitive.58
It remains unclear how successful this effort proved to be, although
the fact that Sea-Land only sent three of the former Econships, Sea-Land
Motivator, Sea-Land Pride, and Sea-Land Value, to the Blohm and Voss
yard in Germany for the alterations suggests that the program’s design
objectives were less than fully realized. Once so rebuilt, the three former
Atlantic class vessels were identified on the Sea-Land roster as the SL-31
class. The other nine former Econships retained their as-built configuration, and as noted earlier, several were chartered to such container-ship
operators as Nedlloyd, P&O, and OOCL under various vessel-sharing
arrangements.
Before these three Atlantic class vessels were rebuilt, Sea-Land had
considered plans for an even more radical solution to the chronic speed
problems of the one-time Daewoo dozen. Namely, slice the vessels in half
three hatches forward of the deckhouse and join the after end to a newly
built bow and midbody, but one of a proper size to permit twenty-oneor twenty-two-knot speed from the original engine. Then, the Econship
forebody would be grafted onto a newly built stern section, complete with
machinery, thus creating another series of container ships that could also
manage the same speed.
The proposal advanced to a point where class names were identified
for the new vessels; the twelve smaller ships with the original Daewoo
engines would be the D-14 class, while the larger vessels, with new engines, would have been the D-18 class.59 The complexity of it all proved
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overwhelming, though, and the only Atlantic class vessels to be substantially altered were the three SL-31s.
What Sea-Land called its Atlantic class, though, were not the only exUnited States Lines vessels the company acquired following the latter’s
bankruptcy in 1986. U.S. Lines’ final fleet included a mix of vessels that
were both designed and built to its own specifications, as well as ships it
acquired through the takeover of other companies. Sea-Land thus assumed title to three Lancer class ships, steam-powered vessels that were
built by United States Lines in 1968 as the company’s first fully cellular
container ships, as well as five slightly newer steam-powered container
ships that wound up in the United States Lines fleet when that company
acquired the Farrell Line. In 1991 Sea-Land even acquired two LASH-type
vessels that were built in 1980 by Waterman Steamship—the one-time
parent corporation of Pan-Atlantic—and converted them into 2,100-TEU
container ships that were called Sea-Land Reliance and Sea-Land Spirit.
Table 6.4 identifies the ex-United States Lines vessels—over and above
the Econships—that were acquired by Sea-Land.
Sea-Land also continued to upgrade its fleet by designing and building
new container ships. One relatively small class of vessels—a mere three
hulls—enjoys the distinction of being the first and only Sea-Land newbuildings to be constructed from the keel up in a U.S. yard. The trio was built
in the Great Lakes city of Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin, and after completion,
made their way to the sea via the Welland Canal and the Saint Lawrence
Seaway. Sea-Land was willing to contract with a U.S. yard for this acquisition not because the Bay Shipbuilding Corporation had underbid such
overseas yards as Mitsubishi or Hyundai, but rather because Sea-Land had
to acquire new tonnage for its Puget Sound–Alaska trade and the Jones
Act stipulated that such vessels necessarily had to be built domestically.
(These three vessels were designed and ordered prior to the CSX takeover
of Sea-Land and delivered afterward.)
The trio were fully cellular container ships that were 710 feet long and
could each accommodate 1,712 TEUs, small by conventional standards of
the day, but quite appropriate for Sea-Land’s Alaska trade. Powered by
a seven-cylinder Mitsubishi diesel, the trio included such features as a
controllable-pitch propeller as well as forward and aft water-jet thrusters
to assist in close-quarters maneuvering. The trade publication Marine Engineering, looking to the future and seeing few, if any, possible orders
for additional U.S.-built cargo vessels, declared the trio to be ‘‘the last
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table 6.4. Sea-Land Fleet: Other Ex–United States Lines Vessels
Off. No. Name

515155

518444

516464

544303

547288

541868

612085

Sea-Land Challenger
a) American Legion
b) Sea-Land Legion
d) Horizon Challenger
Sea-Land Crusader
a) American Lark
b) Sea-Land Lark
d) CSX Crusader
e) Horizon Crusader
Sea-Land Discovery
a) American Liberty
b) Sea-Land Liberty
d) CSX Discovery
e) Horizon Discovery
Sea-Land Expedition
a) Austral Ensign
b) American Marketer
c) Sea-Land Marketer
e) CSX Expedition
f) Horizon Expedition
Sea-Land Hawaii
a) Austral Endurance
b) American Merchant
d) CSX Hawaii
e) Horizon Hawaii
Sea-Land Navigator
a) Austral Envoy
b) American Envoy
d) CSX Navigator
e) Horizon Navigator
Sea-Land Pacific
a) Austral Pioneer
b) American Pioneer
d) CSX Pacific
e) Horizon Pacific

Hull dimensions GRT

Place built
(year)

Notes

700 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 32

19,157

Chester, Pa.
(1968)

1

700 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 32

19,203 Chester, Pa.
(1969)

1

700 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 32

18,894 Chester, Pa.
(1968)

1

668 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 37

21,687

Pascagoula,
Miss.
(1973)

2

668 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 35

21,687

Pascagoula,
Miss.
(1973)

2

812 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 36

28,087 Pascagoula,
Miss.
(1972)

2

813 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 33

28,095 Baltimore,
Md.
(1979)

2
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table 6.4. (Continued)
Off. No. Name

552706

623168

Sea-Land Trader
a) Austral Entente
b) American Entente
d) CSX Trader
e) Horizon Trader
Sea-Land Enterprise
a) Austral Puritan
b) American Puritan
d) CSX Enterprise
e) Horizon Enterprise

Hull dimensions GRT

Place built
(year)

813 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 37

28,087 Pascagoula,
Miss.
(1973)

813 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 34

28,095 Baltimore, Md. 2
(1980)

Notes
1. Lancer class vessels designed and built by United States Lines.
2. Designed and built by Farrell Lines; later acquired by United States Lines.

oceangoing merchant ships to be built in the United States.’’60 (The magazine’s prediction was slightly off the mark, as Matson would later order a
number of new container ships for its Jones Act trade between California
and Hawaii—vessels we shall learn more about in chapter 8.) In any
event, the arrival of the three new vessels allowed Sea-Land to retire four
older steam-powered vessels that it had previously used in its Alaskan
trade. Interestingly, when Sea-Land inaugurated Alaskan operation in
1964, one of its vessels was named Seattle to honor the southern terminal
of the service. The replacement trio in 1987 included no Seattle references, but one vessel was called Sea-Land Tacoma. The reason is that SeaLand shifted its Puget Sound operations south from Seattle to Tacoma,
where a massive terminal was opened in 1985, a facility that fosters the
intermodal transfer of incoming containers to waiting railroad trains for
subsequent dispatch eastward over what is now called the Burlington
Northern Santa Fe Railroad.
Table 6.5 displays relevant information about Sea-Land’s three new
container ships, vessels that were designated the D-7 class on the company’s roster.
If the D-7 class was a minor and specialized addition to the Sea-Land
fleet, a more substantial acquisition that reflected the industry trend of
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Notes

2

table 6.5. Sea-Land Fleet: The D-7 Class of 1987
Off. No.

Name

Hull dimensions

GRT

Place built (year)

910306

Sea-Land Anchorage
b) CSX Anchorage
c) Horizon Anchorage
Sea-Land Kodiak
b) CSX Kodiak
c) Horizon Kodiak
Sea-Land Tacoma
b) CSX Tacoma
c) Horizon Tacoma

710 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 34

20,965

Sturgeon Bay, Wis.
(1987)

710 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 34

20,965

Sturgeon Bay, Wis.
(1987)

710 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 34

20,965

Sturgeon Bay, Wis.
(1987)

910803

910307

building ever larger vessels was a nine-ship order placed with IsjikawajimaHarima Heavy Industries (IHI) of Japan in the early 1990s. The newcomers were constructed in two different company yards—four ships at Kure,
five at Chita—and were identified as the Champion class. Sea-Land explored a number of unusual possibilities before contracting with IHI for
this order, including constructing the midbody and bow in one country,
stern and propulsion machinery in another. Each of the nine new vessels
could accommodate 4,082 TEUs, measured 958 feet in length, and was
driven by a powerful Sulzer diesel engine. In terms of Sea-Land traditions,
what was surely the most novel feature of the newbuildings was not to be
found among their technical specifications. What was different about
these new container ships was the fact that once they were completed
and delivered to Sea-Land, they were registered in the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, not the United States. Table 6.6 provides information
about Sea-Land’s Champion class vessels.

Flags of Convenience
CSX and Sea-Land had decided to follow what was rapidly becoming a
near-universal trend among U.S. steamship operators, namely the placement of vessels under ‘‘flags of convenience’’ to generate savings in their
day-to-day operation. In addition to placing newly built Champion class
vessels under foreign registry, CSX also initiated a program of reflagging
vessels that had originally been registered in the United States to the open
registries of foreign countries as a further effort to reduce costs.
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table 6.6. Sea-Land Fleet: Champion Class of 1995
Flag

Name

Hull dimensions

GRT

Place built
(year)

Marshall Islands

Sea-Land Champion

958 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 43

49,985

Marshall Islands

Sea-Land Charger

958 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 43

49,985

Marshall Islands

Sea-Land Comet

959 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 43

49,985

Marshall Islands

Sea-Land Eagle

959 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 43

49,985

Marshall Islands

Sea-Land Intrepid
a) Sea-Land Intrepid
b) CSX Intrepid
Sea-Land Lightning

958 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 43

49,985

Chita, Japan
(1995)
Chita, Japan
(1997)
Chita, Japan
(1995)
Chita, Japan
(1997)
Kure, Japan
(1997)

958 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 43

49,985

958 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 43

49,985

Marshall Islands

Sea-Land Mercury
a) Sea-Land Mercury
b) CSX Mercury
Sea-Land Meteor

958 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 38

49,985

Marshall Islands

Sea-Land Racer

958 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 43

49,985

Marshall Islands
Marshall Islands

Kure, Japan
(1997)
Kure, Japan
(1995)
Chita, Japan
(1996)
Kure, Japan
(1996)

Once a vessel leaves U.S. registration, it no longer must be operated
by more costly U.S. seafarers, considerable regulatory burdens—and
therefore costs—are avoided, and certain tax benefits may also accrue.61
A Sea-Land liner fleet that had long consisted of none but U.S.-registered
tonnage soon included vessels that would only fly the Stars and Stripes
from their masts as a maritime courtesy when they were making a call at
a ‘‘foreign’’ U.S. port.
In June 1993, while the Champion class vessels were under design, CSX
petitioned the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) to reflag thirteen
older Sea-Land vessels under the registry of the Marshall Islands. Authorization for such a massive effort was delayed, and while CSX still had such
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a large scale reflagging program in mind, expedited approval was then
sought to reflag only five vessels, and in mid-February of 1995 MARAD
approved such an action. As a result, as table 6.7 shows, five Sea-Land
container ships were removed from U.S. registry and the name of the tiny
mid-Pacific municipality of Majuro, in the Marshall Islands, was painted
on their sterns as their home port.62
Other than the Champion class of newbuildings, this five-vessel transaction would prove to be Sea-Land’s principal effort at reflagging older
tonnage during the 1990s. Two additional vessels were transferred to
Marshall Islands registry in following years, while two of the original five
table 6.7. Sea-Land Fleet: Marshall Islands Reflagging of 1995
U.S. Off. No.

Name(s)

Built (Year)

2005 Registry

Notes

606065

Sea-Land Freedom

Marshall Islands

1

606066

Sea-Land Mariner

Marshall Islands

1

665223

Sea-Land Motivator
a) American
New Jersey
b) Elizabeth L.
c) Raleigh Bay
Sea-Land Pride
a) American
Kentucky
b) Mary Ann
c) Galveston Bay
Sea-Land Value
a) American
Maine
b) Kim D.

Nagasaki, Japan
(1980)
Tomano, Japan
(1980)
Okpo, South Korea
(1984)

U.S.A.

2

Okpo, South Korea
(1985)

U.S.A.

2

Okpo, South Korea
(1984)

Singapore

3

665784

665781

Notes
1. D-9 class vessel originally built by Sea-Land.
2. Atlantic class vessel, formerly owned by United States Lines, and rebuilt to smaller dimensions by
Sea-Land in an effort to improve speed and performance.
3. Atlantic class vessel, formerly owned by United States Lines.
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reflagged vessels were returned to U.S. registry at the same time.63 A SeaLand official estimated that by reflagging, the company stood to save between $2.5 and $3 million per vessel per year, since more costly U.S. crews
could be replaced by less expensive seafarers of various nationalities.
Although Sea-Land did not decide to use flags of convenience for its
international liner fleet until the 1990s, the company had long relied on
offshore registries for vessels that provided feeder services in and out of
major overseas terminals. Many of these vessels were not owned by SeaLand itself but provided feeder service under service contracts of various
sorts. In chapter 5 we learned of a Sea-Land affiliated company called
InterSea Operations Ltd., and the several feeder vessels it managed could
be regarded as Sea-Land tonnage. Indeed, in 1988, Sea-Land’s four-vessel
D-6 class of 1977—the company’s first diesel-powered container ships—
were reflagged Bahamian and transferred to InterSea for intra-European
trades. By the mid-1990s, though, the majority of vessels used in contract
feeder services were not owned by Sea-Land, although they were typically
identified with ‘‘Sea-Land’’ names. Table 6.8 identifies a sampling of such
tonnage.
The variety of names under which many of these vessels have been
known over relatively short periods of time is indicative of the fluid state
under which contract feeder services operate. The vessel identified as SeaLand Salvador, built in Hamburg in 1984, certainly stands out for the fact
that over the span of two decades, it has been identified under seventeen
different formal names.
The nine-vessel Champion class of 1995 was followed a few years later
by a newbuilding project that could well have resulted in the largest vessels ever to work for Sea-Land Service. Yet another corporate realignment
would take place between their ordering and their delivery, though, and
this meant that they would never sail with the Sea-Land fleet. Built in
South Korea by Hyundai Heavy Industries, the five vessels can each accommodate a massive 6,250 TEUs. (Ignoring again, for purposes of comparison, the difference between a thirty-five-foot container and a fortyfoot one, these vessels each have a carrying capacity that is twenty-eight
times greater than that of Gateway City, Sea-Land’s first cellular container
ship of 1957.)
The vessels are 998 feet long and have a beam of 132 feet—far too
wide to transit the Panama Canal and thus are the first, and only, postPanamax vessels to be ordered by Sea-Land. Each features a 10-cylinder
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table 6.8. Adjuncts to Sea-Land Fleet: Various Feeder Vessels
Flag

Name(s)

Dimensions
(GRT)

Place built
(Year)

Denmark

Sea-Land Costa Rica
a) Colleen Sif
c) Colleen Sif
d) OPDR Madeira
e) Colleen Sif
f) MSC Sebnem
Sea-Land Colombia
a) Maersk Bogota
c) Saudi Buraydah
d) Major
e) City of Istanbul
f) OPDR Gran Canaria
g) MSC Atlas
Sea-Land Argentina
b) MSC Provence
c) Coni Cartagena
d) CMA CGM Eagle
e) Coni Cartagena
Sea-Land Salvador
a) Jork Eagle
b) Dalsa
c) Wiking
d) Woermann Ulanga
e) Wiking
f) Kahira
g) City of Salerno
h) Karyatein
i) Wiking
j) Sieipner
k) May Tikai
m) Maersk Caracas
n) Christine Delmas
o) Cielo de Venezuela
p) Sea Pilot
q) Margret Knuppel

439 ⳯ 75 ⳯ 25
(8,908)

Frederikshavn,
Denmark
(1991)

490 ⳯ 74 ⳯ 27
(9,600)

Szczecin, Poland
(1992)

676 ⳯ 98 ⳯ 37
(25,713)

Okpo,
South Korea
(1997)

438 ⳯ 71 ⳯ 25
(8,639)

Hamburg,
West Germany
(1984)

Antigua & Barbuda

Germany

Antigua & Barbuda
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table 6.8. (Continued)
Flag

Name(s)

Dimensions
(GRT)

Place built
(Year)

Greece

Sea-Land Iberia
a) Chevalier Paul
b) Carmen Marna
c) Zim Livorno
Sea-Land Mexico
b) Stadt Berlin
c) Mekong Sapphire
d) Stadt Berlin

827 ⳯ 100 ⳯ 36
(35,530)

La Seyne, France
(1976)

480 ⳯ 75 ⳯ 27
(9,528)

Cuxhaven,
Germany
(1998)

Germany

B&W diesel built under license by Hyundai Heavy Industries that generates an output of 77,572 horsepower. Table 6.9 displays statistical information about the vessels.
Despite the heading of the preceding table, the five big vessels would
never formally join the Sea-Land roster. They are owned by Costamarine
Shipping, a Greek company—hence their Greek registry—and they are
bare-boat chartered on a long-term basis for operation.64 Except for reasons that will be explained in the next chapter, when the quintet entered
service in 2000 and 2001, the firm that had been founded by Malcom
table 6.9. Sea-Land Fleet: Newbuildings of 2000
Flag

Name

Hull dimensions

GRT

Place built (year)

Greece

Sealand Michigan

998 ⳯ 132 ⳯ 46

47,667

Greece

998 ⳯ 132 ⳯ 46

47,667

Greece

Sealand Virginia
b) Safmarine Himalaya
Sealand Washington

998 ⳯ 132 ⳯ 46

47,667

Greece

Sealand New York

998 ⳯ 132 ⳯ 46

47,667

Greece

Sealand Illinois

998 ⳯ 132 ⳯ 46

47,667

Ulsan, South Korea
(2000)
Ulsan, South Korea
(2000)
Ulsan, South Korea
(2000)
Ulsan, South Korea
(2000)
Ulsan, South Korea
(2000)
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McLean over four decades earlier had evolved into yet another new and
different corporate formality, and the Sea-Land house flag would never
fly from the masts of any of the five vessels.

Falling Waters, West Virginia
With all the shifting and reflagging and buying and selling of vessels
that occurred during Sea-Land’s CSX era, what may well be the most curious development of all is one that saw several deepwater Sea-Land container ships remaining under the U.S. flag, but showing their ‘‘home port,’’
for a short period of time, as the unincorporated village of Falling Waters,
West Virginia! Falling Waters is located on the Potomac River seventy or
so miles west by northwest of Washington, D.C., on the far side of the
Blue Ridge Mountains.
It is not at all uncommon for vessels to identify as their home port a
place they would never actually visit—and, in some cases, never could
visit. (Many U.S. ships on the Great Lakes that are far too large to transit
the Welland Canal and the Saint Lawrence Seaway show Wilmington,
Delaware, as their home port, for instance.) Falling Waters lacks so much
as a single traffic light and could well compete for the title of the most
curious home port ever assigned to any deepwater vessel.
The explanation for this anomaly can be found in a new single-story
brick building in Falling Waters that is adjacent to nearby Interstate Route
81. Thanks to the vigilance of West Virginia’s senior U.S. senator, Robert
Byrd, and his well-known penchant for ‘‘encouraging’’ federal agencies to
relocate various operations to the state he represents by the insertion of
compelling language in appropriations and authorization measures, the
building is the home of the Vessel Documentation Center of the United
States Coast Guard. Exactly how several vessels came to be listed with
Falling Waters, West Virginia, as their formal hailing port remains
shrouded in myth and mystery. Some kind of clerical error was likely
made, though, and no actual Sea-Land vessels ever had ‘‘Falling Waters,
WV’’ painted across their sterns. But when the Coast Guard released digital files of registered U.S. merchant vessels for 1998 and 1999, deepwater
vessels including Sea-Land Endurance and Sea-Land Express were listed
with their home port showing as Falling Waters. Formal publications such
as the definitive Lloyds’ Register of Shipping then dutifully went to press
and turned the inadvertent mistake into a permanent record that will
remain on library shelves—well, as close to forever as any printed volume
is likely to survive.
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Oddly enough, Falling Waters, West Virginia, is not far from a bona
fide maritime installation that was established to foster the shipment of
containers by sea. An hour’s drive south of Falling Waters is a facility
called the Virginia Inland Port. Here, close to the intersection of Interstate
Routes 81 and 66 and just outside Front Royal, Virginia, containers being
hauled along the highway can be dropped off and shifted to railroad cars
for forwarding to the ports of Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Newport News in
the tidewater area of the state, while inbound containers follow the reverse course. The state of Virginia established this ‘‘inland port’’ for two
reasons: to reduce traffic congestion on highways leading to the state’s
principal seaports, and to foster the use of Virginia seaports by making
the over-the-road haul for truckers shorter than it would be to Baltimore
or New York.

186 : : : box boats

A pair of container corner castings, stacked one atop the other and linked
together with a toggle-like device. Such simple but standardized equipment is at
the heart of the new style of cargo transport.

Double-stack railroad cars bring additional efficiency to containerized transport.

High in the Cascade Mountains along the bank of the Columbia River, a
Burlington Northern Santa Fe freight train forwards containers to eastern
markets from the ports of Seattle and Tacoma.

Above: The 1994-built container ship Feihe, operated by state-owned
China Overseas Shipping Company (COSCO), has a capacity of 4,315
TEUs. Containers are stacked thirteen across as the ship is unloaded at
the port of Boston. Below: Efficiency requires that refrigeration
equipment not protrude beyond the dimensions of a container. Eimskip
is a small Scandinavian company that specializes in service to Iceland.

A typical waterfront scene in the container era. A ship is waiting to be loaded
while inbound and outbound containers are stacked nearby. This is
St. Petersburg, Russia.

Above: APL Malaysia, built by Hyundai Heavy Industries in 2000 and
accommodating 4,843 TEUs, is maneuvered into the port of Southampton,
England, by a pair of tractor tugs. Below: Hapag-Lloyd’s Bremen Express, also
built by HHI in 2000 with a 4,890-TEU capacity, seen here leaving Seattle,
reveals the lines of a typical container ship: most containers are in cells
forward of the deck house, which is toward the stern but with room for some
additional containers aft.

When American New York made her first visit to New York Harbor in late July
1984, escorted by a flotilla of Moran tug boats, she was the largest container ship
of all time. (Duffy/Granard Associates)

Invitation issued jointly by
United States Lines
and Daewoo Shipbuilding
for the christening
ceremonies of the first four
Econships, American New
York, American New Jersey,
American Alabama, and
American Maine. (McLean
Foundation)

MOL Encore moves into Long Beach Harbor after a trans-Pacific crossing.
The panamax ship has a capacity of 4,578 TEUs and works for Japan’s
Mitsui-O.S.K. Line, a company that was formed in 1964 through the merger of
Mitsui Steamship and the Osaka Shogen Kaisha Line.

The first of the massive 1984 Econships of
the United States Lines, American New York,
is turned by Moran tugboats in lower
Newark Bay before docking at the Howland
Hook container terminal on Staten Island.
(Duffy/Granard Associates)

United States Lines acquired a fleet of cellular container ships and began making
inroads into the new style of transport. The 19,267 gross ton American Astronaut,
built in Chester, Pennsylvania, in 1969, leaves the port of San Francisco.

Like many of Sea-Land’s early container ships, Matson Navigation Company’s
Hawaiian Monarch was once a C-4 cargo ship. (Thompson Tully)

Above: Matson’s Hawaiian Citizen began life as the C-3 cargo ship Sea Wren
and was converted into a container ship in 1960. (Paul Tully). Below: Matson’s
Kauai, shown after conversion into a hatchcoverless container ship. (Paul Tully)

Lihue is currently a cellular container ship in the Matson fleet, but began life as
a LASH-type cargo vessel owned by Pacific Far East Line. (Roger J. Cudahy)

Originally a ro/ro vessel, Matsonia was later converted into an unusual hybrid.
Forward of the deck house are conventional container cells, but abaft is a garage
for transporting automobiles between Hawaii and the mainland. (Paul Tully)

With a forward deck house and machinery slightly abaft of midships, Matson’s
Mahimahi steams under the Golden Gate Bridge into San Francisco Harbor. The
general design recalls Sea-Land’s famous SL-7. (Paul Tully)

Like Lihue, Matson’s Ewa was built as a LASH-type ship by Pacific Far East Line.
Matson retains these vessels in a reserved status to handle unusual traffic
demands. (Paul Tully Collection)

Sisters in the mist—on opposite coasts. Two large sister ships of South Korea’s
Hanjin Shipping: Hanjin Osaka (above), making its way up the Savannah River,
and Hanjin Marseilles (below), in Seattle. Both ships were built in 1992 and are
registered as 51,000 gross tons.

Harbel Cutlass was built in 1980 and is an example of a smaller container ship
that is classified as “geared,” meaning that it carries its own equipment—
gear—for loading and unloading containers.

Saudi Hofuf is one of four sister ships built in 1983 for the state-owned National
Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia (NSCSA), which maintains a regular
trade between ports in the Middle East and the East Coast of the United States.

The stern gate of
Saudi Hofuf, which
can handle ro/ro
cargo.

Above: This medium-sized container ship entering the port of Savannah in
the fall of 2005 appears to be named Mont Ello; in fact, it is the Germanregistered Montebello, which somehow lost two letters at sea. Below: As a
ship’s name, CMA CGM Potomac may sound awkward. CMA + CGM is a
French holding company representing a merger of Compagnie Maritime
d’Affretement and Compagnie Generale Maritime, the latter a product of an
earlier merger that included Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, better
known as the French Line, of N or mandie fame.
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AFTER 1999
HORIZON, MAERSK-SEALAND,
AND BEYOND

In January 1999, the CSX Corporation issued a seemingly
routine announcement. It was splitting its Sea-Land subsidiary into three separate divisions. The international liner
business would be one unit, and a separate division would
be established to handle domestic container-ship services
where Jones Act provisions had to be observed, while terminal operations at home and abroad would be the province of yet a third new CSX unit.1 All three units would be
managed out of a headquarters in Charlotte, North Carolina—ironically, Malcom McLean’s home state—where CSX
had moved all Sea-Land management functions some years
earlier.
The announcement suggested to many observers that far
more than a merely internal reorganization was involved.
Speculation quickly spread through the railway, the container-ship, and the investment sectors that this management action would facilitate CSX’s divesting itself of its
international liner business entirely. Bloomberg News Service reported that the ‘‘move could make it easier for CSX
to sell its ocean-shipping business and concentrate on its
railroad,’’ while the Journal of Commerce claimed that the
possibility of CSX’s divesting itself of Sea-Land had been a
‘‘persistent rumor over the past few years.’’2
The rumor proved to be predictive as well. Before 1999
had run its course, CSX had indeed divested itself of SeaLand Service.

Moving the Hyphen
The obvious company to acquire Sea-Land’s international liner business and merge it into its own worldwide

operations was the steamship operator with which CSX had earlier developed a cooperative strategic alliance, the Maersk Line, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Denmark’s A. P. Moeller Group. After acquiring Sea-Land
from CSX in 1999, Moeller-Maersk combined its new property with its
own international container-ship subsidiary and called the operation
Maersk-Sealand. Five new vessels that Sea-Land had designed and ordered before the merger were delivered afterward and bore names such
as Sealand Michigan and Sealand Illinois, telling with no hyphen between
‘‘Sea’’ and ‘‘Land.’’ Maersk ordered three additional vessels from the same
shipyard and that were built to the same specifications. Like the earlier
five, the three were owned by Costamare and chartered to MaerskSealand, but they bore the names Maersk Kolkata, Maersk Kobe, and
Maersk Kalamata.
CSX chairman John W. Snow—a man who would later serve as Secretary of the Treasury during the administration of President George W.
Bush—felt the divesture would unlock more value at both CSX and SeaLand, and much was said about CSX’s being able to concentrate attention
and effort on its ‘‘core business’’—which is to say running the railroad—
now that Sea-Land and its deepwater container ships were no longer part
of the corporate picture.
As early as 1996, CSX made no secret of the fact that the Conrail acquisition was its first priority. ‘‘Because of the overriding importance of the
Conrail transaction,’’ the company’s annual report warned that year, ‘‘our
main public policy focus has been on rail issues.’’ Three years later, the
1999 report noted, ‘‘Selling Sea-Land’s international business was a hard
but necessary decision.’’3
Even earlier in 1995, when rumors began to surface that CSX was thinking about selling Sea-Land to Maersk after the two companies had established a strategic alliance, the same John Snow emphatically denied that
any such development was even possible. ‘‘Sea-Land is not for sale,’’ Snow
insisted.4 The following year Tommy Thomsen, the chief executive at
Maersk, issued a parallel denial. Despite such seemingly unambiguous
assertions, though, in the years after 1995 Snow began to hint broadly
that CSX was disappointed with Sea-Land’s earnings. Fourth-quarter income in 1998 fell 79 percent over the previous year, for instance, the
sharpest profit decline of any CSX unit. The corporation summed matters
up in its 1999 annual report: ‘‘Recent years have seen profit margins decline as a number of strong, well-capitalized competitors entered the business. Projected worldwide vessel overcapacity and substantial, ongoing
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capital requirements pointed to a worrisome outlook, and we made the
strategic decision to sell Sea-Land’s international business assets to Danish carrier Maersk Line.’’5
It took most of 1999 to iron out a number of regulatory details associated with the sale, and the formal date of Sea-Land’s transfer from CSX
to Maersk was December 10, 1999. Sea-Land Service, Inc., a company
whose emergence out of the Pan-Atlantic Steamship Company will forever
stand as a major accomplishment of Malcom P. McLean, failed to see the
dawn of the new millennium by a mere twenty-one days. The containership industry that Sea-Land sired, however, greeted the new century with
vigor and promise, and that stands as a permanent legacy of extraordinary proportion.

What Happened?
It is difficult to identify a clear and single reason why CSX divested
itself of Sea-Land—and, as important, why the oft-stated goal of creating
a seamless, intermodal transport system was apparently abandoned so
quickly. Certainly the financial and managerial pressures associated with
the Conrail acquisition are perfectly reasonable factors that pressured the
corporation to refocus its objectives and redirect its resources in ways that
were important.
Another issue, though, is that while CSX made some strategic capital
investments in its Sea-Land subsidiary during the years it was part of
the overall corporation, future years would demand far heavier levels of
commitment if Sea-Land were to remain competitive, and this was something CSX had no desire to undertake. Sea-Land was part of CSX for thirteen years, from 1986 through 1999, an era that saw the construction of
the nine-vessel Champion Class of newbuildings, plus the acquisition of
twenty-one vessels that formerly ran for United States Lines, including
the twelve Econships, and this was certainly not an insignificant level of
capital investment. But even greater levels would soon be required, as
the Sea-Land fleet continued to age and, as important, the worldwide
container-ship industry continued to build newer, larger, and more efficient vessels. This, simply enough, was not a prospect that CSX relished.
A telling and early glimpse into CSX thinking about Sea-Land might be
evident in an interview that a man by the name of Alex J. Mandl gave to
the Journal of Commerce in late 1988, a mere two years after CSX acquired
Sea-Land. It was Mandl who had headed up the management team at
CSX that recommended the acquisition of Sea-Land two years earlier, and
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in mid-1988 he was named chairman and CEO of the new CSX containership subsidiary. But to Mandl, it was clear that not only Sea-Land but also
the entire container-ship industry were beset by fundamental economic
problems. ‘‘The industry may never make an adequate return if everyone
continues reinvesting in new ships to drive costs down while simultaneously pushing rates down,’’ Mandl said.6 One is left to speculate if this
was a problem Mandl understood two years earlier in recommending the
acquisition of Sea-Land, or something that only became evident once CSX
was able to gain a more detailed inside look at container-ship operations
and finance.
A further comment from Mandl during the 1988 interview that likely
points toward Sea-Land’s eventual departure from CSX control involves
his reflection on global economics, and the emergence of both alliances
and other cooperative efforts among container-ship operators. Addressing
specifically Europe’s plan to abolish trade barriers among the twelve original members of the European Community, Mandl noted, ‘‘We have had
considerable discussion among the executive management of Sea-Land on
how we might protect ourselves during this transformation in Europe.’’7 In
closing, Mandl made this point: ‘‘A joint venture with a European company is the kind of option that makes a lot of sense.’’8
The alliance era was rather well established in 1988 when Mandl was
interviewed by the Journal of Commerce, and passage of the Shipping Act
of 1984 had paved the way for U.S.-based companies to participate in such
joint ventures. In any event, it would appear that as early as 1988 corporate thinking at CSX had begun to embrace the notion that the future
of Sea-Land involved emphasizing linkages with overseas container-ship
operators. Whether this also meant that CSX was willing to compromise
its original goal of making Sea-Land part of a seamless and intermodal
transportation system is, perhaps, a moot question. The fact remains,
though, that Mandl’s observations in 1988—reservations about Sea-Land’s
earning capabilities together with a future that would involve forming a
partnership with an overseas container-ship operator—is the way matters,
in fact, turned out.9 American Commercial Lines, the family of inland towboat and barge operations that was to have given CSX an even more pronounced intermodal dimension, was also spun off and converted into an
independent and freestanding corporation in mid-1998.10
As noted in the previous chapter, CSX would also decide to register
Sea-Land newbuildings in the Marshall Islands, and would both seek and
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secure government approval to reflag some of the company’s older tonnage in the open registry of that same mid-Pacific jurisdiction. While such
steps were significant with respect to the overall health and condition of
the U.S.-flag merchant marine, they were more efforts to achieve operational economies than indicators of any fundamental change in thinking
about retaining Sea-Land as part of CSX.
Perhaps the only satisfactory conclusion one can draw is that it was all
more inevitable than anything else. Not that CSX acquired Sea-Land in
1986 knowing it would sell the company to a Danish conglomerate before
century’s end, but rather that the continuation of disturbing economic
trends in the container-ship industry—‘‘overcapacity’’ is a handy code
word for a variety of more complicated matters—coupled with global opportunities associated with the European Union and the possibility of strategic alliances, made the continuation of Sea-Land as a CSX subsidiary,
much less as a U.S.-flag carrier, a less attractive option than it had appeared to be a mere twelve years earlier.

Horizon Lines and Jones Act Services
Only Sea-Land’s international liner business was transferred to Maersk
in 1999, though. CSX established a separate unit to retain and operate the
company’s domestic container-ship services, and these were not conveyed
to Maersk. Eighteen Sea-Land vessels that were certified for Jones Act
services (that is to say, they were registered in the United States and had
been built there as well) remained under CSX ownership and continued
to operate under the flag of a new unit called CSX Lines. (Vessels that
remained in the fleet of CSX Lines lost the ‘‘Sea-Land’’ preface in their
names and were renamed with designations such as CSX Tacoma and CSX
Navigator.) CSX also retained what had previously been Sea-Land’s domestic terminal operations, and while most overseas terminals were part
of the package conveyed to Maersk, CSX retained control of an especially
valuable terminal property in Hong Kong.11
Even these arrangements would be subject to further adjustment,
though, and CSX soon decided to divest itself of CSX Lines and convert
the unit into an independent and stand-alone company. Thus in February
2003—three years and some months after the international liner operation had been conveyed to Maersk-Moeller—a $300 million transaction
was executed between CSX and the Carlyle Group, of Washington, D.C.,
and a new company was created that was called Horizon Lines.12 Corporate headquarters of the new steamship company remained in Charlotte,
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North Carolina, and the sixteen-vessel fleet that had been working for
CSX Lines was transferred to Horizon and continued to offer containership services between the U.S. mainland and Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Alaska,
and Guam. Also included in the transaction was a quantity of containers
said to be in excess of 21,000.
Horizon adopted a vessel livery and color scheme of its own, and the
stack markings that appear on its vessels incorporate the old Sea-Land
logo in a modified, but recognizable, fashion. Horizon even affixed a
winged emblem to the bow of its ships that prominently displays the initials ‘‘HL’’—wonderfully reminiscent of the letters ‘‘PA’’ that once adorned
ships of the Pan-Atlantic Steamship Company, and the ‘‘SL’’ that was long
carried on the bow of Sea-Land vessels. The new company’s sixteen container ships were also renamed and are currently known as Horizon Challenger, Horizon Discovery, and so forth.
A quick review of the roster of ships that Horizon acquired from CSX
might suggest that the new company wound up with a rather elderly fleet,
while newer and more modern Sea-Land tonnage was all conveyed to
A. P. Moeller. There is truth to this observation, but it was not a case of
Moeller getting first pick among Sea-Land vessels with Horizon forced
to accept only the leftovers. Because it would be operating solely Jones
Act–protected trades, Horizon necessarily required vessels that were built
in the United States. Other than the three D-6 class container ships that
were turned out in Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin, in 1987 for Alaskan service,
Sea-Land had never built a Jones Act–eligible vessel of its own from the
keel up. All the converted T-2s and C-4s had long been retired by the time
Horizon came on the scene, of course, so the bulk of the vessels that
were available to constitute a Jones Act–eligible startup fleet were steampowered tonnage that Sea-Land had acquired from other companies, principally United States Lines. At the time Horizon Lines was created in 2002,
the oldest units in the new company’s fleet had been in service for the
rather remarkable span of thirty-four years.
The Carlyle Group would not retain Horizon Lines among its assets for
any extended term, however. In July 2004, in a $650 million transaction,
Horizon was sold by Carlyle and was taken over by another investment
syndicate, Castle Harlan Partners of New York, an organization whose
portfolio included a variety of enterprises with a total value in excess of
$7 billion. Among the holdings of Castle Harlan are restaurant chains,
plus firms that manufacture such products as lawn furniture and garden
tools.13 Then in early 2005, under Castle Harlan, it was announced that
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Horizon Lines had submitted a filing to the Securities and Exchange Commission that would lead to an initial public offering of stock valued at up
to $287.5 million.14
No matter the investors behind Horizon Lines, though, the company
operates the largest fleet of Jones Act–compliant vessels currently under
the U.S. flag, and Horizon is the only provider of liner service in all Jones
Act–protected trades—Puerto Rico, Alaska, Hawaii and Guam. (An oddity
of the Jones Act is the fact that steamship service to and from the U.S.
Virgin Islands is not covered by its restrictions—nor was service to the
Philippines in years past when these islands were a U.S. possession.) Table
7.1 identifies the vessels that were conveyed to Horizon and constituted
its fleet in 2005.
It will be interesting to see how Horizon’s future plays itself out. The
company sees itself as the true heir of the early Sea-Land tradition of
innovation and customer service, and by 2003, Horizon’s president, Chuck
Raymond—a Sea-Land veteran, incidentally—proudly boasted that in excess of 70 percent of the company’s bookings were being made by shippers
via the company’s website on the Internet. ‘‘We haven’t heard anybody in
the liner business talking numbers above small double digits, say 15 or 17
percent,’’ Raymond pointed out.15
Raymond also acknowledged that the age of the Horizon fleet was a
shortcoming that would have to be addressed—and perhaps soon—and
in response to a reporter’s question, he would not rule out the possibility
of the company’s entering selected international markets in the future.
When Sea-Land was conveyed to A. P. Moeller in 1999, the element that
was retained by CSX to operate Jones Act trade was precluded from expanding into any markets that were competitive with Maersk-Sealand for
five years, a restriction that expired in 2004.16

Maersk-Sealand
As for A.P Moeller and Maersk, it is difficult to say how much of today’s
Maersk-Sealand represents a continuation of the old Sea-Land culture and
traditions, and how much is simply an expanded version of a company
whose roots are Danish through and through. In fact, in 1999, the same
year it acquired Sea-Land, Maersk also bought out another international
container-ship company, Safmarine of South Africa, a corporation that,
while owned by Maersk, continues to be operated as a stand-alone
entity.17
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table 7.1. Horizon Fleet: 2005
Off.
No.

Name

Hull
dimensions

GRT

Place built
(year)

Notes

910306

Horizon
Anchorage
a) Sea-Land
Anchorage
b)CSX
Anchorage
Horizon
Challenger
a) American
Legion
b) Sea-Land
Legion
c) Sea-Land
Challenger
d) CSX
Challenger
Horizon
Consumer
a) Australia
Bear
b) Sea-Land
Consumer
c) CSX
Consumer
Horizon
Crusader
a) American
Lark
b) Sea-Land
Lark
c) Sea-Land
Crusader
d) CSX
Crusader

710 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 34

20,965

Sturgeon Bay,
Wis.
(1987)

1

700 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 32

18,775

Chester, Pa.
(1968)

2

720 ⳯ 95 ⳯ 34

23,763

Baltimore, Md.
(1973)

700 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 32

18,888

Chester, Pa.
(1969)

515155

552818

518444
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table 7.1. (Continued)
Off.
No.

Name

Hull
dimensions

GRT

Place built
(year)

Notes

516464

Horizon
Discovery
a) American
Liberty
b) Sea-Land
Liberty
c) Sea-Land
Discovery
d) CSX
Discovery
Horizon
Enterprise
a) Austral
Puritan
b) American
Puritan
c) Sea-Land
Enterprise
d) CSX
Enterprise
Horizon
Expedition
a) Austral
Ensign
b) American
Marketer
c) Sea-Land
Expedition
d) CSX
Expedition
Horizon Hawaii
a) Austral
Endurance

700 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 32

18,895

Chester, Pa.
(1968)

2

813 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 34

28,095

Baltimore, Md.
(1980)

3

668 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 37

21,687

Pascagoula, Miss.
(1973)

3

668 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 35

21,687

Pascagoula, Miss.
(1973)

3

623168

544303

547288
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table 7.1. (Continued)
Off.
No.

Name

910803

541868

612085

552819

b) American
Merchant
c) Sea-Land
Hawaii
d) CSX Hawaii
Horizon Kodiak
a) Sea-Land
Kodiak
b) CSX Kodiak
Horizon
Navigator
a) Austral
Envoy
b) American
Envoy
c) Sea-Land
Navigator
d) CSX
Navigator
Horizon Pacific
a) Austral
Pioneer
b) American
Pioneeer
c) Sea-Land
Pacific
d) CSX Pacific
Horizon
Producer
a) New Zealand
Bear
b) Sea-Land
Producer
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Hull
dimensions

GRT

Place built
(year)

Notes

710 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 34

20,965

Sturgeon Bay, Wis.
(1987)

1

812 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 37

47,667

Pascagoula, Miss.
(1972)

3

813 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 33

28,095

Baltimore, Md.
(1979)

720 ⳯ 95 ⳯ 34

23,763

Baltimore, Md.
(1974)

table 7.1. (Continued)
Off.
No.

625873

624457

910307

552706

Name

c) CSX
Producer
Horizon
Reliance
a) Edward
Rutledge
b) Sea-Land
Reliance
c) CSX Reliance
Horizon Spirit
a) Benjamin
Harrison
b) Sea-Land
Spirit
c) CSX Spirit
Horizon
Tacoma
a) Sea-Land
Tacoma
b) CSX Tacoma
Horizon Trader
a) Austral
Entente
b) American
Entente
c) Sea-Land
Trader
d) CSX Trader

Hull
dimensions

GRT

Place built
(year)

893 ⳯ 100 ⳯ 41

34,077

Avondale, La.
(1980)

893 ⳯ 100 ⳯ 41

34,077

Avondale, La.
(1980)

4

710 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 34

20,965

Sturgeon Bay, Wis.
(1987)

1

813 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 37

28,087

Pascagoula, Miss.
(1973)

3

Notes
1. Designed and built by Sea-Land; only diesel-powered vessels currently on Horizon roster.
2. Designed and built by United States Lines.
3. Designed and built by Farrell Lines.
4. Designed and built by Waterman Steamship.
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Notes

Maersk-Sealand is certainly a major participant in a steadily expanding
container-ship industry, the only question being whether Maersk-Sealand
is the industry leader in all important categories of container-ship performance, or merely most of them. Table 7.2 displays the world’s ten
largest container fleets—measured in active trailer equivalent unit (TEU)
capacity as well as tonnage on order—at the time A. P. Moeller acquired
Sea-Land in 1999.
In late 1999, newly created Maersk-Sealand deployed almost as many
TEU slots as the industry’s second- and third-place carriers combined,
while the new tonnage it then had on order, all by itself, could be considered the tenth largest container-ship fleet in the world. More whimsically,
were Maersk-Sealand required to achieve its 1999 carrying capacity solely
with vessels similar to Pan-Atlantic’s Gateway City of 1957, the world’s
largest container line would have to own and operate a fleet of 2,409
converted C-2 cargo ships.
Maersk-Moeller is so vast a maritime operation that when it decides to
build a new container ship—or two, or six, or twelve—it rarely has need
to shop among the world’s shipyards to find construction capacity. Maersk
is able to build tonnage at its very own shipyard, the Odense Steel Shipyard in Lindo, Denmark. For that matter, the maritime operations of the
table 7.2. Major World Container-Ship Fleets: 1999
Steamship company
(including subsidiaries)

TEUs
in service

TEUs
on order

Projected
TEUs

Maersk-Sealand
Evergreen Marine
P&O Nedlloyd
Mediterranean Shipping Co.
(MSC)
Hanjin Shipping Co.
APL Ltd.
China Ocean Shipping Co.
(COSCO)
NYK Line
Mitsui OSK Lines (MOL)
Zim Israel Navigation Co.

544,558
311,951
268,625
225,636

128,340
65,450
83,952
8,200

672,896
377,401
352,577
233,836

217,804
199,881
189,016

40,600
15,160
57,500

258,404
215,041
246,566

156,821
146,026
144,741

0
16,500
0

156,821
162,526
144,751
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A. P. Moeller Group are considerably more extensive than the subsidiary
known as Maersk-Sealand. A steamship company called, simply, the
Maersk Line is a separate entity, and in the year 2005 its fleet included
the modest total of 172 deepwater merchant vessels, seventy-eight of
which were fully cellular container ships. The Maersk-Sealand fleet, on
the other hand, consists of ‘‘merely’’ forty-six vessels, thirty-seven of which
are hulls that were formerly owned by Sea-land Service.18 Interestingly, in
2005, nineteen of these thirty-seven vessels remain registered in the
United States, thus producing this anomaly: a firm based in Copenhagen,
Denmark, operates more U.S.-flag container ships than any domestic
steamship company, including Horizon Lines.
The reason for this curious situation is not that Maersk-Sealand plans
to operate vessels in any services covered by the Jones Act. In fact the
U.S.-flag vessels in the Maersk-Sealand fleet were all built in overseas
shipyards and are not qualified for Jones Act trade.
Backtracking to 1999, Maersk-Sealand was required to continue the
U.S. enrollment of fifteen ex–Sea-Land vessels that are part of a government initiative known as the Maritime Security Program (MSP). The MSP
is a federal program that was established in 1996 and signed into law by
President Clinton to replace, after a fashion, the operating differential
subsidy program that was created in 1936 and phased out during the
Reagan administration.
The purpose of the MSP is to ensure that both ships and crews are
available for any sea-lift needs of the U.S. Department of Defense. Each
enrolled vessel earns a fixed-fee annual payment for its owner irrespective
of any calls the government may make for the use of the ship. In addition,
owners are compensated at standard commercial rates should a vessel
actually be required for defense-related work.
Unlike operating-differential subsidies, the MSP places no restrictions
on what trades an enrolled vessel may ordinarily work, and the program
is administered by the Maritime Administration (MARAD), an arm of the
U.S. Department of Transportation. (In 2004, the Bush administration advanced a legislative proposal to shift management of the MSP from
MARAD to the Department of Defense, but as of this writing in early 2006,
no congressional action had been taken on the proposal.)
During 1999, when the sale of Sea-Land to A.P. Moeller was under
discussion, MARAD insisted that Sea-Land vessels that had previously
been enrolled in the MSP—by Sea-Land—must remain so as part of its
agreement to the overall transaction. Because vessels enrolled in the MSP
after 1999: horizon, maersk-seland, and beyond : : : 199

must be owned by U.S. interests, remain under the active management of
U.S. firms, and be crewed by U.S. seafarers, a rather unusual structure
was established for the fifteen Sea-Land vessels that were to remain in the
MSP.
Although seemingly conveyed to Danish interests, the fifteen vessels
were made subject to mortgage instruments held by domestic banks, a
step that is considered adequate to establish formal U.S. ownership. Next,
the vessels were managed, for Maersk-Sealand, by a newly created firm
that was called United States Ship Management, Inc. (USSMI). This company provides qualified U.S. seafarers to operate the ships, thus fulfilling
the statutory requirement that MSP vessels be operated by U.S. crews and
be under the control of entities composed of U.S. citizens. Finally, USSMI
time-charters the vessels, along with their crews, to Maersk-Sealand, and
their day-to-day operation is at the direction of that company as part of
its ordinary international container-ship services. Table 7.3 identifies the
fifteen Sea-Land vessels whose enrollment in the MSP survived the conveyance of the Sea-Land fleet to Moeller-Maersk in 1999.
After 1999, Maersk-Sealand would substitute newer tonnage from the
Champion class of 1995 for some of the vessels originally enrolled in the
MSP. Ironically enough, when they were built, Champion-class vessels
were enrolled in the open registry of the Marshall Islands as a way of
avoiding more costly wage rates associated with U.S. seafarers. Before
joining the MSP, of course, such vessels had to be reflagged under the
stars and stripes.
As for the kind of services MSP vessels may be called upon to provide,
in 2000 Maersk-Sealand was awarded a five-year charter from the U.S.
Navy’s MSC to transport containers of ammunition from the United States
to various overseas locations. The containerships OOCL Innovation and
OOCL Inspiration—both registered in the MSP—were assigned to this important service, vessels that were earlier owned by Sea-Land but decorated in the livery of Hong Kong–based Orient Overseas Container Line,
a company with which Sea-Land had established a cooperative working
agreement. (Since they would no longer be operating in conjunction with
OOCL, the two were renamed Sealand Oregon and Sealand Commitment,
respectively.)
Curiously enough, A. P. Moeller was no stranger to the MSP when it
acquired Sea-Land in 1999. At the time the MSP program was created
three years earlier in 1996—and when vessels began to be enrolled in
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table 7.3. Maersk-Sealand Fleet: Ex–Sea-Land Vessels Enrolled in the MSP, 1999
Off.
No.

Name

MSP
agreement
number

Place built
(year)

Notes

665782

Sealand Achiever
a) American Alabama
b) Leyla A.
c) Galveston Bay
d) Sea-Land Achiever
Sealand Florida
a) American New York
b) Catherine K.
c) Nedlloyd Holland
Newark Bay
a) American Utah
b) Irene D.
c) Utah
e) LTC John U.D. Page
Sealand Oregon
a) American Nebraska
b) Susan C.
c) Nebraska
d) Nedlloyd Hudson
e) OOCL Innovation
Sealand Commitment
a) American California
b) Marguerete
c) CGM Ile de France
d) OOCL Inspiration
e) Sea-Land Commitment
Sea-Land Atlantic
a) American Oklahoma
b) Karen H.
Sea-Land Defender

MA/MSP 29

Okpo,
South Korea
(1984)

1

MA/MSP 30

Okpo,
South Korea
(1984)

1

MA/MSP 31

Okpo,
South Korea
(1985)

1

MA/MSP 32

Okpo,
South Korea
(1984)

1

MA/MSP 33

Okpo,
South Korea
(1985)

1

MA/MSP 34

Okpo,
South Korea
(1985)
Tomano,
Japan
(1980)

1

665222

665789

665785

665788

665786

604246

MA/MSP 35
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table 7.3. (Continued)
Off.
No.

Name

MSP
agreement
number

Place built
(year)

Notes

606062

Sea-Land Endurance

MA/MSP 36

2

604248

Sea-Land Explorer

MA/MSP 37

606064

Sea-Land Innovator

MA/MSP 38

665783

MA/MSP 39

604245

Sea-Land Integrity
a) American Virginia
b) Jacqueline J.
c) Virginia
Sea-Land Liberator

Ulsan,
South Korea
(1980)
Nagasaki,
Japan
(1980)
Ulsan,
South Korea
(1980)
Okpo,
South Korea
(1985)

2

604245

Sea-Land Patriot

MA/MSP 41

665790

Sea-Land Performance
a) American Washington
b) Ruth W.
Sea-Land Quality
a) American Illinois
b) Patricia M.

MA/MSP 42

Nagasaki,
Japan
(1980)
Kobe, Japan
(1980)
Okpo,
South Korea
(1985)
Okpo,
South Korea
(1985)

665787

MA/MSP 40

MA/MSP 43

Notes
1. Sea-Land Atlantic class vessel; originally built by United States Lines.
2. Sea-Land D-9 class vessel; later rebuilt as D-9J class.
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2

2

1

2
1

1

1997—Maersk sensed an opportunity and quickly established a U.S. subsidiary, Maersk Line, Ltd., of Norfolk, Virginia, and arranged to have four
1,325-TEU containerships reflagged in the United States and enrolled in
the MSP. Table 7.4 identifies these four vessels—U.S.-flag container ships
operated by Maersk that were never part of the Sea-Land operation.
As was the case with ex–Sea-Land vessels enrolled in the MSP, Maersk
has shifted and reflagged its MSP vessels over the years. In 2005, Maersk
Tennessee was flying the flag of Afghanistan, for example, and Maersk
Texas was Liberian-registered, while other company tonnage had been
reflagged in the United States.
More recently, Maersk-Sealand petitioned MARAD to allow the vessels
under the control of U.S. Ship Management to be shifted to its own Norfolkbased U.S. subsidiary, Maersk Line, MARAD agreement was forthcoming
and in early 2005, the fifteen MSP vessels previously managed by U.S.
Ship Management were shifted to Maersk Line.

Maersk on the Move
In 2005, A. P. Moeller-Maersk unveiled a breathtaking corporate strategy that would further strengthen its position in the container-ship industry. The Copenhagen-based company planned to acquire, in its entirety,
P&O Nedlloyd, merge its operations into Maersk-Sealand, and create a
container-ship colossus that would be twice as large as the industry’s
second-largest container-ship company. Preliminary approval of the merger
came from the European Union in July 2005. The new company would
table 7.4. Maersk Fleet: Vessels Enrolled in the MSP, 1999
Off.
No.

Current name

Former name

GRT

Dimensions

Built
(Year)

1052356

Maersk California

Caroline Maersk

20,800

620 ⳯ 91 ⳯ 33

1052357

Maersk Colorado

Clifford Maersk

17,000

526 ⳯ 91 ⳯ 33

1051612

Maersk Tennessee

Thomas Maersk

18,900

572 ⳯ 91 ⳯ 33

1051102

Maersk Texas

Tinglev Maersk

18,900

572 ⳯ 91 ⳯ 33

Denmark
(1994)
Denmark
(1992)
Japan
(1994)
Japan
(1994)
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have to forgo serving certain trades, one of many details worked out by
late 2005, and the newly merged entity chose to identify itself as the
Maersk Line. Sea-Land Services ceased to exist as an independent maritime company in 1999. By 2006, even its vestigial identity in the hyphenated form Maersk-Sealand had disappeared from the seven seas.
At longer range, it is difficult to imagine that the acquisition of P&O
Nedlloyd by Maersk would not trigger additional mergers in the industry,
including, possibly, combinations involving European-based companies
with onetime rivals based in the Far East. An active and vigorous industry
is like that, though. It just keeps on changing.

Malcom McLean: The Final Curtain
The individual who has often been called the father of containerization
refused to regard the 1986 liquidation of United States Lines as the end
of his involvement with the industry. Malcom McLean—with little formal
education beyond grammar school—had a wonderful catholicity of interests. During the same petroleum crisis that laid his magnificent SL-7 container ships low in the mid-1970s, McLean was investigating the possibility
of harvesting millions of tons of peat from his North Carolina farm and
promoting such fuel as an alternative source of energy. He was active in
diverse industries—from a major life insurance company to a mechanized
pig farm, from prefabricated houses to electron microscopes. And always,
of course, after taking a gold mechanical pencil out of his jacket pocket
and performing extended calculations on the back of whatever envelope
happened to be handy.
Malcom McLean received many honors. In 1999, the International Maritime Hall of Fame designated him its ‘‘Man of the Century’’—a century,
it should be noted, that saw such maritime developments as the Liberty
ship, atomic-powered warships, and the superliner United States. On the
occasion of its fortieth anniversary in 1994, the editors of American
Heritage magazine identified McLean as the first of ten people who had
orchestrated major changes in American life over the past four decades—
but whom few people had ever heard of.19 Malcom McLean received many
additional honors—including an award from President Dwight Eisenhower in 1959 and recognition from President Bill Clinton in 1996.
What has to be a most remarkable finale to a magnificent career,
though, is the fact that in 1991, at the age of seventy-seven, Malcom
McLean founded yet another container-carrying shipping company, a firm
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that he called Trailer Bridge. (According to the New York Stock Exchange,
Trailer Bridge was the fifth publicly traded company McLean established.)
Unlike the seagoing vessels of Sea-Land Service or United States Lines,
Trailer Bridge uses tug-and-barge technology, and it has restricted itself
to a single, though lucrative, market—round-trip service between Jacksonville, Florida, and Puerto Rico. Trailer Bridge operates seagoing barges
with containers stacked three high, and its barges are powered by contract
tugboats. What is unique about Trailer Bridge, though, is the fact that its
vessels are configured to handle fifty-three-foot containers, the largest
trailer currently authorized to operate in all fifty states.20
Malcom McLean passed away in his home in upper Manhattan on Friday, May 25, 2001, at the age of eighty-seven.21 It was forty-five years and
twenty-nine days since a converted T-2 tanker bearing the unlikely name
Ideal X sailed away from nearby Port Newark on a memorable voyage to
Houston, Texas.
On May 30, 2001, Malcom McLean’s family and friends gathered at the
Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church in New York for a memorial service.
The eulogy was delivered by Charles L. Cushing—the longtime friend and
business associate who, two decades before, had designed what were then
the largest container ships of all time, the famous Econships that sailed
for United States Lines.
‘‘Malcom’s secret weapon was his uncanny ability to select and surround himself with very talented and capable people,’’ Cushing told the
congregation. McLean ‘‘revolutionized and sped up the entire transportation chain and reduced its cost.’’ The result, Cushing said, was ‘‘a steady
and identifiable increase in the standard of living in the developing countries and elsewhere throughout the world.’’22
One is only left to wonder how differently things might have turned
out if during Thanksgiving week of 1937, gangs of longshoremen in northern New Jersey who were loading cargo aboard American Export Line’s
Examelia had worked a little faster, shown a little more dispatch, hoisted
several bales of cotton aboard the ship a little quicker—and allowed a
truck driver to return home to North Carolina a little sooner than he actually did.
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The shape and size of the current world container-ship fleet
incorporates dimensions that few could possibly have predicted—or even imagined—on a rainy Thursday afternoon
in April 1956 when Ideal X set sail for Houston from Port
Newark with fifty-eight trailer-truck bodies secured to its
jury-rigged spar deck. Previous chapters have outlined how
the Pan-Atlantic Steamship Company evolved into SeaLand Service, and Sea-Land eventually became part of
Maersk-Sealand. To gain additional perspective on the development of the container-ship industry, past and present,
let us explore briefly how three other and rather different
fleets of container ships have assumed their current proportions—American President Lines, Evergreen Marine, and
Matson Navigation. Two were originally U.S.-flag companies, although only one remains so today, while the third is
based in Taiwan and represents the emergence of Far Eastern interests in the contemporary container-ship industry.

APL and NOL
A Singapore-based steamship company known as the
Neptune Orient Line (NOL) may not be a familiar name to
North American maritime enthusiasts. Organized in 1968
just as containerization was beginning to revolutionize
cargo transport at sea, NOL can boast of no lengthy heritage from the days of break-bulk cargo ships, and certainly
no era when the company operated luxury passenger ships
across the oceans of the world. What NOL does bring to the
table, though, is the fact that an October 1997 transaction
involving NOL would foreshadow Sea-Land’s acquisition by
Maersk-Moeller two years later in 1999. In 1997 NOL laid

out $825 million and acquired one of the more famous U.S.-flag container
ship companies of that era, American President Lines (APL). Unlike A. P.
Moeller’s merging of Sea-Land into a company that was called MaerskSealand and bore little resemblance to the Sea-Land of old, NOL has retained APL as the operating ‘‘brand’’ for its container ships, and the traditional APL name and logo remain visible on the contemporary scene.
APL continues to own and operate a number of U.S.-flag container
ships under the provisions of the Maritime Security Program (MSP)—a
venture in which Maersk-Sealand also participates, as was discussed in
the previous chapter.1 But while APL has its operating headquarters in
Oakland, California, the contemporary APL is a wholly owned subsidiary
of a Singapore-based parent company and is a very different entity from
the American President Lines of yesteryear.
American President Lines dates to the mid-nineteenth century, when
William H. Aspinwall was the successful bidder on a government contract
to deliver mail between the west coast of Panama and the new Oregon
Territory. Aspinwall’s company was called the Pacific Mail Line, and its
success was assured when gold was discovered in California in 1848. Pacific Mail was later acquired by the Southern Pacific Railroad, and after
that by the Grace Line.
A second constituent element of APL was a transpacific steamship company called the Dollar Line that was established in 1900. Its easily recognized stack marking was a large dollar sign, and the company played an
important role as trade between the United States and China grew in
importance during the early years of the twentieth century. By the end of
World War II, Pacific Mail and Dollar had been merged and the combined
entity was called American President Line, a premier U.S. flag steamship
company operating both passenger and cargo tonnage between the West
Coast and the Far East.2
APL recognized the benefits that containerization would bring to its
cargo operations rather early in the game. The company had experimented with various styles of onboard containers even before the 1956
inaugural voyage of Pan-Atlantic’s Ideal X, although the first APL vessels
that were rigged to carry true containers, as the term would come to be
understood, were President Lincoln and President Tyler, launched in 1961
as combination container ships and break-bulk freighters and identified,
by APL, as Searacer-class vessels. The two vessels remained in the APL
fleet until 1979, when they were retired. During the remainder of the
1960s and on into the 1970s, additional company vessels were adapted to
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carry containers, in addition to break-bulk cargo, while other units in the
APL fleet were converted into fully cellular container ships.
Unlike Sea-Land and its penchant for acquiring wartime vessels such
as T-2 tankers and C-4 troopships for reworking into container ships, APL
preferred to use newer cargo tonnage as the ‘‘raw material’’ for its conversion projects. For example, a C-4 that was built by Ingalls Shipbuilding in
Pascagoula, Mississippi, in 1967 as the twenty-three-knot break-bulk cargo
ship President Van Buren was sent to Todd’s Seattle yard in 1972, lengthened from 574 feet to 663, and emerged the following year, with no
change of name, as a container ship capable of transporting 1,094 trailer
equivalent units (TEUs). The lengthened President Van Buren merited redesignation, under MARAD notation, as a C-6 cargo ship, and similar conversion projects were undertaken on four other C-4s—President Fillmore,
President Grant, President Taft, and President McKinley. In fact, these vessels, which APL identified as its Seamaster class, had been designed and
built from the outset to facilitate later conversion into container ships.3
(Because APL traditionally memorialized past presidents of the United
States in christening its vessels, the company’s pool of potential vessel
names was limited. Consequently, many names have been repeated on
multiple vessels, even within the relatively recent era of container-ship
operations. One must therefore exercise a measure of caution in referring,
for example, to ‘‘the container ship President Tyler,’’ since APL operated
two different container carriers—not to mention two earlier break-bulk
cargo ships—that bore this name.)
Four additional C-4s built in the 1960s for the American Mail Line, a
company that APL later acquired, were also lengthened in the early 1970s
and converted into container ships, each with a capacity of 1,100 or so
TEUs. APL named them President Roosevelt, President Truman, President
Eisenhower, and President Kennedy. They would soon be followed by APL’s
first fully containerized newbuildings, a quartet of vessels the company
called the Pacesetter Class.
The Pacesetters, designed by the George C. Sharp Company of New
York, were built to the same general specifications as four Farrell Line
container ships of the same era. In fact, APL and Farrell were able to
solicit bids for these new vessels jointly, and all eight were built in Pascagoula, Mississippi, by Ingalls Shipbuilding.4 APL’s first Pacesetter was President Jefferson, and it was soon joined by President Madison, President
Pierce, and President Johnson. (The fourth Pacesetter was named after
President Andrew Johnson, not LBJ.)
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Each Pacesetter could maintain twenty-three knots and carry 1,570
TEUs, while propulsion was generated by a Westinghouse steam turbine
engine. Pacesetter-class vessels were 668 feet long and equipped with
bow thrusters to assist in close-quarters maneuvering.
The four Farrell Line container ships, also built in Pascagoula and near
sister ships of APL’s Pacesetter class, later worked for Sea-Land after earlier being acquired by United States Lines when that company took over
Farrell, and eventually the ex–Farrell Line vessels wound up on the roster
of Horizon Lines. The first of the four, Austral Envoy, reportedly set a
transpacific speed record when it steamed over a 7,928-mile course from
the western end of the Panama Canal to Sydney, Australia, in thirteen
days and seven hours at an average speed of 24.85 knots.5 (Sea-Land’s
SL-7s posted multiple transpacific crossings at far faster speeds. Austral
Envoy’s record applies only to a specific route, not to any and all transpacific crossings.)
APL experienced some wrenching corporate realignments during the
1970s, and suffered a series of business reversals as well. In September
1976, the Seamaster-class container ship President Grant went aground off
the port of Keelung, Taiwan, and was eventually declared a total loss,
while decreasing market share prompted the company’s principal stakeholder, then a San Francisco–based energy company known as Natomas,
to think about reducing its investment in the troubled steamship line.6
Various overtures to bring Pacific Far East Line (PFEL) under the APL
wing were unsuccessful, but in the mid-1970s, the tide began to turn. APL
discontinued all passenger operations in 1973, recognizing that its future
involved none but containerized operations, and in 1977 APL eliminated
steamship service to and from the East Coast, substituting dedicated landbridge railroad service as a better way for containers from the Far East to
reach eastern destinations.7 Freight revenues rose by an impressive 73
percent between 1975 and 1977, and a net income of $18 million was
posted in 1977, against a $10 million loss in 1973. Rather than reducing its
investment in APL, Natomas increased its stake instead and by 1980, APL
was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the energy company.
The next expansion of APL’s container fleet was more a matter of seizing an opportunity than developing a careful long-term strategy. PFEL
entered receivership in August 1978, and its fleet was liquidated. The company had acquired four new LASH-type vessels in the early 1970s—vessels
that carry cargo in ‘‘containers,’’ except rather than highway trailers detached from their running gear, LASH containers are large barges that are
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lifted onto the ship by an onboard hoisting mechanism at the vessel’s
stern. (As discussed in previous chapters, Sea-Land acquired two LASHtype vessels from Waterman Steamship in 1990 and converted them into
cellular container ships.)
In 1979, APL acquired three of PFEL’s four LASH vessels and converted
them into cellular container ships, each with a capacity of 1,856 TEUs,
while PFEL’s fourth LASH-type vessel wound up on the roster of United
States Lines as American Trader. APL later had additional work done on
its ex-PFEL vessels and their container-carrying capacity was increased to
1,984 TEUs. In any event, PFEL’s Golden Bear became APL’s President
Grant, Thomas E. Cuffe became President Hoover, and Japan Bear became
President Tyler.
In the early 1980s, APL was again in the market for new container
tonnage, although serious consideration had earlier been given to expanding the company’s container-carrying capacity by increasing the size
of older vessels. In any event, the company not only decided to acquire
new vessels, it also took a bold step—at least a bold step for a U.S.-flag
company—and specified diesel propulsion for the newbuildings. While
APL did not face the same devastating impact from the Arab oil embargo
of 1973 as did Sea-Land with its high-speed SL-7s, steam turbine engines
still consumed large quantities of fuel, and the switch to diesel was amply
warranted. The three vessels ordered in 1982—President Lincoln, President
Washington, and President Monroe—were built at Avondale Shipyards in
Louisiana; each had a carrying capacity of 2,590 TEUs, and they were the
largest container ships built in the United States up until that time, as
well as the first diesel-powered container ships to be turned out by any
American yard. Each vessel was powered by a powerful twelve-cylinder
Sulzer model 12RND90M diesel engine that had been built in the United
States by Allis-Chalmers, under license from Sulzer. The new vessels included a forward deckhouse, and because APL continued to identify its
vessels with notation that was originated by the Maritime Commission
back in the 1930s, the three new container ships were designated C-9–
class cargo vessels. Interestingly, APL chose to handle design aspects of
this fleet expansion with in-house personnel and did not retain an outside
naval architect.8
The next fleet additions foretold APL’s future in a way that few—and
perhaps even few at APL—would have been able to appreciate at the
time. The company acquired a pair of four-year-old container ships from
Neptune Orient Lines of Singapore in 1984, reflagged the vessels in the
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United States, and added them to the APL fleet as President F.D. Roosevelt
and President Eisenhower. The two had been built in Japan, and with a
capacity of 2,600 TEUs each, they would reign—although only briefly—as
the largest container ships in the APL fleet. (They beat out the three Avondale-built C-9s in this regard by the modest margin of ten TEUs.)
APL’s next fleet expansion would follow Sea-Land’s lead and avoid the
higher costs associated with U.S. yards by contracting with an overseas
shipbuilder. As discussed in previous chapters, companies could register
vessels built in foreign yards in the United States, although such tonnage
was ineligible for Jones Act–protected services and for any form of subsidy from the Maritime Administration (MARAD). Since the major trades
APL worked were international, the company felt comfortable forgoing
Jones Act eligibility. In addition, because MARAD subsidies were on the
verge of being eliminated anyway, there was little risk in APL’s acquiring
newbuildings from overseas shipyards.
In October 1986, the company contracted with Howaldtswerke–
Deutsche Werft of Kiel, West Germany, to design and oversee the construction of five new container ships. Howaldtswerke-Deutsche was given
overall design responsibility and would turn out the first vessel, while
construction of the remaining four would be split between Howaldtswerke-Deutsche and Bremer Vulkan of Bremen, West Germany. In keeping with past APL practice, MARAD notation was again used to identify
the newcomers and they were designated the C-10 class.
The five new German-built container ships that were delivered to APL
in 1988 were big—61,926 gross registered tons, 899 feet long, with a carrying capacity of 4,340 TEUs. They exceeded the Econships Malcom
McLean had put into service for United States Lines a year or so earlier in
the way of gross tonnage—61,926 versus 57,075—but they were fifty-one
feet shorter and could carry 274 fewer TEUs than the Daewoo dozen. The
most telling statistical difference between McLean’s Econships and the
new APL vessels, though, involved their beam. The Econships measured
106 feet from side to side and were able to transit the Panama Canal. The
new APL vessels measured 129.5 feet across and were the first container
ships to be placed in service by any operator that were too big to use the
famous waterway.
APL believed that its big new container ships would work transpacific
trades exclusively, thus obviating any need to respect the Panama Canal’s
110-foot width limitation. The first of the five, President Polk, was delivered by Bremer Vulkan in 1988 and drew considerable comment in the
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trade press because of its status as the world’s first post-Panamax container ship. The four sister ships of President Polk included President
Adams, also built by Bremer Vulkan, and President Jackson, President Kennedy, and President Truman, all turned out by Howaldtswerke–Deutsche
Werft.9
The big new ships were part of a major $900 million capital upgrade
at APL that included improved terminals as well as new rail cars for the
company’s steadily expanding land-bridge services that carried containers
inland from West Coast ports aboard double-stack rail cars. But no sooner
had the company substantially expanded its carrying capacity—and incurred new levels of debt in the process—than a worldwide economic
downturn, coupled with the same transpacific rate wars that drove Malcom McLean’s United States Lines into bankruptcy, left APL with excess
capacity aboard its ships, and too little revenue to make a profit. To make
matters a bit worse, the big new C-10s drew too much water to dock in
the port of Oakland except at flood tide, and APL soon became tangled in
disputes with environmental interests over plans to deepen the channel
approach into Oakland.10
The five new ships would turn out to be the last APL newbuildings to
sail under the stars and stripes. In the years after they were delivered—
and more important, in the years after the United States Congress passed
the Shipping Act of 1984—APL joined three other important containership operators in the Global Alliance and the nature of its operations
would be forever altered. (See chapter 6 for additional treatment of the
alliance era.)
APL’s partners in the Global Alliance were Mitsui-OSK, Nedlloyd, and
Orient Overseas Container Lines, and while the four members only committed seventy-seven vessels to the alliance from their combined fleets of
187 ships in 1995, the Global Alliance was second only to the 175-vessel
alliance that had been earlier created by Maersk and Sea-Land Service.
APL, however, would not remain a permanent member of the Global
Alliance. Major mergers and acquisitions were pending in the global container-ship industry, and these would substantially affect alliance affiliations. In 1996, after five years of behind-the-scenes negotiations, Great
Britain’s P&O Container Lines, a member of the Grand Alliance, announced that it was merging with Holland’s Nedlloyd, of the Global Alliance. The merged entity, which called itself P&O Nedlloyd, chose to ally
itself with the Grand Alliance.11
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Less than a year later, the container-ship industry learned of yet another corporate realignment. APL, then ranked number fifteen among
world container-ship operators as measured by TEUs transported, was
steadily failing to meet its own revenue forecasts and the company was
regarded as a likely acquisition target. What came as a surprise on April
13, 1997, though, was the announcement that Singapore-based Neptune
Orient Lines would lay out $825 million and acquire APL. The two companies had no history of cooperative activities—APL’s purchase of two NOL
container ships in 1984 was a one-time transaction—and despite some
efforts to call the pending deal a merger, in fact it was an out-and-out
acquisition, and APL became a wholly owned subsidiary of NOL. APL
shareholders were thoroughly pleased with the NOL offer, though, and a
robust 99 percent of them voted their approval, thus creating the world’s
fifth-largest container-ship fleet.12
Interestingly, NOL recognized the value of the APL brand, and chose
to identify its newly combined container-ship fleet solely under the APL
name, while noncontainer ship operations of the corporation would be
identified as NOL activities. Although there was some consideration that
APLⳭNOL might choose to operate outside the structure of a formal alliance, in fact the new company cast its lot with the Global Alliance.
NOL divested itself of an important part of APL in 1999, when it sold
off the latter’s double-stack train operation to a New York investment
house. Care was taken to ensure that the former subsidiary would still
dispatch APL containers eastward from West Coast ports, and most in the
industry believed the transaction was undertaken not because APL was
turning its back on double-stack services, but to allow NOL to liquidate
some of the debt it had incurred in its earlier acquisition of APL.
APL’s acquisition by a Singapore-based company was not the first time
a major U.S. steamship company had been taken over by a non-U.S. entity. CP Ships, a Canada-based company that was long known as Canadian
Pacific, began to expand from a niche-market provider into a major force
in the worldwide container-ship industry in the early 1990s; part of
its expansion involved the acquisition of Lykes Brothers Steamship Company, a venerable U.S.-flag operator. Something that NOLⳭAPL was able
to orchestrate, but that CP ShipsⳭLykes was not, was the continued participation of APL vessels in MARAD’s Maritime Security Program (MSP).
The structure that was established for such participation would later
be used by Maersk-Sealand. Namely, formal ownership of a number of
U.S.-flag vessels is transferred to a lending institution—in this case, the
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Wilmington Trust Company, of Delaware—and the vessels are then bareboat-chartered to American Ship Management, a U.S. corporation. American Ship Management then arranges for the hiring of U.S. crews, serves
as the vehicle for the receipt of MSP subsidies, and time-charters the fully
crewed vessels to APL, who, in turn, operates them as part of its overall
container-ship system. Because APL wanted to include four relatively new
vessels in the MSP that had been registered in the Marshall Islands since
they were delivered, APL arranged for their reflagging in the United
States, a prerequisite, of course, of MSP participation.13 Table 8.1 identifies
the nine U.S.-flag container ships that APL enrolled in the MSP in 1997.
As expected, following APL’s acquisition by NOL, the company’s newbuildings would no longer be registered under the U.S. flag, and some
older tonnage was also reflagged to take advantage of lower overseas
wage rates. Recognizing, though, that there would be something singularly incongruent in having a foreign-built and Singapore-registered container ship named after a former president of the Untied States, APL
adopted a new style of vessel nomenclature and the company’s recent
fleet additions bear names such as APL Japan and APL Singapore.
Because an NOL-controlled APL had no interest in operating any Jones
Act–protected services—nor, for that matter, would it be legally qualified
to do so—the company disposed of those vessels in its fleet that were
eligible to work Jones Act trades. There were only six of these on the
roster by 1996, and all were conveyed to the Matson Navigation Company
for additional years of service under that company’s house flag.14
The story of APL during the age of containerization provides a modest
counterpoint to Sea-Land—many similarities, but also a few unique characteristics. Unlike Sea-Land, APL enjoys a heritage that extends back into
the final decades of the nineteenth century, but the company followed a
path that parallels that of Sea-Land in the final decades of the twentieth
century and the company is today a wholly owned subsidiary of an overseas steamship company.

Evergreen Marine
Although it will not soon challenge the Maersk Line for title of the
world’s largest operator of container ships, Taiwan-based Evergreen Marine Corporation provides an interesting glimpse into the growing phenomenon of Asian steamship companies serving major international
trades.
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table 8.1. APL Fleet: Vessels Enrolled in the Maritime Security Program (MSP), 1997
Off. No.

Name

Hull dimensions

GRT

Place built
(year)

TEUs

936100

President Adams

902 ⳯ 130 ⳯ 41

61,926

4,340

934737

President Jackson

902 ⳯ 130 ⳯ 41

61,926

931613

President Kennedy

902 ⳯ 130 ⳯ 41

61,926

931612

President Polk

902 ⳯ 130 ⳯ 41

61,926

928562

President Truman

899 ⳯ 130 ⳯ 41

61,926

1061420

APL Singapore

906 ⳯ 132 ⳯ 46

64,502

1061429

APL Korea

906 ⳯ 132 ⳯ 46

64,502

1061430

APL Thailand

842 ⳯ 131 ⳯ 46

64,502

1061426

APL Philippines

906 ⳯ 132 ⳯ 46

64,502

Kiel,
West Germany
(1988)
Kiel,
West Germany
(1988)
Kiel,
West Germany
(1988)
Bremen,
West Germany
(1988)
Bremen,
West Germany
(1988)
Okpo,
South Korea
(1995)
Okpo,
South Korea
(1995)
Kiel,
West Germany
(1995)
Okpo,
South Korea
(1996)

Like Neptune Orient Line, Evergreen is no old-line steamship company.
It was established in 1968 by a Taiwanese man named Yung-Fa Chang,
and the company adopted as its initial mission the operation of conventional break-bulk cargo ships between the Far East and the Middle East.
In fact, Chang and Evergreen begin operations with a single break-bulk
cargo ship that was acquired secondhand in Japan.15
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4,340

4,340

4,340

4,340

4,832

4,832

4,832

4,832

The same mid-1970s energy crisis that spelled the demise of Sea-Land’s
SL-7s prompted Evergreen to move in a new direction. The company
began to acquire a fleet of fully cellular container ships, vessels it used to
help transport the growing volume of manufactured products flowing out
of Asia and destined for both Europe and North America.
Initially, Evergreen’s container fleet consisted of a handful of combination cargo/container vessels, plus a few bulk carriers that had been converted into containers ships. Then, in 1975, Evergreen took delivery of its
first fully cellular newbuildings, a four-vessel fleet that established a number of important themes for the company.
Evergreen’s first true container ships were built in Nagasaki, Japan, by
the Hayashikana Ship Building and Engine Company and were each
driven by an eight-cylinder Mitsui diesel engine. Not large by later standards—or even by 1975 standards, for that matter—each of the four vessels accommodated 600 TEUs and was 528 feet long. A mere two years
after joining the fleet, though, Evergreen increased their length by fortyfour feet and expanded their carrying capacity to 878 TEUs.
The four vessels were called Ever Spring, Ever Summit, Ever Superb,
and Ever Shine, and identified by Evergreen as the company’s S class. As
the fleet expanded, all Evergreen vessels would feature names that began
with the word ‘‘Ever,’’ and all members of a given class would have ‘‘second names’’ that started with the same letter—the letter of that particular
class. Evergreen also developed a four-character alpha designation for
each of its vessels. Ever Diamond, for instance, is identified as DMND, Ever
Useful is USFL, Ever Reward is REWD, and so forth.
Between 1977 and 1979, Evergreen added seven V-class container ships
to its growing fleet, 613 feet long with a carrying capacity of 1,214 TEUs.
The V class was quickly followed by the five-vessel L class, 665 feet long
and 1,810 TEUs.
In addition to getting bigger, the Evergreen fleet was also getting more
efficient. When the S class was lengthened, for example, various onboard
functions were automated, and each lengthened S-class vessel was able
to operate with an onboard crew of twenty-four, while it required a larger
crew of thirty to work the same vessels when they were considerably
smaller. The V-class vessels were designed to operate with a crew of
twenty-two, while the slightly larger L-class vessels were able to go to sea
with a complement of only sixteen. Stated differently, for each crew member aboard an S-class container ship when the ships were delivered, the
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vessel could accommodate 20 TEUs. Five years later with the new L class,
that number had increased to 113 TEUs.16
At this point, Evergreen was still a newcomer in the container-ship
industry, but its rate of growth was something that caught the attention
of maritime people the world over. Evergreen remained a privately held
company—its founder and chairman, Yung-Fa Chang, owned something
like a 95-percent interest in the firm—and with a clever combination of
financing from Japan and support from the government on Taiwan, Evergreen was able ‘‘to find a cargo base for its operations and a funding
source for its investments,’’ in the words of container-ship authority, R. F.
Gilbney, who also believes that the company’s success can be traced to its
making use of ‘‘all the entrepreneurial advantages that come from shopping abroad and registering under flags of convenience.’’17
The container trade in which Evergreen was making its mark was primarily defined by a growing tide of exports out of Far Eastern ports—
primarily to Europe, but also to North America. By the spring of 1982,
Evergreen had deployed twenty-two container ships on three major liner
routes, as displayed in table 8.2.
Two years later in 1984, Evergreen took a step whose boldness shook
the container-ship industry to its roots. With its fleet continuing to grow
table 8.2. Evergreen Marine: May 1982
No. of
vessels
deployed

Frequency
of service

Two-way TEUs
(annually)

Round
trip

Trade

7

Every 10 days

112,984

70 days

8

Every 10 days

84,446

70 days

7

Every 10 days

61,631

70 days

Various cities in the Far East
to the channel ports of
Europe via the Suez Canal
and return
Transpacific from Osaka to
both the West Coast and
East Coast of the United
States and return
Various cities in the Far East
to Mediterranean points
via the Suez Canal, and
return
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and the newest of its container ships now able to carry in excess of 2,000
TEUs, the company inaugurated a weekly service that sailed around the
world—in both directions. Evergreen inaugurated this new service at the
same time another container-ship operator was preparing to do much the
same thing. Malcom McLean, then the principal factotum of the United
States Lines, had ordered twelve super-large containerships from South
Korea’s Daewoo Shipyard and beginning in 1986 deployed his new vessels
on a parallel globe-circling route. McLean, though, would dispatch his
vessels in a single direction, west-to-east. Evergreen was inaugurating
around-the-world service at the same weekly frequency as McLean, but
its ships sailed in both directions.
Evergreen’s plan was greeted with a fair degree of skepticism within
the industry. Peter Goldman, the editor of the newsletter Seatrade Weekly,
wrote that because of Evergreen’s rapid expansion, ‘‘a rate war is inevitable.’’18 And while a rate war would indeed soon erupt, it was a conflict
that saw Evergreen emerge victorious, with Malcom McLean’s United
States Lines being the defeated party.
In September 1984, two Evergreen container ships kicked off the new
service. One vessel set sail from Hong Kong and steamed eastbound
across the Pacific, the other left Tokyo and headed westward.19 Twentyfour ships were deployed on the new service venture, twelve eastbound
and twelve westbound, and the schedules the company proudly announced called for each of the twenty-four vessels to sail around the
world in eighty days.
It is reasonable to speculate that Evergreen’s publicists took a little
poetic license in describing the company’s new service. Dispatching vessels on an around-the-world itinerary every seven days, and protecting
the schedules with a dozen ships, works out to voyages that are eightyfour days in duration, not eighty. An Evergreen container ship would have
brought Phineas Fogg home four days late.
We saw in chapter 6 how the strategy behind McLean’s ‘‘Daewoo
dozen’’ proved to be seriously flawed. Evergreen’s initiative, on the contrary, was far from flawed, and it was the Taiwan company’s ability to
undercut McLean with respect to price, while offering substantially faster
delivery times than United States Lines’ slow-speed Econships that, as
much as any other single factor, propelled Evergreen into a position at or
close to the top of the container-ship pyramid, a role it would not surrender for many years.20
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A notable characteristic of Evergreen’s fleet maintenance policies has
been the continual replacement of older vessels with newer tonnage,
often long before a vessel even remotely approaches obsolescence. An
Evergreen subsidiary, Uniglory Marine, often takes title to older tonnage
from the parent company, although Evergreen has been known to order
newbuildings for Uniglory service, as well. In 2005, the newest members
of the Evergreen fleet were seven post-Panamax vessels—the U class—
built in the late 1990s and early 2000s that can each accommodate 5,652
TEUs—and maintain twenty-five knots.
In recent years, Evergreen has moved into slot-charter arrangements
with other operators as a means of improving its own efficiency, but the
company has been notably reluctant to enter the kind of strategic alliances
that so many other operators have embraced, and it has eschewed conference participation, as well. Whether Evergreen remains wedded to such
an independent policy in future years remains to be seen. This much is
clear, though: A company that was over a full decade away from being
formed on the day Ideal X inaugurated container-ship service in 1956 is
today one of the dominant forces in the new industry that developed in
the way of that famous T-2 tanker.

Matson Navigation Company
In chapter 4, we learned a little about container services that the Matson Navigation Company inaugurated on the Pacific in the years immediately after Malcom McLean pioneered the idea of transporting cargo in
‘‘sea-land’’ containers. Matson would remain a specialized operation concentrating on service between the West Coast and Hawaii, with modest
ventures into more distant markets, and so not for its impact on the
worldwide industry, but rather because Matson remains an active container-ship operator under the U.S. flag in the twenty-first century, its
history is worthy of some attention.21
Matson neither owns nor operates any of the post-Panamax container
ships that are currently being used by the major liner operators. In the
year 2005, its fleet consisted of thirteen seagoing vessels, with two more
under construction; most were fully cellular container ships, while two
were configured to transport both containers and roll-on, roll-off (ro/ro)
traffic, a capability that is useful on the Hawaiian run since thousands of
automobiles must be transported between the mainland and the island
state each year.
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Like many other U.S. flag steamship companies, Matson’s first venture
involved carrying containers as deck cargo aboard otherwise conventional
break-bulk freighters. When a C-3 cargo ship that worked for the company
as Hawaiian Merchant steamed under the Golden Gate Bridge on August
31, 1958, bound for Honolulu, it marked Matson’s entry into the new
trade. Five additional C-3s were also configured to transport containers
as deck cargo, and this was all part of the company’s first phase of containerization. While Hawaiian Merchant carried a mere twenty containers on
its initial voyage in August 1958, fully laden the company’s C-3s could
transport as many as seventy-five containers as deck cargo.22
A second phase would soon follow, though. Demand for container service quickly outpaced the capacity of the six C-3s and so the company
advertised for bids to convert another C-3 into a fully cellular vessel. The
successful bid was submitted by the Portland, Oregon, yard of the Willamette Iron and Steel Company; Gibbs and Cox, of New York, handled
design work; and on April 29, 1960, Hawaiian Citizen emerged as Matson’s first true container ship. The vessel could accommodate 408 of the
distinctive twenty-four-foot containers that Matson had decided were just
the right size for the distinctive characteristics of its service. (The narrow
streets of Hawaii, plus the fact that the state of California permitted two
twenty-four-foot containers to be hauled in tandem by a single tractor,
were among the factors Matson considered.) Hawaiian Citizen lacked onboard gantry cranes, but otherwise much resembled such early converted
freighters as Pan-Atlantic’s Gateway City and her five sister ships.
What Matson’s first cellular container ship quickly demonstrated was
that the speed at which its containers could be loaded and unloaded
meant that Hawaiian Citizen could manage twenty-two round trips between California and Honolulu over a year’s time, while a conventional
C-3 in break-bulk service—with or without containers as deck cargo—was
hard-pressed to manage twelve.
Paralleling a policy that Malcom McLean followed at Sea-Land, Matson
quickly turned to surplus C-4 troop transports for conversion into container ships. Two C-4s were reconfigured later in 1960 and emerged as
Hawaiian and Californian. (The two had been lengthened in 1954 by a
previous owner for use as ore carriers.) In 1965 and 1966, two more
C-4s—built in 1944 by Sun Shipbuilding in Chester, Pennsylvania, as Marine Dragon and Marine Devil—were sent to Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding, lengthened by 110 feet, and emerged as Hawaiian Monarch and
Hawaiian Queen, respectively. These two were later renamed Maunawili
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and Maunalei when Matson adopted its current policy of using native
Hawaiian terminology to identify its vessels—or at least most of its vessels.
Because there was an imbalance in the Hawaiian trade, Matson configured many of its new container ships to perform double duty. Outbound from the mainland, vessels could accommodate containers as well
as a number of standard automobiles. On return trips, container capacity
was reduced so certain of the container-carrying cells could be used to
carry a bulk commodity—namely, raw sugar, an important product of the
island state.
Matson followed these acquisitions with the company’s first containercarrying newbuildings. One of these, Hawaiian Princess, was turned out
in 1966 by Bethlehem Steel at Beaumont, Texas, and was a smaller vessel—338 feet long with a capacity of 212 twenty-four-foot containers—
designed for interisland feeder service. Because of its modest size,
Hawaiian Princess was a good candidate for diesel propulsion during an
era when most deepwater tonnage built in the United States continued to
be powered by steam turbine engines; the engine room of Hawaiian Princess was thus equipped with two twelve-cylinder Caterpillar diesels.
The other vessel acquired during this era, Islander, was also intended
for feeder service. Built at Bethlehem’s Beaumont facility in 1963, Islander
was an unpowered barge—but featured a shiplike hull and was designed
for later conversion into a powered vessel. Matson hoped to reach agreement with various maritime labor unions to operate a self-propelled Islander with a reduced crew. Such approval was not forthcoming, though,
and Islander remained as built.
In the early 1970s, believing that ro/ro traffic would continue to be an
important market in the specialized Hawaiian trade, Matson acquired,
under the terms of a lease, a pair of newbuildings that had been under
construction at Sun Shipbuilding in Chester, Pennsylvania. The new vessels were given names that had graced classic company passenger liners
of earlier years, Lurline and Matsonia. Unlike typical Matson-designed
container tonnage that featured a forward deckhouse, the deckhouse on
each of the newcomers was positioned well toward the stern. Acquiring
such ro/ro vessels proved to be something of a miscalculation on Matson’s
part, though. Container-carriers, not ro/ros, were what Matson truly
needed, and Matsonia and Lurline were removed from service and laid up
less than a decade after entering service.
The next additions to the Matson container fleet were turned out in
1970 by Bethlehem Steel’s Sparrows Point yard in Baltimore. Originally
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called Hawaiian Enterprise and Hawaiian Progress, the two could each
accommodate 988 twenty-four-foot containers, and in a concession to
what had by then become an industry-wide standard, 94 forty-footers.
Following Matson practice—and unlike most Sea-Land vessels—the newcomers featured a deckhouse and pilothouse forward, with a second
house at the stern. The pair were renamed Manukai and Manulani in later
years and were still in service in the early years of the twenty-first century.
Another unfortunate instance of corporate misdirection would soon
follow. A pair of container ships that Matson had ordered from West Germany’s Bremer Vulkan yard, vessels that were launched in the early 1970s
as H. P. Baldwin and S. T. Alexander, were intended for a West Coast–Far
East service where the Jones Act requirement of domestic construction
did not apply. (Matson has long been a subsidiary of Alexander and Baldwin, Inc., and the two new vessels memorialized that company’s founders.) Matson had inaugurated container service to the Far East in 1967
with a pair of C-3 cargo vessels, Pacific Trader and Pacific Banker, that
were converted into container ships in Japan at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in 1967 and could each accommodate 464 twenty-four-foot containers. Once delivered, the two newbuildings from West Germany were to
have replaced the converted C-3s, allowing the smaller vessels to be deployed in feeder service.
While the vessels were under construction, though, Matson management decided that such an expansion into Far East trades was unwise,
preferring to concentrate corporate energies—and resources—on steamship service between Hawaii and the mainland, as well as various nonmaritime investments throughout the island state. The two new vessels
were sold to Sea-Land before seeing any Matson service, a transaction
that was discussed in chapter 6.
Two companion vessels that were built to the same general specifications as the Bremer Vulkan pair and were intended to upgrade Matson’s
Hawaiian service were under construction at Bethlehem Steel’s Baltimore
yard at roughly the same time. Fully compliant with provisions of the
Jones Act, these vessels were to have been called Hawaiian Enterprise and
Hawaiian Progress, and would have been identified as the company’s
O-71H class. The corporate cutbacks that resulted in the company’s abandoning its recently established Far East service also impacted plans for
upgrading the West Coast–Hawaii trade, though, and Matson sold these
two vessels to the Pacific Far East Line (PFEL) before their construction
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was completed. PFEL quickly fell upon difficult days, though, and, as we
learned earlier, these two vessels also wound up on the Sea-Land roster.
So, while Matson began construction of four newbuildings in the late
1960s, not one of these vessels ever entered company service as retrenchment and cost control became the rule. The cutbacks of the early 1970s
proved effective, though, and as business conditions improved later in the
decade, Matson was again ready to expand its container-carrying fleet.
Kauai was turned out by the Chester, Pennsylvania, yard of Sun Shipbuilding in 1980, while a sister ship, Maui, had been built in Bath, Maine,
at the famous Bath Iron Works two years earlier.23 Each could accommodate 1,118 twenty-four-foot containers and 94 forty-footers; the two are
generally identified as the company’s 071 class. The two newcomers were
each powered by a pair of Delaval steam turbine engines geared to a
single shaft—evidence, once more, of the fact that the U.S. merchant marine took much longer to adopt diesel technology for deepwater vessels
than did their European and Asian equivalents.
Matson’s next effort to upgrade its fleet and replace some of its older
container-carrying tonnage was to take Matsonia and Lurline out of layup,
send the two ships to the Sun Shipbuilding yard, and lengthen each hull
by 126.5 feet. This produced combination vessels that could each carry
1,175 twenty-four-foot containers, as well as 422 automobiles. The rebuilt
Matsonia and Lurline also include the capability of carrying 3,200 tons of
bulk molasses, another important Hawaiian product.24
In their new configuration, the two vessels exhibit a rather unusual
profile. Container-carrying cells are located between bow and deckhouse.
(The addition was spliced into the hull immediately forward of the deckhouse.) To the rear of the deckhouse are a few additional rows of container cells, while at the very stern is a multistory ‘‘parking garage’’ where
automobiles are loaded and unloaded in ro/ro fashion and transported
on multiple decks that are exposed to the elements on all four sides.
Other than the interisland feeder vessel Hawaiian Princess of 1967, it
was not until 1992 that the company took delivery of its first deepwater
container ship that was not steam-propelled. The R. J. Pfeiffer is a modestsized container ship with a capacity of 2,019 TEUs—larger than earlier
Matson tonnage, surely, but modest by world standards of the early 1990s.
Matson gave consideration to building a much larger vessel, since its trade
did not require transit of the Panama Canal. But the factor that proved
decisive in selecting the vessel’s size was avoiding the need—and the expense—of expanding terminal facilities in both California and Hawaii to
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accommodate a post-Panamax hull. (By the 1990s, incidentally, Matson
had largely converted its operation to more standard-size forty-foot containers.) R. J. Pfeiffer also deviated from earlier Matson design and featured a deckhouse close to the stern, not immediate abaft the bow.
National Steel and Ship Building, of San Diego, would build the new vessel, with technical and engineering support provided by Odense Steel
Shipyard of Odense, Denmark—the shipbuilding subsidiary of MoellerMaersk.
The new vessel’s price tag, though, is stark testimony to the extraordinary cost differential that contracting with a United States shipyard entails. When Matson took title to the vessel from National Steel and Ship
Building, it paid the yard $129.4 million for its new vessel. It would be
over a decade before container ship costs at non-U.S. shipyards broke
through the $100 million mark, and for such a price, a buyer could expect
to receive a post-Panamax vessel with a container capacity in the range
of 8,500 TEUs—four times the size of Matson’s R. J. Pfeiffer. In 2005, a
German company ordered a number of 1,800-TEU container ships from a
South Korean yard that are not all that different in size from the Pfeiffer.
Their cost was approximately $50 million per vessel.25
R. J. Pfeiffer was also a brief departure from Matson’s preference for
using native Hawaiian terminology as vessel names. Roland J. Pfeiffer
was a longtime chairman of Matson Navigation, and a man who enjoyed
an effective working relationship with Malcom McLean during the early
days of the industry. Pfeiffer was also largely responsible for adopting as
Matson policy the use of native terminology for company vessels—a policy from which R. J. Pfeiffer, the vessel, stands as a one-time exception.
As mentioned earlier in treating American President Lines (APL), several units in Matson’s current fleet were acquired when APL became a
subsidiary of Neptune Orient in 1997, redeployed its services, and had no
further need for vessels that were Jones Act–compliant. Matson thus took
title to six former APL hulls, including the three Avondale-built container
ships that were APL’s first diesels, as well as the three converted LASHtype vessels that APL had acquired from PFEL and converted into cellular
container ships. The sales contract between the two companies included
a provision that gave APL eastbound slot-charter rights aboard five of the
vessels from such mid-Pacific points as Guam and Saipan for a period
of ten years, and they continued to be shown—under their new Matson
names—among the vessels APL advertised as constituting its fleet. Matson
signaled its intention to reconfigure its operation when the agreement
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with APL expired in early 2006, resuming transpacific routes between the
United States and Asia.
As the twentieth century was drawing to a close, the Matson fleet was
again in need of upgrading as older vessels were nearing the end of their
useful lives. How and where Matson acquired its newest tonnage is itself
an interesting story.
With considerable public assistance, Norway’s Kvaerner had established a subsidiary on the grounds of the former U.S. Navy Yard in Philadelphia, and hull number 001 of Kvaerner Philadelphia Shipyard was a
2,890-TEU container ship that was delivered to Matson in 2003 and called
Manuki, memorializing an older Matson vessel. A sister ship, Maunawili,
was delivered in 2004—Kvaerner Philadelphia’s hull number 002—and
the pair, while more costly than comparable tonnage built in Europe or
Asia, was each slightly less expensive, and considerably larger, than R. J.
Pfeiffer a decade earlier. The Pfeiffer bore a price tag of $129.4 million in
1992; the Kvaerner duo each cost Matson $110 million.26
Kvaerner Philadelphia took a gamble and decided to turn out two additional Jones Act–compliant container ships following the delivery of Manuki and Maunawili in the hope that a buyer for the two vessels would
soon materialize. After some speculation that the pair would be acquired
by Horizon Lines, they, too, were conveyed to Matson and christened
Manulani and Maunalei. The cost of the two vessels was reported to be
more than $315 million. Meanwhile, Kvaerner Philadelphia underwent
corporate reorganization, and the facility that occupies the site of the Philadelphia Navy Yard is now known as Aker Philadelphia Shipyard.
In 1993, Matson decided to emulate an innovation that was gaining
popularity in the container-ship industry—hatchcover-less vessels. The
company sent 1,600-TEU container ships, the 1978-built Maui and the
1980-built Kauai, to the Todd Pacific Shipyard where the conversion was
carried out, and the company has been quite satisfied with the experiment. Maui and Kauai thus became the first U.S.-flag vessels to operate
as hatchcover-less container ships, and the first in the world to be converted to such a status, rather than so designed from the keel up. Like
Sea-Land’s SL-7, Maui and Kauai feature a forward deckhouse, a design
that provides a degree of added protection against green water crashing
over the bow and into the exposed holds of the ship.
One important mechanical addition that a hatchcover-less container
ship requires is more robust pumping machinery to remove any water
that might flood over the gunwales into the hold. In more conventional
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container ships, boxes are stowed below deck inside steel guides, and then
stacked atop the hatch covers with twist-locks securing the containers to
each other, and cable lashings holding them down besides. A hatchcoverless design features vertical steel cell guides extending up from the tank
tops to as high as containers are to be carried. Thanks to the absence of
hatch covers, a vessel’s carrying capacity is marginally increased, but the
more important productivity gains involve increased speed and greater
flexibility in the loading and unloading of containers. While the experiment was deemed successful, Matson has yet to expand the concept to
other units of its fleet.27
(Sea-Land’s initial experience with hatchcover-less design did not involve one of its own vessels. In the mid-1990s, while under CSX ownership, the company chartered the 1992-built Atlantic Lady from OOST
Atlantic to gain experience with the new design. Sea-Land did not specify
hatchcover-less design in subsequent fleet additions, though.)
Although schedules and itineraries would change once Matson resumed its Far East service early in 2006, the company long concentrated
most of its resources on its West Coast-to-Hawaii services, dispatching
vessels westbound from Portland, Seattle, Oakland, and Los Angeles once
a week from the two Puget Sound ports, twice a week from Los Angeles,
and twice a week from Oakland. Matson also operates connecting services
out of Honolulu to other points in Hawaii, as well as to such mid-Pacific
destinations as Kwajalein, Johnston Island, Guam, Saipan, and Tinian.
Some of these connecting services utilize tug-and-barge technology, while
others involve cooperative arrangements with APL that were established
in 1996 when Matson took title to a half-dozen ex-APL vessels.
The Matson Navigation Company has been in the container-ship business since the earliest days of the industry, remains under the U.S. flag,
and thus merits attention. Table 8.3 displays statistical information about
the various cellular container ships that Matson has operated over the
years.
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table 8.3. Matson Container Fleet
Off. No.

Name

Retired Vessels
252149
Hawaiian Citizen
a) Sea Wren
b) USS Goodhue
(APA 107)
249239
Californian
a) Mount Greylock
c) California
249353
Hawaiian
a) Mount Rogers
c) Eileen
246343
Hawaiian Queen
a) Marine Devil
c) Maunalei
246984 Hawaiian Monarch
a) Marine Dragon
c) Maunawili
292810
Islander

Hull dimensions

GRT

Place built
(year)

Notes

492 ⳯ 70 ⳯ 30

7,901

San Francisco,
Calif.
(1944)

1

633 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 39

13,636

2

633 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 39

13,113

630 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 26

17,504

630 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 26

17,807

312 ⳯ 50 ⳯ 25

3,403

Vancouver,
Wash.
(1946)
Vancouver,
Wash.
(1946)
Chester,
Pa.
(1944)
Chester,
Pa.
(1944)
Beaumont,
Tex.
(1963)
Beaumont,
Tex.
(1967)
Baltimore,
Md.
(1970)
Baltimore,
Md.
(1970)
Pascagoula,
Miss.
(1945)

506694

Hawaiian Princess
b) Mauna Kea

338 ⳯ 52 ⳯ 28

3,934

524219

Hawaiian Enterprise
b) Manukai

720 ⳯ 95 ⳯

23,786

528400

Hawaiian Progress
b) Manulani

720 ⳯ 95 ⳯

23,786

248741

Pacific Trader
a) Sea Pegasus
b) Hawaiian
Planter
d) Oriental
Enterprise

544 ⳯ 70 ⳯ 31

14,246
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2

2

2

3

4

5

5

1, 6

table 8.3. (Continued)
Off. No.

Name

Hull dimensions

GRT

Place built
(year)

Notes

247826

Pacific Banker
a) Marguerite
Le Hand
b) Hawaiian
Craftsman

544 ⳯ 70 ⳯ 31

14,161

Pascagoula,
Miss.
(1945)

1, 6

788 ⳯ 100 ⳯ 35

30,877

7

788 ⳯ 100 ⳯ 41

26,746

720 ⳯ 95 ⳯ 34

22,626

Lihue
a) Thomas E. Cuffe
b) President Hoover
Lurline

790 ⳯ 100 ⳯ 35

26,746

826 ⳯ 105 ⳯ 31

24,901

860 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 35

40,627

860 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 35

37,811

1141163

Mahimahi
a) President
Washington
Manoa
a) President
Lincoln
Manukai

712 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 36

32,575

1153166

Maunawili

712 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 36

32,575

Avondale,
La.
(1971)
Avondale,
La.
(1971)
Chester,
Pa.
(1980)
Avondale,
La.
(1971)
Chester,
Pa.
(1973)
Avondale,
La.
(1983)
Avondale,
La.
(1982)
Philadelphia,
Pa.
(2003)
Philadelphia,
Pa.
(2004)

Container Fleet: 2005
530138
Chief Gadao
a) Golden Bear
b) President Grant
530140
Ewa
a) Japan Bear
b) President Tyler
621042
Kauai

530137

549900

653424

651627
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7

8

7

9

10

11

12

12

table 8.3. (Continued)
Off. No.

Name

Hull dimensions

GRT

Place built
(year)

Notes

1168529

Maunalani

712 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 36

32,575

12

553090

Matsonia

760 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 33

19,301

591709

Maui

719 ⳯ 95 ⳯ 34

24,544

655397

860 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 35

37,811

979814

Mokihana
a) President
Monroe
R.J. Pfeiffer

713 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 38

31,573

n/a

Maunalei

712 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 36

32,575

Philadelphia,
Pa.
(2005)
Chester, Pa.
(1973)
Bath, Maine
(1978)
Avondale,
La.
(1983)
San Diego,
Calif.
(1992)
Philadelphia,
Pa.
(2006?)

9
13
11

14

12

Notes
Vessels are excluded that carried containers solely as deck cargo. Unless noted otherwise, all vessels are
steam-powered.
1. C-3 cargo ship converted to cellular container ship, 1960, with capacity of 408 twenty-four-foot
containers; powered by General Electric steam turbine.
2. Converted C-4 cargo or troopship.
3. Unpowered barge built for possible conversion to self-propelled vessel.
4. Matson’s first container-carrying newbuilding, designed for interisland feeder service.
5. Built by Bethlehem Steel; powered by Bremer Vulkan steam turbine engines; carrying capacity of 988
twenty-four-foot and 94 forty-foot containers.
6. Lengthened by 53 feet and converted into cellular container ship by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
Kobe, Japan, 1967.
7. Built as LASH-type vessel; converted to cellular container ship with capacity of approximately 2,000
TEUs; powered by De Laval steam turbine engine. Acquired from American President Lines, 1996.
8. Fully cellular container ship with capacity of 1,626 TEUs; powered by De Laval steam turbine engine
and equipped with bow thruster.
9. Combination cellular container and ro/ro, with stern ramp; capacity of approximately 1,500 TEUs;
powered by GE steam turbine engine, equipped with bow thruster.
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10. Fully cellular container ship with capacity of 3,027 TEUs; powered by twelve-cylinder Sulzer diesel,
equipped with bow thruster. Acquired from American President Lines, 1996.
11. Fully cellular container ship with capacity of 3,027 TEUs; powered by twelve-cylinder Allis Chalmers
diesel, equipped with bow thruster. Acquired from American President Lines, 1996.
12. Fully cellular container ship with capacity of 2,890 TEUs; powered by eight-cylinder B&W diesel,
equipped with bow thruster.
13. Fully cellular container ship with capacity of 1,635 TEUs; powered by De Laval steam turbine,
equipped with bow thruster.
14. Fully cellular container ship with capacity of 2,019 TEUs; powered by eight-cylinder B&W diesel,
equipped with bow thruster.
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9

THE PRESENT—
AND THE FUTURE

In the preceding chapters, I have attempted to tell the
story of the first half-century of the container-ship industry by focusing on the rise and fall, after a fashion, of SeaLand Service, with some incidental treatment of other
lines and companies presented to provide context and
contrast. Because it is impossible to bring the story of an
active and dynamic industry to any kind of logical or definitive conclusion—as this is written in the early years
of the twenty-first century, the container-ship industry is
about as active and dynamic as any maritime sector ever
has been, from the days of the Phoenicians to the present—let us substitute for a true ‘‘final chapter’’ of our
story a brief look at some statistical tables that help define
the scope of contemporary container-ship operations, as
well as some admittedly subjective reflections on a variety
of considerations that may impact the industry in years to
come.

Statistics
A useful statistic for understanding the size and scope
of the contemporary container-ship industry is the relative
traffic that the major lines currently transport. The first
table displays the number of containers, expressed in trailer
equivalent units (TEUs), that the ‘‘top ten’’ container companies imported and exported from U.S. ports in the year
2003, the most recent full year for which statistics were
available at this writing. Excluded from this tabulation is
any and all traffic between U.S. ports—that is, Jones Act
services—as well as containerized transport between and
among countries other than the United States.1

The top ten companies carried slightly more than half of both import
and export containers, while the number of containers exported from the
United States was slightly more than half the number of containers that
were imported. (Acres upon acres of empty containers are typically stored
adjacent to major U.S. seaports—available for future exports or, more
probably, waiting to be shipped overseas empty. Because they are empty,
they will sometimes be stacked ten and twelve high—both to save space
and to forestall theft.)
This imbalance in container traffic is not necessarily a precise indicator
of foreign trade in general. The value, for example, of a single Boeing
777 aircraft exported to a foreign country equals thousands of inbound
containers filled with teddy bears and garden tools. The fact remains that
in terms of the basic cargo that is carried in seagoing containers, the
United States imports almost twice as much as it exports.
Another important fact that table 9.1 displays is the extraordinary position that Maersk-Sealand holds with respect to trade with the United
States. The Copenhagen-based company handled twice as many containers in 2003 as Hanjin Shipping Company, the line that was ranked second,
and 12.9 percent of all containerized traffic moving to and from the United
States. As the merger of Maersk-Sealand and P&O Nedlloyd announced
in early 2005 moves forward, one can envision a day when the successor
of Sea-Land Service will handle as many containers to and from the
United States as its next three competitors combined. (Preliminary data
for the first six months of the year 2004 reveal no change in the rank
ordering of the world’s container-ship operators as measured by traffic to
and from the United States.)
Table 9.2 presents parallel information about the relative standing of
the world’s major container-ship operators by ranking companies not in
terms of traffic in and out of U.S. ports, but rather in terms of their overall
TEU capacity. This data represents a one-time ‘‘snapshot’’ of fleet capacity,
and is not a measure of actual performance.2
CMA-CGM and K Line are among the top ten carriers when ranked by
overall TEU capacity, but are not so ranked in terms of containerized
cargo imported to and exported from the United States. OOCL and
Hapag-Lloyd, on the other hand, rank seventh and tenth in terms of containerized cargo to and from the United States, but fail to make the top
ten in terms of overall TEU capacity. Maersk-Sealand is first—and so by
substantial margins—on both lists, while those ranked immediately below

232 : : : box boats

table 9.1. Import and Export Containerized Cargo, 2003: Top 10 Steamship
Companies
Steamship Line

Containers
Imported
(000s of
TEUs)

Containers
Exported
(000s of
TEUs)

Total
Containers
(000s of
TEUs)

Maersk-Sealand
Hanjin Shipping Co.
Evergreen Marine
APL, Ltd.
Mediterranean Shipping
Co. (MSC)
P&O Nedlloyd
Orient Overseas Container
Line (OOCL)
China Ocean Shipping Co.
(COSCO)
Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line
(NYK)
Hapag-Lloyd
Total: top 10 lines
Grand total: all lines
Top 10 lines as % of
grand total

1,802
953
966
934

940
442
405
408

2,742
1,395
1,371
1,342

609
616

402
328

1,011
943

595

301

896

594

251

845

594
494
8,157
13,899

249
325
4,051
7,389

843
819
12,207
21,289

58.6

54.8

57

Note
Steamship lines are rank ordered on the basis of total containers, both import and
export. Two lines not identified in the table carried more import containers than the ten
lines shown: Hyundai Merchant Marine (536,000) and K Line (532,000).

Maersk-Sealand tend to place somewhat differently on the two tables.
Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), a growing presence in the contemporary passenger cruise business, is second to Maersk-Sealand in
overall TEU capacity, although it only ranks fifth when measured by traffic
in and out of U.S. ports.
Another statistic that helps paint a picture of the contemporary container-ship industry is the relative traffic that moves through various
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table 9.2. Carrying Capacity in TEUs, 2004: Top 10 Steamship Lines
Steamship Line

Capacity (000s of TEUs)

Maersk-Sealand
Mediterranean Shipping Co. (MSC)
Evergreen Marine
Royal P&O Nedlloyd
CMA-CGM
Hanjin Shipping Co.
APL
Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line (NYK)
China Ocean Shipping Co. (COSCO)
K Line
Total: top 10 lines
Total: all lines
Top 10 lines as % of grand total

920,051
536,040
454,843
415,817
319,180
284,937
277,684
251,322
236,399
203,753
3,900,026
7,485,000
52.1

United States ports; such information is displayed in table 9.3. As with
table 9.1, the data displayed reflect only containerized commerce between
the U.S. and foreign ports.
The ratio of imports to exports is consistent with information in the
first table, while the top ten U.S. ports dominated foreign trade by handling 86.1 percent of import containers, 78.5 percent of all exports. The
Port of New York is clearly the most important on the East Coast. The
second-ranked Atlantic port, Charleston, South Carolina, handles less
than half as much traffic as New York. On the other hand, if one combines
the three southern ports along the East Coast—Norfolk, Charleston, and
Savannah—their cumulative traffic is roughly equal to that of New York.
The southern trio imported 1,949,000 TEUs between them, as against
New York’s 1,965,000, and exported 1,518,000 TEUs, considerably more
than New York’s 838,000.
These numbers reflect several important facts. Wal-Mart, the largest
single transpacific shipper of containerized cargo, routes considerable
traffic through the port of Savannah to its inland distribution centers,
while such other retail giants as Home Depot and Best Buy also make
heavy use of southern ports. (Wal-Mart is so dominant a presence in the
container-ship industry that the firm is often rumored to be on the verge
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of establishing its own container-ship line!) In addition, the fact that containers exported from the three southern ports stand as a robust 77.9
percent of containers imported is indicative of the fact that many kinds of
manufacturing—needle trades, for example—still form an important part
of the economies of southern states, while such activities are less common
than they once were in areas adjacent to the port of New York, where
export containers are a mere 29.2 percent of imports.3
The most dramatic data revealed in table 9.3, though, is the extraordinary level of traffic that moves through ports in southern California. Statistically, Long Beach and Los Angeles/San Pedro are listed as separate
ports. A case could be made for regarding the two as one; they are adjacent to each other and are inland of a common breakwater. (In the port
of New York, container terminals at Howland Hook and Port Elizabeth
are in different states, yet are considered part of a single port.) In any
event, between them, Los Angeles and Long Beach account for a massive
table 9.3. Import and Export Containerized Cargo, 2004: Top 10 U.S. Ports
U.S. Port

Los Angeles, Calif.
(San Pedro)
Long Beach, Calif.
New York, N.Y. (incl.
New Jersey)
Charleston, S.C.
Savannah, Ga.
Norfolk, Va.
Oakland, Calif.
Houston, Tex.
Seattle, Wash.
Tacoma, Wash.
Total: top 10 ports
Total: all U.S. ports
Top 10 ports as % of
grand total

Containers
Containers
Total containers
imported
exported
(000s of TEUs)
(000s of TEUs) (000s of TEUs)

3,846
2,951

1,029
812

4,874
3,764

2,239
837
665
717
613
532
681
601
13,688
15,805

924
584
625
488
584
565
368
339
5,753
8,045

3,163
1,421
1,290
1,206
1,197
1,098
1,049
941
20,003
23,851

86.6

71.5

83.9
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36.5 percent of all containerized traffic moving in and out of the United
States. (Popular press accounts typically round this number up to 40 percent.) By contrast, New York’s share is a more modest 13.2 percent. Between them, the two southern California ports occupy a land area that is
greater than Manhattan Island below 34th Street, and most studies predict that cargo volume through Los Angeles and Long Beach will triple
over the next quarter-century.
Within the container-ship industry, there are some concerns about how
Los Angeles/Long Beach will function in the years ahead. Both ports will
continue to see annual traffic increases, and transpacific trade will likewise grow. Despite the popularity of land-bridge railroad services out of
the southern California ports, it is entirely possible that in future years
shippers will choose to specify an all-water route from the Far East to the
East Coast. Despite the investment of many millions of public dollars in
improved rail freight connections to and from Long Beach and Los
Angeles—a massive project called the Alameda Corridor was recently
completed that eliminated grade crossings between the twin ports and
inland main line railroad connections in an effort to improve overall operations—landside congestion remains a serious problem in Southern California and some commentators believe that shippers could well decide
that a dependable but slower East Coast arrival is better than a nominally
faster one that entails too many delivery risks. In fact, given congestion
in Long Beach and Los Angeles, a container ship can often deliver cargo
from China to, say, Savannah, Georgia, faster by transiting the Panama
Canal than by its relying on the Union Pacific Railroad to move containers
out of southern California.
Another factor that could affect the growth of container traffic through
Los Angeles and Long Beach is increasing concern among the California
citizenry about air pollution. While the state has imposed very strict controls on emissions from conventional automotive traffic, railroad locomotives, container ships, and, rather interestingly, the hundreds of largely
older trucks that move containers around the port area—and have no
need either to venture onto state or local roadways or carry state license
plates—are largely beyond the reach of the state’s otherwise strict environmental standards.4 (An oft-heard refrain throughout the containership industry is this: ‘‘Old trailer trucks never die—they’re just converted
into rigs for moving containers around seaports.’’)
Of course, something that will militate in favor of the dominance of
Los Angeles and Long Beach is the continued construction of more and
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more post-Panamax container ships. Such vessels are too large to transit
the Panama Canal, and thus cannot be used in direct transpacific trade
between the Far East and the East Coast. As container ships get even
larger—super post-Panamax, and even post-Suezmax, are terms that are
sometimes used—such tonnage will necessarily find itself using West
Coast ports at the end of transpacific voyages.
To understand the growth of containerized traffic in recent years, table
9.4 displays seven years of serial data for import containers into the same
ten seaports depicted in table 9.3. The relative standing of the ten seaports one to another is subject to minor change over the seven-year interval, but in none of the seven years did any city not listed here earn
designation among the top ten. (Among U.S. cities that typically ranked
table 9.4. Import Containerized Cargo, 1998–2004: Top 10 U.S. Ports
U.S. Port

Los Angeles, Calif.
(San Pedro)
Long Beach,
Calif.
New York, N.Y.
(incl. New Jersey)
Charleston, S.C.
Savannah, Ga.
Norfolk, Va.
Oakland, Calif.
Houston, Tex.
Seattle, Wash.
Tacoma, Wash.
Total: 10 ports
Total: all U.S.
ports
Top 10 ports as % of
grand total

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

%
increase,
1998–
2004

1,673 1,912

2,429

2,614

3,194

3,642

3,846

129.8

2,049 2,264 2,401

2,376

2,467

2,468

2,951

44

1,213
482
271
365
374
279
561
278
7,545

1,588
612
431
454
419
381
500
356
9,840

1,879
676
561
551
482
420
512
491
11,233

1,965
721
595
633
517
450
486
594
12,071

2,239
837
665
717
613
532
681
601
13,688

84.6
73.7
145.5
96.4
64
90.7
21.4
116.2
81.4

1998

1,362
554
317
409
387
336
582
327
8,450

1,512
618
382
438
419
367
588
391
9,545

8,919 9,960 11,087 11,268 12,916 13,899 15,805 77.2
84.6

84.8

86.1

87.3

87.0

86.8

86.6

———
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just below the top ten are Miami and Port Everglades, Florida; Baltimore,
Maryland; and Wilmington, Delaware.)
The extraordinary growth of containerized traffic in recent years is underscored by the fact that three of the ten cities displayed in table 9.4
experienced increases in excess of 100 percent over the short span of six
years, while the only two ports with growth rates of less than 50 percent
are both located relatively close to one of the ports whose increase must
be recorded with three digits—Seattle and Tacoma, Long Beach and Los
Angeles.
Another important statistic for understanding the dynamics of the international container-ship industry is the relative standing of the major
trading partners of the United States. Once again, the information displayed in table 9.5 describes only cargo moving between the United States
and foreign ports aboard container ships, not foreign trade in general.
The dominance of China (for statistical purposes, Hong Kong continues
to be listed separately from it) is the most compelling fact displayed in
the following table. China accounts for a robust 30.8 percent of all containerized traffic moving into the United States, with Japan in second
place at 10.4 percent. Japan is also the only country among the top ten
whose containerized imports from the United States exceed its exports
destined for U.S. markets.
Perhaps the most interesting fact that emerges from table 9.5, though,
is this: Among the top ten partners of the United States as measured by
containerized trade, only one country, Germany, represents traditional
traffic across the North Atlantic. One country from South America, Brazil,
is one of the top ten, but all the other countries are located in Asia. This
is not to say that some traffic between the United States and, say, India
does not travel across the North Atlantic Ocean, but in terms of trade
between East Coast points in North America and the traditional channel
ports of Europe, only traffic to and from Germany keeps this venerable
tradition alive. (Looking farther down the list beyond the top ten countries displayed here, one would find the United Kingdom ranked eleventh,
Belgium and Luxembourg combined in the twelfth spot, the Netherlands
at number fourteen, and France in eighteenth place.)
In 1972, when Malcom McLean put his magnificent SL-7s into service
for Sea-Land, it was noteworthy that six of the eight new vessels were
deployed in transpacific trade, while only two worked the North Atlantic.
As has so often proven to be the case, McLean knew which way the wind
was blowing.
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table 9.5. Import and Export Containerized Cargo, 2004: Top 10 U.S.
Trading Partners
Trading
partner

Containers
exported
to U.S.
(000s of TEUs)

Containers
imported
from U.S.
(000s of TEUs)

Total containers
(000s of TEUs)

China
Japan
Hong Kong
South Korea
Taiwan
Germany
Brazil
Italy
Thailand
India
Total: top 10
countries
Total: all
countries
Top 10 countries
as % of
grand total

5,960
836
313
515
588
482
476
480
410
299

1,390
771
1,138
449
340
190
177
132
115
148

7,351
1,608
1,452
963
929
673
654
612
526
447

10,359

4,850

15,215

15,805

8,045

23,850

65.5

60.3

63.7

The evolution of the container-ship industry during its first half-century has been nothing less than remarkable. From a pair of converted
T-2 tankers, Ideal X and Almena, sailing between New York and Houston
for the Pan-Atlantic Steamship Company in the spring of 1956—vessels
that between them could carry a grand total of 116 thirty-three-foot
containers—the world container-carrying fleet would grow in the mere
span of five decades into one whose overall capacity would be in excess
of 7.5 million TEUs.
In chapter 5, I calculated that, circa 1975, Sea-Land’s containers, if
placed end to end, would stretch from midtown Manhattan to the suburbs
of Cleveland, Ohio. Three decades later, the containers required to exhaust the capacity of the world’s deepwater container fleet would more
than encircle the earth at the equator.
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Reflections
Let us now reflect, albeit briefly, on a number of considerations that
may help explain the remarkable half-century of growth the containership industry has experienced, and that may also point the way to what
the future holds for this altogether remarkable maritime sector.
1. Globalization
The phenomenal growth of the container-ship industry has not occurred independent of other important economic and geopolitical trends.
Whether container ships facilitated the shift of manufacturing from North
America to Asia or were merely available to serve its inevitable needs is a
question that need not be answered—and possibly can never be answered. The overwhelming fact remains, though, that the endless chain
of massive container ships moving eastward across the Pacific Ocean day
after day—and the explosive growth of the twin ports of Long Beach and
Los Angeles/San Pedro to accommodate the inbound cargo these vessels
are bringing to North America—represent as profound a change in world
economics as has been experienced since the early days of the Industrial
Revolution. Entire categories of retail products whose manufacture once
provided jobs for thousands upon thousands of wage earners and breadwinners in cities large and small throughout the United States—from children’s clothing to portable radios, from small appliances to lawnmowers,
from baseball gloves to bicycles—are now produced overseas and shipped
to the United States in vessels that sail for Maersk, Evergreen Marine,
NOLⳭAPL, and dozens of other lines.
Globalization, however defined, was certainly a factor in the demise of
the Soviet Union. To the extent that the end of the Cold War both produced and was produced by freer trade between East and West, one could
advance a plausible argument that the seagoing assets most responsible
for the breakup of the Soviet monolith were not so much aircraft carriers
and battleships as they were container ships gracefully plying their commercial trades.
Globalization, of course, has profound social and political implications
and is a topic that can excite noble passions. It is difficult to imagine any
situation, though, where the fundamental dynamics associated with the
phenomenon of globalization—open markets, free trade, international
corporations whose manufacturing facilities are continually shifted to
countries where the costs of production are better able to be constrained—will not continue to prevail. To the extent that they do prevail,
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fleets of ‘‘box boats’’ will continue to be necessary to keep the process
going and move product to market.
2. Vessels
With respect to container-carrying vessels, continued growth in carrying capacity appears inevitable. As we have seen in previous chapters,
significant economies of scale can be realized by building larger and
larger container-carrying vessels.
At this writing in late 2005, the largest container ship in service is a
vessel called Colombo Express, rated at a difficult-to-imagine 8,749 TEUs
and the first of a fleet of eight identical vessels ordered by Hapag-Lloyd
from Hyundai Heavy Industries, of South Korea. Colombo Express, christened in Singapore in April 2005 and immediately put to work on a fiftysix-day circuit between the Far East and Europe, measures 1,099 feet from
stem to stern, features a beam of 141 feet, and is flagged in Germany. To
offer a comparison with a fleet of vessels discussed in some detail in previous chapters, Colombo Express has a carrying capacity that is more than
double any of the twelve Econships that Malcom McLean acquired in 1984
for United States Lines service and that were the largest container ships
of all time when they were built. (Each Econship accommodated 4,258
TEUs, and when American New York entered service in the summer of
1984, it wrested the designation of world’s largest container ship from
Hapag-Lloyd’s Hamburg Express, a fleet predecessor of the current title
holder.)
Something that can be said with certainty, though, is that Colombo
Express will not retain its crown for long. Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), a Swiss company that has quietly catapulted itself into second place among world container-ship operators, is about to take delivery
of a pair of newbuildings that will be the first to break the 9000-TEU
mark. Built in South Korea by Samsung Heavy Industries, MSC Pamela
and MSC Susanna are each 1,105 feet long, feature a carrying capacity of
9,200 TEUs, and will likely enter service in late 2005 or early 2006. But
even these will not long reign. A state-owned company called China Shipping Container Line (CSCL) will shortly take delivery of an eight-vessel
fleet of gigantic container carriers that will each be rated at 9,600 TEUs.
Even larger vessels will surely follow.
While it may be difficult to speculate about exactly what dimensions
future container ships will actually realize, there do appear to be finite
limits that will constrain naval architects and container-ship operators.
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Unlike ultra-large oil tankers of 500,000 deadweight tons and more, for
example, which are able to transfer product to smaller vessels at offshore
locations and avoid entering traditional harbors like New York, container
ships must respect the limitations of the world’s important ports. Such
limitations affect draft, length, and beam and are inherent in the configuration of channels and berths. While some infrastructure expansion can
be undertaken in this regard—New York has recently dredged the Kill van
Kull and Newark Bay to a fifty-foot depth, for instance—there would appear to be limits associated with container-ship size that the industry is
rather close to realizing. It would certainly seem that the once-unimaginable capacity of 10,000 TEUs will soon be eclipsed, but precisely how far
beyond this mark future vessels might go remains to be seen.
A 1999 study published at the University of Delft, in the Netherlands,
explored the matter of container-ship size from the perspective of the
largest container-carrying hull that state-of-the art developments in metallurgy and engine performance could accommodate.5 The resultant design has been called Malacca-max, a hull that, while big, is not so large
as to prohibit transiting the Straits of Malacca, a critical Asian waterway
to the north of Singapore that separates Indonesia from the Malaysian
peninsula. This Malacca-max design effort postulated a vessel that could
accommodate 18,154 TEUs in a hull 1,300 feet long, with a draft of almost
70 feet and a beam of 196 feet; dual engines driving twin screws would
propel the gigantic vessel at a speed of twenty-five knots.
Of the values cited in this Malacca-max design, the ones that would
prohibit such vessels from using most world ports today are the proposed
70-foot draft, as well as the 196-foot beam. Such a massive beam raises
problems with respect to the ‘‘reach’’ of shore-side gantry cranes necessary
for the loading and unloading of containers. When Maersk Line put the
Regina Maersk in service in 1996, it was not only the first container ship
to break the 6,000-TEU mark, it was also the first to carry containers
nineteen across, and major ports had to deploy a new generation of gantry cranes to service the giant vessel and its several fleetmates. The proposed Malacca-max design would require gantry cranes with the ability
to ‘‘reach’’ containers that would be stored thirty or so across.
Coincident with this theoretical study conducted under the auspices of
the University of Delft, Lloyd’s Register addressed the same general question, but from the perspective of what might be the largest container ship
that present and likely future developments in port and shore-side facilities at major world harbors could accommodate, a set of constraints that
the Netherlands study did not feel bound to observe.6
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The Lloyd’s Register study, conducted in conjunction with Ocean Shipping Consultants, Ltd., developed a design that has generally been called
the ultra-large container ship (ULCC). Such a ULCC would accommodate
12,500 TEUs and could maintain twenty-five-knot speed, but unlike the
Malacca-max design, its sixty-foot draft would permit navigation into a
number of important world harbors—either in their current or likely future configuration.
Theoreticians will continue to explore ways of building bigger and bigger container ships. One concept that is not new—Malcom McLean
adopted such a strategy for his fast SL-7s in the early 1970s—would be to
run ULCCs, or perhaps even Malacca-max, container ships on restricted
routes between a handful of major, deepwater transfer ports, and utilize
smaller vessels for service between such hubs and other more conventional ports. As envisioned by some in the United Kingdom, the famous
Royal Navy anchorage off northern Scotland at Scapa Flow could become
one such transfer port, giving new meaning to the biblical injunction
about swords and ploughshares.
In any event, in early 2005, the world container-ship fleet consisted of
3,478 vessels with an aggregate capacity of 7,708,524 TEUs. Rather remarkably, 62 of these vessels featured carrying capacity in excess of 7,500
TEUs. Stated differently, a mere 1.8 percent of the world fleet accounted
for 6.5 percent of total capacity. Looking to the future by examining shipyard order books reveals the even more remarkable fact that, in mid-2005,
1,219 new container ships were under design or construction at various
world shipyards, vessels with an overall capacity of 4,529,625 TEUs. In
percentage terms, in the summer of 2005, steamship companies were preparing to acquire new container-carrying tonnage whose capacity equaled
58.8 percent of the then-active fleet, with 33.1 percent of this new capacity—
or 171 hulls—in the 7,500 or above TEU range.7
Some of these new vessels will, of course, replace older hulls and so
the pending increase in the overall size of the world fleet cannot be estimated by adding the new vessels to the sum of existing ones. But since
the industry has been experiencing year-to-year growth in recent years of
approximately 15 percent, it seems safe to predict that the newbuildings
on order in 2005 will allow such growth to continue.
Despite steady increases in container-ship size, the industry will continue to require fleets of smaller vessels to operate various feeder services.
Many of these smaller hulls continue to include hardware that was a
major feature of such older container ships as Pan Atlantic’s Gateway City
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of 1957, namely onboard cranes for hoisting containers on and off ship.
Container ships that are equipped with onboard cranes for loading and
unloading are typically referred to as ‘‘geared,’’ while those that are not—
and this is the great bulk of the industry’s liner fleet—are identified as
gearless.
Size is not the only quantitative vessel category where the industry can
expect to experience change. There has even been some movement in the
way of designing super-fast container ships, vessels that could maintain
forty-knot speed at sea—perhaps more—and fault the rather dogmatic
assertions advanced in chapter 5 that Sea-Land’s SL-7 of 1972 will forever
retain the title of the world’s fastest container ship.
A Philadelphia-based company called FastShip, Inc., is moving ahead
with such a business plan and hopes to have a fleet of three water-jet
propelled vessels—driven by Rolls-Royce gas turbine engines—in service
by the year 2008. The initial trade the new vessels are expected to work
will be a transatlantic route between Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and
Cherbourg, France. FastShip will not challenge any records for carrying
capacity, as the vessels the company plans to build at a shipyard in Europe
will accommodate in the range of 1,400 TEUs. (The speedsters will also
be able to handle a mix of containers and ro/ro cargo.) At 870 feet long,
though, the sleek-looking new vessels will be substantial oceangoing tonnage, not high-speed novelties. FastShip sees its proposed service as providing a useful compromise between the high cost of air freight and the
relatively slow speed of conventional container ships in transatlantic service, where much high-value cargo is transported.8
Another niche market that a container-ship company called Ivaran
Lines recently tried to enter recalls the days after World War II, when Pan
Atlantic’s C-2 cargo ships carried a handful of passengers in addition to
basic cargo. In the late 1980s Ivaran took delivery of a 19,500-GRT container ship with a larger-than-normal deckhouse and that bore the name
Americana. Ivaran’s specialty was container service between the United
States and a number of South American ports, but what made Americana
unique was the vessel’s ability to carry a hundred passengers in deluxe
stateroom accommodations. Alas, Ivaran’s venture in carrying passengers
proved to be less than successful, and the company no longer markets
such services.
In summary, the maritime revolution that Malcom McLean began fifty
years ago on April 26, 1956, shows no sign of losing any momentum.
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3. Safety and Security
Another family of considerations that will help shape the industry as it
enters its second half-century are the dual matters of safety and security.
As a general matter, container ships have maintained excellent records in
the way of safety at sea. While container ships have been involved in their
fair share of groundings and fires and collisions over the years, there are
no container-ship names that have earned the notoriety one associates
with, say, Titanic and Andrea Doria, or Exxon Valdez and Torrey Canyon.
Heavy seas have been known to dislodge containers from their abovedeck securement devices, and oceangoing yachts have experienced difficulty, from time to time, when such containers fail to sink. Some recent
incidents involving contemporary container ships include the following:
In November 1998, the 5,316-TEU APL China was on a transpacific voyage bound for Seattle when the vessel ran smack into Typhoon Babs. Several containers were lost, and many that remained on deck were badly
damaged. But APL China survived the heavy weather with modest
damage.
An incident that merited more than passing interest in the popular
press happened on August 23, 1999, in the English Channel. Norwegian
Cruise Line’s Norwegian Dream was en route to Dover at the end of a
Baltic cruise when it collided with Evergreen Marine’s 1997-built Ever
Decent, bound for Zeebrugge. When the cruise liner was escorted into
Dover, several Evergreen containers were still attached to her foredeck,
while a fire that broke out aboard the container ship was regarded as
especially hazardous, since among Ever Decent’s containerized cargo were
cylinders of cyanide.
In November 2002, the recently built Hanjin Pennsylvania was eightyeight miles off Sri Lanka, bound for Europe from Singapore via the Suez
Canal. A fire broke out in one of the vessel’s holds, and among the cargo
that proved to be especially vulnerable were several containers filled with
fireworks. Two crewmembers lost their lives, and Hanjin Pennsylvania was
at first thought to be a total loss. The vessel was later rebuilt—an expense
that almost equaled its initial construction cost—and returned to sea
some months later as Norasia Bellatrix.
In November 1997, Mediterranean Shipping Company’s MSC Carla was
en route to Boston from Le Havre when the vessel broke in two in heavy
seas off Portugal. The bow section sank, while the stern was salvaged and
towed to the Azores.
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Finally, a Sea-Land D-9 class vessel, Sealand Express, ran aground near
Cape Town, South Africa, on August 19, 2003. (The fact that the vessel
was called Sealand Express, and not Sea-Land Express, signifies that the
accident happened after the company had been acquired by MoellerMaersk.) Sealand Express was eventually refloated and returned to service, but removal of its cargo proved to be especially challenging.
But if the industry’s record with respect to basic safety at sea has been
rather good, new concerns over matters of security have been raised in
the light of threats posed by the specter of world terrorism. The very same
feature that quickly became such an important selling point during the
industry’s early years of growth—the ability to dispatch a sealed container
from origin to destination with no intermediate handling of the cargo it
contains—can quickly become a terrible liability if a sealed container is
used to deliver a lethal cargo.
The sheer volume of containers imported into the United States each
year—in excess of 15,000 TEUs in 2004, for instance, a figure that is typically understated in popular press accounts as ‘‘seven million containers
a year’’—certainly suggests vulnerability. There have been several welldocumented instances of seagoing containers being used to transport illicit human cargo—often with fatal results—and speculation has been
continuous about the vulnerabilities associated with the flow of ordinary
commerce as containerized cargo.
New systems of surveillance are being developed and deployed at
world seaports, and perhaps more importantly, better and more detailed
documentation of inbound cargo before its arrival at U.S. seaports are all
reasonable steps to take in the light of the horror that world terrorism
represents.
The fact remains, however, that some of the very same factors and
efficiencies that were responsible for the growth of containerization over
the past fifty years can quickly become liabilities in a world where some
people believe that flying airplanes into skyscrapers is an acceptable form
of political expression.
4. On the Waterfront
The full story of how labor-management relations along various U.S.
and world waterfronts evolved to acknowledge and incorporate the benefits of containerization would itself provide subject matter for several
studies and books. A fascinating difference that emerges between labormanagement relations on the East Coast—namely, Malcom McLean and
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Sea-Land Service—and the West Coast—namely, R. J. Pfeiffer and Matson
Navigation Company—involves the fact that in Atlantic and Gulf ports,
the principal bargaining agent is the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA), while a different union, the International Longshoremen’s
and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU), prevails at West Coast ports.
While the ILA managed to reform itself in fundamental ways in the
wake of Malcolm Johnson’s explosive series of articles that ran in the New
York Sun in 1948, the specter of criminality—and continual associations
with organized crime—is something the ILA has never been quite able to
rid itself of entirely.9
On the West Coast, the principal bargaining agent for longshoremen
has long been the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s
Union (ILWU), a bargaining agent that was founded by Australian-born
Harry Bridges. Pfeiffer, and other West Coast operators, found Bridges an
honorable man to bargain with, and ties between waterfront labor and
organized crime were far less an issue on the West Coast than along the
Atlantic seaboard. The association that cast a pall over the ILWU, though,
was Bridges’s political affiliations, namely his relationship with various
organizations that were overt in their espousal of Communist ideology.
Bridges himself had earlier been a member of the International Workers
of the World—the infamous Wobblies—and when he orchestrated the creation of the ILWU in the late 1930s, he received considerable assistance
from elements within the Communist Party. Something that would later
become a virtual cliché among container-ship operators when discussing
the differences between labor-management relations with the ILWU and
the ILA would be some version of the following: Who would you prefer
to deal with, an honest Communist or a crooked patriot?10
Today, while the U.S. workforce of longshoremen is a small fraction of
what it was in the days of break-bulk cargo operations, the skill levels that
workers must possess and master are substantially different from those
that were needed a half-century ago.
Approaching a typical container port today from the land side brings
one to what looks like a toll plaza on a major highway. Teamsters drive
up to the various booths in the plaza with a container in tow and there
they encounter a longshoreman who proceeds to enter an identification
code of the container into a computerized system.11 Then, after reading
on their computer screens where in the sprawling portside yard the driver
should take his or her inbound cargo, the longshoremen direct the teamsters to the proper location.
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Some years ago, Maryland Public Broadcasting produced a documentary that included extensive interviews with contemporary longshoremen.
What may well have been the program’s most revealing insight involved
older longshoremen whose principal job skill at the start of their careers
was mastery of a simple baling hook, but who were approaching retirement as individuals who spent their days working with keyboards and
computer monitors. Today’s longshoremen still repair to the same watering holes as their fathers and grandfathers after a day’s work, though, and
swap stories about life on the Baltimore waterfront, past and present.
A parallel issue, of course, that would be an appropriate subject for
yet another extensive analysis is the degree to which the growth of the
container-ship industry over the past fifty years would have been impossible without the parallel development of powerful computer systems to
keep track of containers, develop stowage plans for their placement
aboard ship, and ensure that when a 7,500-TEU vessel puts out to sea, all
of its containers are properly positioned to ensure the vessel’s stability—
and, not incidentally, keep customers informed about when their container of men’s socks, or pots and pans, or automobile parts will be
delivered.
5. The U.S. Merchant Marine
How does one begin to deal with the fact that the first fifty years of the
container-ship industry have also seen the near-total decline of the U.S.
merchant marine as an effective commercial enterprise? The story of SeaLand Service is a telling account of an enterprise that grew—and grew
quickly—into the largest and most dominant force in the U.S. merchant
marine. Indeed, wartime cargo fleets excepted, Sea-Land may well have
been the largest and most dominant force in the entire history of the U.S.
merchant marine, granted that there are surely passionate advocates who
would advance the same claim for, say, United States Lines, Grace Line,
or Moore-McCormack. What cannot be denied, though, is that while SeaLand earned whatever distinctions it achieved without the benefit of any
subsidies from the federal government, it was eventually forced to recognize the realities of world economics and convert itself into an enterprise
whose only links to the U.S. flag under which it began are a handful of
vessels that a Copenhagen-based conglomerate has technically transferred to a nominally U.S. subsidiary in order to qualify for lucrative military traffic.
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Fifty years ago, in 1956—the year Ideal X set sail from Port Newark
on a voyage to Houston, Texas—the U.S. merchant fleet included 3,083
deepwater vessels of 1,000 GRT or more and was ranked as the largest in
the world. In 2005, by contrast, the number of U.S.-flag oceangoing hulls
in excess of 1,000 GRT was a mere 412, a figure that ranks twelfth among
world merchant fleets if measured by total deadweight tonnage, fifteenth
if measured by number of vessels.12
But even these figures can be misleading. If one factors out U.S. flag
vessels that are used in protected Jones Act trades (over 25 percent of the
412), and if one also ignores those merchant ships whose presence under
the U.S. flag is a mere technical exercise to maintain enrollment in the
MSP (something that involves another thirty or so vessels), and if one
ignores, as well, government-owned merchant ships that are maintained
by the Maritime Administration in its Ready Reserve Force (some sixtyeight hulls), then the oceangoing U.S. merchant marine, as an active commercial enterprise, assumes a posture that one may charitably describe as
statistically insignificant.13 Once upon a time, we were number one. We’re
not even in the game any more. Sic transit gloria mundi.
6. The Port of New York
Two related factors have contributed to what can only be described as
healthy trends in and for the port of New York. After an extensive evaluation of alternative East Coast ports for its North American operations—
Halifax, Baltimore, and New York were the three finalists—in the early
months of the new century, Maersk-Sealand decided to sign a long-term
contract with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and expand
its shoreside facilities at Port Elizabeth. The company’s plans include
construction of adequate cranes to handle the largest of its newest postPanamax container ships, and so vessels with distinctive light-blue hulls—
some of which even retain their original Sea-Land names—will remain a
presence in the port that launched the container-ship revolution a halfcentury ago.
In addition, just as city officials in Newark, New Jersey, were able to
prevail on the U.S. government in 1915 to dredge the channel approaches
to Port Newark before their new municipal seaport could welcome its first
cargo ships, so has the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey taken
the lead in securing federal participation in a massive upgrade of the
channel approaches to Newark Bay. A two-phase project got under way
in 1987 that saw the approach to Port Elizabeth—from the Narrows,
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through Kill van Kull, and on into Newark Bay—dredged to a channel
depth of forty-five feet by 1995, fifty feet by 2004.14 The cost of the massive
project was in excess of $2 billion; among recent projects managed by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, only the restoration of the Florida Everglades carried a higher price tag.
Expansion of container-ship facilities in the port of New York between
1956 and 2006 has not been without some unfortunate misdirection,
though. A view long held by factions within the City of New York that the
Port Authority has continually favored the state of New Jersey when making capital investment decisions continued to find resonance. Consequently, in the late 1970s, the municipal government invested many
millions of dollars in building container ports of its own—in the Red Hook
section of Brooklyn, for example, and the Howland Hook facility on
Staten Island. Despite the use of Howland Hook by United States Lines
for several seasons, these municipal investments proved to be especially
wasteful, since Port Newark and Elizabethport continued to be the terminals of choice for most deepwater steamship companies. As Newark civic
officials correctly foresaw in the years before World War I, waterfront
facilities in the state of New Jersey provide more ready access to inland
points in the United States than any similar facilities on the New York side
of the state line possibly can, a geographic advantage that has become all
the more important in the era of containerization.
Finally, this reflection: When a wonderful new passenger liner called
RMS Queen Mary steamed into New York Harbor for the very first time on
June 1, 1936, and was given an enthusiastic welcome by FDNY fireboats
and other harbor craft, as the vessel steamed up the Hudson River from
the Battery to her berth at North River Pier 90, the new Cunarder passed
no fewer than thirty different finger piers along the Manhattan shoreline.
Cargo ships from countries the world over were moored at most of these
piers. Longshoremen who were hard at work unloading the wares the
ships had delivered to New York and reloading the vessels with U.S. exports destined for countries the world over undoubtedly paused for a few
moments to steal a glance at the new superliner.
On April 22, 2004, a new Queen Mary 2 made her initial visit to New
York, and while her harbor welcome was perhaps as enthusiastic as that
given her illustrious predecessor sixty-eight years earlier, the Hudson
River waterfront between the Battery and the vessel’s ultimate berth at
Pier 92 had changed dramatically. Whereas RMS Queen Mary passed pier
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after pier where freighters of all shapes and sizes were loading and unloading cargo, Queen Mary 2 passed none.15 Some of the old piers remain
in place, but they have been converted, over the years, and now are used
for such diverse purposes as golf-driving ranges, restaurants, and storage
garages for city transit buses.
What Queen Mary 2 did not pass, though, was the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey’s huge container terminal on the western shore
of nearby Newark Bay. Because while Hudson River cargo piers along the
Manhattan waterfront disappeared in the years after Ideal X inaugurated
the container-ship era a half-century ago, it was the availability of spacious and efficient docking facilities at Port Newark and Elizabethport—
and the Port Authority’s foresight in developing and expanding these
facilities to meet present and future needs—that has enabled New York to
remain dominant as a major world seaport.
The new Queen Mary 2 is designed for a totally different trade from
that of her famous namesake. The 1936 vessel was built to transport passengers across the world’s most hostile ocean, while QM2 is a leisureoriented cruise ship, albeit one that has been designed to make the classic
North Atlantic crossing between New York and Southampton something
of an ultimate cruise experience. The container ships that move in and
out of Elizabethport each day are every bit as different from the breakbulk cargo ships of 1936 as the new QM2 is from RMS Queen Mary of
yesteryear.
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EPILOGUE
THE U.S. NAVY’S T-AKR-CLASS
FAST SEALIFT SHIPS
The full story of the logistical effort behind the invasion of
Iraq by Allied forces in the spring of 2003 will likely not be
known in full for many years; perhaps all the details will
never be known. One important fact at the conclusion of
the Sea-Land story is that a major role in transporting
equipment and supplies from the United States to the Middle East fell to an eight-vessel fleet of supply ships that the
U.S. Navy designates its T-AKR class of fast sealift ships.
When they were built in 1972, they bore names like SeaLand McLean and Sea-Land Galloway. The Navy acquired
the eight ships during two different fiscal years, six in fiscal
year 1981 and two in fiscal year 1982. One can likely conclude that were it not for the Reagan administration’s policy of making substantially increased funds available for
defense expenditures during the early 1980s, a more budgetminded Navy might have been less inclined to purchase the
high-speed container ships. Once the ships were conveyed
to the Navy, a major rehabilitation program was developed
to adapt the vessels for their new role.
Basically, they were converted from cellular container
ships into roll-on, roll-off (ro/ro) equipment carriers, with
multiple decks, linked by ramps, built in open hull spaces
where containers were once stowed. Four onboard cranes
were also installed to hoist equipment on and off ship,
while the deck area between the dual superstructures was
configured so it could serve as a landing pad for helicopters. Three U.S. shipyards handled the conversions: National Steel and Shipbuilding in San Diego, California;
Pennsylvania Shipbuilding in Chester, Pennsylvania; and
Avondale Shipyards in New Orleans, Louisiana. Despite all
this heavy reconstruction, though, the eight ships have retained the same basic profile they featured when they entered Sea-Land service in 1973.

The vessels are owned by the Navy but operated by contract civilian
crews for the Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC). Bay Ship Management currently holds the management contract for the ex-SL-7s. One
can distinguish civilian-operated MSC Navy ships from other Navy tonnage by the blue and yellow bands painted atop their funnels. Other
shapes and styles of cargo and supply vessels that are painted ‘‘Navy
gray’’ but feature red, white, and blue funnel bands are owned by the
Maritime Administration and are part of a sixty-eight-vessel Ready Reserve Force that the federal government also maintains for defense-related assignments.
Each of the eight former SL-7s is typically maintained in layup status
by a permanent crew of eighteen but is capable of being fully activated in
ninety-six hours. The eighteen permanent crewmembers are then supplemented by twenty-four others for a full complement of forty-two. It has
been estimated that because of both its carrying capacity and its speed, a
single T-ARK can perform sealift work that would require the services of
116 smaller and slower World War II–era Liberty ships.
In keeping with Navy traditions, the eight T-AKR vessels are identified
by the name of the first vessel of the class to be commissioned. The former
SL-7s are thus called the Algol class—USNS Algol itself being the former
Sea-Land Exchange, the SL-7 that still holds the transatlantic speed record
for cargo ships, and is second only to the United States for the fastest
crossing by any conventional merchant ship.
To give a sense of the kind of missions the Navy has asked the former
SL-7s to carry out, the following examples are instructive:
In early 1999, USNS Antares—the former Sea-Land Galloway—called
at Beaumont, Texas, and there loaded fifty-four pieces of rolling
stock, twenty-five helicopters, and a number of military containers.
The vessel then steamed north to Wilmington, North Carolina, and
took on more containers, plus nine pieces of rolling stock and fifteen
additional helicopters. On February 12, 1999, Antares put to sea and
arrived in the port of Rijeka, Croatia, on February 28. The supplies
the vessel was carrying were to support U.S. troops participating in
Operation Joint Command in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In early January 2003, USNS Denebola—the former Sea-Land Resource—was activated and later that month made a voyage from
Wilmington, Delaware, to the Persian Gulf with supplies for the
Second Marine Expeditionary Force. Denebola then steamed quickly
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back to Jacksonville, Florida, picked up additional military equipment, and made a second voyage to the Persian Gulf, this time carrying equipment for the 101st Airborne Division.
The following table identifies the eight vessels, shows where their conversions were carried out, and also indicates the U.S. port where each
vessel is moored when its services are not required.
U.S. Navy T-AKR-Class Vessels
Sea-Land
name

USN
number

USN
name

Where
converted

Home port

Date
commissioned

Sea-Land
McLean
Sea-Land
Galloway
Sea-Land
Exchange
Sea-Land
Commerce
Sea-Land
Resource

T-AKR 293

Capella
Antares

T-AKR 287

Algol

T-AKR 292

Regulus

T-AKR 289

Denebola

Sea-Land
Market
Sea-Land
Trade
Sea-Land
Finance

T-AKR 290

Pollux

T-AKR 288

Bellatrix

T-AKR 292

Altair

Baltimore,
Md.
Baltimore,
Md.
New Orleans,
La.
New Orleans,
La.
Originally
Bayonne, N.J.,
now Norfolk,
Va.
New Orleans,
La.
New Orleans,
La.
Norfolk, Va.

June 1984

T-AKR 294

Chester,
Pa.
Chester,
Pa.
San Diego,
Calif.
San Diego,
Calif.
Chester,
Pa.
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New Orleans,
La.
San Diego,
Calif.
New Orleans,
La.

November 1985
June 1984
August 1985
October 1985

March 1986
September 1984
July 1984

appendix a: vessel roster
Although tracing the history of the Sea-Land fleet does not require searching through
musty nineteenth-century archival materials, a number of factors have combined to complicate the task. One involves various subsidiary and allied corporations that were established to serve as the formal owners of vessels whose inclusion in the Sea-Land fleet
thus becomes difficult to determine. Another source of ambiguity is the not infrequent
chartering of vessels, both by others to Sea-Land and by Sea-Land to other companies.
Sea-Land also established cooperative working agreements with other container-ship
companies over the years, raising yet another series of questions as to the criteria for
including vessels in this roster. Finally, as noted in the text, Sea-Land raised to an art
form the practice of mixing and matching the bow of one vessel with the stern of another
to create a new and different container ship, but one whose continuity becomes a little
difficult to follow.
The roster includes container-carrying vessels that were operated in liner service by
Sea-Land itself and owned by Sea-Land, a predecessor or subsidiary company, or a leasing agency. Vessels used in Sea-Land service between 1956 and 1999 were formally
owned by a number of different entities, including Pan-Atlantic Steamship Company;
Waterman Steamship Company; Sea-Land Service, Inc.; Coastal Ship Corp.; Beauregard;
Containership Chartering Service; Madison Transportation Company; Litton Industries
Leasing Corp.; Donmac Corp.; Reynolds Leasing Corp.; and various other lending institutions, as well as individual corporations for each D-9–class vessel. No effort has been
made to specify these formal owners in this roster.
Vessels are arranged chronologically under the various classes Sea-Land used to identify its fleet. A class of vessels that was delivered in 2000, after the 1957–1999 limits
nominally assigned to this roster, is included because they were designed and ordered
within the proscribed limits. I acknowledge that the roster, as here presented, is undoubtedly less than perfect; corrections are both welcome and encouraged.
Column 1: For all U.S.-registered vessels, an ‘‘official number’’ is issued by the Coast
Guard—in times past, by the Treasury Department—and is unique to each vessel. For
vessels registered in countries other than the United States, this column identifies the
flag under which the vessel is registered. Sea-Land vessels that were originally registered
in the U.S. and later transferred to foreign registry show their U.S. official number in
this column, with foreign registry identified in a note.
Column 2: Any different names by which a given vessel may have been known over
its lifetime are identified, sequentially, by lowercase letters. The principal name by which
the vessel was known during its Sea-Land career is cited first, while any ‘‘missing letter’’
in a sequence of names means this is where the vessel’s principal name belongs.
Column 3: ‘‘GRT’’ stands for gross registered tonnage, a common statistic for expressing the overall size of a merchant vessel. It is a cubic measure of a vessel’s revenueproducing space, with 100 cubic feet equaling one gross ton. ‘‘DWT’’ is deadweight tonnage, an approximate measure of a vessel’s carrying capacity.

Column 4: ‘‘Dimensions’’ indicate the length, breadth, and draft of a vessel’s hull. The
statistic identified as a vessel’s length often causes confusion, since any given ship has a
number of different lengths—all at the same time. There is overall length, molded
length, waterline length, length between perpendiculars, and in an especially wellturned qualification found in The Record of the American Bureau of Shipping, ‘‘length as
given in the official register of the government with which the vessel is registered.’’ The
following roster has attempted to display each vessel’s overall length, although it is likely
that in certain cases, some ‘‘other length’’ is shown for a particular vessel. All values are
expressed in feet, rounded to the nearest whole number.
Columns 5 and 6: These indicate the city where a vessel was built, the year of its
construction, the shipyard that built the vessel, and the hull number used by the yard.
The abbreviation S/B means shipbuilding company, while D/D means drydock company. With respect to vessels that became Sea-Land container ships only after extensive
renovation work, this column provides information about the original hull, not its subsequent conversion.
Column 7: Engines are identified by their design, not necessarily their manufacture.
While the Mitsubishi Corporation, for example, may have built the diesel engine in a
particular vessel, the fact that it was constructed under license to standards and specifications of the Sulzer Corporation means it is properly referred to as a ‘‘Sulzer diesel.’’
Unless noted otherwise, all vessels feature single-screw propulsion with a fixed-pitch
propeller. The abbreviation C/P indicates a controllable-pitch propeller. This column
also identifies the presence of bow or stern thrusters.
Column 8: For most early Sea-Land vessels and unless noted otherwise, container
capacity is expressed in the maximum number of thirty-five-foot containers a vessel
accommodated. The abbreviation TEU indicates the number of twenty-foot trailer equivalent units a vessel can accommodate, a more common notation in the industry, and one
that Sea-Land later adopted. A vessel’s carrying capacity can change over its lifetime,
even without major structural alterations. The values shown in this column are accurate
for some point in the life of each vessel.
Column 9: Supplementary information about individual vessels, as well as entire
classes of vessels, is provided through notes.
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sea-land vessel roster, 1956 –1999
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

U.S. Off. No.
(or flag)

Names

GRT
(DWT)

Dimensions
(feet, rounded)

Place built
(year)

Yard (hull no.)

Propulsion

Container
capacity

Notes

Ideal X
a) Potero Hills
b) Capt. John
D.P.

10,572
(16,460)

524 ⳯ 68 ⳯ 30

Sausalito, Calif. Marinship Corp.
(1945)
(68)

Elliott Company
steam turbine;
electric
propulsion

58 (33-foot)

2

10,544

524 ⳯ 68 ⳯ 30

Sausalito, Calif. Marinship Corp.

Elliott Company

58 (33-foot)

3

(1945)

(71)

Mobile, Ala.

Alabama D/D

steam turbine;
electric
propulsion
GE steam

58 (33-foot)

4

(1945)

(353)

58 (33-foot)

5

T2 Class 1956
247155

247292

1

c) Potero Hills
e) Elemir
Almena
a) Whittier Hills

248800

Maxton
a) Black River
b) Ponca City
c) Marine Leader
e) Potomac

246810

Coalinga Hills

(16,623)

10,516

504 ⳯ 68 ⳯ 30

(16,669)

10,573
(16,460)

504 ⳯ 68 ⳯ 30

Sausalito, Calif. Marinship Corp.
(1944)
(61)

turbine; electric
propulsion

Elliott Company
steam turbine;
electric
propulsion

sea-land vessel roster, 1956 –1999 (continued)
(1)
U.S. Off. No.
(or flag)

(2)
Names

C2-C Class 1957
251506
Gateway City
a) Iberville
b) Sumter (USN)
c) Iberville

(3)
GRT
(DWT)

(4)
Dimensions
(feet, rounded)

(5)
Place built
(year)

(6)
Yard (hull no.)

(7)
Propulsion

(8)
Container
capacity

9,006

469 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 25

Chickasaw,

Gulf S/B

2 GE steam

226

6
7

Ala.
(1943)

(5)

turbines; geared

(8,410)

(9)
Notes

243436

Azalea City

9,014
(8,510)

469 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 24

Chickasaw,
Ala.
(1943)

Gulf S/B
(8)

2 GE steam
turbines; geared

226

8

243438

Bienville

9,014
(8,384)

469 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 24

Chickasaw,
Ala.
(1943)

Gulf S/B
(9)

2 GE steam
turbines; geared

226

9

242073

Fairland

9,014
(8,490)

469 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 27

Chickasaw,
Ala.
(1943)

Gulf S/B
(3)

2 GE steam
turbines; geared

226

10

242074

Raphael Semmes

9,014
(8,581)

469 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 27

Chickasaw,
Ala.
(1942)

Gulf S/B
(4)

2 GE steam
turbines; geared

226

11

251508

Beauregard
a) Afoundria
b) Wayne (USN)

9,016
(7,865)

469 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 27

Chickasaw,
Ala.
(1943)

Gulf S/B
(7)

2 GE steam
turbines; geared

226

12

c) Afoundria

T-3 Class 1962
242557

241153

241220

16,395
(15,770)

627 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 27

Chester, Pa.
(1942)

Sun S/B
(235)

2 GE steam
turbines; geared

476

13
14

b) Housatonic
c) New Orleans
Los Angeles
a) Esso Albany

16,395
(15,609)

620 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 30

Chester, Pa.
(1941)

Sun S/B
(217)

2 GE steam
turbines; geared

476

15

b) Esso
Bethlehem
San Francisco
a) Esso Trenton

16,401
(15,813)

630 ⳯ 79 ⳯ 27

Chester, Pa.
(1941)

Sun S/B
(218)

2 GE steam
turbines; geared

476

16

16,395
(15,770)

630 ⳯ 79 ⳯ 27

Chester, Pa.
(1942)

Sun S/B
(237)

2 GE steam
turbines; geared

476

17

Detroit
10,391
a) Sea Arrow
(10,665)
b) Tangier (USN)

469 ⳯ 70 ⳯ 20

Oakland, Calif.
(1940)

Moore D/D
(195)

2 De Laval steam
turbines; geared

automobile
carrier

18

Summit
a) Jalapa
b) Gulflight

524 ⳯ 68 ⳯ 23

Chester, Pa.
(1943)

Sun S/B
(285)

Westinghouse
steam turbine;
electric
propulsion

226

19

Elizabethport
a) Esso New
Orleans

b) Chicopee
c) Esso Trenton
d) Esso
Chattanooga
242653

C-3 Class 1962
239692

San Juan
a) Esso Raleigh

T-2 Class 1963
243658

7,813
(9,394)

sea-land vessel roster, 1956 –1999 (continued)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

U.S. Off. No.
(or flag)

Names

GRT
(DWT)

Dimensions
(feet, rounded)

Place built
(year)

Yard (hull no.)

Propulsion

Container
capacity

Notes

11,724

497 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 33

Chester, Pa.

Sun S/B

2 GE steam

360

20
21

(1945)

(347)

turbines; geared

Chester, Pa.

Sun S/B

2 GE steam

360

22

(1944)

(345)

turbines; geared

505 ⳯ 75 ⳯ 26

Wilmington,

North Carolina S/B 2 GE steam

274

23
24

(118)

10,485
(8,514)

504 ⳯ 74 ⳯ 26

N.C.
(1944)
Wilmington,
N.C.
(1944)

North Carolina S/B 2 GE steam
(114)
turbines; geared

274

25

8,673
(10,840)

469 ⳯ 63 ⳯ 27

Chickasaw,
Ala.
(1943)

Gulf S/B
(6)

225

26
27

C4-M Class 1965
247275
Seattle

246736

a) Marine Fox
b) Dorothy
c) Mobile
Anchorage
a) Marine
Panther
b) Alicia
c) New Orleans

C2-L Class 1965
245544
Ponce

245546

a) Santa Leonor
b) Land
Mayaguez
a) White Falcon
b) Santa Eliana

(n/a)

11,737

497 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 33

(n/a)

10,485
(7,413)

turbines; geared

c) Sea
C2-X Class 1965
251507
Arizpa
a) Jean Lafitte
b) Warren (USN)

2 GE steam
turbines; geared

245189

Wacosta

243815

Warrior

8,673
(10,368)

469 ⳯ 63 ⳯ 27

8,673

469 ⳯ 63 ⳯ 27

(n/a)
244018

Afoundria

8,673
(10,672)

469 ⳯ 63 ⳯ 27

Chickasaw,
Ala.
(1944)
Chickasaw,
Ala.
(1943)
Chickasaw,
Ala.

Gulf S/B
(24)

2 GE steam
turbines; geared

225

28

Gulf S/B

2 GE steam

225

29

(10)

turbines; geared

Gulf S/B
(14)

2 GE steam
turbines; geared

225

30

(1943)
C4-J Class 1966
248240
Long Beach
a) Marine
Flasher

248241

Trenton
a) Marine Falcon
c) Borinquen
Panama

248076

a) Marine
Jumper
Oakland

248239

a) Marine Tiger
248238

Baltimore
a) Marine

17,184
(16,977)

685 ⳯ 79 ⳯ 31

Vancouver,
Wash.
(1945)

Kaiser
(505)

2 Joshua Hendy
steam turbines;
geared

609

31
32, 33

17,189
(16,977)

685 ⳯ 79 ⳯ 31

Kaiser
(504)

32, 34

685 ⳯ 79 ⳯ 31

2 Joshua Hendy
steam turbines;
geared
2 Joshua Hendy

609

17,184

Vancouver,
Wash.
(1945)
Vancouver,

609

32, 35

(506)

658 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 30

Wash.
(1945)
Vancouver,

609

32, 36

Wash.
(1945)
Vancouver,
Wash.

(501)

360

37

(16,977)
17,184
(16,977)
11,389
(10,020)

523 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 30

Kaiser

Kaiser

Kaiser
(503)

(1945)

Cardinal

steam turbines;
geared
2 Joshua Hendy
steam turbines;
geared
2 Joshua Hendy
steam turbines;
geared

C4-X Class 1966
248095

31
Charleston
a) Marine Shark

11,389
(8,854)

520 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 30

Vancouver,
Wash.
(1945)

Kaiser
(502)

2 Joshua Hendy
steam turbines;
geared

325

38

sea-land vessel roster, 1956 –1999 (continued)
(1)
U.S. Off. No.
(or flag)
MV Class 1976
283030

282733

(2)
Names

(3)
GRT
(DWT)

(4)
Dimensions
(feet, rounded)

(5)
Place built
(year)

(6)
Yard (hull no.)

(7)
Propulsion

(8)
Container
capacity

New Yorker

4,631

361 ⳯ 52 ⳯ 16

Baltimore, Md.

Maryland S/B

2 8-cyl.

ro/ro

39
40

(1960)

(136)

Enterprise
diesels; twin
screw

Baltimore, Md.
(1960)

Maryland S/B
(135)

2 8-cyl.
Enterprise
diesels; twin

ro/ro

41

332

42
43

332

44

332

45

b) Aleutian
Developer

(2,189)

Floridian
b) Pan-Antilles
c) Freeport

4,631
(2,189)

361 ⳯ 52 ⳯ 16

screw

Express
T2-M Class 1967
245186
Jacksonville
a) Mission
245542

Solano
Houston
a) Mission

11,601
(n/a)

524 ⳯ 68 ⳯ 31

Sausalito, Calif. Marinship Corp.
(1944)
(34)

GE steam
turbine; electric

11,601
(13,050)

524 ⳯ 68 ⳯ 31

Sausalito, Calif. Marinship Corp.
(1944)
(39)

propulsion
GE steam
turbine; electric
propulsion

Carmel
T2-M1 Class 1969
245726
Tampa
a) Mission
Dolores

(9)
Notes

11,601
(13,381)

524 ⳯ 68 ⳯ 31

Sausalito, Calif. Marinship Corp.
(1944)
(42)

GE steam
turbine; electric
propulsion

C4 Class 1968
516542

515620

248242

511485

513557

Chicago
a) Gen. C. H.
Muir
c) San Juan
Saint Louis
a) Gen. M. L.
Hersey
b) Pittsburgh
Galveston

18,455
(17,897)

695 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 31

Richmond,
Calif.
(1945)

Kaiser
(23)

2 Westinghouse
steam turbines;
geared

622

31
46

18,455
(15,691)

685 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 31

Richmond,
Calif.

Kaiser
(13)

2 Kaiser steam
turbines; geared

622

47

Vancouver,

Kaiser

2 Joshua Hendy

360

48

Wash.
(1945)
Richmond,
Calif.

(507)
Kaiser
(16)

steam turbines;
geared
2 Westinghouse
steam turbines;

360

49

(1944)
Richmond,
Calif.

Kaiser
(28)

geared
2 Westinghouse
steam turbines;

360

50

(1943)
11,389

523 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 30

(10,020)

a) Marine
Serpent
Boston
a) Gen. M.M.

11,522
(9,317)

523 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 31

Patrick
Brooklyn
a) Gen. C.C.

10,958
(8,035)

523 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 31

(1945)

Ballou
c) Humacao
d) Eastern Light
516541

511487

Philadelphia
a) Gen. A. W.
Brewster
USMC
Portland
a) Gen. D. E.
Aultman

geared

10,979
(9,357)

523 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 31

Richmond,
Calif.
(1945)

Kaiser
(26)

2 Westinghouse
steam turbines;
geared

360

51

12,521
(9,702)

523 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 31

Richmond,
Calif.
(1945)

Kaiser
(27)

2 Westinghouse
steam turbines;
geared

360

52

sea-land vessel roster, 1956 –1999 (continued)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

U.S. Off. No.
(or flag)

Names

GRT
(DWT)

Dimensions
(feet, rounded)

Place built
(year)

Yard (hull no.)

Propulsion

Container
capacity

Notes

511486

Newark

11,522

523 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 31

Richmond,

Kaiser

2 Westinghouse

360

53

a) Gen. H.B.
Freeman
New Orleans
a) Gen. E.T.

(9,344)

Calif.
(1945)
Richmond,
Calif.

(24)

steam turbines;
geared
2 Westinghouse
steam turbines;

360

54

360

55

602

56

602

57

602

58

59
60

516540

513556

Collins
c) Guayama
d) Eastern Kin
Mobile
a) Gen. Stuart
Heintzelman

C4-JC Class 1969
246736
Rose City
b) Arecibo
248238
San Pedro

11,400
(9,100)

523 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 31

(1944)

11,307

523 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 31

(9,406)

11,737
(15,096)
18,420

520 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 33
695 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 30

(17,897)
247275

Pittsburgh

C-4 ⴐ T-2 reconversion 1970
245025
Seattle
a) Hanging Rock
b) Petrolite

Kaiser
(11)

18,024
(15,959)

695 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 30

11,499

471 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 30

(10,529)

geared

Richmond,

Kaiser

2 Westinghouse

Calif.
(1944)

(30)

steam turbines;
geared

Chester, Pa.
(1944)
Vancouver,

Sun S/B
(345)
Kaiser

2 GE steam
turbines; geared
2 Joshua Hendy

Wash.
(1945)
Chester, Pa.
(1945)

(503)
Sun S/B
(347)

steam turbines
geared
2 GE steam
turbines; geared

Chester, Pa.

Sun S/B

Westinghouse

342 35-foot;

(1944)

(390)

steam turbine;
electric
propulsion

12 40-foot

243850

Anchorage
a) Bull Run

11,476
(8,712)

471 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 30

Chester, Pa.
(1943)

Sun S./B
(287)

GE steam
turbine; electric
propulsion

354

61

246103

Baltimore
a) Roanoke
b) Esso Roanoke

10,948
(9,036)

497 ⳯ 72 ⳯ 30

Chester, Pa.
(1945)

Sun S/B
(416)

Westinghouse
steam turbine;
electric

325

62

propulsion
SL-7 Class 1972
542200

63
Sea-Land Galloway
b) USNS Antares

41,127
(28,095)

946 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 35 Bremen, West
Germany

A. G. Weser
(1,382)

4 GE steam
turbines; geared,

896; plus
400 TEU

540413

Sea-Land McLean
b) USNS Capella

41,127
(28,077)

(1972)
946 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 35 Rotterdam
(1972)

Rotterdam
Dockyard

twin screw
4 GE steam
turbines; geared,

896; plus
400 TEU

545200

Sea-Land
Commerce

41,127
(27,728)

946 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 35 Bremen, West
Germany

(330)
A. G. Weser
(1,383)

twin screw
4 GE steam
turbines; geared,

896; plus
400 TEU

b) USNS Regulus
Sea-Land Exchange
b) USNS Algol

41,127
(29,829)

(1973)
946 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 35 Rotterdam
(1973)

Rotterdam
Dockyard

twin screw
4 GE steam
turbines; geared,

896; plus
400 TEU

Sea-Land Resource
b) USNS

41,127
(27,776)

946 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 35 Rotterdam
(1973)

(331)
Rotterdam
Dockyard

twin screw
4 GE steam
turbines; geared,

896; plus
400 TEU

Denebola
Sea-Land Market
b) USNS Pollux

41,127
(27,728)

946 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 35 Bremen, West
Germany

(332)
A.G. Weser
(1,384)

twin screw
4 GE steam
turbines; geared,

896; plus
400 TEU

546383

550723

550721

(1973)

twin screw

sea-land vessel roster, 1956 –1999 (continued)
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(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

U.S. Off. No.
(or flag)

Names

GRT
(DWT)

Dimensions
(feet, rounded)

Place built
(year)

Yard (hull no.)

Propulsion

Container
capacity

Notes

545201

Sea-Lane Trade
b) USNS
Bellatrix
Sea-Land Finance

41,127
(29,293)

946 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 35

946 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 35

Rheinstahl
Nordseewerke
(430)
Rheinstahl

4 GE steam
turbines; geared,
twin screw
4 GE steam

896; plus
400 TEU

41,127

Emden, West
Germany
(1973)
Emden, West
Germany
1973)

Nordseewerke
(431)

turbines; geared,
twin screw

400 TEU

BremenVegesack, West

Bremer Vulkan
(957)

Bremer Vulkan
steam turbine;

737

550722

b) USNS Altair

SL-18M Class 1973
532410
Sea-Land Economy
a) H.P. Baldwin

(27,727)

64
24,774
(25,696)

720 ⳯ 95 ⳯ 34

b) SL 181
531478

Sea-Land Venture
a) S.T. Alexander
b) SL 180

SL-18P Class 1974
552819
Sea-Land Producer
a) New Zealand
Bear
c) CSX Producer
d) Horizon
Producer

896; plus

24,774

720 ⳯ 95 ⳯ 34

(25,937)

Germany
(1971)
Bremen, West

geared
Bremer Vulkan

2 Bremer Vulkan

Germany
(1970)

(958)

steam turbines;
geared

Sparrows
Point, Md.

Bethlehem Steel
(4,660)

2 DeLaval steam
turbines; geared

735

65
23,510
(27,051)

720 ⳯ 95 ⳯ 34

(1974)

1,664 TEU

23,763
(27,051)

721 ⳯ 95 ⳯ 32

Sparrows
Point, Md.
(1973)

Bethlehem Steel
(4,639)

2 DeLaval steam
turbines; geared

1,664 TEU

Sea-Land Leader
b) Sea Leader

17,618
(15,417)

662 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 39

Kobe, Japan
(1977)

Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries
(6,451)

6-cyl. Sulzer
diesel; bow
thruster

1,346 TEU

66

594375

Sea-Land Pioneer
b) Sea Pioneer

17,618
(15,417)

662 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 39

Kobe, Japan
(1978)

67

Sea-Land Pacer

17,618

662 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 39

Kobe, Japan

6-cyl. Sulzer
diesel; bow
thruster
6-cyl. Sulzer

1,346 TEU

593980

Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries
(6,452)
Mitsubishi Heavy

1,346 TEU

68

Industries
(6,453)
Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries

diesel; bow
thruster
6-cyl. Sulzer
diesel; bow

1,346 TEU

69

(6,454)

thruster

Mitsui Engine &
S/B
(1,198)

9-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

552818

Sea-Land
Consumer
a) Australia Bear
c) CSX Consumer
d) Horizon
Consumer

D-6 Class 1977
594374

(15,417)
594073

Sea-Land
Adventurer

17,618
(15,417)

(1978)
662 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 39

Kobe, Japan
(1978)

b) Sea Adventure
c) Maersk
Constantza
d) Sea Adventure
e) Maersk Koper
D-9 Class 1980
604246

70
Sea-Land Defender

25,224
(23,749)

745 ⳯ 101 ⳯ 33

Tomano, Japan
(1980)

1,678 TEU

sea-land vessel roster, 1956 –1999 (continued)
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(5)
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(7)
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U.S. Off. No.
(or flag)

Names

GRT
(DWT)
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Place built
(year)

Yard (hull no.)

Propulsion

Container
capacity

Notes

604247

Sea-Land Developer

25,224
(23,732)

745 ⳯ 101 ⳯ 33

Kobe, Japan
(1980)

Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries

9-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

1,678 TEU

606062

Sea-Land
Endurance

25,224
(23,250)

745 ⳯ 101 ⳯ 33

Ulsan, South
Korea
(1980)

(1,107)
Hyundai Heavy
Industries
(123)

9-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

1,678 TEU

604248

Sea-Land Explorer

25,224
(23,702)

745 ⳯ 101 ⳯ 33

Sea-Land Express

25,225

745 ⳯ 101 ⳯ 33

9-cyl. Sulzer
Mitsubishi Heavy
diesel
Industries
(1,852)
Mitsui Engine & SB 9-cyl. Sulzer

1,678 TEU

604249

Nagasaki,
Japan
(1980)
Tomano, Japan

606065

Sea-Land Freedom

(23,676)
25,225
(23,352)

745 ⳯ 101 ⳯ 33

606061

Sea-Land

26,500

745 ⳯ 101 ⳯ 33

(1980)
Nagasaki,
Japan
(1980)
Nagasaki,

(1,199)
Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries
(1,854)
Mitsubishi Heavy

Independence

(22,957)

606064

Sea-Land Innovator

26,500
(23,250)

745 ⳯ 101 ⳯ 33

Japan
(1980)
Ulsan, South
Korea

Industries
(1,153)
Hyundai Heavy
Industries

604245

Sea-Land Liberator

25,225
(23,676)

745 ⳯ 101 ⳯ 33

(1980)
Nagasaki,
Japan
(1980)

(124)
Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries
(1,851)

1,678 TEU

diesel
9-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

1,678 TEU

9-cyl. Sulzer

1,678 TEU

diesel
9-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

1,678 TEU

9-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

1,678 TEU

606066

Sea-Land Mariner

25,224
(23,780)

745 ⳯ 101 ⳯ 33

Tomano, Japan
(1980)

604244

Sea-Land Patriot

24,867

745 ⳯ 101 ⳯ 33

Kobe, Japan

(23,682)
606063

Sea-Land Voyager

26,500

(1980)
745 ⳯ 101 ⳯ 33

(22,963)

C-6 Class 1987
544303

Kobe, Japan

Mitsubishi
Engine & SB
(1,200)
Mitsubishi Heavy

9-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

1,678 TEU

9-cyl. Sulzer

1,678 TEU

Industries
(1,106)
Mitsubishi Heavy

diesel
9-cyl. Sulzer

(1980)

Industries
(1,108)

diesel l

Pascagoula,
Miss.

Ingalls S/B
(1181)

2 Westinghouse
steam turbines;

1,678 TEU

72
Sea-Land
Expedition

21,687
(19,845)

668 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 37

a) Austral Ensign
b) American
Marketer

(1973)

1,476 TEU

geared; bow
thruster

c) Sea-Land
Marketer
e) CSX
Expedition

547288

71

f) Horizon
Expedition
Sea-Land Hawaii
a) Austral
Endurance
b) American
Merchant
d) CSX Hawaii
e) Horizon
Hawaii

21,687
(19,842)

668 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 35

Pascagoula,

Ingalls S/B

2 Westinghouse

Miss.
(1973)

(1182)

steam turbines;
geared; bow
thruster

964 TEU
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U.S. Off. No.
(or flag)
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GRT
(DWT)
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(year)

Yard (hull no.)

Propulsion

Container
capacity

Notes

Sea-Land

19,157

700 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 32

Chester, Pa.

Sun S/B

2 GE steam

695 TEU

Challenger
a) American
Legion
b) Sea-Land

(22,493)

(1968)

(641)

turbines; geared

Chester, Pa.

Sun S/B

2 GE steam

(1969)

(644)

turbines; geared

Chester, Pa.
(1968)

Sun S/B
(642)

2 GE steam
turbines; geared

C-7 Class 1987
515155

518444

516464

73

Legion
d) Horizon
Challenger
Sea-Land Crusader

19,203

a) American Lark
b) Sea-Land Lark
d) CSX Crusader
e) Horizon
Crusader

(20,904)

Sea-Land Discovery
a) American
Liberty
b) Sea-Land

18,894
(22,013)

Liberty
d) CSX Discovery
e) Horizon
Discovery

700 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 32

700 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 32

1,028 TEU

988 TEU

C-8 Class 1987
541868

612085

72
Sea-Land Navigator
a) Austral Envoy
b) American
Envoy

28,087
(28,200)

d) CSX Navigator
e) Horizon
Navigator
28,095
Sea-Land Pacific
(30,093)
a) Austral

812 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 36

Pascagoula,
Miss.
(1972)

Ingalls S/B
(1180)

2 Westinghouse
steam turbines;
geared

2,139 TEU

813 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 33

Baltimore, Md.
(1979)

Bethlehem Steel
(4650)

2 Westinghouse
steam turbines;

2,407 TEU

geared; bow
thruster

Pioneer
b) American
Pioneer
d) CSX Pacific
e) Horizon
552706

Pacific
Sea-Land Trader
a) Austral
Entente
b) American
Entente
d) CSX Trader
e) Horizon
Trader

28,087
(31,495)

813 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 37

Pascagoula,
Miss.
(1973)

Ingalls S/B
(1183)

2 Westinghouse
steam turbines;
geared

2,139 TEU
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(or flag)
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GRT
(DWT)
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Yard (hull no.)

Propulsion

Container
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Notes

623168

Sea-Land
Enterprise
a) Austral
Puritan

28,095
(30,976)

813 ⳯ 90 ⳯ 34

Baltimore, Md.
(1980)

Bethlehem Steel
(4651)

2 Westinghouse
steam turbines;
geared; bow
thruster

2,407 TEU

57,075
(58,943)

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 38

Okpo, South
Korea

Daewoo Heavy
Industries

7-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

4,614 TEU

(1985)

(4008)

Okpo, South

Daewoo Heavy

7-cyl. Sulzer

4,614 TEU

Korea
(1985)

Industries
(4005)

diesel

b) American
Puritan
d) CSX Enterprise
e) Horizon
Enterprise
Atlantic Class 1988
665786
Sea-Land Atlantic
a) American

665783

Oklahoma
b) Karen H.
Sea-Land Integrity
a) American
Virginia
b) Jacqueline J.
c) Virginia

74

57,075
(58,943)

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 38

665223

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 38 Okpo, South
Korea
(1984)

Daewoo Heavy
Industries
(4002)

7-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

4,614 TEU

57,075
(58,869)

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 38 Okpo, South
Korea
(1985)

Daewoo Heavy
Industries
(4012)

7-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

4,614 TEU

57,075

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 38 Okpo, South

Daewoo Heavy

7-cyl. Sulzer

4,614 TEU

Industries
(4006)

diesel

Daewoo Heavy

7-cyl. Sulzer

Industries
(4009)

diesel

Daewoo Heavy
Industries
(4004)

7-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

Sea-Land Motivator 57,075
a) American New (47,171)
Jersey

75

b) Elizabeth L.
c) Raleigh Bay
e) Sealand
Motivator
665790

665784

Sea-Land
Performance
a) American
Washington
b) Ruth W.
Sea-Land Pride
a) American
Kentucky
b) Mary Ann

665787

665782

c) Galveston Bay
e) Sealand Pride
Sea-Land Quality

(47,171)

57,075

a) American
Illinois
b) Patricia M.

(58,869)

Sea-Land Achiever
a) American
Alabama
b) Leyla A.

57,075
(58,943)

d) Galveston Bay
e) Sea-Land
Achiever

Korea
(1985)

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 38 Okpo, South
Korea
(1985)
950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 38 Okpo, South
Korea
(1984)

4,614 TEU

4,614 TEU

75
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665788

Sea-Land
Commitment
a) American
California

57,075
(58,869)

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 38

Okpo, South
Korea
(1985)

Daewoo Heavy
Industries
(4010)

7-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

4,614 TEU

57,075
(58,869)

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 38

Okpo, South
Korea
(1985)

Daewoo Heavy
Industries
(4011)

7-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

4,614 TEU

57,075
(47,171)

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 38

Okpo, South
Korea
(1984)

Daewoo Heavy
Industries
(4003)

7-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

4,614 TEU

b) Marguerete
d) CGM Ile de
France
e) OOCL
Inspiration
f) Sea-Land
Commitment
665789

Newark Bay
a) American
Utah
b) Irene D.
c) Utah
e) LTC John U.D.
Page

665781

Sea-Land Value
a) American
Maine
b) Kim D.

76

665222

665785

Nedlloyd Holland
a) American New
York
b) Catherine K.
d) Sea-Land
Florida
Nedlloyd Hudson
a) American
Nebraska
b) Susan C.
c) Nebraska

57,075
(58,943)

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 38

Okpo, South
Korea
(1984)

Daewoo Heavy
Industries
(4001)

7-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

4,614 TEU

77

57,075

950 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 38

Okpo, South

Daewoo Heavy

7-cyl. Sulzer

4,614 TEU

77

Korea
(1984)

Industries
(4007)

diesel

Sturgeon Bay,

Bay S/B

7-cyl. B&W

Wis.
(1987)

(735)

diesel; single
screw (C/P); jet
pumps bow &

(58,620)

e) OOCL
Innovation
f) Sealand
Oregon
g) SSG Edward A.
Carter, Jr.
D-7 class 1987
910306

910803

78
Sea-Land

20,965

Anchorage
b) CSX
Anchorage

(20,668)

c) Horizon
Anchorage
Sea-Land Kodiak
b) CSX Kodiak
c) Horizon
Kodiak

710 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 34

1,412 TEU

stern
20,965
(20,668)

710 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 34

Sturgeon Bay,
Wis.
(1987)

Bay S/B
(737)

7-cyl. B&W
diesel; single
screw (C/P); jet
pumps bow &
stern

1,412 TEU

sea-land vessel roster, 1956 –1999 (continued)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

U.S. Off. No.
(or flag)

Names

GRT
(DWT)

Dimensions
(feet, rounded)

Place built
(year)

Yard (hull no.)

Propulsion

Container
capacity

Notes

910307

Sea-Land Tacoma
b) CSX Tacoma

20,965
(20,668)

710 ⳯ 78 ⳯ 34

Sturgeon Bay,
Wis.

Bay S/B
(736)

7-cyl. B&W
diesel; single

1,412 TEU

LASH Class 1990
624457
Sea-Land Spirit
a) Benjamin

625873

Harrison
c) CSX Spirit
d) Horizon Spirit
Sea-Land Reliance
a) Edward
Rutledge
c) CSX Reliance
d) Horizon
Reliance

screw (C/P); jet
pumps bow &
stern

(1987)

c) Horizon
Tacoma

79
29,965
(45,795)

29,965

893 ⳯ 100 ⳯ 41

893 ⳯ 100 ⳯ 41

(45,795)

2,100 TEU

Avondale
Shipyards

2 DeLaval steam
turbines; geared;

(2307)

Bow thruster

Avondale, La.

Avondale

2 DeLaval steam

(1980)

Shipyards
(2308)

turbines; geared;
bow thruster

Chita, Japan
(1995)

IshikawajimaHarima
(3055)

9-cyl. B&W diesel 4,065 TEU

Avondale, La.
(1980)

2,100 TEU

Champion Class 1995
Marshall
Islands

Sea-Land
Champion
b) Sealand
Champion

49,985
(59,840)

958 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 43

80

Marshall
Islands

Marshall
Islands

Sea-Land Charger
b) Sealand
Charger
c) Sea-Land
Charger
Sea-Land Comet
b) Sealand

49,985
(59,961)

958 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 43

Chita, Japan
(1997)

IshikawajimaHarima
(3077)

9-cyl. B&W diesel 4,065 TEU

81

49,985
(58,840)

959 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 43

Chita, Japan
(1995)

IshikawajimaHarima

9-cyl. B&W diesel 4.082 TEU

82

(3056)

Comet
c) Sea-Land
Comet
Marshall
Islands

Sea-Land Eagle
b) Sealand Eagle

49,985
(48,151)

959 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 43

Chita, Japan
(1997)

IshikawajimaHarima
(3078)

9-cyl. B&W diesel 4.082 TEU

80

Marshall
Islands

Sealand Intrepid
a) Sea-Land
Intrepid

49,985
(59,840)

959 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 43

Kure, Japan
(1997)

IshikawajimaHarima
(3079)

9-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

4,082 TEU

83

Marshall
Islands

Sealand Lightning
a) Sea-Land
Lightning

49,985
(58,840)

958 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 43

Kure, Japan
(1997)

IshikawajimaHarima
(3080)

9-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

4,082 TEU

84

Marshall
Islands

Sea-Land Mercury
a) Sea-Land
Mercury

49,985
(59,961)

958 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 43

Kure, Japan
(1995)

IshikawajimaHarima
(3057)

9-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

4,082 TEU

80

49,985
(59,940)

958 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 38

Chita, Japan
(1996)

IshikawajimaHarima

9-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

4,082 TEU

85

Marshall
Islands

b) Sealand
Mercury
Sea-Land Meteor
b) Sealand
Meteor
c) Sea-Land
Meteor

(3058)

sea-land vessel roster, 1956 –1999 (continued)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

U.S. Off. No.
(or flag)

Names

GRT
(DWT)

Dimensions
(feet, rounded)

Place built
(year)

Yard (hull no.)

Propulsion

Container
capacity

Notes

Marshall
Islands

Sea-Land Racer
b) Sealand Racer

49,985
(59,964)

958 ⳯ 106 ⳯ 43

Kure, Japan
(1996)

IshikawajimaHarima
(3059)

9-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

4,082 TEU

80

74,583
(81,462)

998 ⳯ 132 ⳯ 46

Ulsan, South
Korea

Hyundai Heavy
Industries

9-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

6,250 TEU

Sealand Virginia
b) Safmarine

74,583
(81,594)

998 ⳯ 132 ⳯ 46

(2000)
Ulsan, South
Korea

(1208)
Hyundai Heavy
Industries

9-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

6,250 TEU

Greece

Himalaya
Sealand
Washington

74,583
(81,556)

998 ⳯ 132 ⳯ 46

(2000)
Ulsan, South
Korea
(2000)

(1209)
Hyundai Heavy
Industries
(1210)

9-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

6,250 TEU

Greece

Sealand Michigan

74,583
(81,574)

998 ⳯ 132 ⳯ 46

6,250 TEU

Sealand Illinois

74,583

998 ⳯ 132 ⳯ 46

Hyundai Heavy
Industries
(1211)
Hyundai Heavy

9-cyl. Sulzer
diesel

Greece

Ulsan, South
Korea
(2000)
Ulsan, South

9-cyl. Sulzer

6,250 TEU

Korea
(2000)

Industries
(1212)

Undesignated 2000
Greece
Sealand New York

Greece

(81,577)

diesel

notes
1. T-2 tankers equipped with temporary spar decks, not cellular container
ships.
2. Acquired by Pan-Atlantic, 1955; conveyed to Oceanic Tankers Corp, 1959;

17. Midbody built in Hamburg, West Germany, by Schlieker Werft and towed
across the North Atlantic by seagoing tug Smit Mississippi; conversion
performed at Bethlehem Steel, Hoboken, N.J.
18. Converted from dry cargo carrier, 1962; not cellular container ship;

sold to overseas interests for scrapping, 1965; scrapped in Japan, 1967.
3. Acquired by Pan-Atlantic from National Bulk Carriers, 1955; conveyed to
U.S. Tanker Corp., 1960; scrapped in Spain, 1972.
4. Chartered by Pan-Atlantic from Waterman Steamship; sold to Empire

scrapped Valencia, Spain, 1974.
19. T-2 tanker converted at Alabama Shipbuilding, Mobile, Ala., 1962.
20. C-4 cargo ships converted to container ships by Bull Line; acquired by
Sea-Land during conversion. Initially configured to carry 166 containers

Transportation ca. 1958; scrapped, 1983.
5. Chartered by Pan-Atlantic from Sword Line; returned to tanker service,
1957; scrapped Hong Kong, 1963.
6. C-2 cargo ships built for Waterman Steamship.

and break-bulk cargo; converted to full container ships by Sea-Land.
21. Portions of vessel later reconverted into C4-JC class container ship
Pittsburgh; remains in documentation in 2005 as unpowered barge.
22. Portions of vessel later reconverted into C4-JC class container ship Rose

7. Scrapped Hong Kong, 1978.
8. Scrapped Vigo, Spain, 1976.
9. Damaged on voyage from Kobe, Japan, to Busan, South Korea, 1975;
scrapped Busan, 1976.

City; remains in documentation in 2005 as unpowered barge.
23. C-2 cargo ships converted to container ships by Grace Line at Maryland
Shipbuilding, Baltimore; later acquired by Sea-Land.
24. Scrapped Hong Kong, 1978.

10. Scrapped Hong Kong, 1975.
11. Scrapped Hong Kong, 1978.
12. Laid up Hong Kong, 1975; scrapped Kaohsiung, 1977.
13. T-3 tankers converted to cellular container ships with newly built

25. Scrapped Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 1979.
26. C-2 cargo ships formerly in the Waterman fleet. Unlike C2-C class,
conversion involved no alteration to hull geometry.
27. Acquired from U.S. government in exchange for C-2 cargo ship Chatham;

midbody spliced between original bow and stern.
14. Midbody built in Hamburg, West Germany, by Schlieker Werft and towed
across the North Atlantic by seagoing tug Smit Thames; conversion
performed at Todd Shipbuilding, Hoboken, N.J.

scrapped Brownsville, Tex., 1977.
28. Acquired from U.S. government in exchange for C-2 cargo ship Fanwood;
scrapped Bilbao, Spain, 1978.
29. Acquired from U.S. government in exchange for C-2 cargo ship Colorado;

15. Midbody built in Hamburg, West Germany, by Bloom and Voss;
conversion performed at Bethlehem Steel, Hoboken, N.J.
16. Midbody built in Hamburg, West Germany, by Bloom and Voss;
conversion performed at Bethlehem Steel, Baltimore, Md.

scrapped Bilbao, Spain, 1978. Arizpa, Wacosta, and Warrior were
involved in dual transactions with the U.S. government. The three exWaterman C-2s were traded in when Sea-Land acquired the C-4 troop
ships Marine Flasher, Marine Falcon, and Marine Tiger, respectively, then

reacquired by Sea-Land. Chatham (252493), Fanwood (252355), and
Colorado (252492) had been acquired from Matson Navigation, where
they bore the names Hawaiian Wholesaler, Hawaiian Banker, and
Hawaiian Trader, respectively.
30. Sold to New York shipbreakers, 1979.
31. Converted from C-4-style troopships. C-4 Class vessels are displayed, by
groups, in the approximate order of their conversion. Sea-Land
subclassifications not specified in roster tables include: Class C4-J1:
Chicago and Rose City; Class C4-X3: Galveston, Brooklyn, Philadelphia,
New Orleans, and Mobile; Class C4-J2: San Pedro, Pittsburgh, and Saint

39. Diesel-powered ro/ro vessels built for Erie and St. Lawrence
Corporation, and later worked for Bull Line; not cellular container ships.
40. Reconfigured in 1975 at Willamette Iron and Steel in Portland, Oregon,
for service as a feeder ship in Alaska.
41. Sold to Pan Antilles Ship Corp. ca. 1977; reflagged Liberian.
42. Converted from Class T-2 tankers originally built for U.S. Navy with
10,000-hp turbo-electric propulsion system, rather than 6,000-hp
system of more conventional T-2 tankers.
43. Acquired from U.S. government in exchange for C-1 cargo ship California
Sword; converted to container ship at Todd Shipbuilding, Galveston,

Louis.
32. Vessel remains in documentation in 2005 as unpowered barge.
33. Chartered to United States Lines, 1946–49; acquired from U.S.

Texas.
44. Acquired from U.S. government in exchange for C-1 cargo ship Oregon
Sword; converted to container ship at Todd Shipbuilding, Galveston,

government in exchange for C-2 cargo ship Arizpa. (See note 29.)
Converted to container ship at Ingalls Shipbuilding, Pascagoula, Miss.
34. Converted to container ship at Ingalls Shipbuilding, Pascagoula, Miss.

Texas.
45. Acquired from U.S. government in exchange for bulk carrier Philip
Minch; converted to container ship at Todd Shipbuilding, Galveston,

35. Chartered to United States Lines, 1947–48, and also known to have
worked for Moore-McCormack; acquired from U.S. government in
exchange for C-2 cargo ship Jean Lafitte. Converted to container ship at

Texas.
46. Acquired from U.S. government in exchange for Liberty ship Losmar;
converted to container ship at Todd Shipbuilding, San Pedro, Calif.

Ingalls Shipbuilding, Pascagoula, Miss.
36. Operated in postwar passenger, under charter, by Atlantic Gulf and West
Indies Steamship Lines (AGWI); acquired from U.S. government in

47. Acquired from U.S. government in exchange for bulk carrier Edward Y.
Townsend; converted to container ship at Todd Shipbuilding, San Pedro,
Calif.

exchange for C-2 cargo ship Warrior. (See note 29.) Converted to
container ship at Ingalls Shipbuilding, Pascagoula, Miss.
37. Acquired from U.S. government in exchange for C-2 cargo ship Claiborne.
38. Chartered to United States Lines, 1948–49, and also known to have

48. Acquired from U.S. government in exchange for Delaware River
ferryboat Delaware; converted to container ship at Todd Shipbuilding,
Galveston, Texas.
49. Acquired from U.S. government in exchange for New York excursion boat

worked for American-Export; acquired from U.S. government in
exchange for Liberty ship La Salle. Converted to container ship Maryland
Dry Dock, Baltimore, Md.

John A. Meseck; converted to container ship at Todd Shipbuilding,
Galveston, Texas.
50. Acquired from U.S. government in exchange for Lake Erie excursion boat

Canadiana; converted to container ship at Bethlehem Steel, Hoboken,

61. Utilizes bow and midbody of Anchorage (246736); converted at Todd

N.J.; later conveyed to Puerto Rican interests.
51. Acquired from U.S. government in exchange for Liberty ship Alamar;
converted into container ship at Bethlehem Steel, Baltimore, Md.
52. Acquired from U.S. government in exchange for Jersey Central R.R.

Shipbuilding, Seattle, Wash.
62. Utilizes bow and midbody of Baltimore (248238); converted at Todd
Shipbuilding, San Pedro, Calif.
63. First class of Sea-Land-designed newbuildings; conveyed to U.S. Navy

ferryboat Wilkes-Barre; converted to container ship at Willamette Iron
and Steel, Portland, Ore.
53. Acquired from U.S. government in exchange for Great Lakes bulk carrier
Peavey Pioneer; converted to container ship at Todd Shipbuilding,

1981–82.
64. Designed and built by Matson Navigation Company; acquired by SeaLand before entering Matson service.
65. Designed by Matson Navigation Company and construction begun by

Galveston, Tex.
54. Acquired from U.S. government in exchange for bulk carrier Frank E.
Taplin; converted to container ship at Willamette Iron and Steel,
Portland, OR; later conveyed to Puerto Rican interests.

Matson; conveyed to Pacific Far East Line during construction; acquired
by Sea-Land before entering service.
66. Contains midbody section from Elizabethport. Conveyed to InterSea, a
Bermuda-based Sea-Land affiliate in 1988 and reflagged Bahamian;

55. Acquired from U.S. government in exchange for Delaware, Lackawanna
and Western R.R. ferryboat Lackawanna; converted to container ship at
Alabama Drydock, Mobile, Ala.
56. Constructed from stern and machinery of Sea-Land’s Anchorage
(246736); conveyed to Puerto Rican interests ca. 1974.

transferred to the Maersk Company in 1999 at time of Sea-Land’s
acquisition by Moeller-Maersk. Reflagged United Kingdom, 2002;
Marshall Islands, 2002; Gibraltar, 2002.
67. Contains midbody section from Los Angeles. Conveyed to InterSea, a
Bermuda-based Sea-Land affiliate in 1988 and reflagged Bahamian;

57. Constructed from stern and machinery of Sea-Land’s Baltimore (248238);
remains in documentation in 2005 as unpowered barge.
58. Constructed from stern and machinery of Sea-Land’s Seattle (247275);
remains in documentation in 2005 as unpowered barge.

transferred to the Maersk Company in 1999 at time of Sea-Land’s
acquisition by Moeller-Maersk. Reflagged United Kingdom, 2002;
Marshall Islands, 2002; Gibraltar, 2002.
68. Contains midbody section from San Juan. Reflagged Marshall Islands,

59. Vessels constructed by combining stern and machinery of surplus T-2
tankers with forebodies of earlier Sea-Land container ships.
60. Utilizes bow and midbody of Seattle (247275); converted at Todd
Shipbuilding, Alameda, Calif.

2002; Singapore, 2002.
69. Contains midbody section from San Francisco. Conveyed to InterSea, a
Bermuda-based Sea-Land affiliate in 1988 and reflagged Bahamian;
transferred to the Maersk Company in 1999 at time of Sea-Land’s

acquisition by Moeller-Maersk. Reflagged United Kingdom, 2002;
Marshall Islands, 2002; Gibraltar, 2002.
70. Entire class lengthened by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in 1985 to these
dimensions: 845 feet long, 32,629 GRT, container capacity of 2,472 TEUs;
redesignated D-9J Class.
71. Reflagged Marshall Islands, 2002.
72. Designed and built by Farrell Lines; later conveyed to United States Lines;
acquired by Sea-Land ca. 1987.
73. Designed and built by United States Lines; acquired by Sea-Land ca. 1987.
74. Designed and built by United States Lines; acquired by Sea-Land ca.
1988.
75. Reduced in length by Bloom and Voss, 1994, to these dimensions: 856 feet
long, 47,667 GRT, carrying capacity of 3,918 TEUs. Reflagged Marshall
Islands, 2001; Singapore, 2001; United States, 2002.
76. Reduced in length by Bloom and Voss, 1994, to these dimensions: 856
feet long, 47,667 GRT, carrying capacity of 3,918 TEUs. Reflagged
Marshall Islands, 2001; Singapore, 2001.
77. Identified with Nedlloyd name after being acquired by Sea-Land since
vessel was used in joint service with Nedlloyd.
78. Only Sea-Land newbuildings to be constructed in U.S. shipyard.
79. Constructed as LASH-type barge carriers for Waterman Steamship;
acquired by Sea-Land 1990-’91 and converted to fully cellular container
ships.
80. Reflagged United Kingdom, 2003.
81. Reflagged United Kingdom, 2003; United States, 2003 (Off. No. 1163273).
82. Reflagged United Kingdom, 2003; United States, 2003 (Off. No. 1163271).

83. Reflagged Singapore, 2003; United States, 2003 (Off. No. 1163268).
84. Reflagged Singapore, 2003; United States, 2003 (Off. No. 1163272).
85. Reflagged United Kingdom, 2003; United States, 2003 (Off. No.
1163267).
Sources
Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, The Record of the American Bureau of Shipping
(ABS) and Merchant Vessels of the United States are the three most critical
primary sources. The first is published annually in book form. Merchant
Vessels of the United States is no longer published regularly, but equivalent
current data is available online from the U.S. Coast Guard at
www.st.nmfs.gov/st1/CoastGuard/VesselByName.html. A different Coast
Guard database geared to vessel inspections includes information on U.S.flag as well as foreign-flag vessels: http://cgmix.USCG.mil/PSIX/PSIX2/
VesselSearch.asp. The Record has not been published conventionally since
1999, but updated information is available online at http://
absapps.eagle.org/unsecured/record/record_vesselsearch.
Two additional sources that are of a secondary nature, but extremely
helpful in many cases, include an annual list of U.S.-flag merchant vessels
that was long published by the trade journal Marine Engineering/The Log,
plus a series of books edited by David Hornsby and published periodically
under the title Ocean Ships (Shepperton, England: Ian Allan Publishing).
Sea-Land produced internal vessel rosters over the years that are not
readily available but are extremely useful. See, for example, Vessel Standards
(Elizabeth, N.J.: Sea-Land Service), 1972; Sea-Land Vessel Standards
(Edison, N.J.: Sea-Land Service, 1990).

appendix b: sea-land liner services, 1999
Frequency

Port of origin
(General service
description)

Ports of call

Cooperative aspects

Fixed day; weekly

Tacoma, Wash.
(transpacific)

Oakland, Calif.; Honolulu,
Hawaii; Apra, Guam;

Operated in alliance
partnership with

(transpacific) Kaohsiung,

Maersk

Taiwan; (transpacific) and
return to Tacoma, Wash.
Fixed day; weekly

Charleston, S.C.

San Juan, Puerto Rico; Puerto

Operated in alliance

(Panama Canal and

Manzanillo, Costa Rica;

partnership with

transpacific)

(Panama Canal) Long Beach,
Calif.; Oakland, Calif.; Dutch

Maersk

Harbor, Alaska; (transpacific)
Yokohama, Japan; Nagoya,
Japan; Busan, South Korea;
Kaohsiung, Taiwan; Naha,
Okinawa; Shanghai, China;
Busan; Yokohama, Japan;
(transpacific) Long Beach,
Calif.; (Panama Canal) Puerto
Manzanillo, Costa Rica;
Freeport, Bahamas; Miami, Fla.;
and return to Charleston, S.C.
Fixed day; weekly

Charleston, S.C.

Miami, Fla.; Puerto

Operated in alliance

(transpacific and
transatlantic circuit

Manzanillo, Costa Rica;
(Panama Canal) Long Beach,

partnership with
Maersk

via Panama Canal)

Calif.; Oakland, Calif.;
(transpacific) Yokohama,
Japan; Kobe, Japan; Hong
Kong; Kaohsiung, Taiwan;
Kobe, Japan; Nagoya, Japan;
Yokohama, Japan;
(transpacific) Oakland, Calif.;
Long Beach, Calif.; (Panama
Canal) Puerto Manzanillo,
Costa Rica; Miami, Fla.;
Charleston, S.C.; Norfolk, Va.;
Port Elizabeth, N.J.;
(transatlantic) Le Havre,
France; Felixstowe, England;

Frequency

Port of origin
(General service
description)

Ports of call

Cooperative aspects

Bremerhaven, Germany;
Rotterdam, Netherlands;
(transatlantic) Halifax, Nova
Scotia; Port Newark; Norfolk,
Va.; and return to Charleston,
S.C.
Fixed day; weekly

Long Beach, Calif.

Oakland, Calif.; (transpacific)

Operated in alliance

(transpacific and
Middle East)

Kaohsiung, Taiwan; Hong
Kong, China; Singapore,

partnership with
Maersk

Malaysia; Dubai, United Arab
Emirates; Shuwaikh, Kuwait;
Dammam, Saudi Arabia; Mina
Sulman, Bahrain; Port
Muhammad Bin Qasim,
Pakistan; Colombo, Sri Lanka;
Singapore; Hong Kong;
Kaohsiung; (transpacific) and
return to Long Beach, Calif.
Fixed day; weekly

Halifax, Nova

Port Elizabeth, N.J.; Norfolk,

Operated in alliance

Scotia (transatlantic Va.; Charleston, S.C.;
and transpacific via (transatlantic) Algeciras,

partnership with
Maersk; also slot

Suez Canal)

charters to P&O
Nedlloyd

Spain; Gioia Tauro, Italy;
(Suez Canal) Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia; Dubai, United Arab
Emirates; Port Klang,
Malaysia; Singapore,
Malaysia; Yantian, China;
Hong Kong, China;
(transpacific) Long Beach,
Calif.; Tacoma, Wash.;
(transpacific) Yokohama,
Japan; Shimizu, Japan; Kobe,
Japan; Kaohsiung, Taiwan;
Hong Kong; Yantian, China;
Singapore; Port Klang;
Colombo, Sri Lanka; (Suez
Canal) Gioia Tauro, Italy;
Algeciras, Spain;
(transatlantic) and return to
Halifax, Nova Scotia

284 : : : appendix b

Frequency

Fixed day; weekly

Port of origin
(General service
description)

Ports of call

Cooperative aspects

Bremerhaven,

Felixstowe, England;

Operated in

Germany
(transatlantic;

Rotterdam, Netherlands; Le
Havre, France; (transatlantic)

partnership with
OOCL and P&O

multiple crossings)

Boston, Mass.; Port Elizabeth,
N.J.; (transatlantic) Rotterdam,

Nedlloyd; also slot
charters to Maersk

Netherlands; Bremerhaven,
Germany; Felixstowe, England;
Rotterdam, Netherlands; Le
Havre, France; (transatlantic)
Boston, Mass.; Port Elizabeth,
N.J.; Norfolk, Va.;
(transatlantic) Rotterdam,
Netherlands; (transatlantic)
Port Elizabeth, N.J.; Norfolk,
Va.; (transatlantic) Rotterdam;
and return to Bremerhaven,
Germany
Fixed day; weekly

Rotterdam,
Netherlands

Bremerhaven, Germany;
Felixstowe, England;

Operated in
partnership with

(transatlantic)

(transatlantic) Charleston, SC;
Port Everglades, Fla.;

OOCL and P&O
Nedlloyd; also slot

Houston, TX; Jacksonville,

charters to Maersk

Fla.; Charleston, S.C.;
(transatlantic) Rotterdam,
Netherlands; Bremerhaven,
Germany; Felixstowe,
England; and return to
Rotterdam
Fixed day; weekly

Le Havre, France

Felixstowe, England;

(transatlantic)

Bremerhaven, Germany;

Operated in
partnership with

Rotterdam, Netherlands;
(transatlantic) Port Elizabeth,

OOCL and P&O
Nedlloyd; also slot

N.J.; Norfolk, Va.; Charleston,
S.C.; Miami, Fla.; Charleston,

charters to Maersk

S.C.; Baltimore, Md.; Port
Elizabeth, N.J.; (transatlantic)
and return to Le Havre, France
Fixed day; weekly

Felixstowe, England

Bremerhaven, Germany;

Operated in alliance

(transatlantic; St.

Rotterdam, Netherlands;

partnership with

Lawrence)

(transatlantic) Montreal,

Maersk; also slot
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Frequency

Fixed day; weekly

Port of origin
(General service
description)

Ports of call

Cooperative aspects

Quebec; (transatlantic) and
return to Felixstowe, England

charters to P&O
Nedlloyd

Port Everglades,

Freeport, Bahamas;

Operated in alliance

Fla. (transatlantic;
Caribbean and

Charleston, SC; (transatlantic) partnership with
Algeciras, Spain; Gioia Tauro, Maersk; also slot

Mediterranean)

Italy; Genoa, Italy; Valencia,

charters to P&O

Spain; Algeciras, Spain;
(transatlantic) Charleston,

Nedlloyd

S.C.; Freeport, N.J.; Miami,
Fla.; Veracruz, Mexico;
Houston, Tex.; and return to
Port Everglades, Fla.
Fixed day; weekly

Le Havre, France
(Europe–Far East

Rotterdam, Netherlands;
Hamburg, Germany;

Operated in alliance
partnership with

via Suez Canal)

Felixstowe, England;
Rotterdam, Netherlands;

Maersk

Gioia Tauro, Italy; (Suez
Canal) Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
Port Klang, Malaysia;
Singapore, Malaysia; Hong
Kong; Hakata, Japan; Busan,
South Korea; Kwangyang,
South Korea; Shanghai,
China; Yantian, China; Hong
Kong; Singapore; (Suez
Canal) Gioia Tauro, Italy; and
return to Le Havre, France
Fixed day; weekly

Felixstowe, England
(Europe–Middle

Rotterdam, the Netherlands;
Bremerhaven, Germany;

Operated in alliance
partnership with

East via Suez

Algeciras, Spain; (Suez Canal)

Maersk

Canal)

Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Jawaharlal Nehru, India;
Colombo, Sri Lanka; Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia; (Suez Canal)
Algeciras, Spain; and return to
Felixstowe, England

Fixed day; weekly

Algeciras, Spain
(transatlantic;

Antwerp, Belgium;
Rotterdam, Netherlands; Le

Operated in alliance
partnership with

Europe–South

Havre, France; Algeciras,

Maersk

America)

Spain; (transatlantic) Rio de

286 : : : appendix b

Frequency

Port of origin
(General service
description)

Ports of call

Cooperative aspects

Janeiro, Brazil; Santos, Brazil;
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Rio
Grande, Brazil; Sao Francisco
do Sul, Brazil (alternate
sailings only); Paranagua,
Brazil; Santos, Brazil;
(transatlantic) and return to
Algeciras, Spain
Fixed day; weekly

Rotterdam,

Bremerhaven, Germany; Le

Operated in alliance

Netherlands
(transatlantic;

Havre, France; (transatlantic)
Charleston, S.C.; Freeport,

partnership with
Maersk

Europe–Central and

Bahamas; Miami, Fla.;

South America)

Cartagena, Colombia; Puerto
Manzanillo, Costa Rica;
(Panama Canal)
Buenaventura, Colombia;
Manta, Ecuador; Callao, Peru;
Arica, Chile; San Antonio,
Peru; Callao, Peru; Guayaquil,
Ecuador; Buenaventura,
Colombia; (Panama Canal)
Puerto Manzanillo, Costa
Rica; Puerto Limon, Costa
Rica; Freeport, Bahamas;
Miami, Fla.; Charleston, S.C.;
(transatlantic) and return to
Rotterdam, Netherlands

Fixed day; weekly

Bremerhaven,

Goteborg, Sweden;

Operated in alliance

Germany

Felixstowe, England;

partnership with

(Europe–Far East
via Suez Canal)

Rotterdam, Netherlands;
Maersk
Algeciras, Spain; (Suez Canal)
Singapore, Malaysia; Hong
Kong, China; Kaohsiung,
Taiwan; Kobe, Japan; Nagoya,
Japan; Yokohama, Japan;
Kaohsiung, Taiwan; Hong
Kong; Singapore; (Suez
Canal) Algeciras, Spain;
Felixstowe, England;
Rotterdam, Netherlands; and
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Frequency

Port of origin
(General service
description)

Ports of call

Cooperative aspects

return to Bremerhaven,
Germany
Weekly

Freeport, Bahamas
(Caribbean)

Miami, Fla.; Puerto Cortes,
Honduras; Santo Tomas de

Operated in alliance
partnership with

Castilla, Guatemala; and

Maersk

return to Freeport, Bahamas
Weekly

Port Elizabeth, N.J.
(Caribbean and

San Juan, Puerto Rico; Rio
Haina, Dominican Republic;

Puerto Rico)

Kingston, Jamaica; New
Orleans, La.; San Juan, Puerto

Operated by SeaLand alone

Rico; Rio Haina, Dominican
Republic; and return to Port
Elizabeth, N.J.
Weekly

Fixed day; weekly

Port Elizabeth, N.J.

San Juan, Puerto Rico;

Operated by Sea-

(Puerto Rico)

Jacksonville, Fla.; and return
to Port Elizabeth, N.J.

Land alone

New Orleans, La.

San Juan, Puerto Rico; Rio

Operated by Sea-

(Caribbean and
Puerto Rico)

Haina, Dominican Republic;
and return to New Orleans,

Land alone

La.
Fixed day; weekly

Port Everglades,

Jacksonville, Fla.; Miami, Fla.; Operated in alliance

Fla. (Caribbean
circuit)

Freeport, Bahamas; Rio
Haina, Dominican Republic;

partnership with
Maersk

La Guaira, Venezuela; Puerto
Cabello, Venezuela; Rio
Haina, Dominican Republic;
and return to Port Everglades,
Fla.
Weekly

Port Elizabeth, N.J.

Norfolk, Va.; Jacksonville,

(South America;
Fla.; Freeport, Bahamas;
East Coast) America Miami, Fla.; Puerto Cabello,
Venezuela; Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil (alternate sailings
only); Santos, Brazil; Buenos
Aires, Argentina; Rio Grande,
Brazil; Rio de Janeiro
(alternate sailings only);
Puerto Cabello, Venezuela;
Freeport, Bahamas; and
return to Port Elizabeth, N.J.
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Operated in alliance
partnership with
Maersk

Frequency

Port of origin
(General service
description)

Ports of call

Cooperative aspects

Weekly

Port Elizabeth, N.J.
(South America;

Baltimore, Md.; Norfolk, Va.;
Jacksonville, Fla.; Charleston,

Operated by SeaLand alone

West Coast via
Panama Canal)

S.C.; Miami, Fla.; Kingston,
Jamaica; Cartagena,
Colombia; (Panama Canal)
Buenaventura, Colombia;
Callao, Peru; Arica, Chile;
Iquique, Chile; San Antonio,
Peru; Callao, Peru;
Buenaventura, Colombia;
(Panama Canal) Cristobal,
Panama; Kingston, Jamaica;
Miami, Fla.; Jacksonville, Fla.;
Charleston, S.C.; and return to
Port Elizabeth, N.J.

Weekly

Houston, Tex.
(Central and South

New Orleans, La.; Miami, Fla.; Operated by SeaKingston, Jamaica; Cartagena, Land alone

America via
Panama Canal)

Colombia; Cristobal, Panama;
(Panama Canal)
Buenaventura, Colombia;
Callao, Peru; Iquique, Chile;
San Antonio, Peru; Callao,
Peru; Buenaventura,
Colombia; (Panama Canal)
Cartagena, Colombia;
Kingston, Jamaica; Veracruz,
Mexico; and return to

Two sailings per

Tacoma, Wash.

Houston, Tex.
Anchorage, Alaska; Kodiak,

Operated by Sea-

week

(Alaska)

Alaska; and return to Tacoma,

Land alone

Fixed day; weekly

Long Beach, Calif.

Wash.
Manzanillo, Mexico; Puerto

Operated in alliance

(Central and South
America; West

Quetzal, Guatemala;
Guayaquil, Ecuador; Callao,

partnership with
Maersk

Coast)

Peru; San Antonio, Peru;
Iquique, Chile; Puerto Ilo,
Peru; Callao, Peru; Paita,
Peru; Guayaquil, Ecuador; and
return to Long Beach, Calif.
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appendix c: maritime activity at the port of
new york, thursday, april 26, 1956
To give some sense of the scope and style of maritime operations in the Port
of New York in the days before containerization, the following tables display
information about the arrival and the departure of deepwater vessels on April
26, 1956, the same day Pan-Atlantic’s Ideal X cast off from Port Newark bound
for Houston, Texas.
arrivals
vessel

type

company (flag)

arrived from

berth

(1)

(2)

passenger
troopship

Italian Line (Italy)
Trieste, Italy
Military Sea Transport Bremerhaven,

Pvt. W.W.
Thomas

troopship

Military Sea Transport San Juan, Puerto 58th Street (Brooklyn)
Service (USA)
Rico’

Santa Olivia

cargo

Grace Line (USA)

Cristobal,
Panama

Mormachawk

cargo

Moore-McCormick

Philadelphia, Pa. Pier 32 (North River)

cargo

(USA)
Yugoslav Line

Gibraltar

Erie Basin (Brooklyn)

cargo

(Yugoslavia)
N.V. Reederij

Bremen, West

5th Street (Hoboken)

Amsterdam

Germany

Saturnia
General G.M.

Service (USA)

Randall

Biokovo
Amstelpark

Excellency
Horta

Pier 84 (North River)
58th Street (Brooklyn)

West Germany

Java Street (Brooklyn)

cargo

(Holland)
American-Export

Norfolk, Va.

Pier F (Jersey City)

cargo

(USA)
Cia. De Nav.

Puerto Delgato

Pier 16 (East River)

Carregadores

(Azores),

Acoreanos
(Portugal)

Portugal

Athelfoam

tanker

Athel Line (UK)

La Romana,
Dominican

(4)

Edward
Luckenbach

cargo

Luckenbach (USA)

Cristobal,
Panama

35th Street (Brooklyn)

A.P. Moeller
(Denmark)

Providence, R.I.

Clark Street
(Brooklyn)

Republic

Nicoline Maersk cargo
(3)

vessel

type

company (flag)

arrived from
(1)

berth
(2)

Mormacyork

cargo

Moore-McCormick

Buenos Aires,

Erie Basin (Brooklyn)

(USA)
Yucatan

cargo

West India Fruit &

Argentina
Nicaro, Cuba

Pier 34 (North River)
29th Street (Brooklyn)

Steamship (Liberia)
Para (3)

cargo

Lloyd Brasileiro
(Brazil)

Avonmouth
(Bristol),

American

cargo

American-Hawaiian

West Coast

Pier 88 (North River)

Puerto Cortes,
Honduras

Weehawken
Interchange

England
(USA)
Metapan

cargo

United Fruit (USA)

Terminal (North
River)
Nebraska

cargo

Swedish-American
(Sweden)

Quirigua

cargo

United Mail

Goteborg,

45th Street (Brooklyn)

Sweden
Philadelphia, Pa. Pier 3 (North River)

Steamship (USA)
Steel Rover

cargo

Isthmian (USA)

Boston, Mass.

Erie Basin (Brooklyn)

Ciudad de Cali

cargo

Grancolombiana

Baltimore, Md.

Atlantic Avenue

Havmann

cargo

A/S Havbo (Norway)

Hamburg,

Joralemon Street

Villamartin (3)

cargo

Cia. Frutero-

n/a

n/a

n/a

(4)

n/a

(4)

(Colombia)

(Brooklyn)
West Germany

(Brooklyn)

Valenciana de
Navegacion (Spain)
Mabay

tanker

Empresa Hondurena
de Vapores

Antonia

tanker

Royal Dutch Shell
(Holland)

Jakara

cargo

A/S Kosmos (Norway) Camden, N.J.

Jersbek

cargo

Jersbeck Partners
(West Germany)

Seatrain New

railroad car Seatrain (USA)

(Hondurus)

Columbia Street
(Brooklyn)

York

Jacksonville, Fla. Pier 16 (East River)
Savannah, Ga.

Seatrain Terminal

Houston, Tex.

(4)

carrier

(Edgewater)

Keytanker

tanker

Keystone Tankship
(USA)

Jeanette

tanker

Grancargo S.A. (Costa Jacksonville, Fla. Erie Basin (Brooklyn)
Rica)
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vessel

type

company (flag)

arrived from
(1)

berth
(2)

President

cargo

American President

Boston, Mass.

Pier 9 (Jersey City)

cargo

Lines (USA)
Iceland Steamship

Reykjavik,

Erie Basin (Brooklyn)

cargo
tanker

(Iceland)
Iceland
French Line (France) Le Havre, France 45th Street (Brooklyn)
Liberty Transportation Amuay Bay, Tex. (4)

Madison
Godafoss
St. Malo
Olympic Sky

Shinnecock Bay cargo

(Liberia)
Veritas Steamship

Moline Victory

cargo

(USA)
Prudential (USA)

Almena

container
ship-

Pan-Atlantic
Steamship Co.

tanker

Philadelphia, Pa. n/a
Mediterranean
ports
(5)

Pier 20 (East River)
Port Newark

(USA)

departures
vessel

type

company

destination

berth

(1)

(2)

Houston, Tex.

Port Newark

container
ship-

Pan-Atlantic
Steamship Co.

Liberte
Brazil

tanker
passenger
passenger

(USA)
French Line (France)
Moore-McCormick

Le Havre, France Pier 88 (North River)
Buenos Aires,
Pier 32 (North River)

Copan

cargo

(USA)
Empresa Hondurena

Argentina
Puerto Cortez,

Elizabeth

cargo

de Vapores
(Honduras)
Bull Line (USA)

Panama

passenger

Trevince

cargo

Panama Canal
Company (USA)
Hain Steamship (UK)

Shomron
Santa Ines

cargo
cargo

Zim Israel (Israel)
Grace Line (USA)

Antonina

cargo

Bella Dan

cargo

Rederi A/B Poseidon
(Sweden)
J. Lauritzen

Ideal X

(Denmark)
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Pier 3 (North River)

Honduras
San Juan, Puerto 21st Street (Brooklyn)
Rico
Cristobal,
Pier 64 (North River)
Panama
Melbourne,
42nd Street
Australia
Haifa, Israel
Cristobal,
Panama
Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil
Cristobal,
Panama

(Brooklyn)
Java Street (Brooklyn)
Java Street (Brooklyn)
n/a
n/a

vessel

type

company

destination
(1)

berth
(2)

Osiris

cargo

Royal Netherlands
(Holland)

Curacao,
Netherlands

31st Street (Brooklyn)

Kawasaki Kisen K.K.
(Japan)
Maersk Lines

West Indies
Yokohama,
Japan
Manila, the

Clark Street

Philippines
Sept Isles,

(Brooklyn)
n/a

Kimikawa
cargo
Maru
Nicoline Maersk cargo
(3)
Texan

(Denmark)
bulk carrier Ore Transport, Inc.

Gulfkey

tanker

Black Osprey

cargo

Samuel Q.
Brown
President
Garfield
Steel Admiral
Seatrain

Lines (USA)
cargo
Isthmian (USA)
railroad car Seatrain (USA)

Georgia
American

carrier
cargo

tanker

Black Diamond Line
(Norway)
Tidewater Associated

Quebec
Caripito,
Venezuela
Antwerp,
Belgium
Houston, Tex.

Smith Street
(Brooklyn)
(4)

cargo

Oil (USA)
American President

n/a

Pier 9 (Jersey City)

n/a
Savannah, Ga.

n/a
Seatrain Terminal

Bilbao, Spain

(Edgewater)
Pier 60 (North River)

Banker
American
cargo
Manufacturer
Pioneer Cove
cargo
American Scout cargo
E. Storil

n/a
tanker

Chemical
Transporter
Kehrea

cargo

Farovi

tanker

E. H. Blum

tanker

Black Heron

cargo

(USA)
Gulf Oil (USA)

n/a

United States Lines

(4)

(USA)
United States Lines
(USA)
United States Lines
(USA)
United States Lines

Boson, Mass.

n/a

Brisbane,
Australia
n/a

Pier 60 (North River)
n/a

(USA)
n/a

Newport News,

n/a

Va.
Chemical Transporter, n/a
Inc. (USA)
T.N. Epiphaniades
n/a
Shipping (Greece)
Compania de
Havana, Cuba
Transporte Mar.
Caribe S.A. (Cuba)
Atlantic Refining
(USA)
Black Diamond Line
(Norway)

(4)
n/a
(3)

Atreco, Tex.

(4)

Antwerp,

Smith Street

Belgium

(Brooklyn)
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vessel

type

company

destination
(1)

berth
(2)

Cheyenne

n/a

n/a

Kingston,

n/a

Jamaica
Para (3)

cargo

Lloyd Brasileiro
(Brazil)

Philadelphia, Pa. 29th Street (Brooklyn)

Villamartin (3)

cargo

Cia. Frutero-Valencian Bilbao, Spain
de Nav. (Spain)

n/a

Kota Agoeng

cargo

N.V. Koninklijke

Bush Terminal

Galveston, Tex.

Rotterdamsche
Lloyd (Holland)

(Brooklyn)

Sloterdyk

cargo

Holland America
(Holland)

Antwerp,
Belgium

La Brea Hills

tanker

Trinidad Corporation

Lake Charles, La. (3)

cargo

(USA)
United Fruit (USA)

Puerto Barrios,

Esparta

Guatemala

n/a

Weehawken
Interchange
Terminal (North
River)

New York
Esso Brooklyn

tanker
tanker

Texas Company (USA) Port Arthur, Tex. (4)
Esso Shipping (USA) Jacksonville, Fla. (4)

Notes
1. Principal origin or destination shown, not all ports served. In some cases, however, only a
vessel’s first (or last) port of call is indicated. Foreign-flag vessels showing a U.S. port as either
its origin or destination were necessarily working longer international itineraries, since the Jones
Act precludes such vessels from serving domestic trades.
2. Manhattan berths along the Hudson (North) River and the East River, as well as berths in
Jersey City, are identified by pier number. Because the Brooklyn waterfront includes a variety of
numbering sequences, berths in Brooklyn are identified by the street where they are located.
3. Vessel arrived early on April 26 and departed later that evening.
4. Tankers typically docked at various private oil terminals located along the Kill Van Kull and
the Arthur Kill. Precise berthing information is not included in routine published information
about maritime activity in the port.
5. Almena arrived in port on April 26 following a one-day trial trip. Vessel sailed from Port
Newark bound for Houston, Tex., on May 3, 1956, Pan-Atlantic’s second container-ship departure.
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notes

notes to introduction
1. In 1956, Pan-Atlantic’s Ideal X carried fifty-eight custom-built containers that were
thirty-three feet long, a common dimension for over-the-road trailers of that era. Trailers
and containers today come in a variety of sizes, and most jurisdictions in the United
States permit trailers up to fifty-three feet in length, with eleven states allowing even
longer fifty-seven-foot rigs under certain conditions. For purposes of vessel quantification and comparison, though, the capacity of a contemporary container ship is typically
expressed in something called ‘‘trailer equivalent units,’’ or TEUs. One TEU equals a
trailer that is twenty feet long, the smallest ordinary container in common use, and the
capacity of a container ship is routinely expressed in TEUs. Thus ‘‘nine thousand containers per trip’’ is more correctly 9,000 TEUs.
2. Although few merchant ships in the world fleet today are powered by steam engines, the term steamship line remains in popular usage as a generic description of oceangoing transport companies. Likewise, it is perfectly ordinary to speak of a vessel’s
‘‘steaming’’ from one port to another, even if its propulsion power is being generated by
a diesel engine.

notes to chapter 1
1. See Richard Pollak, Colombo Bay (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).
2. For additional information about the United States Shipping Board, written by the
man who chaired the organization during its early years, see Edward N. Hurley, A Bridge
to France (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1927). See also Darrell Hevenor Smith and
Paul V. Betters, The United States Shipping Board: Its History, Activities and Organization
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1931). The Hog Island name comes from a
waterfront location along the Delaware River where such vessels were built.
3. This ranking would continue until World War II. In 1939, for example, the merchant
fleet of the United Kingdom totaled 24,054,000 deadweight tons; that of the United
States was 11,382,000, while Japan was in third place with 7,145,000 deadweight tons.
William A Lovett, ed., United States Shipping Policies and the World Market (Westport,
Conn.: Quorum Books, 1996), 60.
4. For an analysis of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and its impact on subsequent
cargo-ship construction in the United States, see E. Scott Dillon, Ludwig C. Hoffman,
and Donald P. Roseman, ‘‘Forty Years of Ship Designs Under the Merchant Marine Act,
1936–1976,’’ Proceedings of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers 84 (1976):
169–207. See also Frederic C. Lane, Ships for Victory: A History of Shipbuilding Under the
U.S. Maritime Commission in World War II (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2001).
5. For additional information about the C-2, including a brief history of each vessel,
see L. A. Sawyer and W. H. Mitchell, From America to United States (Kendal, England:

World Ship Society, 1981). See also John H. La Dage, Ships: A Pictorial Study (Cambridge, Md.: Cornell Maritime Press, 1955), 32–46; Dillon, Hoffman, and Roseman,
‘‘Forty Years of Ship Designs,’’ 173–174.
6. For purposes of this narrative, it will not be necessary to identify various subclassifications that were appended to the C-2 designation, such as C2-S-B1, for example. In
this case, S designates steam-powered, while B1 identifies distinctive features of hull and
superstructure. In addition to the basic C-2 specification, there were nineteen subclasses.
Many C-2s built during the final years of World War II looked ahead to postwar commerce and reflected specifications that were tailored to the trading needs of specific U.S.
steamship companies. The C2-S-E1 subclass cited as an example in the text, for instance,
identifies a fleet of thirty hulls built to meet requirements of the Waterman Steamship
Company; these vessels would figure prominently in the early history of the containership industry. For additional information, see Charles R. Cushing, ‘‘Break-Bulk and Containerships,’’ in A Half Century of Maritime Technology: 1943–1993, ed. Harry Benford and
William A. Fox (Jersey City, N.J.: Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers,
1993), 209–226.
7. What would become the Maritime Commission’s C-4 design was originated by a
private company, the American Hawaiian Steamship Company, but the onset of war
precluded the completion of any such vessels for this carrier. The wartime production of
C-4s included seventy-five vessels: the forty-five troop transports noted in the text, ten
all-cargo ships, one tank carrier, five combination cargo-transport vessels, and fourteen
hospital ships. See Sawyer and Mitchell, From America to United States, 63–85.
8. For detailed information about the T-2 tanker, see L. A. Sawyer and W. H. Mitchell,
Victory Ships and Tankers (Newton Abbot, England: David and Charles, 1974), 88–218.
Chris Nutton describes the T-2 in some detail, but focuses on those vessels that operated
under British registry, in ‘‘Workhorse Tankers,’’ Ships Monthly 37 (April 2002): 16–19. An
interesting treatment of the T-2 is an article written by naval architect David R. Dorn in
defense of the design, New York Times, January 1, 1961.
9. For information about the Liberty Ships, see L. A. Sawyer and W. H. Mitchell, The
Liberty Ship (Cambridge, Md.: Cornell Maritime Press, 1970); John G. Bunker, Liberty
Ships: The Ugly Ducklings of World War II (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1972);
Lane, Ships for Victory, 72–100. For a treatment of the Victory Ships, see Sawyer and
Mitchell, Victory Ships and Tankers, 15–87; Lane, Ships for Victory, 574–607; James A.
Pottinger, ‘‘Victory Ships of World War II,’’ Ships Monthly 34 (November 1999): 18–21.
10. Rene De La Pedraja, The Rise and Decline of U.S. Merchant Shipping in the Twentieth
Century (New York: Twayne, 1992), 147. Serial statistics about the U.S. merchant fleet
from 1943 through 2003, by vessel type, are to be found on a public website maintained by
the U.S. Maritime Administration at www.marad.dot.gov/MARAD_statistics/index.html.
11. Containerization Oral History Collection: 1999–2000 (Washington, D.C.: National
Museum of American History), Scott Morrison interview, 61. This oral history project
was supervised by Arthur Donovan, a distinguished maritime historian, and recorded
under the sponsorship of the Jerome and Dorothy Lemelson Center for the Study of
Innovation. It may be found in the Archives Center at the National Museum of American
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History of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington. Original tapes are not available
for research purposes, but written transcripts are. Citations to this resource will identify
the individual being interviewed and the page number of the written transcript.
12. A more precise estimate suggests that an average C-2 cargo ship spent 55 percent
of its days at sea, the rest in port. See E. Scott Dillon, Francis G. Ebel, and Andrew R.
Goobeck, ‘‘Ship Design for Improved Cargo Handling,’’ Transactions of the Society of
Naval Architects and Marine Engineers 70 (1962): 634–748; the statistic is found at 649.
13. McLean would frequently retell this story over the years, identifying the waterfront
as that of Hoboken, New Jersey. It is a good deal more likely, however, that McLean’s
patience was tried—and the seeds of a later transport revolution were sown—at the foot
of Exchange Place in Jersey City, under the famous Colgate clock. The vessel his cargo
was eventually placed aboard was more than likely American Export’s Examelia, a cargo
ship that departed for the Mediterranean on Wednesday, November 24, and was scheduled to reach Istanbul on December 18, 1937. Examelia would become a wartime casualty
when it was torpedoed and sunk twenty miles south of the Cape of Good Hope on
October 9, 1942.
14. The formal citation of the Jones Act is 46 USC 862–889. For an incisive treatment
of this statute, albeit from the perspective of changes advocated by the authors, see
Warren G. Leback and John W. McConnell Jr., ‘‘The Jones Act: Foreign-Built Vessels and
the Domestic Shipping Industry,’’ Proceedings of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers 91 (1983): 169–193.
15. The 165 vessels operating intercoastal in 1939 had a combined deadweight tonnage
of 1,641,000, while the 543 in coastwise trade totaled 4,360,000. In 1954, the 57 vessels
operating intercoastally had a combined deadweight tonnage of 573,000 and included 6
tankers and 51 dry cargo ships, while the 283 vessels working coastwise included 53 dry
cargo ships and 230 tankers and totaled 4,115,000 deadweight tons. New York Times,
January 13, 1955.
16. For an account of Nazi submarine activity off the East Coast during the early war
years, see Michael Gannon, Operation Drumbeat (New York: Harper & Row, 1990).

notes to chapter 2
1. ‘‘Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation, Mobile, Alabama; Agency Agreement for
Managing and Operating Vessels,’’ unpublished document from the Waterman Steamship Corporation Records; University of South Alabama Archives, box 6, file 38. Additional background on Waterman and Pan-Atlantic may be found in ‘‘History of Waterman
Steamship Corporation,’’ unpublished paper in the holdings of the McLean Foundation,
Alexandria, Va. See also John L. Hazard, Crisis in Coastal Shipping (Austin: University of
Texas, 1955), 156–161.
2. ‘‘History of Waterman Steamship Corporation,’’ 8. For an account of Waterman’s
efforts at establishing an airline, see John L. Marty Jr., ‘‘Steamship Airline,’’ Airways 12
(July 2005): 53–57; (August 2005): 55–59. Though it was unable to secure permanent
rights to operate scheduled service, Waterman Airlines did make some impressive
achievements in charter work, including the first commercial air service between the
United States and South Africa.
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3. The era following World War I saw the emergence of three important U.S. steamship companies that were Gulf Coast–based: Waterman (along with its subsidiaries), the
Lykes Brothers Steamship Company, and the Delta Line. For additional details, see Rene
De La Pedraja, The Rise and Decline of U.S. Merchant Shipping in the Twentieth Century
(New York: Twayne, 1992), 79–93.
4. Pan Royal and Panama City from 1936 were still on the Pan-Atlantic roster in 1941–
42, but the original Pan Atlantic had been replaced by a different ship of the same name,
while three additional vessels, Pan Orleans, Pan Gulf, and Pan Kraft, had joined the fleet.
Pan-Atlantic briefly owned yet another vessel called Pan Atlantic (Off. No. 217436). It
was acquired from Christenson Steamship in 1938 but was quickly transferred to the
roster of parent Waterman and renamed DeSoto. The Pan Atlantic, also acquired from
Christenson, spent an equally short tenure on the Waterman roster under the name
DeSoto.
5. A sister-ship of El Dia and El Valle was involved in a critical incident in New York
Harbor during World War II. On April 24, 1943, fire broke out in the hold of the El
Estero (Off. No. 220829) while the vessel was loading ammunition along the New Jersey
waterfront. With devastating explosion an imminent threat, fireboats of the New York
Fire Department poured water onto the burning ship as it was towed away from its berth
and safely scuttled. For additional details, see Brian J. Cudahy, Around Manhattan Island
and Other Maritime Tales of New York (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997),
96–99.
6. ‘‘History of Waterman Steamship Corporation,’’ 8.
7. New York Times, October 11, 1948.
8. Hazard, Crisis in Coastal Shipping, 156–157. See also New York Times, November 15,
1948.
9. New York Times, October 1, 1951.
10. Ibid., November 7, 1948.
11. For a detailed account of the development of piggyback service by American railroads, see David J. DeBoer, Piggyback and Containers (San Marino, Calif.: Golden West,
1992).
12. For a treatment of the ICC, see Marvin L. Fair, Economic Considerations in the
Administration of the Interstate Commerce Act (Cambridge, Md.: Cornell Maritime Press,
1972.
13. For additional insights into the workings of the ICC, told informally, see Frank N.
Wilner, Comes Now the Interstate Commerce Practitioner (Gaithersburg, Md.: Association
of Transportation Practitioners, 1993).
14. Quoted in the New York Times, September 18, 1953.
15. Hazard, Crisis in Coastal Shipping, iii.
16. For autobiographical details about Malcom McLean, see McLean Foundation Oral
History Collection, Malcom McLean interview, 6–13. This is a second oral history of the
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Railroads, 85, 160–67: competition with
steamship lines for coastal traffic,
11–12; conflicts with Port of New York
Authority, 56; mergers and consolidations, 160–62; rail cars carried aboard
ocean-going ships, 73–74. See also
Land bridge
Raleigh, N.C., 20
Rapid transit cars (as steamship cargo),
151
Raymond, Chuck, 193
Raymond, Thomas L., 49
Ready Reserve Force. See U.S. Government, Maritime Administration,
Ready Reserve Force
Reagan, Ronald W.; Reagan Administration, 252
Rederi A/B Transatlantic, 100, 102
Red Hook Container Terminal, 250
Re-flagging. See Flags of convenience
Reilly, James M., 48

S class (Evergreen), 216
Safmarine, Ltd., 193
Saigon, South Vietnam, 106
Saint George Ferry Terminal, 43
Saint Lawrence Seaway, 57, 185
Saint Nazaire, France, 22
Saipan, 226
Samsung Shipbuilding Co., 153, 241
San Diego, Calif., 224, 252
San Francisco, Calif., 76
San Juan, Puerto Rico, 22, 73, 85, 89
San Pedro, Calif., 235–36
Santa Fe Railroad. See Atchison, Topeka
and Santa Fe R.R.; Burlington Northern Santa Fe R.R.
Sattahip, Thailand, 109
Sausalito, Calif., x
Savannah, Ga., 53, 151, 155, 166, 234, 236
Savannah Line, 13

Reynolds Leasing Corp., 131

S.C. Loveland Co., 23–24, 25, 30
Scappa Flow, U.K., 243

Rheinstahl Nordseewerke, 118

Schlieker Werft, 79

Richardson, Paul, 21, 107

Sea Change in Liner Shipping (book), 168
Sea–Land Service, xi, 167, 171–72, 148–49;

Richmond, Calif., 100
Richmond, Va., 157
Rickenbacker, Eddie, 59

acquired by CSX, 157, 160; acquired by
Moeller–Maersk, 187; acquired by R.J.

Rijeka, Croatia, 253

Reynolds, 130–32; Alaska service, 84–

Ringling Brothers Circus, 69

86, 176; earnings, 173, 188–90; labor
relations, 124; Mayaguez incident,

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, x
R.J. Reynolds Industries; R.J. Reynolds
stock, 131, 138, 145, 148, 156

109–11; origins in Pan-Atlantic Steamship, 75; Puerto Rico service, 72–73;

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 130–33

trans-Atlantic service, 86–89, 123–24,

Robbins Reef; Robbins Reef light, 43

128–29; trans-Pacific service, 108–9,
124, 137; Vietnam service, 106–8; ves-

Roosevelt, Franklin D., Roosevelt Administration, 16
Ro/ro (vessels), xi, 22, 26, 81, 102–3, 221,
252
Rotterdam Dockyards, 118, 130
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sel color schemes, 94. See also specific
classes of vessels, SL-7 class, Atlantic
class, etc., and individual vessels, by
name

Seamaster class (American President
Lines), 208

Stevens Institute, 123
St. Johnson, Kerry, 154

Seatrade Weekly (periodical), 218

Straits of Florida, 74

Searacer class (American President

Straits of Gibraltar, 135

Lines), 207

Straits of San Juan de Fuca, 124

Seatrain Lines, 73–74

Strategic alliances, 100–1, 174, 190

Seattle, Wash., 28, 84–85, 124, 165, 226,

Sturgeon Bay. Wisc., 176, 192

238
Second World War. See World War II

Submarine activity (during World War
II), 12

Sedro-Woolley, Wash., 33

Submarine Boat Corp., 50

Seward, Alaska, 85

Suez Canal, 1, 139, 154

Shafting fairwaters, 122–23

Sulzer (diesel engines), 138, 141, 179, 210

Simmons, Harold, 157–58

Sun Shipbuilding Co., 3, 96, 146, 147, 220.

Sinkings, 82
Skagit Steel and Iron Works, 33

See also Pennsylvania Shipbuilding
Co.

Slater Boat Service, 96–97

Supersonic transport plane, 117

SL-7 class (Sea–Land), 116–30

Susquehanna R.R. See New York, Susque-

SL-18 class (Sea–Land), 132–35, 223

hanna and Western R.R.

SL-31 class (Sea–Land), 175

Swanstrom, Edward E., 65–66

Snow, John W., 188

Swedish American Line, 100

Southampton, U.K., 11, 45, 87, 89

Swift boats, 110

South China Sea, 109

Sword Line, 30

Southern Pacific R.R., 15, 160, 163, 207

Sydney, Australia, 209

Soviet Union; Union of Soviet Socialist

Syria, 130

Republics, 36
Spar decks, x–xi, 23, 38, 51

T-1 tankers, 5

Sparrows Point (Baltimore), 27, 133, 221

T-2 tankers, 5, 6, 8, 23, 27–32, 51, 58: con-

Sponsons, 33, 70

versions into container ships, 90, 100,

Spreaders, 39–40

111

Sputnik, 36
Staten Island Ferry, 43

T-3 tankers, 5, 8: conversions into container ships, 77–78, 138

Staten Island, N.Y., 43

Tacoma, Wash., 165, 238

Statistical tables: Carrying Capacity by

Tampa, Fla., 17

Line (2004), Import and Export Cargo

Tanlinger, Kieth, 39

(2003), 233; 234; Import and Export

Teamsters, 21, 247. See also International

Containers by Port (2004), 235, 237;
Import and Export Containers by
Trading Partners (2004), 239

Brotherhood of Teamsters
TEU (definition), 41, 295n1
The Business of Shipping (book), 171

Statue of Liberty, 42, 45, 152

The Colombo Bay (book), 1

Steam engines (marine): triple expansion

Thomas, William du Berry, 117

(reciprocating), 6, 86; turbines, 4, 6,

Thomsen, Tommy, 188

77, 120, 136–37, 176, 192

Tillbury, U.K., 72, 103, 105

Stevedores, 20. See also longshoremen

Tinian, 226
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TMT Trailer Ferry, 22
Tobin, Austin, 58, 61

—Coast Guard, 28, 118, 124, 138; Vessel
Documentation Center, 185

Todd Shipbuilding, 78, 84, 100, 225

—Congress, 93, 212

Toledo, Ohio, 28

—Constitution, 53
—Customs Service, 78

Tokyo, Japan, 215
Trailerships, Inc., 21

—Department of Defense, 107, 199
—Department of Justice, 148

Transatlantic Conference Agreement, 172

—Federal Aviation Administration, 96

Trans-Siberian R.R., 167

—Federal Court of Appeals, 25
—Federal District Court, 25

Trailer Bridge, Inc., 205

Triborough Bridge; Triborough Bridge
Trieste, Italy, x

—Federal Maritime Commission, 172
—House of Representatives, ix, 16

Truman, Harry S; Truman Administra-

—Interstate Commerce Commission, 19–

and Tunnel Authority, 58–59

tion, 58
Tug boats, 23–24, 43, 45–6, 81, 152
Tulane University, 20
Tung, C. Y., 104
Tydings, Millard E., 25
Ultra Large Container Carrier, 243
Ulsan, South Korea, 140
Uniglory Marine, 219
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See
Soviet Union
Union Pacific R.R., 160–61, 236
United Airlines, 171
United Dock Workers, 73
United States Lines, 5, 72, 145–56, 168,
176–77, 218, 248: acquired by Malcom
McLean, 145, 148–49; Challenger class
vessels, 86, 146–47; early history,
145–46; Econships, 149–55; inauguration of transatlantic container service,
86, 146; Lancer class vessels, 147; liquidation, 154–55; passenger services,
146, 147
United States Government:
—Air Force, 5

20, 25, 26, 28, 30–31, 76, 162
—legislation: Shipping Act of 1916, 168;
Jones Act of 1920, 11, 75, 78, 176, 178,
192, 193, 211, 214, 222, 224, 231, 249;
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 3–5, 75;
Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946, 4;
Staggers Rail Act of 1980, 165–66;
Shipping Act of 1984, 171, 190, 212
—Marine Corps, 110: Second Marine Expeditionary Force, 253
—Maritime Administration, 70, 93–94,
99, 157, 180–81, 199–200, 211, 213,
253: Ready Reserve Force, 253
—Maritime Commission, 3, 5–6, 16, 19,
26–27, 32, 86, 93, 148, 210
—Maritime Security Program, 199–203,
207, 213
—Navy, 3, 121, 137: Military Sealift Command, 200; Military Sea Transport
Service, 22, 107
—Office of Defense Mobilization, 27
—Shipping Board, 2–3, 15, 50, 146
—Supreme Court, 148
—White House, 165
United States Ship Management, Inc.,

—Army: American Expeditionary Forces,

200
University of Delft, 242

2, 49; Army Air Corps, 51; Army Corps

U.S. Virgin Islands, 193

of Engineers, 48, 123; First Logistical
Command, 107; Quartermaster Corps,

V class (Evergreen), 216

49–50

Valdez, Alaska, 28
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Vancouver, Wash., 93, 100
Venezuela Federation of Port Workers,

Waterman Steamship Co., 14–19, 24–25,
52, 76, 93, 97–98, 176

71–72
Venezuela Line, 72

Waterman Steamship Co. of Puerto Rico,
72–73, 97

Verrazano-Narrows Bridge, 123, 152, 171

Weehawkeen, N.J., 56

Via Port of New York (periodical), 70
Vicksburg, Miss., 123

Welland Canal, 185
Weyerhauser Steamship Co., 52

Victory ships, 6–8
Viet Cong, 107, 110–11

White Star Line, 105
White, Weld, and Co., Inc., 24

Vietnam; Vietnam War, 106–11

Willamette Iron and Steel, 69, 220

Virginia Inland Port, 186
Virgin Islands. See U.S. Virgin Islands

Wilmington, Del., 130, 185, 238, 253
Wilmington, N.C., 26, 253

Vito Corleone (fictional character), 42
V.J. Day, 51, 56, 64

Wobblies. See International Workers of
the World
World Trade Center (New York), 152

Wallenius Lines, 102
Wall Street Journal, 150

World War I, 2, 47, 49, 51, 54
World War II, x, 6–8, 16, 44–45, 51, 207

Wal-Mart stores, 234–35
Walsh, Cornelius S., 98

Wriston, Walter, 25–26

Walsh, Edward P., 98

Xavier Labor School (New York), 65

Walter Kiddie and Co., 147, 154
Ward Line, 2, 25

Yangming Line, 174

Wars. See individual wars by name
Washington, D.C., 185

Yokohama, Japan, 109
Yom Kipper War, 136

Washington Heights (New York), 56

Yokohama, Japan, 124

Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 67

Yoo, C. G., 151

Waterman, John Barnet, 14
Waterman Airlines, 15

Zeebrugge, Belgium, 105
Zumwalt, Elmo, 157
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vessel index
Roman numerals after multiple vessels with the same name merely distinguish those
vessels that are mentioned in the text; not all vessels with that name that may have
operated for a given company over its full history. In addition, page numbers shown in
bold face indicate photographs.
Active, 299n22

Baltimore (I), 111

Albany, 21–22
Aleutian Developer, 75

Baltimore (II), 111
Baltimore Trader, 90

Algol, USNS, 253

Bessemer Victory, 16

Almena, 28–31, 239, 299n36

Bienville, 34, 73
Botany Bay, 103

Alva Cape, 301n4
American Alabama, 151

Brazil, x
Bremen (I), 128

American Astronaut, 186–87

Bremen (II), 88

American Georgia, 153

Bremen Express, 186–87
Bull Run, 111

Americana, 244

American Hawaii, 153
American Maine, 151
American Merchant, 146
American New Jersey, 151
American New York, 150–52, 186–87, 241
American North Carolina, 153
American Ohio, 153
American Racer, 86–87
American Ranger, 146
American Scout, 146
American Trader, 210
Amoco Virginia, 34
Anchorage (I), 84–85, 111
Anchorage (II), 111
Andrea Doria, 245
Antares, USNS, 253
APL China, 245
APL Japan, 214
APL Malaysia, 186–87
APL Singapore, 214
Atlantic Lady, 226

Californian, 220
Canton Victory, 16
Carib Queen, 22
Carpathia, 42, 301n1
Challenge, 3–4
Chenango, USS, 305n15
Chicago, 100, 111, 144–45
Clifford J. Rogers, 306n35
CMA CGM Potomac, 186–87
Coalanga Hills, 30–32
Colombo Express, 241
Columbia, 81–82
CSX Navigator, 191
CSX Tacoma, 191
C.V. Lightening, 103
Denebola, USNS, 213
De Soto, 298n4
Detroit, 113, 115
Donald McKay, 3–4

Atlantic Span, 101–2
Austral Envoy, 209
Azalea City, 35–36, 73

El Estero, 298n5
Elizabethport, 77–79, 93, 117, 138, 144–45

El Valle, 15
Encounter Bay, 103–4

Hawaiian Progress, 222
Hawaiian Queen, 230

Esso New Orleans, 79
Esso Roanoke, 111

Holland, USS, 303n27
Horizon Anchorage, 315n16

Europa, 128

Horizon Pacific, 144–45

Ever Decent, 245
Ever Diamond, 216

Houston, 100
H.P. Baldwin, 132, 222

Everlite, 316n15
Ever Reward, 216
Ever Shine, 216

Ideal X, x–xi, 28–32, 34, 37, 39, 43, 47, 68,
80, 87, 90, 131, 144–45, 239, 251

Ever Spring, 216
Ever Summit, 216

Islander, 221

Ever Superb, 216
Ever Useful, 216

Jacksonville, 100

Ewa, 186–87
Examelia, 205, 297n13
Exxon Valdez, 245

Japan Bear, 210
Jervis Bay, 103
John J. Harvey, 318n15
Kauai, 25–6, 223, 225

Fairland, 73, 87–89, 90, 105, 110
Fairport, 79

Kofresi, 16

Feihe, 186–87

Land, 90
Lena Luckenbach, 76

Flinders Bay, 103
Floridian, 74–75, 84, 309n45

Leviathan, 44, 116

Frankfurt Express, 149

Liberte, ix, 34
Lihue, 205–6

Gateway City (I), 16

LST-970, USS, 21
LST-969, USS, 21

Gateway City (II), 32–37, 40, 47, 69, 70,
80, 89, 104, 144–45, 150, 182, 198
Golden Bear, 210
Gulflight, 90
Gulfmoon, 90

Lurline, 221, 223
Lusitania, 136
Maersk Kalamata, 188
Maersk Kobe, 188

Hamburg Express, 96, 241, 313n50

Maersk Kolkata, 188

Hanjin Marseilles, 186–87
Hanjin Osaka, 186–87

Mahimahi, 186–87
Manchester Challenger, 105

Hanjin Pennsylvania, 245
Harbel Cutlass, 186–87

Manukai, 222
Manuki, 225

Harold E. Holt, USS, 110

Manulani (I), 222

Hawaiian, 220
Hawaiian Citizen, 69, 186–87, 220

Manulani (II), 225
Marine Devil, 220

Hawaiian Enterprise, 222
Hawaiian Merchant, 68–69, 220

Marine Dragon, 220
Marine Snapper, 76

Hawaiian Monarch, 186–87, 220

Matsonia, 186–87, 221, 223

Hawaiian Princess, 221, 223

Maui, 223, 225
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Maunalei (I), 221
Maunalei (II), 225

Pan Gulf, 298n4

Maunawili (I), 222
Maunawili (II), 225

Pan Orleans, 298n4

Mauretania, 44, 136

Pan York, 15–16

Maxton, 30–32, 153
Mayaguez, 90, 109–11

Patrick Henry, 7

Mobile, 85, 306n33
MOL Encore, 186–87

Pioneer Glen, 146

Montebello, 186–87

Pioneer Star, 146

Mormacaltair, 306n37
Mormacarlo, 306n37

Pittsburgh, 111

Mormacdraco, 306n37
Mormaclynx, 306n37

President Adams, 212

Mormacrigel, 306n37

President Eisenhower (II), 211

Mormacvega, 306n37
Morro Castle, 62

President F.D. Roosevelt, 211

MSC Carla, 245
MSC Pamela, 241

President Grant (I), 208, 209

MSC Susanna, 241

President Hoover, 210

Nadina, 85
New Orleans, 85

President Johnson, 208

New York, 21–22
New Yorker, 74–75, 84, 309n45

President Kennedy (II), 211

Pan Kraft, 298n4
Pan Royal, 144–45

Petrolite, 111–12
Pioneer Mist, 146

Ponce, 89
President Eisenhower (I), 208

President Fillmore, 208
President Grant (II), 210
President Jackson, 211

Norasia Bellatrix, 245
Normandie, 123–24
North River Steamboat, x
Norwegian Dream, 245
Oakland, 108
Oceanic, 88

President Kennedy (I), 208
President Lincoln (I), 207
President Lincoln (II), 210
President McKinley, 208
President Monroe, 210
President Polk, 211
President Roosevelt, 208
President Taft, 208
President Truman (I), 208

Ocean Monarch, 88
Oduna, 85

President Truman (II), 211

Old Point Comfort, 22
OOCL Innovation, 173, 200

President Tyler (II), 210

OOCL Inspiration, 173, 200

President Tyler (I), 207
President Washington, 210

Oregon Standard, 112
Queen Elizabeth, 128
Pacific Banker, 222

Queen Elizabeth 2, 128

Pacific Trader, 222
Pan Atlantic (I), 298n4

Queen Frederica, 88

Pan Atlantic (II), 298n4

Queen Mary 2, 250–51

Pan Crescent, 16

Queen of Bermuda, 88

Queen Mary, 123, 124, 128, 250–51
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Regina Maersk, 242
Regulus, USNS, 144–45

Sea–Land Pride, 175
Sea–Land Producer, 133

R.J. Pfeiffer, 223–24

Sea–Land Reliance, 176
Sea–Land Resource, 253

Rose City, 111

Sea–Land Salvador, 182

Saint Louis, 100, 111, 144–45

Sea–Land Spirit, 176
Sea–Land Tacoma, 178

Rio Haina, 97

San Pedro, 111

Sea–Land Trade, 124
Sea–Land Value, 175

Santa Eliana, 70–72, 109

Sea–Land Voyager, 144–45

Santa Leonor, 72

Seatrain, 73–74
Seatrain New Orleans, 74

San Juan, 109

Santa Magdalena, 90
Saudi Hofuf, 205–6

Seattle (I), 84–85, 111
Seattle (II), 111

Sea, 90

S.T. Alexander, 132, 222

Sea–Land Commerce, 124, 144–45

Summit, 90
Suwanee, USS, 305n15

Saturnia, x, 36

Sealand Commitment, 200
Sea–Land Economy, 133
Sea–Land Endurance, 185
Sea–Land Exchange, 123, 253
Sea–Land Explorer, 144–45
Sea–Land Express; Sealand Express, 185,
246
Sea–Land Finance, 129, 144–45
Sea–Land Galloway, 121, 123, 128, 130,
144–45, 252
Sealand Illinois, 188
Sea–Land Mariner, 140
Sea–Land Market, 144–45
Sealand Michigan, 188

Taifuku Maru No. 2, 15
Takaosan Maru, 316n15
Tampa, 100
Tangier, USS, 113
Tatarrax, 305n15
Taurus, 22
Thames, 79
Thomas E. Cuffe, 210
Titanic, 42, 245
Tonsina, 85
Torrey Canyon, 245

Sea–Land Motivation, 175

United States, 116, 123, 124, 147, 152, 204,
253

Sea–Land McLean, 121, 123, 130, 150, 252

Utah, USS, 113

Sealand Oregon, 200
Sea–Land Pacific, 144–45
Sea–Land Patriot, 140
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White Falcon, 109
William J. Scott, 299n22

